Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000665
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50863/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

29th June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

CJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. E Waheed, counsel, instructed by Lisa’s Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr. M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal Judge (FtTJ) promulgated on 30 July 2025. By that decision, the FtTJ dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection claim made on 14 December 2020.
2. For the reasons set out below in paragraphs [64] – [70], this appeal is allowed and will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
Anonymity Order
3. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in this appeal because the appellant has made a claim for international protection. No party asked for this to be set aside and I consider it appropriate for that order to continue because the public interest in the UK’s compliance with its international obligations and in the confidentiality of the asylum system outweigh the public interest in open justice in this case.
Background
4. The appellant is a national of the People’s Republic of China. He claimed to be at risk of persecution/serious harm as a member of a particular social group (victims of loan sharks) on account of a debt owed to a money lender in China.
5. In summary, the appellant claims that in November 2012 he was playing poker in Yangzhou with a friend. The appellant states he did not know the group he was playing with was a loan shark group. When the appellant started losing he asked to borrow 200,000 RMB but the debt was eventually raised to 20,000,000 RMB in respect of which he was forced to sign an IOU under threat of having his arm amputated. He only knew the loan shark as “Ding”. The appellant fled to the city of Shandong and moved a few times there but was found via the loan shark’s connections.
6. The appellant left China and arrived in the United Kingdom on 21 January 2014 on a visitor visa. He claimed asylum on 14 December 2020 upon being detained. The initial screening interview took place the same day. The asylum interview was undertaken on 12 September 2023.
7. The appellant claimed at the time of his asylum interview that he had not had contact with his wife or son since November 2012. In his second statement dated 16 May 2025, the appellant claimed he received text messages from his son forwarding threatening messages received by his son from the loan shark. The text messages were translated into English and included in the bundle before FtT. The appellant stated that he lost the phone which had the IOU on it. The text messages were sent to the appellant’s previous phone but he saved the screen shots on his computer.
8. The appellant claims that he would not receive sufficient protection from the police in China as the loan sharks are too powerful.
First-tier Tribunal Decision
9. The FtTJ found at [13] that the appellant failed to establish that people in debt to money lenders constitute a particular social group. This was conceded on behalf of the appellant in submissions. Accordingly the FtTJ dismissed the appellant’s appeal on asylum grounds and went on to consider his appeal on humanitarian protection grounds.
10. At [14] the FtTJ found that Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 applied as the appellant had not claimed asylum before being detained and failed to provide a satisfactory reason for failing to do so other than saying he did not know how to do it. Consequently, he considered that Section 8 was engaged and that the appellant’s credibility was negatively affected thereby.
11. Having set out at [15] to [21] the matters relied on by the appellant to establish his claim the FtTJ finds at [22] that “the basis of this is plausible.” Whilst not specific as to what “this” is, it is presumed that it is, his indebtedness to and threats from the loan shark [17]; his flight to another city [18]; his knowing the loan shark only by a nickname [19] and the loss of documents evidencing the loan [20]. However, the FtTJ stated that he would need to consider that account holistically alongside the other evidence.
12. The FtTJ ultimately did not accept the credibility of the appellant’s account [29-30].
13. At [23-27] the FtTJ considered the appellant’s evidence regarding the text messages the appellant claims were forwarded by his son. The FtTJ stated that:
a. the appellant was unable to give any explanation as to how the appellant received the messages from his son;
b. the appellant was unable to locate any messages from his son on his phone
c. the appellant told the FtTJ that his son only had one phone [26]. He observed that the screenshots of the text messages show that the texts come from different phones and whilst a person may change phones over time it does not explain why the dates on the two phones overlap.
14. The FtTJ found the appellant to be evasive in his evidence about the text messages [27] as he was unable to provide any explanation of who he got the messages from; any evidence of receiving them; or any explanation as to how his son had made contact with him over a ten year gap. The FtTJ concluded that the text messages were fabricated to enhance his claim.
15. The FtTJ stated at [28] that the appellant was unable to name the location at which he was gambling or how the loan shark obtained his son’s number. He stated that he appellant was unable to give the name of the loan shark. The FtTJ stated he found it hard to believe the appellant only seemed to believe his house belonged to him but accepted that current ownership was likely to have become more complicated since his departure.
16. At [29] the FtTJ found that the appellant was not an honest witness having weighed what he considered to be gaps in the evidence, the text messages he found to be fabricated and the evasiveness of the appellant.
17. Having determined that the appellant’s claim was not credible, the FtTJ did not go on to consider whether the appellant could obtain sufficient protection or relocate internally and dismissed the appellant’s appeal on humanitarian grounds.
Grounds of Appeal
18. The grounds of appeal challenged the FtTJ’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility and can be summarised as follows:
a. The FtTJ erred in his approach to Section 8 Immigration and Asylum (Treatment of Claimants) Act in that:
i. He took Section 8 as the starting point for the assessment of credibility failing to consider the evidence in the round; contrary to SM (Section 8: Judge’s process) Iran [2005] UKAIT 00116
ii. The FtTJ failed to provide any reasons for finding that the appellant did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay in claiming asylum

b. The FtTJ made a material error of fact in finding that the appellant:
i. Was unable to give the name of the location he was gambling
ii. Was unable to give the name of the loan shark

c. The FtTJ made adverse findings not open to him to make in respect of : -
i. The appellant being unable to say how the loan sharks obtained his son’s number
ii. Failing to be open to the conclusion that whilst one of the phones used to send the text messages did in fact belong to his son even if he concluded the other did not.
19. The grant of permission to appeal was unrestricted.
The Hearing
20. I had before me a composite bundle consisting of 107 pages; the respondent’s Rule 24 response and the appellant’s Rule 15 A response and skeleton argument referring to a Rule 25 response filed at the same time. This included a transcript of the FtT proceedings which proved crucial.
21. I heard submissions from Mr. Waheed and then from Mr Parvar. I have taken their submissions into account in making my decision, but I do not rehearse them here. I will refer in the discussion below to the aspects of those submissions I consider to be material.
Discussion and Findings
22. In considering whether the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I have reminded myself of the principles of appellate restraint set out in Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 [2-4] and Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 [26]. I note in particular the following from Ullah:
(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];

(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
23. I had regard to the, Senior President of Tribunals Practice Direction: Reasons for Decisions 4 June 2024 and in particular paragraphs 5 and 6 and also to R, G, and H (Return Home Under Supervision Order ) [2026] EWCA civ 713 citing Re B (A Child) (Adequacy of Reasons) [2022] EWCA Civ 407.
24. As the focus of the appellant’s challenge is to the FtTJ’s credibility assessment, I had regard to the principles governing the assessment of credibility well-established by a long line of authorities: MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216, SB (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA 160 and KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC).
25. I took account of ASO v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1282 endorsing the approach to materiality espoused by Sales LJ in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AJ (Angola) and AJ (Gambia) [2014] EWCA Civ 1636 at [49].
26. As I have found Grounds 2 and 3 to raise overlapping issues, I have found it convenient to set out my findings in relation to both in the conclusion section.
Ground 1: Section 8 Immigration and Asylum (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004
Whether the FtTJ erred in his approach to Section 8
27. Mr. Waheed submitted that it is clear from the structure of the decision, with Section 8 addressed prior to the substantive discussion on the appellant’s claim, that the FtTJ took Section 8 as the starting point for the assessment of the appellant’s credibility. Approaching Section 8 in this way, he argued, tainted the overall credibility assessment and is contrary to SM. In SM the UT explicitly rejected the use of Section 8 as the starting point of credibility assessment, reaffirming the basic principle that evidence must be considered in the round.
28. Mr. Parvar relied on the respondent’s Rule 24 response. He submitted that there is no bar to the FtTJ taking note of Section 8 factors at the outset of the decision so long as it is clear the judge considered the evidence as a whole. Mr. Parvar submitted that the FtTJ explicitly states at [22] that he had considered the case holistically. He submitted that it is clear that the Section 8 finding did not dispose of the credibility issue as the FtTJ went on to consider specific issues within the appellant’s narrative demonstrating that the FtTJ did in fact undertake a holistic credibility assessment. He submitted there is therefore no error of law.
29. The Senior President of Tribunals Practice Direction: Reasons for Decisions 4 June 2024 does not prescribe any particular structure to be followed in setting out the reasons for a tribunal decision. What the Practice Direction does require is that the reasons “must always be adequate, clear, appropriately concise and focused on the principal controversial issues on which the outcome of the case has turned” and “must always enable an appellate body to understand why the decision was reached, so that it is able to assess whether the decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.”
30. In R, G, and H (Return Home Under Supervision Order ) [2026] EWCA civ 713, at [30] Baker LJ refers to the observations of Jackson LJ in Re B (A Child) (Adequacy of Reasons) [2022] EWCA Civ 407 stating:
…Peter Jackson LJ, whilst emphasising the crucial importance of every judgment having a structure, was at pains to acknowledge that judgments “reflect the thinking of the individual judge and there is no room for dogma”. I would add that all judges develop their own style in writing judgments – some more “unconventional”, even “idiosyncratic” – and it is no business of this Court to be prescriptive about how they go about it, provided the end result meets the requirements …
31. Applying R, G, and H to the present context, the requirement to be met is the consideration of the evidence in the round rather than using Section 8 as the starting point. In my judgment, therefore, the fact that the FtTJ set out Section 8 at the start of the decision does not necessarily of itself demonstrate that the FtTJ considered Section 8 as a starting point. The decision needs to be considered holistically.
32. On one hand, the FtTJ’s expressed openness to the plausibility of the appellant’s account at [22], after dealing with Section 8, points away from this being the FtTJ’s starting point.
33. On the other hand, however, as will be seen, the problematic treatment of the appellant’s evidence suggests that the FtTJ’s Section 8 determination at the outset may have tainted his view of the appellant’s evidence and I am not confident that he did not therefore use Section 8 as the starting point in assessing the appellant’s credibility.
Failure to give reasons
34. Mr. Waheed submitted firstly that FtTJ’s wording in [14] is ambiguous. He argued that the FtTJ’s phrasing “No satisfactory explanation has been provided for this delay other than (my emphasis) “I did not know how to do it” suggests that the FtTJ considered that an appellant not knowing how to claim asylum could be a legitimate reason to explain a delay but the FtTJ did not then explain why it was not a satisfactory explanation from this appellant.
35. Mr. Parvar submitted that it is clear that the FtTJ considered the appellant’s explanation for delay but gave it little weight, weight being a matter for the judge. Mr. Parvar averred that given the appellant had delayed claiming asylum for 6 years, it was not unreasonable for the FtTJ to expect a more detailed explanation for that delay.
36. I have considered the following exchange between Mr. Waheed and the FtTJ during Mr. Waheed’s submissions on the appellant’s explanation for the delay in claiming asylum at pages 25-26 of the transcript:
MR. WAHEED……Imagine if someone such as ourselves would – would be in China with the unfamiliar script for language and the unfamiliar culture, how would one apply for asylum there when one cannot make oneself understood? The appellant does not speak English. The appellant, however, achieved his aim of being away from those whom he feared by simply overstaying and not being returned. It is only when he was advised that he could do so when out – when detained by police here that he did claim for asylum.

JUDGE WRIGHT: I mean, that – that argument would have more weight were he living in a – a vacuum but the - the claimant’s – the appellant’s evidence is that he was attending a – a church regularly during this period. So what – what do you say there? Because surely people who – if you are saying that he had no idea what to do, but he was around people who could support him?

MR WAHEED: The Secretary of State does not make anything of that. The Secretary of State is aware of that in – in her – in the evidence that the appellant presented in his initial bundle to her. And the Secretary of State in her review of – does not think that is a point of – that she ought to raise to the appellant and hence, the Secretary of State has not put that to the appellant.

JUDGE WRIGHT: Yes.

MR WAHEED: As part of her case. Had she done so then the appellant would have had – have been afforded the opportunity to address that if it is material but the Secretary of State does not think it is material and does not wish to trouble the Tribunal with that point and the appellant invites the Tribunal not to be so troubled.
36. This exchange suggests that the FtTJ did consider that the substance of the appellant’s explanation for the delay in claiming asylum might, in some circumstances, amount to a reasonable excuse. However, when Mr Waheed pointed out that the matters raised by the FtTJ had not been put by the respondent to the appellant in evidence, the FtTJ did not pursue the issue further, for example by recalling the appellant.
37. It is a fundamental principle of procedural fairness that if the evidence of a witness is not to be accepted, the witness must be afforded the opportunity in evidence to address that challenge, Tui UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48; Abdi v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1455.
38. At [14] the FtTJ gives no reasons for concluding that the appellant’s explanation was not reasonable. In light of the exchange set out above, and absent any reasoning, I am not confident that the FtTJ, in rejecting the explanation, did not take into account matters raised in submissions to which the appellant had no opportunity to respond.
39. I find therefore that the FtTJ’s decision contravened the Senior President’s Practice Direction in that I am from unable to understand whether his finding in relation to Section 8 involved an error of law.
40. Accordingly, I find that the FtT erred in failing to provide reasons for rejecting the appellant’s explanation for the delay in claiming asylum.
Ground 2: Material Error of Fact
Gambling location
41. The grounds of appeal advanced that the FtTJ was clearly wrong in finding at [28] that the appellant was unable to name the location where he gambled. The appellant said in his asylum interview at questions 22 and 23 that he was in the city of Yangzhou and the place was near the railway station.
42. Mr. Waheed referred to the transcript at pages 13-14 where it was put to the appellant that he did not know the name of the gambling centre. The appellant does go on to say it was the “Danta” gambling centre which does not appear in either the asylum interview or his statement but no point was taken on this by the respondent.
43. The FtTJ in any event, it was argued, refers to the appellant’s inability to name the location rather than the name of the gambling centre. Mr. Waheed submitted that it is not safe to infer that the FtTJ meant “centre” rather than “location” and the lack of specificity in his reasoning fails to meet the requirement for anxious scrutiny in protection cases.
44. Mr. Parvar accepted that in his interview the appellant names the city in which he was gambling and at question 38 states he does not know the name of the gambling centre. He further accepted that the focus in cross-examination at the FtT was on the name of the centre and not the location. Mr. Parvar submitted that if the accepted lack of clarity in the decision on this issue amounted to an error of law, it is not material to the ultimate decision.
45. There is no dispute that in his asylum interview the appellant names the city in which he was gambling and the approximate location of the space where the gambling took place. In the appellant’s witness statement dated 5 September 2024, the appellant also states that the gambling took place in Yangzhou by the railway station.
46. I note from the transcript that Mr. Waheed’s submissions on this point focussed on the cross-examination around the name of the gambling centre and did not refer back to the appellant’s account in interview or his witness statement.
47. The FtTJ does not, in his decision, refer to the appellant’s evidence of the gambling location (ie Yangzhou City) given in both his asylum interview or statement. Given the ambiguity of FtTJ’s language, I cannot be confident that he took this evidence into account.
Name of the loan shark
48. Mr. Waheed submitted that the FtTJ is clearly wrong in stating at [28] that the appellant was unable to give the name of the loan shark. In his SEF the appellant stated that he only knew the surname of the loan shark as Ding and in his statement dated 5 September 2024 he states the loan shark did not disclose his full name, he was only known as ‘Ding’ or ‘Older Brother’.
49. With the benefit of the transcript, Mr. Waheed was able to identify that the FtTJ’s reference to the appellant only knowing the ‘nickname’ of the appellant at [19] was introduced by Mr. Waheed in his submissions. The appellant was not asked about the name of the loan shark in his evidence.
50. Mr. Parvar submitted that it can be inferred from the transcript that the FtTJ meant that the appellant was unable to give the loan shark’s full name, accepting the respondent’s submissions in those terms.
51. In his decision the FtTJ again does not refer to the appellant’s evidence about the loan shark’s name in his SEF or statement. Again, as the only reference to the name in the decision was that erroneously given by Mr. Waheed, I cannot be confident that the FtTJ took into account the appellant’s evidence in his SEF and witness statement.
52. Ground 3: Findings not open to the FtTJ
How the loan shark got the appellant’s son’s number
53. Mr. Waheed argued that the FtTJ erred in placing weight on the appellant’s inability to say how the loan shark obtained his son’s telephone number. He submitted that this was not a matter reasonably within the knowledge of the appellant and he could therefore not be expected to provide that information.
54. Responding to the Rule 24 submission on this issue, that is, that there was a lack of enquiry on the part of the appellant; Mr. Waheed argued that rationale is not contained in the decision and it would be wrong to read into the determination what was not said in the decision or in evidence.
55. This matter was put to the appellant in cross-examination:
Q: My question is, who told your son’s mobile number to the loan sharks?
A. Regarding this questioning, I am not sure. They knew all of my things. I do not know how they knew it.
56. Mr. Parvar submitted that the appellant’s inability to say how the loan shark found his son’s number is one of a number of gaps in the evidence in the appellant’s account of the messages he said his son sent to him set out by the FtTJ at [27]. Mr. Parvar submitted that it was open to the judge to infer that the appellant should have been able to provide more details about how the loan shark got his number.
57. It is arguable that the matter of how that loan shark would have got the appellant’s son’s number may be outside the knowledge of the appellant (and his son). It is also right the appellant was not questioned about the enquiries he made of his son with respect to this. It is further acknowledged that the FtTJ did not provide a specific rationale for rejecting the appellant’s evidence on this point.
58. However, it is also right that this is not the only gap in the appellant’s evidence relating to the text messages. The appellant has not challenged the factors the FtTJ set out at [27] informing the FtTJ’s finding that the text messages were fabricated, namely, his inability to provide a detailed explanation of how he got them, evidence of receiving them, and/or credible explanation of how his son made contact with him after 10 years.
59. Thus, even were I too find an error on this point, which I do not consider necessary given my conclusion, on it’s own, it would plainly not be material to the outcome of the decision. The more significant issue arising from the phone evidence, in my judgment, is dealt with below.
The son’s phone(s)
60. Mr. Waheed initially argued that it was open to the judge to find that one of the two text messages relied upon by the appellant came from the appellant’s son’s phone even if he found the other did not.
61. I explored this submission with Mr. Waheed, as in my judgement, that argument undermined the appellant’s credibility as it had been the appellant’s evidence that both of the messages were sent via his son. Mr. Waheed submitted that if the appellant had been given the benefit of the doubt properly throughout the hearing, that would have extended to the apparent inconsistencies with respect to the phones.
62. However, when we looked together at the transcript, it became clear that the judge had erred in stating at [26] that the appellant said his son had one phone [16]. In fact what was asked of the appellant in evidence is whether his son had the same phone in 2014 to which the appellant replied “I don’t know.”
63. Mr. Parvar accepted that the FtTJ did make a mistake of fact on this issue. However, he maintained that the crux of the issue is that the appellant failed to satisfactorily explain how he re-established contact with his son. Therefore his error in recording the appellant’s evidence is immaterial and the wider finding that the appellant failed to provide a detailed explanation is safe.
64. It is clear to me that the FtTJ’s factual error regarding the appellant’s evidence as to the number of phones his son had was a factor in finding that the text messages were fabricated which in turn was a factor in the FtTJ’s adverse credibility finding.
Conclusion
65. Drawing the threads together from the discussion above on Grounds 2 and 3, I find:
a. Gambling location
i. The FtTJ was either wrong in stating that the appellant was unable to name the gambling location and failed to take into account to his evidence in in SEF and statement; or
ii. The FtTJ was insufficiently clear as to what he meant by the “location” at which he was gambling
iii. If the FtTJ meant “gambling centre” rather than geographical location, the FtTJ failed to provide reasons for rejecting the appellant’s evidence as to the geographical location as sufficient

b. Name of loan shark
i. The FtTJ wrongly stated that the appellant told him he only knew the loan shark by a nickname
ii. The FtTJ was either wrong to state the appellant was unable to name the loan shark and failed to take into account the appellant’s evidence in his SEF and witness statement; or
iii. The FtTJ was insufficiently clear as what the FtTJ meant with respect to “naming” the loan shark
iv. If the FtTJ meant that the appellant was unable to give the full name of the loan shark, the FtTJ failed to provide reasons as to why he rejected the appellant’s evidence as insufficient or implausible; particularly as he appears to find at [19] that it was plausible that the appellant only knew the loan shark by a nickname

c. Phones/Messages
i. The FtTJ wrongly stated that the appellant said his son only had one phone.
66. In ML (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA 844 it was held that a series of material factual errors can constitute an error of law. Any doubt as to the materiality of the error of fact is to be resolved in favour of the individual complaining of it [16]. Moses LJ said at [10]:
It is surely trite, but in any event we have the recent decision of the second section of the European Court of Human Rights as authority if authority is needed, that everyone, however poor their case, is entitled to a fair hearing. As part of that fair hearing, the finders of fact must listen to and take into account conscientiously the arguments that are deployed in favour of a finding that the claimant is telling the truth as well as those arguments against. It surely needs no further authority, and certainly no words of mine can achieve anything like the force of those words such as Megarry J in John v Rees [1970] Ch 345 as to the importance of conscientiously listening to the arguments rather than regarding the conclusion as open and shut.
67. The matters in [28] of the FtTJ decision, to which errors summarised at [62] above relate are clearly central to his determination at [29] that the appellant was not an honest witness and were therefore material to the outcome.
68. These errors are compounded by the failure of the FtTJ to provide adequate reasons in his determination on Section 8. Further, when looked at in the round with the mistakes the FtTJ made, the argument that FtTJ viewed the appellant’s evidence through the lens of an adverse Section 8 finding, gains strength.
69. Together, I find these errors demonstrate that the FtTJ did not consider the appellant’s appeal with the anxious scrutiny demanded in protection claims.
70. I therefore find that the decision involved a material error of law.
Disposal
71. The error of the law is such that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside pursuant to section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
72. I considered whether any findings of fact should be preserved, bearing in mind the principles set out in AB (preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 268 (IAC). However, I determined that the nature of the error of law was so significant that it infected the judge’s approach to the evidence and therefore preserve no findings.
73. Mr. Waheed and Mr. Parvar were in agreement that the case should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal were I to find an error of law arising from the assessment of the appellant’s credibility. Taking those submissions into account and applying the principles set out in the Practice Direction, according to the guidance given in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), I consider it appropriate to remit the decision to the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant has not yet had a fair hearing of his appeal and ought not to be unfairly deprived of the two-tier decision making structure.
Notice of Decision
74. The decision of the First-tier involves an error of law and is set aside. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier to be heard de novo with no findings preserved.

M Walsh

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 June 2026