UI-2026-000679 & UI-2026-000740

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 07 Sep 2026
• Promulgation date: 09 Oct 2026
• Publication date: 29 Oct 2026
• Last updated on: 29 Oct 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000679
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/62693/2024
Case No: UI-2026-000740
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67273/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

9th October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON

Between

VO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 September 2026

­Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. In a decision dated 5 August 2026 (annexed to this decision), I found an error of law in the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Marenah promulgated on 15 October 2025 in relation to Article 8 matters only, in which the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decisions to refuse his protection claim dated 17 June 2024 and refuse his human rights claim dated 18 September 2024 were dismissed. No error of law was found in relation to the First-tier Tribunal’s findings on either the Appellant’s protection claim or his human rights claim under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and those findings, contained in paragraphs 46 to 64 of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision are preserved and not repeated further within this decision. This is the re-making of the Appellant’s appeal on Article 8 grounds only.
2. I do not repeat the Appellant’s background and immigration history, set out more fully in paragraphs two to fourteen of the error of law decision annexed, save where directly relevant to the remaining issues in relation to Article 8 for ease.
The appeal
Respondent’s decision
3. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s human rights application in a decision dated 18 September 2024 for the following reasons. First, the Appellant had no established family life in the United Kingdom and could not satisfy the requirements of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules. Secondly, he did not meet the requirements of Appendix Private Life to the Immigration Rules on both suitability and eligibility grounds. In relation to suitability, by reference to the Appellant’s conviction for destroying or damaging property and battery, the Respondent decided that his presence was not conducive to the public good. However, at the date of hearing before me, the Respondent no longer relied on this ground for refusal and as such, I do not set out in any detail the evidence in relation to the Appellant’s offences in early 2023, on which there is medical evidence as to his poor mental health at that time and from his Probation Officer with the view that the Appellant poses a low risk of reoffending which would only increase if his mental health deteriorates or he experiences further significant life trauma.
4. In relation to eligibility, the Appellant had not lived in the United Kingdom for the required 20 years and there would be no very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Nigeria, a county where he had resided for his formative years and where he retains knowledge of life, language and culture and where his parents and extended family members still reside. The Appellant had also returned to Nigeria in 2015 and 2017 to visit family. Thirdly there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant a grant of leave to remain outside of the Immigration Rules. The Respondent had separately considered the Appellant’s mental health in the context of Article 3, considering that although he was a ‘seriously ill person’, mental health treatment would be available and accessible to him in Nigeria as required and removal would not lead to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy.
Legal Framework
5. In relation to Article 8, the relevant provision in the Immigration Rules was, at that the relevant time of this decision under appeal, that contained in Appendix Private Life which refers to an applicant who has lived in the United Kingdom for less than 20 years and “there would be very significant obstacles to their integration in the country of return”. Integration was explained in Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813 as follows:
“14. In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal’s ‘integration’ into the country to which it is proposed that he would be deported … is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal to simply direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of ‘integration’ calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life.”
6. The very significant obstacles requirement was considered by the Court of Appeal in Parveen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932, who in paragraph 9 held:
“9. … It is fair enough to observe that the words “very significant” connote an “elevated” threshold, and I have no difficulty with the observation that the test will not be met by “mere inconvenience or upheaval”. But I am not sure that saying that “mere” hardship or difficulty or hurdles, even if multiplied, will not “generally” suffice adds anything of substance. The task of the Secretary of State, or the Tribunal, in any given case is simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether they regard them as “very significant”.”
7. Outside of the Immigration Rules, when considering an individual’s right to respect for private and family life in accordance with Article 8, then the usual step-by-step approach set out in Razgar [2004] UKHL 27, applies as follows:
(i) Will the proposed removal be an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicant’s right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) family life?
(ii) If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially to engage the operation of Article 8?
(iii) If so, is such interference in accordance with the law?
(iv) If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others?
(v) If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public ends sought to be achieved?
8. When assessing the public interest in removal, I am required to take into account the factors in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Those include that the maintenance of immigration control is in the public interest and that little weight is to be attached to private life established at a time when either the person’s immigration status was precarious or when a person is here unlawfully. The other factors, in relation to English language and financial independence are neutral in the present case where the Appellant speaks English, has financially supported himself in the past and there is no reason to think he would not do so through employment in the future.
9. As to the question of whether there is family life between adult siblings under Article 8(1), the Court of Appeal set out the test in IA & others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 as follows:
116. We are clearly of the view that the correct test is the one enunciated by the ECtHR in Kumari at [35] and by the House of Lords in Beoku-Betts at [39]. Bearing in mind the huge amount of authority cited and summarised at [42]-[84] above, we should perhaps, despite the common ground between the parties, explain that conclusion in a little further detail.
117. First, this is an area in which the domestic courts have universally demonstrated their willingness to follow the consistent jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Even if some of the domestic decisions may have provided divergent interpretations of the additional elements of dependency test, none has suggested that they wanted to depart from ECtHR jurisprudence.
118. Secondly, many of the cases, both ECtHR and domestic, actually concern family life between parents and adult children, rather than between adult siblings. No case has suggested that the legal test is different in the two types of case.
119. Thirdly, all the cases make clear that the exercise of deciding whether there are the necessary additional elements of dependence involving more than the normal emotional ties is a fact-sensitive exercise that is to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
120. Fourthly, financial dependency and dependency created by physical or mental disability both play a part in the evaluation. It is not, however, necessary to show that one sibling is completely reliant on their care and support in their daily life. In other words, none of the cases go so far as to require exclusive or complete dependency.
121. All these points are, in our judgment, pretty well self-explanatory from our summary of the cases at [42]-[84] above. But there are two points that merit a little more explanation: (a) the meaning and function of what we have described as the "real, committed or effective support" test taken from Sedley LJ's judgment in Kugathas at [17], and (b) why exclusive or complete dependency is not required.
122. The real, committed or effective support test is, in our judgment, as we have already intimated at [68], on a proper analysis different from the additional elements of dependency test. Dependency may in one sense be the other side of the support coin. But "real support" may be provided without any serious dependency. Even "effective support" might be provided without there being meaningful dependency. As Sedley LJ himself acknowledged in Kugathas, the real, committed and effective support test was a reading down of the additional elements of dependency test. The FTT said the same at [25] where it acknowledged that the sponsor's real, committed and effective support of family was short of the family being dependent on the sponsor.
123. In our judgment, it would be going too far to say that it is wrong to test whether there are additional elements of dependency by reference to the real, committed or effective support provided. But real, committed and effective support is not the test itself, because the level of real support, for example, may be minor or insignificant, whereas the word "dependency" denotes a significant relationship. This is not a semantic point. The ECtHR used the word "dependence" in S v. UK in the context of "cohabiting dependents", which were its starting point (see [42] above).
124. The domestic cases (e.g. PT Sri Lanka at [30]) were not wrong, for example, to point out that a cohabiting child would not necessarily lose their family life with its parents or even their siblings on their 18th birthday. But that is because the relationship of dependence would subsist at that point.
125. In our judgment, it is undesirable to lay down hard and fast rules as to how the additional elements of dependency test should be applied. It obviously requires some dependence, and dependence is more than the existence of support, even if that support is qualified by the adjectives real, committed or effective. Kumari makes clear that it is harder for adults to demonstrate the necessary dependency because family life is normally limited to the core cohabiting family. The examples in Kumari at [38]-[39] (see [50] above) make clear the kinds of physical or mental dependency that might qualify. They are not exhaustive, and dependency may take many forms, as Kumari at [37] and [41]-[43] also reminds us. So far as exclusive dependency is concerned, on the particular facts of that case, Alvarado made clear that it was not always required to establish family life. Moreover, whilst one person being completely dependent on another might normally satisfy the additional elements of dependency test, it is not the only way that the test can be satisfied as the cases we have cited demonstrate.
Witness evidence
10. The Appellant has submitted witness statements dated 18 July 2024, 15 July 2026 and 5 August 2026. Within those statements and summarised in his skeleton arguments, the Appellant sets out his background and immigration history. He first arrived in the United Kingdom with leave to enter as a student on 25 September 2009 and has resided in the United Kingdom since, with two visits to Nigeria, one for two weeks in 2015 and one for two to three weeks in 2017. Shortly after the expiry of his student visa on 15 October 2013, the Appellant sought and was granted an EEA Residence Card as the spouse of a Dutch national, valid to 6 January 2019. His marriage broke down and he has been seeking to regularise his immigration status since then. The Appellant had a psychotic episode in early 2023 following a decline in his mental health and was in hospital, detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 between 3 March 2023 and 7 April 2023.
11. The Appellant has a BA (Hons) in Economics from the London Metropolitan University (awarded 2013) and a MSc in Entrepreneurship from the University of Durham (awarded 2017). He has worked on the London Underground and for Network Rail and has recently been offered a full-time position as an Assistant Site Manager with Lawtech (which he was unable to take up as his permission to work in the United Kingdom did not extend to the role offered).
12. The Appellant is a practising Catholic and active member of his local Church community. He has a number of health conditions, including secondary hypothyroidism, hyperphospatemia, hypercholesterolemia and hypertriblyceridemia; as well as mental health problems and an episode of psychosis.
13. In his last statement, the Appellant states that he attended his final psychiatric review with Newham Early Intervention Service, in which it was recorded that he had engaged well with psychosocial interventions, had good insight, did not present with any current risk and was not actively psychotic. The Appellant relies on the reports from this to show that he has been successfully treated and rehabilitated. He also refers to a recent employment offer and efforts to obtain permission to work to take up that employment.
14. The Appellant attended the oral hearing and gave evidence in English after adopting his written statements. He confirmed that his parents were fit and well and lived in Nigeria, where he also had a number of extended family members in different areas. The Appellant’s parent’s house had four bedrooms and the only other person living there was sometimes his younger sister when not at university. The Appellant is in touch with his parents every day and he would stay with them if returned as he has nowhere else to go. He last visited Nigeria in 2017 for his sister’s wedding and she has returned twice since moving to the United Kingdom in 2021. The Appellant does not have contact with any friends in Nigeria and would not be able to re-establish any old friendships after such a long time, as people would have changed.
15. When asked about employment in Nigeria, the Appellant stated that he would not have things like the internet at his parent’s house to find a job and no means to pursue employment, which takes more than his education and experience in the United Kingdom and is in the context of high unemployment in Nigeria. He would not have the resources to create employment for himself. Just the flights home would take up most of the voluntary assistance money from the Home Office to return so he could not use this to help re-establish himself. The Appellant left Nigeria aged 20 and has never worked there.
16. The Appellant is not currently on any regular medication and has not taken any for some time. He voluntarily attends talking therapy that he can have walk-in access to. He would not be able to know where to start to find a therapist in Nigeria or how far away one may be, compared to his current group being only a five minute walk away. The Appellant would be physically able to travel to seek treatment if he had the resources.
17. If returned to Nigeria, the Appellant stated that he struggles to know what he would do or what would happen to him. He has considered this question many times with his therapist and can set out many plans for his future in the United Kingdom, but he does not have those in Nigeria. When asked if he could identify the risk of relapse of his mental health if returned, the Appellant stated that he did not come to the United Kingdom to be dependent on others, he had a plan for education and a life here but has spent a long time in limbo and not being able to work; so he feels like his life has been in limbo and he has been stopped from progressing. He doesn’t want anything else to hold him back.
18. In the United Kingdom, the Appellant is in frequent contact with his sister and visits her to stay once or twice a month. She does not really provide him with any financial support, she is still paying off the debt from his legal fees in the First-tier Tribunal and supports other family members. She will sometimes pay for his train ticket to visit. The relationship between the Appellant and his sister is one of mutual support.
19. At the end of his oral evidence, the Appellant explained that he had found it really hard to express himself and to cover everything that he wanted to say. He was concerned that the Respondent had focused too much on the period of his life in early 2023 and not properly considered the much longer period of his life in the United Kingdom since 2009 and more recently, his connections here and that his life was more than just a relatively short period of mental illness.
20. Mrs Jennifer Ogbuja-Ndukwo, the Appellant’s sister, made written statements in support of the appeal dated 16 September 2025 and 14 August 2026. In those statements, she describes financial difficulties in Nigeria in 2017 and becoming the main financial support for her own family (including her husband and later two children), her parents and her younger sister, who had all previously been supported by the Appellant. Mrs Ogbuja-Ndukwo states that she became aware of the Appellant’s situation worsening and had an increased awareness of mental health and attitudes towards it in Nigeria in around 2020, including from her own experiences and those of her husband, as well as the Appellant. She relocated to the United Kingdom for work and to support the Appellant in November 2021.
21. Mrs Ogbuja-Ndukwo is worried that if the Appellant were returned to Nigeria, he would have no meaningful support system there and there would be a risk to his health and well-being as she is his only sources of emotional and financial support. The Appellant’s parents are in their late sixties, retired and live on his father’s pension and financial support from Mrs Ogbuja-Ndukwo. Their younger sister has only just completed university and is not yet financially independent either, so she is also financially supported by Mrs Ogbuja-Ndukwo. The family in Nigeria would not be able to provide the combination of support that the Appellant has in the United Kingdom, for accommodation, financial stability, mental health understanding or day-to-day encouragement.
22. The Appellant’s parents struggled initially to understand the Appellant’s mental health problems and the family had only limited understanding of serious mental illness. Mrs Ogbuja-Ndukwo tried to explain this to them and that the Appellant needed medical help.
23. Mrs Ogbuja-Ndukwo has supported the Appellant since his hospital admission in early 2023, both emotionally and to help him understand his legal and medical processes. She has also updated their parents about his progress and given him some financial support when she could. In particular, she paid for his previous legal representation.
24. The Appellant and his sister have a mutually supportive relationship and he visits her and her family in Peterborough from London, helping with practical things whilst there and he has a close relationship with her children. The Appellant encourages his sister about work and family responsibilities, gives advice and helps out generally. She has provided him with direct support and practical help, including providing meals, emotional support, financial support and a safe family environment.
25. Mrs Ogbuja-Ndukwo attended the oral hearing, adopted her written statements and gave evidence in English. She stated that she sent a variable amount of money to her parents each month in Nigeria depending on what they needed, but as a minimum it would be between 1.8 and 2 million Naira a month (the higher amount being roughly £1118 at the date of hearing). This amount was a struggle already to keep up with and she could not additional financially support the Appellant if he retuned to Nigeria. Mrs Ogbuja-Ndukwo did not think he would be able to find a job in Nigeria, the economy was bad before she left and her husband lost his job in 2017 and was not able to find another before they left in 2021, even with his qualifications and experience there.
26. When asked if the Appellant could stay with his parents on return, Mrs Ogbuja-Ndukwo stated that he would not have any mental health understanding or support in Nigeria. She described her own experience of post-partum depression which she only understood afterwards when she had moved to the United Kingdom and had not got any support from her parents there, only backlash. There was no medical support available to her in Nigeria either. The Appellant’s parents are already struggling in Nigeria, their house is not in good repair, there are no basic facilities there like wifi, it is in a small settlement and when Mrs Ogbuja-Ndukwo visits, she stays in a hotel.
Documentary evidence
27. There are a not insignificant number of documents before the Upper Tribunal as to the Appellant’s mental health, which I have considered in detail, in particular noting the expert reports and the relatively long period of support he has been given for this, but for present purposes I refer to the most recent medical evidence as it shows the Appellant’s current mental health.
28. In a letter dated 19 March 2026, Dr B Patel updates the Appellant’s GP as to the Appellant’s mental health. At the appointment, the Appellant stated that is still dealing with the same social situations that made him unwell in the past, but that the psychotherapy had helped him release stress and learn coping strategies. At that time, the Appellant was not taking any psychotropic medication (having stopped in April 2023) but is prescribed diazepam to use as needed. The Appellant had engaged well with psychosocial interventions and continues to be asymptomatic despite recent immigration stresses. He had engaged well in psychosocial interventions and there was no evidence of delusional beliefs, no self-referential ideas, no feelings of thought interference, nor formal thought disorder and no evidence of hallucinations. The Appellant had good insight and there was no evidence of harm to self or others. It was recommended that the GP could consider referring the Appellant to CIMHS, CRT or talking therapy if he needed input in the future and a crisis plan was set out if needed.
29. The Appellant’s discharge summary from the NHS Early Intervention Service is dated 15 April 2026, having completed the three-year period of care. At discharge, he presented with no active symptoms of psychosis or mania and pathways were identified for future support if his mental health started to deteriorate. A follow up letter from the Appellant’s social worker at the same service dated 10 June 2026 sets out the Appellant’s good character and engagement. He is described as a thoughtful, kind, hard-working individuals who has educated himself to a high level and who had genuine motivation to make the best use of the resources the service offered.
30. There is an expert report from Dr Ivo Ngade as to country information for Nigeria, dated 23 January 2025. Dr Ngade has a PhD in Africa Studies and describes himself as an anthropologist working for Nestingminds Ltd and Expert Court Reports Ltd (UK) as a country of origin expert, having previously held various academic positions. He has authored various publications and reports. The report covers healthcare in Nigeria, the economic situation there, poverty, kidnapping and discrimination against those with mental health problems.
31. In relation to healthcare, Dr Ngade refers to significant challenges to the affordability and availability of healthcare, including the shortage of healthcare professionals, uneven distribution of the workforce, and emigration of professionals. As to mental health, there are is only one psychiatrist for every 700,000 people and only eight neuropsyhiatric hospitals in the country. The previous mental health legislation was the Lunacy Act of 1958, replaced by a new act adopted in 2021 which brought in significant changes, there remains a lack of funding, inadequate infrastructure and human resources and poor co-ordination with stakeholders. There is little
32. In relation to the economic situation, Dr Ngade refers to persistent rises in inflation in Nigeria and interest rate rises to address this; with a cost of living crisis in 2024 and diminishing household purchasing power. There is some information about economic policy and measures to stabilise the economy. In relation to poverty Dr Ngade refers to extremely high levels of poverty (38% of the population living below the poverty threshold in 2019) and unemployment (with no figures given for the level of this).
33. In relation to discrimination against people with mental health, Dr Ngade states that mental health disorders are “often deeply stigmatised, dominated by misconceptions and cultural beliefs that view such conditions as spiritual or moral failings rather than medical issues. The stigma surrounding mental health significant impacts on individuals’ willingness to seek necessary help.” and discrimination can be from society at large, communities and from families. These factors restrict access to and use of mental health services.
34. In an undated letter from Ms Breedon, the Appellant’s probation officer, it is stated that the Appellant has been fully compliant with all the conditions imposed in his Probation Licence and Hospital Order. The Appellant is described as a polite and respectful man, with high levels of motivation to lead a pro social lifestyle, with a commitment to studying and maintaining employment. He has previously been in well paid employment and contributed to the economy. The Appellant is said to have shown a high level of insight in to his behaviour and its impact, accepting full responsibility and expressing remorse. He is said to have a clear understanding of risk factors and has addressed these through therapeutic intervention and ongoing support from the Community Mental Health Team. In terms of risk of reoffending, this was categorised as posing a low risk which would only increase should his mental health deteriorate and/or he experiences further life trauma. Ms Breedon when on to say, “However, this is unlikely. [The Appellant] has developed the coping skills to recognise when his emotional well being is impacted, this has been through core risk reduction intervention at Probation and with his Mental Health Team and he now has the strategies in place to maintain a high level of stability. He is assessed as not requiring medication to manage his mental health …”. Finally, Ms Breedon notes the strong support network around the Appellant, including from the Church and use of his time to give back to the community, with the potential to rebuild his life in the United Kingdom and contribute to society here.
35. The bundle also contains a number of certificates for education and training, details as to the Appellant’s marriage and divorce, letters of support, including from the Appellant’ church community, and letters relating to employment/job offers; all of which I have considered but none of which are necessary to refer to individually in this decision.
36. The parties both referred to and relied upon the Respondent’s ‘County information note: medical treatment and healthcare, Nigeria’, the most up to date version being that from December 2025 (updated on 14 April 2026), which deals in section 6 with mental healthcare. It refers to a new Mental Health Act being passed in late 2022 and signed in to law in January 2023 which it was said, “… sets out not only to ensure a better quality of mental healthcare services and promote recovery in Nigeria, but to protect the rights of persons who have mental health conditions. The establishment of a department of mental health within the federal ministry is to see that mental health policies are proposed and implemented.” This is said to follow from a starting place of historic disregard for mental health, with poor understanding, discrimination and stigma, with inadequately staffed services and mistreatment.
37. In paragraph 6.14 of the COI, a report dated 27 July 2025 is quoted, including that of the 56 sections of the new act, most have not been implemented, no Department of Mental Health services had been established (and no date for when this will be created as been given), the basic rights and legal protections have not been enforced and only two out of 36 states have adopted the act at in local legislation, with one more recognising it. There remains a lack of budget for implementation.
38. The COI also sets out the available psychiatric and general hospitals providing mental health care (nine and twelve in the country respectively, with fifteen state run psychiatric facilities); together with a good number of private mental health care facilities, especially in urban centres. As to community care, there are a number of NGOs, including one (MANI) that operates a suicide/distress hotline and plan to launch an app to connect mental health professionals to those in need or help and others that target particular groups (such as women and those who have suffered trauma from Boko Haram attacks), as well as services from the Red Cross. The vast majority of people with mental health issues seek help from informal providers such as priests, spiritualists and traditional healers. In terms of accessibility to mental healthcare services, the COI quotes the 2022 EUAA medical COI report that mental illnesses are not treated at community level due to societal myths, misconceptions and stigma. There are however prescription medications available, but there is a significant shortage of health professionals.
Closing submissions on behalf of the Respondent
39. On behalf of the Respondent, Mr Ojo relied on the reasons for refusal letter (but not the suitability reason for refusal) and the Respondent’s review. He submitted that the Appellant had not established that there were very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Nigeria and for context, relied on the preserved findings in relation to healthcare and Article 3 from the First-tier Tribunal decision. There is no further evidence before the Upper Tribunal as to stigma or discrimination against those with mental health problems, nor as to the changes brought about by recent legislation and no evidence of any likely ill-treatment on return for this reason.
40. In relation to health grounds, Mr Ojo relied in particular on paragraph 40 of the Court of Appeal’s decision in AA (Morocco) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 144:
“40. If such a claim fails under Art. 3, it does not follow that an appellant cannot succeed under Art. 8. But Art.8 does not provide an easier route for resisting removal on health grounds than Art. 3. If an Art. 3 claim fails, the appellant cannot succeed under Art. 8 without some separate or additional factual element which brings the case within the relevant paradigm for that provision, namely the capacity to form and enjoy relationships, or a state of affairs having some affinity with that paradigm. The only cases where absence of adequate medical treatment in the country to which a person is to be removed will be relevant to Art.8 are where it is an additional factor to be weighed in the balance with other factors which by themselves are sufficient to engage Art. 8. The rigour of the principles applicable to the consideration of ill health cases under Art. 3 applies with no less force when a claim is brought under Art.8. Save in the exceptional circumstances recognised in the case law, the UK is under no ECHR obligation to provide medical treatment here because it is not available in the country to which an appellant is to be removed.”
41. Mr Ojo emphasised the need for a broad evaluative judgment on an objective basis in a similar way to the assessment of whether there are very significant obstacles to reintegration. The Appellant has, throughout his time in the United Kingdom, formed relationships with professionals and within the Church community and although Mr Ojo accepted that if his mental health relapsed on return to Nigeria his ability to do that there would be changed, there would be some available medical resources there to mitigate the impact, in combination with familial support. There is evidence that the Appellant’s family, including his parents do care about his well-being and mental health, as demonstrated by his mother making an urgent request from Nigeria to the Knights of St Columba to assist the Appellant. The Appellant is not currently receiving any mental health treatment beyond voluntary counselling and on return to Nigeria he could travel if needed to access such treatment. Mr Ojo accepted that there was nothing in the COI (referred to above) which indicated any community-based therapy or counselling like that which is available to the Appellant in the United Kingdom, but went no further than to say the situation was not ideal. Mr Ojo also relied on the Appellant’s strong Catholic religion as a protective factor which also supports his outlook.
42. Overall, in relation to obstacles to reintegration, Mr Ojo submitted that the Appellant was enough of an insider in Nigeria to understand life there and reintegrate, having spent the first 20 years of his life living there and with regular contact with family there. The Appellant’s education, qualifications and work experience would all place him in a better position than many others to seek employment, even in a difficult economic climate and he could search internationally for job offers. There is insufficient evidence to establish that the Appellant would be destitute on return, with possible support from family members and his sister. Mr Ojo accepted Mrs Ogbuja-Ndukwo’s evidence that her finances were strained, which he did not directly challenge in cross-examination, but he did challenge her evidence given that there was no documentary evidence of her financial position. It was submitted that the Appellant would be able to re-establish old friendships or make new ones in Nigeria.
43. Finally, Mr Ojo submitted that the Appellant had not established family life with his sister in the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights as there were no additional elements of dependency beyond normal emotional ties. The Appellant’s private life was accepted and the factors in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 would need to be applied. Overall, it was submitted that the Appellant’s removal would not be a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for private life in breach of Article 8.
Closing submissions on behalf of the Appellant
44. The Appellant relied on his skeleton argument, on which I commended him for its clarity and focus, and on all of the evidence that he had filed.
45. In relation to whether there are very significant obstacles to reintegration in Nigeria, the Appellant specifically relies on his length of absence from Nigeria since 2009 (save for two short visits in 2015 and 2017); his history of stress induced psychosis and vulnerability to relapse; the loss of support structures through which he has achieved stable mental health; affordability and continuity of treatment available in the United Kingdom but not in Nigeria; the accommodation and living costs he will face in Nigeria and the difficulty in functioning and building new relationships after a long period in the United Kingdom. Although the Appellant’s parent’s remain living in Nigeria, the Appellant states that they are retired, have other dependants and that he would only return to them as he has no other options in Nigeria, but they do not have the basic facilities to support him to reintegrate, or, for example, gain employment for which he would need internet access and finances to travel and apply for jobs. Further, they do not understand his mental health problems, nor would they be able to support him during a relapse. There are no other family members who could provide accommodation, financial support, practical support or mental health support to the Appellant in Nigeria and his sister in the United Kingdom could not do that remotely from here either.
46. The Appellant has developed private life in the United Kingdom since 2009, including in education, employment, professional development, involvement with the Catholic Church, through friends, volunteering, from mental health and other support. He claims to have established family life with his sister in the United Kingdom, with whom he is in regular contact, including with her children and in which there is mutual emotional and practical support for each other which amounts to real, effective or committed support beyond normal emotional ties. In any event, even if not family life, the Appellant’s relationship with his sister forms part of his established private life in the United Kingdom.
47. In the proportionality balancing exercise, the Appellant relies on his length of residence in the United Kingdom; his social and community ties; his recovery from serious mental illness; successful rehabilitation and low risk of reoffending; close family and wider support network and the practical consequences of a return to Nigeria for the Appellant. The Appellant is able to support himself and has a job offer, so he would not be a burden on public funds. Overall, the Appellant submits that the combined weight of factors in his favour outweigh any public interest in his removal.
Findings and reasons
48. The first issue to determine is whether the Appellant would face very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Nigeria, such that he could meet the requirements for a grant of leave to remain under Appendix Private Life to the Immigration Rules. I do not find that he would for the following reasons.
49. Although the Appellant has been living in the United Kingdom since 2009 and has only visited Nigeria for a few weeks at a time on two occasions, the last of which some nine years ago; he has also spent his childhood and early adulthood in Nigeria, covering the majority of his life. The Appellant remains in very regular contact with his parents in Nigeria and has a close relationship with his sister and her husband who lived there until relocating to the United Kingdom in 2021 (and his sister has visited Nigeria since then). There is also extended family in Nigeria for the Appellant. The Appellant retains links to Nigeria and there is nothing to suggest that with his history and family connections, he would not be enough of an insider as to how life operates in Nigeria to participate in society on a day-to-day basis and build up relationships there. Whilst I accept that the Appellant is unlikely to be able to re-establish old friendships from before 2009 in Nigeria, I find he would be able to establish new friendships there, as he has done in the United Kingdom. He would also be able to practice his religion in Nigeria and participate in a Church community as he has done in the United Kingdom (albeit the particular order involved with here does not have a base in Nigeria). There would be no language barriers to the Appellant on return.
50. The Appellant has not worked in Nigeria (having left aged 20 as a student) but he is educated to Masters level and has employment experience in the United Kingdom which he would be able to utilise to seek employment in Nigeria or set up a business there. Although there is some evidence of difficult economic conditions in Nigeria from Dr Ngade, it lacked detailed and of the figures that were given, many were several years out of date. There was no assessment by Dr Ngade or otherwise about prospects of employment for a person with the Appellant’s level of education and experience and the Appellant has not established that he would be at risk of destitution on return. The Appellant refers to a number of practical difficulties with seeking employment, including a lack of wifi at his parent’s home (to where he would initially return if needed) and a lack of financial resources even to travel to find work. He would be eligible for financial assistance on return and although he says this would not last long, it would provide some assistance initially. I do not find that he would receive any regular or significant financial support from his sister in the United Kingdom, if at all, as I accept her evidence that she is not currently in a position to do so on top of that which she already gives to her parents in Nigeria. Mr Ojo did not seek to challenge her evidence on this during cross-examination and had no proper basis thereafter to seek to challenge her credibility in closing submissions. I found her to be a credible witness throughout.
51. These practical matters are however, in combination, not significant obstacles, nor ones which could not be overcome. Overall, I find that the Appellant would be able to seek employment or establish a business on return.
52. The only potential difficulty with the Appellant’s reintegration in Nigeria is his mental health, on the basis that if this deteriorates to any significant extent, reintegration would almost inevitably be harder, particularly to build up within a reasonable period of time the variety of human relationships to give substance to a private and family life. However, there is little evidence before me as to what the risk of a decline in the Appellant’s mental health is and to what extent. There is some evidence from some time ago about the importance to the Appellant of regular routines and the value of his support network in the United Kingdom to his mental health recovery, including from his sister, from NHS professionals and support groups and from his Church community. However, the more recent evidence is of a man who after a three-year period of early intervention support, has now been discharged from the mental health team with no active symptoms, learned coping mechanisms and a future plan if there is a deterioration. He has significant insight into his condition which he did not have before and currently has stable mental health.
53. I would not expect the recent NHS letters or discharge letter to make any assessment of a risk of deterioration in the future, that is not the purpose of those letters, but it does leave a difficulty in trying to assess what the risk of a decline is. The Appellant was asked this question directly, albeit I don’t attach any significant weight to his inability to give a direct answer to the question either as it would understandably be very difficult for him to do so.
54. The Appellant’s history is one which includes a deterioration in his mental health from the late 2010’s up to the lowest point of being sectioned in early 2023 and where his lack of immigration status was at least a factor, alongside the breakdown of his marriage and potentially the impact of the Covid pandemic during that period. In more recent times, the Appellant has recovered from that period even though he still has uncertainty as to his immigration status, which is referred to in the recent NHS letters that he is doing well despite still facing some of the same difficulties as before with immigration. I do appreciate that this is in the context of this ongoing appeal and no final decision, which may have a different impact if adverse.
55. The context of the Appellant’s return if his mental health does deteriorate must also be considered. The starting point is that his Article 3 appeal on this basis was dismissed as he did not meet the high threshold for such a claim on the basis of the severity of the impact of a deterioration not being significant enough and that there was some treatment available in Nigeria. Mr Ojo accepted that mental health treatment was far from ideal and that there was nothing to suggest any real availability of community treatment such as counselling in Nigeria, but that there was some mental health provision in place (and new legislation to improve the situation, even if mostly not implemented as yet) which would be sufficient. The Appellant would also have his parents in Nigeria, who, whilst historically may have had limited understanding of mental health problems, this has been explained to them by the Appellant’s sister since she has been in the United Kingdom and the Appellant’s mother did recognise the need for urgent help and sought to seek it for the Appellant in the United Kingdom when his mental health was deteriorating rapidly.
56. Having taken all of the above into account, whilst I accept that if the Appellant were required to return to Nigeria he is likely to find this very difficult and his mental health is likely to deteriorate; there is insufficient evidence before me that this would be to such an extent, or without sufficient treatment and/or support that it would impact on his ability to reintegrate in Nigeria to a degree that it would amount to a very significant obstacle to reintegration, even in combination with the other factors considered above. That is particularly so given the significant period of mental health support and treatment that the Appellant has received over the last three and a half years or so which I find would go some considerable way to lessen the risk of a significant deterioration of the Appellant’s mental health and where plans are in place for referrals immediately in the United Kingdom before departure if needed.
57. In considering all of the factors together, a return to Nigeria will undoubtedly be difficult for the Appellant and there would be obstacles to his reintegration due to his length of residence in the United Kingdom, some likely deterioration in his mental health and the need to seek employment and re-establishment him, including forming new relationships; I do not find that these would be very significant obstacles. The risk of a serious deterioration in his mental health is no more than a theoretical possibility at this time given his progress to a stable position, he does have family support and familiarity with life in Nigeria, he has no language barriers and he is well-educated with some employment experience. Overall, the Appellant is enough of an insider to understand how life is carried on in Nigeria and with capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted, to participate on a day-to-day basis and to build up and form relationships there. As such, the Appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds.
58. The second issue is whether in any event the Appellant’s removal would be a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for private and/or family life in breach of Article 8.
59. In terms of family life, I do not find that Article 8(1) is engaged in this case as the Appellant has not established family life for these purposes with his sister in the United Kingdom. The Appellant has a close relationship with his sister, they are in regular contact and provide mutual support and encouragement to each other. One of the Appellant’s sister’s motives for moving to the United Kingdom was to support her brother at a time when he was starting to struggle with his mental health and around that time, it may be that greater support was provided than it is now. However, they do not live together (living some distance apart in different cities) and there is only occasional and limited financial support to the Appellant from his sister (albeit this may have been greater in the past, for example in relation to helping with legal fees). This is not a situation, in accordance with IA, that goes beyond the normal emotional ties between adult siblings and I do not find that there are the required additional elements of dependency between the Appellant and his sister for the purposes of engaging Article 8. In any event, their relationship does form part of the Appellant’s private life.
60. In terms of private life, the Appellant has lived in the United Kingdom since 2009 during which he has undoubtedly built up private life during that period, including through education, friendships, employment, with his sister and her family, with engagement with medical treatment and professionals, and through his Church community.
61. The Appellant’s removal would constitute an interference with his right to respect for private and family life, which would be in accordance with the law as he does not meet any of the requirements for a grant of leave to remain under the Immigration Rules and would be in accordance with a legitimate aim.
62. The final question is whether the Appellant’s removal would be a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for private life established in the United Kingdom. I adopt the recommended balance sheet exercise when considering this.
63. On the Respondent’s side of the balance sheet, there is a public interest in removing those who do not meet the eligibility requirements for a grant of leave to remain. The Appellant also has two minor convictions, although I attach very little weight to removal due to those in the public interest given that they were minor, they were at a time when the Appellant was suffering from psychosis and very shortly before he was sectioned under the Mental Health Act, and they were no longer relied upon by the Respondent as a suitability reason for refusing leave to remain. The Appellant’s risk of reoffending is low and he has very positive reports from his Probation Officer having complied with all of his requirements. There are no other factors of any significance to add weight to the public interest in this case, the Appellant had leave to enter and remain for over nine years and although he has remained here without leave since 2019, throughout that period he has persistently been trying to regularise his immigration status, including through this appeal process which has covered the last two years (in addition to a previous appeal as well) and through a period of very poor mental health. The Appellant has not absconded or left any significant periods without application for leave to remain or pursuing the appeals process.
64. On the Appellant’s side of the balance sheet are all of the factors set out above, including his length of residence in the United Kingdom since 2009; his strong private life ties here with his sister and Church community (for whom he has also done some volunteering work); his education; his lawful, well-paid employment contributing to the economy; and participation with mental health services (which although formally discharged he continues to engage with on a voluntary basis) for rehabilitation and recovery from a period of significant poor mental health. The Appellant has strong letters of support from a number of professionals he has been engaged with over the years as well as from his Church community and his sister. He also has a recent offer of employment at a good salary and is clearly motivated to work and contribute to society, with a clear plan to enable him to do so.
65. I am required to attach little weight to the Appellant’s private life at a time when his leave to remain was either precarious or unlawful, as it has been throughout his time in the United Kingdom; but that does not mean no weight can be attached to this.
66. I have considered all of these factors in the round and find that overall, the Appellant’s removal from the United Kingdom would be a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for private life contrary to Article 8. On the facts of this case, the public interest in removal is relatively low with no particular features of this Appellant’s immigration history to increase it (nor any barriers to integration such as not being able to speak English or not being financially independent) and even with little weight being attached to his private life, is outweighed by a long history since 2009 of positive integration and contributions in the United Kingdom, with a strong support network and important relationships established here with his sister and within the community, not all of which could be re-established in Nigeria or maintained from another country (or at least not in the same way). I therefore allow the Appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds.

Notice of Decision
For the reasons set out in the decision annexed, the making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law and as such it was necessary to set aside the decision, with preserved findings of face on the protection and Article 3 grounds.
The appeal is remade as follows:
The appeal on protection grounds is dismissed.
The appeal on Article 3 grounds is dismissed.
The appeal on Article 8 grounds is allowed.


G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8th October 2026





IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000679
First-tier Tribunal No; HU/62693/2024
Case No: UI-2026-000740
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67273/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON

Between

VO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Marenah promulgated on 15 October 2025, in which the Appellant’s appeal against the decisions to refuse his protection claim dated 17 June 2024 and refuse his human rights claim dated 18 September 2024 were dismissed.
2. The Appellant is a national of Nigeria, who entered the United Kingdom as a student on 25 September 2009, with leave to remain in that capacity initially to 30 June 2010 and extended to 15 October 2013; during which period the Appellant returned to Nigeria between June and October 2010. A further application was made for leave to remain as student on 2 January 2013 which was granted outside of the Immigration Rules to 15 October 2013.
3. On 13 November 2013, the Appellant applied for an EEA Residence Card on the basis of his marriage to an EEA national, which was issued on 6 January 2014, valid for five years to 6 January 2019. On 29 December 2018 the Appellant applied for a permanent EEA Residence Card which was refused on 12 February 2019, with further applications on the same basis made and refused on 1 April 2019, and rejected on 28 May 2019 and 28 June 2019. The Appellant then applied under the EU Settlement Scheme on 15 August 2019, which was refused on 10 September 2020 and a further application for the same was refused on 6 May 2022. The Appellant appealed against that last refusal, which was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal on 12 January 2023.
4. On 24 February 2023, the Appellant committed the criminal offence of damaging property and on 28 February 2023, there were two further offences of assault by beating. On 19 February 2024, the Appellant received a community order in relation to these offences, which included a referral for psychological treatment in relation to his mental health.
5. In March 2023, the Appellant’s mental health deteriorated and he was sectioned under the Mental Health Act 1983. The Appellant claimed asylum on 3 April 2023, on the basis that he would be at risk on return primarily due to his poor mental health (additionally including a fear of destitution, lack of access to medical treatment, lack of acceptance by family, societal discrimination and in relation to the general risks and conditions in Nigeria) and he made a separate application for leave to remain on private life grounds on 30 May 2023. The refusal of both of those claims were the subject of separate appeals, which were joined before the First-tier Tribunal.
6. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s asylum claim in a decision dated 17 June 2024 for the following reasons. First, the Respondent did not accept that the treatment the Appellant feared on return to Nigeria would reach the level of persecution, nor secondly, that it in any event it engaged the Refugee Convention. Thirdly, in any event, the Appellant would benefit from a sufficiency of protection in Nigeria where there is a functioning police force and fourthly, there would be an option of internal relocation. Lastly, the Respondent decided that the Appellant had not established that he would be destitute on return to Nigeria, given his ability to obtain employment using his education and work experience and as he is in regular contact with family in Nigeria who previously supported him.
7. The Respondent accepted that there was a social stigma against those with mental illness, but the constitution protected against discrimination and the first National Mental Health Act was passed in 2021 to promote and protect those suffering from mental illnesses and correcting the flaws in the previous Lunacy Act.
8. The Appellant’s asylum and humanitarian protection claims were both refused on these grounds. The decision also contained a refusal on private and family life grounds, which was then overtaken by the later decision below.
9. The Respondent considered the medical aspects of the Appellant’s claim separately in relation to whether he should be granted discretionary leave to remain. By reference to the Country Information Note, Nigeria: Medical treatment and healthcare, version 4, December 2021, the Respondent considered that there was mental health treatment available in Nigeria, including in public hospitals, through psychiatric counselling and in shelter housing; as well as medication being available and services for suicide prevention. The Appellant had not established that he would be unable to access such treatment was needed. Overall, the Appellant had not established that he met the high threshold for a grant of leave to remain on health grounds.
10. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s human rights application in a decision dated 18 September 2024 for the following reasons. First, the Appellant had no established family life in the United Kingdom and could not satisfy the requirements of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules. Secondly, he did not meet the requirements of Appendix Private Life to the Immigration Rules on both suitability and eligibility grounds. In relation to suitability, by reference to the Appellant’s conviction for destroying or damaging property and battery, the Respondent decided that his presence was not conducive to the public good. In relation to eligibility, the Appellant had not lived in the United Kingdom for the required 20 years and there would be no very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Nigeria, a county where he had resided for his formative years and where he retains knowledge of life, language and culture and where his parents and extended family members still reside. The Appellant had also returned to Nigeria in 2015 and 2017 to visit family. Thirdly there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant a grant of leave to remain outside of the Immigration Rules. Finally, the Appellant’s mental health was considered but it was not accepted that his removal would breach Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights for that reason. In particular, although not necessarily to the same standard as in the United Kingdom, mental health treatment is available in Nigeria that the Appellant would be able to access. Reference was made to the same Country Information Note as in the earlier refusal letter dealing with the protection claim, although it was quoted from more fully in this decision.
11. Judge Marenah dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 15 October 2025 on all grounds. In relation to the protection claim, it was not in dispute that the Appellant suffered from a serious mental illness and it was found that for the purposes of the Refugee Convention and the Nationality and Borders Act 2002, those with mental health problems constituted a particular social group. However, there was a lack of evidence to establish that there was a risk of persecution for this reason and therefore the Appellant’s protection claim failed and there was no need to consider whether there was a sufficiency of protection of option of internal relocation available.
12. In relation to the Appellant’s claim under Article 3, it was not in dispute that due to the Appellant’s poor mental health which started to manifest in 2020, he was a ‘seriously ill person’. The First-tier Tribunal considered that there was some mental health treatment available in Nigeria, albeit not the same nor consistent package of therapy he was currently in receipt of in the United Kingdom and with insufficient information as to the likely cost of this in Nigeria. Overall, it was not accepted that the Appellant’s removal would lead to a ‘serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy’ and the report of Dr Napoletano did not express a view that it would. Further, the Appellant had not established a prima facie case under Article 3 based on suicide risk, which was not evidenced at all by any of the medical professionals involved.
13. In relation to the human rights claim, the First-tier Tribunal considered the suitability criteria due to the Appellant’s convictions in early 2023 for which he received a community order with 20 days’ rehabilitation activities and 18 months’ of compliance with psychiatric treatment in the community. The First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant was suffering from a mental health condition which was a significant contributory factor to the offending. In these circumstances, the Respondent’s approach was ‘extremely harsh’, but the suitability criteria contained a mandatory refusal such that no discretion could be applied in relation to it.
14. On the broader Article 8 aspects, the First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant could not meet the requirements of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules and in particular although he would face some degree of hardship re-establishing his private and family life in Nigeria, there would not be very significant obstacles to his reintegration there. Further, that the Appellant’s removal would not overall be a disproportionate interference with his private life or any family life with his sister (albeit without an express finding that Article 8 was engaged in relation to this relationship).
The appeal
15. The Appellant appeals on the following grounds, that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law in:
1) Failing to properly engage with the evidence of conditions in Nigeria, including as set out in the expert report of Dr Ngade.
2) Failing to properly assess the risk of suicide in accordance with the medical evidence and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, that the medical evidence stated that ‘any significant changes’ to the Appellant’s current situation had the potential to jeopardise his recovery and trigger a mental health relapse and that long distance travel was not advisable. This was sufficient to indicate that there was no appropriate treatment available for the Appellant in Nigeria. Further, that there was sufficient evidence of the difficulties the Appellant would face obtaining employment and the lack of financial support available to him in Nigeria; sufficient to indicate that the Appellant would not be able to fund any required treatment in Nigeria. Finally, there was no evidence from the Respondent to dispel any concerns about the risk to the Appellant’s health or life expectancy on return, following his prima facie case that it would. The First-tier Tribunal had failed to properly follow the staged approach in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 generally and/or specifically in relation to suicide risk.
3) Treating the Respondent’s view on the suitability criteria as conclusive rather than a matter to which appropriate weight should be afforded, particularly in circumstances where that view was described as “extremely harsh”. In particular, the fact of conviction was not sufficient, the First-tier Tribunal was required to assess whether as a result, the Appellant’s presence in the United Kingdom was not conducive to the public good such that it was undesirable to allow him to remain in the United Kingdom. This was a matter on which the First-tier Tribunal could and was required to make a finding as to whether the suitability criteria was met.
4) Making contradictory findings on whether there were very significant obstacles to reintegration to those made on the protection and Article 3 claim. The First-tier Tribunal failed to take into account when considering reintegration the earlier findings that the Appellant suffered from a serious mental illness and would be perceived as different because of that in Nigerian society if he relapsed, that he fears ill-treatment and destitution on return, that the Appellant will need to fund his own treatment and that there are no effective mechanisms in place to reduce the risk of suicide. All of these factors are relevant to the required broad evaluative judgment required under the Immigration Rules.
5) Failing to take into account all relevant factors in the final proportionality balancing exercise, including in particular the medical evidence.
16. The Appellant also refers to the Respondent’s bundle in his appeal only being uploaded to the portal after the hearing, which amounted to procedural unfairness as he did not have sight of the evidence to be able to consider or respond to it at the hearing. There was no specific suggestion that the Appellant’s legal representatives did not have access to the bundle before the First-tier Tribunal hearing, nor that the Appellant was unaware of the relevant information, nor that he had been unable to give evidence in response to any of it or instructions to his legal representatives about it. Considering this in the round, this additional point does not assist the Appellant beyond the substantive grounds of appeal as there was nothing to suggest any unfairness in substance in this appeal nor any detriment to him. It is accepted that there has been confusion and difficulties with the papers in both appeals and how the files have been managed in the First-tier Tribunal; but these have now been resolved with the Upper Tribunal having access to all documents before the First-tier Tribunal and going forward, a composite bundle which includes all of them in one place can be organised.
17. The Appellant also made an application under rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to adduce further evidence in support of his appeal, albeit only in relation to any re-making of it if an error of law was found rather than any of the material being relevant to the question of whether the First-tier Tribunal erred in law.
18. At the oral hearing, the Appellant relied on the grounds of appeal and his skeleton argument in support of them; which was commendably clear and helpful in setting out his position. As such, there was no need for detailed oral submissions, although he helpfully explained a little more background and his current position. This included the Appellant referring to an offer of full-time employment which he had received, further to which Ms Ahmed helpfully advised him of the form he could use to seek permission to work from the Respondent as this is a matter outwith the scope of this appeal.
19. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms Ahmed resisted the appeal on all grounds, albeit recognising difficulties with the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on the Article 8 aspects. In relation to the Refugee Convention grounds, Ms Ahmed submitted that there was no specific challenge to the finding in paragraph 50 of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision that the Appellant was not at real risk of persecution by reason of his mental health in Nigeria and in any event, the Judge had made an appropriate self-direction as to the relevant law and principles, with a clearly reasoned decision applying the same.
20. In relation to the Article 3 medical grounds, there was no dispute that the Appellant satisfied the first limb of the test in AM (Zimbabwe) but there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the second limb as the circumstances did not meet the minimum level of severity required, for which the threshold was high. Ms Ahmed noted that the Appellant was not currently prescribed any medication and the only evidence was of therapeutic and counselling intervention but without consideration as to whether the latter would be available or suitable in Nigeria. It was submitted that the First-tier Tribunal properly considered the evidence before it, it was simply insufficient to meet the high threshold. The Appellant’s reliance on medical evidence stating that any change may lead to a significant deterioration in his mental health was insufficient and no more than disagreement or speculation as to possible impact. As the threshold was not met, there was no obligation on the returning state to respond and the First-tier Tribunal did not need to consider this.
21. Ms Ahmed did accept that when setting out the relevant test in paragraph 57 of the decision, reference was made to ‘will’ not ‘may’, but that this was not material when the decision was read as a whole and against the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal. There were also sufficiently detailed findings on the separate claimed suicide risk.
22. In relation to the suitability grounds issue, Ms Ahmed did not have instructions on this to take a formal position on behalf of the Respondent, although tentatively she saw the force in the Appellant’s ground on this issue. However, she submitted that in any event this point was inmmaterial given the other findings that there were no very significant obstacles to reintegration in Nigeria and overall, no disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s right to respect for private and family life.
23. In relation to the final Article 8 considerations, although Ms Ahmed initially submitted that these grounds amounted to disagreement with the decision, she did then accept that the reasoning in the decision was difficult to follow as it intertwined what should normally be separate consideration first of whether the Immigration Rules were satisfied and only if not, secondly to assess the Appellant’s private and family life in the United Kingdom, any interference with it and undertake a proportionality balancing exercise. She further accepted that there was a lack of engagement with the primary focus of the Appellant’s claim as to his mental health in the final balancing exercise, beyond a brief reference to his vulnerabilities.
Findings and reasons
24. I consider together first the protection and Article 3 aspects of the grounds of appeal and then go on to the Article 8 aspects.
25. The first ground in relation to the protection aspects of this appeal is that the First-tier Tribunal failed to properly address and engage with the background country evidence as to conditions for those with mental illness in Nigeria and in particular, the country expert report by Dr Ngade.
26. The First-tier Tribunal did not expressly refer at all to the country expert report by Dr Ngade in relation to any aspect of the Appellant’s appeal. Whilst it is not necessary for a decision to refer to each and every piece of evidence available to it, it would normally be good practice to make at least some reference to an expert report and indicate what weight has been attached to it, even if to discount it in substance, and the reasons for that should normally be explained. However, whilst this was not done in the present appeal, having considered the report carefully myself, I do not consider that it adds anything of substance in support of the Appellant’s appeal on protection grounds or on Article 3 grounds. In particular, the report contains only two paragraphs on the healthcare system in Nigeria (highlighting predominantly a lack of capacity in it) and four short paragraphs on ‘discrimination against people with mental health’ which goes no further than identifying discrimination with nothing at all to suggest that this would reach the threshold of persecution. A further section on plausibility on lack of mental health treatment is also relatively brief and identifies challenges, but does not go so far as stating that no mental health treatment would be available or accessible for this Appellant. It lacks the detail that would be required for any finding in the Appellant’s favour in relation to his protection and Article 3 grounds of appeal. In particular, it contains no detail at all on the points on which the First-tier Tribunal expressly noted that there was a lack of evidence on, including the implementation of the new Act in relation to mental health, the cost of treatment and so on. For these reasons, there is no material error of law in the failure to engage with this evidence, and to the extent that some or all of it is relevant to the Article 8 claim, it can be considered at the re-making appeal on that ground.
27. As to other background country evidence and medical evidence, the First-tier Tribunal does properly engage with what is available, in particular the COI on medical treatment and healthcare which it expressly refers to. There are no specific parts of this that the Appellant identifies as not being taken properly in to account, nor that would have had any material outcome on the protection aspect of his appeal. For these reasons there is no error of law on the first ground of appeal.
28. The second ground in relation to the protection aspects of this appeal is that the First-tier Tribunal failed to properly assess his Article 3 appeal by failing to identify and follow the test set out in AM (Zimbabwe); as well as failing to attach proper weight to the medical evidence which was sufficient to meet the second limb of the test and in failing to properly consider the suicide risk against the Appellant’s history of psychosis and uncontrollable impulse.
29. The test for a breach of Article 3 on health grounds is set out by the Supreme Court in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 and helpfully distilled following this and the case of Sarvan v Denmark (application no> 57467/15) by the Upper Tribunal in AM (Art 3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC) as follows:
1. In Article 3 health cases two questions in relation to the initial threshold test emerge from the recent authorities of AM (Zimbabwe) … and Savran v Denmark …:
(1) Has the person (P) discharged the burden of establishing that he or she is “a seriously ill person”?
(2) Has P adduced evidence “capable of demonstrating” that “substantial grounds have been shown for believing” that as “a seriously ill person”, he or she “would face a real risk”:
(i) “on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment,
(ii) of being exposed
(a) to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering, or
(b) to a significant reduction in life expectancy”?
2. The first question is relatively straightforward issue and will generally require clear and cogent medical evidence from treating physicians in the UK.
3. The second question is multi-layered. In relation to (2)(ii)(a) above, it is insufficient for P to merely establish that his or her condition will worsen upon removal or that there would be serious and detrimental effects. What is required is “intense suffering”. The nature and extent of the evidence that is necessarily will depend on the facts of the case. Generally speaking, whilst medical experts in the UK may be able to assist in this assessment, many cases are likely to turn on the availability of and access to treatment in the receiving state. Such evidence is more likely to be found in reports by reputable organisations and/or clinicians and/or country experts with contemporary knowledge of or expertise in medical treatment and related country conditions in the receiving state. Clinicians directly involved in providing relevant treatment and services in the country of return and with knowledge of treatment options in the public and private sectors, are likely to be particularly helpful.
4. It is only after the threshold has been met and thus Article 3 is applicable, that the returning state’s obligations summarised at [130] of Savran become of relevance – see [135] of Savran.
30. In the First-tier Tribunal decision, there is express reference to the medical evidence in relation to the Appellant, with high point of that quoted that his prognosis would be poorer and he would be likely to experience a significant deterioration in his mental health in paragraph 57. That sufficiently reflects the broader medical view that any change to his current routine and support could trigger a relapse and deterioration. The First-tier Tribunal is correct to identify that none of the medical evidence expresses any view that even a significant deterioration would expose the Appellant to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health resulting either in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy such as to meet the threshold in the second limb of the AM (Zimbabwe) test. Having considered myself the evidence as a whole, it was not such that it was capable of demonstrating substantial grounds to establish the required risk. The First-tier Tribunal has also given cogent reasons as to why the Appellant had also not established that there was an absence of appropriate treatment in Nigeria or that he would not be able to access it; there was simply insufficient evidence on this point as well. Consideration was given to the lack of evidence as to the cost of treatment, financial and other support available to the Appellant and longer term employment prospects with rational and lawful conclusions on those matters. It is not sufficient that some doubt is cast on accessibility to treatment in these circumstances.
31. In the specific circumstances of a claimed risk of suicide on return to a home country, the test to be applied is set out in J v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 629 [paras 26 to 31], as reformulated in Y (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 362 [paras 15 and 16] as follows:
26. First the test requires an assessment to be made of the severity of the treatment which it is said the applicant will suffer if removed. This must attain a minimum level of severity. The court has said on a number of occasions that the assessment of its severity depends on all the circumstances of the case. But the ill-treatment must ‘necessarily be serious such that it is ‘an affront to the fundamental humanitarian principles to remove an individual to a country where he is at risk of serious ill-treatment’.
27. Secondly, a causal link must be shown to exist between the act or threatened act of removal or expulsion and the inhuman treatment relied on as violating the applicant’s Article 3 rights. Thus, in Soering at para [91], the court said:
‘Insofar as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the extraditing contacting state by reason of its having taken action which has a direct consequent the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment’ (emphasis added).
See also [108] of Vilvarajah where the court said that the examination of the Article 3 issue ‘must focus on the foreseeable consequences of the removal of the applicants to Sri Lanka …’
28. Thirdly, in the context of foreign cases, the Article 3 threshold is particularly high simply because it is a foreign case. And it is even higher where the alleged inhuman treatment is not the direct or indirect responsibility of the public authorities of the receiving state, but results from some naturally occurring illness, whether physical or mental. This is made clear in para [49] of D and para [40] of Bensaid.
29. Fourthly, an Article 3 claim can in principle succeed in a suicide case (para [37] of Bensaid).
30. Fifthly, in deciding whether there is a real risk of a breach of Article 3 in a suicide case, a question of importance is whether the applicant’s fear of ill-treatment in the receiving state upon which the risk of suicide is said to be based is objectively well-founded. If the fear is not well-founded, that will tend to weigh against there being a real risk that the removal will be in breach of Article 3. To which is added, what may nevertheless be of equal importance is whether any genuine fear which the appellant may establish, albeit without an objective foundation, is such as to create a risk of suicide if there is an enforced return (para 16 of Y).
31. Sixthly, a further question of consideration relevance is whether the removing and/or the receiving state has effective mechanisms to reduce the risk of suicide. If there are effective mechanisms, that too will weigh heavily against the applicant’s claim that removal will violate his or her Article 3 rights.
32. The First-tier Tribunal made an appropriate self-direction on these matters and considered them. It was accepted that there was a causal link with removal which may trigger a relapse and that the Appellant had a genuine subjective fear on return to Nigeria (albeit not an objective one) but not such that it would create a risk of suicide on return, particularly in the absence of any medical evidence assessing, or even mentioning such a risk. There is one brief reference to this in some of the medical evidence but refers to it not being a risk and protective factors being in place for the Appellant. Overall, and even in the context of a finding that there are no effective mechanisms in Nigeria to reduce the risk of suicide, there is no error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s overall findings that the Appellant has not established a prima face case of risk on this basis to reach the high threshold in Article 3 cases. On the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal, that was lawful and rational finding for it to make.
33. For these reasons, I find no error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on the first two grounds relating to his protection and Article 3 claims.
34. As indicated to the parties at the hearing, I find an error of law on all of the grounds relating to the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of the Appellant’s private and family life both under the Immigration Rules as to suitability and very significant obstacles to reintegration and in the broader proportionality balancing exercise. My reasons are as follows.
35. First, in relation to the suitability criteria, the requirement of the then applicable paragraph S-LTR.1.6 was that an application must be refused if: “The presence of the applicant in the UK is not conducive to the public good because their conduct, character, associations, or other reasons, make it undesirable to allow them to remain in the United Kingdom.” The Respondent relied on this for reasons given in a single sentence that the Appellant had a conviction dated 26 January 2024 for destroying or damaging property and battery.
36. The First-tier Tribunal considered this to be an “extremely harsh” approach by the Respondent and that it was clear that at the time the Appellant was suffering form a mental health condition which was a significant contributory factor to offending, if not the sole cause and it amounted only to a relatively minor offence. However, the First-tier Tribunal found it had no power to overturn the application of this section. In doing so, it erred in law. The First-tier Tribunal was entitled to make findings of fact as to whether the mere fact of conviction for a relatively minor offence, particularly in circumstances where mental health was the predominant if not sole cause, was sufficient to establish that the Appellant’s presence in the United Kingdom was not conducive to the public good. Whilst due deference should be given to the Respondent’s assessment of the same and appropriate weight attached to it, the Respondent’s view on this is not determinative nor binding on the First-tier Tribunal. That is particularly so in circumstances where the Respondent’s reasoning relies solely on the fact of conviction with no consideration of the circumstances or future risk.
37. Second, the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in its approach to assessment of very significant obstacles to reintegration in (i) not considering this before going on to the broader Article 8 assessment outside of the Immigration Rules; (ii) including within its assessment a comparison of circumstances within the United Kingdom rather than focusing on those that the Appellant would return to in Nigeria; and (iii) most importantly, failing to engage at all with the Appellant’s likely mental health on return to Nigeria or its impact on his ability to reintegrate. The reference in paragraph 76 that the Judge reminds herself of the Appellant’s vulnerabilities is wholly inadequate as a consideration of his mental health when required to undertake a broad evaluative assessment of whether there would be very significant obstacles to reintegration.
38. Further, the finding that there would be no greater financial burden on the Appellant’s sister supporting the Appellant in Nigeria compared to in the United Kingdom is irrational; in circumstances where she provides some meals and overnight accommodation here but he is in asylum accommodation with support payments and in receipt of free medical treatment; compared to a return to Nigeria where he would be required to fully fund all of his own expenses, including accommodation and medical treatment.
39. Thirdly, the First-tier Tribunal erred in its final Article 8 assessment in failing to follow the five stage approach set out in Razgar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27. The First-tier Tribunal fails to make any express findings as to the nature and extent of private life established in the United Kingdom nor whether the Appellant’s relationship with his sister establishes family life such as to engage Article 8(1). Whilst the next stages are relatively straightforward as to whether there would be an interference in accordance with a legitimate aim, they are not mentioned at all and the First-tier Tribunal starts in paragraph 70 by jumping straight to the public interest in removal by reference primarily to the factors set in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as part of the final stage which is the proportionality balancing exercise.
40. Further, when considering factors in the Appellant’s side of the balancing exercise, there is a failure again to engage at all with the Appellant’s mental health, which was the primary focus of his appeal and refers only to him experiencing some degree of hardship but not enough to meet the Immigration Rules (with the old version of the Rules referenced, albeit materially the same as the one relevant to this decision). That fails to take into account all relevant matters for the final balancing exercise.
41. For these reasons, the findings in relation to the Appellant’s Article 8 claim and the dismissal of the appeal on that basis contained material errors of law. As such, it is necessary to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and list a further re-making of the appeal on those grounds. As I have not found any error of law in the protection or Article 3 aspects of the Appellant’s appeal, the findings in relation to those aspects in paragraphs 46 to 64 are preserved; albeit on re-making the Upper Tribunal can consider any up to date evidence as to conditions in Nigeria and medical treatment for mental health there so far as relevant to the Article 8 aspects of the claim.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is necessary to set aside the decision.
I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, with preserved findings of fact dismissing the appeal on protection and Article 3 grounds.
Listing directions
1. The appeal is to be listed before Upper Tribunal Judge Jackson for re-making on 7 September 2026 for a face-to-face hearing at Field House, with a time estimate of 2.5 hours. No interpreter is required.
2. The Appellant may submit any further evidence on which he wishes to rely by 4pm on 17 August 2026 (it is noted that at the time of writing the Appellant has already submitted a supplementary bundle, which he may still add to and which will need to be served on the Respondent). For any witness intending to give oral evidence, this should include a written statement (or updated written statement) accompanied by a statement of truth to stand as evidence in chief. Any further evidence should be submitted to the Upper Tribunal either by uploading this on to CE File or by email to [~] and served on the Respondent by email to [~].
3. The Respondent may submit any further evidence on which she wishes to rely by 4pm on 24 August 2026. It is a matter for the Respondent as to whether she wishes to rely on it, but it is noted that the COI previously relied upon has been updated since the First-tier Tribunal hearing, with version 5 last updated on 14 April 2026 and this latest version is likely to be of assistance to the Upper Tribunal for the purposes of this appeal.
4. The Respondent must file and serve a composite bundle by 4pm on 24 August 2026, which should include papers from both of the First-tier Tribunal files (PA/67263/2024 and HU/62693/2024) and the documents submitted as part of the Appellant’s Rule 15(2A) application all of which are admitted. The Respondent should note that the stitched hearing bundles on the First-tier Tribunal case management system include a number of blank/missing pages and it may be necessary to obtain individual documents from that system rather than relying solely on the stitched bundle.


G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5th August 2026