Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000690
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53133/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 1st of May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

ZMAM
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Kerr, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 22 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Beg) promulgated on 6 November 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 31 January 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Background:
3. The factual background can be briefly summarised as follows. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq from Mosul and is a Sunni Muslim. He claimed that after ISIS had been destroyed in Mosul that many people were harassed by the militia. His problems began in January 2017 when ISIS utilised his home for military purposes and his family were moved to a camp. They later moved back to their home towards the end of the summer of 2019. He claimed that the militia began to target homeowners whose homes ISIS had used and claimed that in July 2019 his brother was arrested. He further claimed that he remained in the area for two months however in September 2019 the militia came back to search for him. He was not there because he had gone to Erbil. He claimed that he was served with a formal death threat from the militia dated 15 October 2019. The basis of his fear was that if he returned to Iraq he would be taken or killed by the militia who control the area where he lives. The appellant left Iraq in November 2019. He travelled through Turkey, Italy, Holland and France before travelling to the United Kingdom by small boat and entering the country illegally on 22 September 2022. He claimed asylum on 7 October 2022. It is part of his factual account that he made an asylum claim in Holland which was unsuccessful.
4. The respondent considered his application and, in her decision letter dated 31 January 2024 refused the claim. Beyond accepting his nationality and identity the respondent rejected the factual account given by him concerning the events in Iraq. The respondent in the decision letter and the review set out the issues raised as to the credibility and consistency of his claim which included the document he sought to rely upon. The respondent also addressed the issues relating to documentation taking into account the country guidance decision of SMO, KSP (civil status documentation – Iraq CG[2022] UKUT 110.
5. The FtTJ recorded the position of the respondent who had maintained that the appellant would be able to access his documents. It was noted that the appellant stated that he had pictures of his Iraqi passport and national ID card and that he could use the pictures on his passport and identity to secure a Laisser Passer. Reference was made to the CPIN , internal relocation, civil documentation returns and it was stated that he could begin the process of renewing his INID card from the Iraqi embassy in London ( paragraph 14 of the FtTJ’s decision).
6. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 6 November 2025, the FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Iraq on the factual basis as claimed. The FtTJ set out her findings of fact and analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 23-39. The FtTJ disbelieved his account finding that there was no credible corroborative evidence that the appellant’s home was overtaken by ISIS and it was not credible that the militias had attempted several times to find the appellant, and that there was no credible evidence that the appellant would have been able to remain in Iraq if the militias were genuinely searching for him. The FtT also found that the appellant’s father was never arrested.
7. Dealing with the issue of documentation, the FtTJ set out the factual findings made between paragraphs 40 -54. The FtTJ concluded in respect of the documents that the appellant had a photograph of his CSID (paragraph 50) and that he would be able to establish his nationality because he had a photograph of his CSID and would be able to obtain a laisser passer from the Iraqi embassy using that document ( paragraph 52). The FtTJ also found that he would be able to obtain an identity document from a family member because his family members lived in Iraq and they would be able to meet him at the airport and he would then be able to travel to a CSA office to obtain an INID ( see paragraph 52). The FtTJ also found that he had a copy of his old expired CSID which he would be able to use to confirm his nationality and other identity details in Iraq ( see paragraph 54). It is also of relevance for this current appeal that the appellant claimed that his CSID had been retained by the Dutch authorities and they told him they would not return it to him unless he withdrew his claim (see paragraph 37 of the appellant’s evidence). The FtTJ made a finding at paragraph 50 that “the appellant claimed there is no credible evidence that he has asked the Dutch or the Italian authorities to return the document to him”.
8. The FtTJ therefore found that the appellant would not be at risk on return for a Convention reason or would be at a real risk of serious harm to qualify for humanitarian protection nor that he would be at risk of serious harm or ill-treatment under Articles 2 and 3. The appeal was dismissed.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
9. The hearing took place on 22 April 2026. The Appellant was represented by Mr Kerr, of Counsel and the Respondent by Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer.
10. The appellant had applied for permission to appeal, based on 1 ground only and that ground related to the assessment of the issue of documentation . Permission to was granted by a FtTJ on 11 February 2026.
11. Mr Kerr indicated that he relied upon the grounds of challenge. In essence they are as follows: It is contended that the Judge’s consideration of the risk to the Appellant on return, on account of his claimed lack of documentation is flawed for two reasons.
12. First, the FtTJ’s decision seems to be premised on the appellant’s ability to use a photograph of his CSID to enable him to obtain sufficient Iraqi documentation to enable him to travel from Baghdad to Mosul, where he could obtain an INID. In taking that approach the Judge erred in law. The Country Guidance in SMO2 and the November 2025 CPIN (referred to at paragraph 46 determination) make it clear that an individual can only safely travel internally in Iraq with a CSID or INID.
13. As the Judge noted at paragraph 48 of the decision (citing from the CPIN) since the replacement of CSIDs with INIDs, it is no longer possible to reapply for a CSID in Iraq or abroad. It follows that, contrary to paragraphs 51-52 determination, the appellant would not be able to use the photograph of his CSID to obtain a CSID at Baghdad airport, to allow him to safely travel to Mosul.
14. Further, the Judge’s implicit suggestion that the CSID photograph would enable the appellant to obtain documentation, in a general sense, to allow him to safely travel in Iraq, to obtain an INID, is entirely unsupported by the CPIN or the Country Guidance.
15. Further the Judge’s conclusion (at paragraph 42 determination) that the appellant’s family members in Iraq would be able to obtain the information required to obtain a CSID from the Iraqi embassy in London misquotes and misapplies the Country Guidance in SMO2.
16. Mr Kerr in his submissions also made reference to the grant of permission by FtTJ Cartin who had referred to paragraph [8](c) of the grounds that the Judge erred at paragraph 52 by considering that the appellant could use a photograph of his CSID to obtain a CSID at the airport to allow for safe travel. FtTJ Cartin considered that was not what he had understood the Judge to have found but that the FtTJ seemed to find that a family member could provide him with an identity document at the airport. Mr Kerr stated that he accepted that observation.
17. He further submitted that the paragraphs in issue with those at paragraph 50 – 52 and that the complaint is that the FtTJ was not entitled to conclude that the appellant could make his way out of the airport to redocument himself with the documents that he had available to him at that stage even with the support of his family. He submitted that the complaint was made out and referred the Tribunal to the relevant Country Policy and Information Note - Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns (October 2025) at paragraph 3.6.6 which the judge had also referred to at paragraph 52. This set out that “Internal travel is possible for those persons who would arrive in Iraq either in possession of a CSID or INID or who would be able to be redocumented on arrival at the airport, or shortly after arrival at a location that does not require passing through a checkpoint. They would then be able to travel to their home governorate (or elsewhere) through the various security checkpoints and are, in general, unlikely to encounter treatment or conditions contrary to paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 ECHR”. Mr Kerr submitted that the appellant did not have a CSID but had a copy of it.
18. He further submitted that the FtTJ was critical of the appellant for not obtaining or attempting to obtain his documents from the authorities in the Netherlands and /or Italy. However, he submitted at the date of the hearing the FtTJ did not have his original CSID. Consequently, was not open to the FtTJ to conclude that he could pass through the airport to relocation and obtain an INID . This was a finding that was not open to the FtTJ to make (see grounds at paragraph 8(d)).
19. He further submitted there was an error of law as set out at paragraph 9 on the basis that family members could bring the appellant’s documents to him. In that regard there was no examination of how that could be achieved and therefore the conclusion that the appellant would be documented in the airport to Mosul was not a sustainable finding. It would not be possible to obtain an INID or a CSID with a copy of it. He submitted therefore the respondent was correct to accept that there was an error of law. However as to the point raised in the Rule 24 response on the basis of the original document being available, he submitted that the appellant did not have that document at the date of the hearing and was therefore undocumented and should have been treated as such. Therefore, the error was material and the grounds were made out.
20. Mr Diwnycz Senior Presenting Officer confirmed that that he relied upon the Rule 24 response as filed pursuant to the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 but that the position of the Respondent was that there was no material error law in the decision of the FtTJ.
21. The Rule 24 response set out that in respect of the ground of challenge that the FtTJ did not err in law in her assessment of the feasibility of return.
22. The respondent identified that as paragraph 51, the FtTJ stated, ‘I find that he would be able to establish his nationality because he has a photograph of his CSID, and he would then be able to obtain a laissez-passer from the Iraqi embassy’.
23. It is submitted that this is consistent with SMO and KSP (Civil status documentation, article 15) (CG) [2022] UKUT 00110 (‘SMO2’), and the CPIN on civil documentation and returns, October 2025, which set out;
“ 3.4.6 The UT in SMO1 held that a person ‘must simply be able to establish their nationality in order to obtain a Laissez Passer.’ (Para 375).
3.4.7 An application for a Laissez Passer is considered on a case-by case basis by the Iraqi Embassy in London. For the enforced return of a failed asylum seeker (FAS) there is no interview requirement providing they hold at least one of the following (copy or original, valid or expired) [a telephone interview may be requested by the Embassy in certain cases]: • Passport • Birth Certificate • Marriage Certificate • Civil Status ID (CSID) • Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) • Iraqi National Identity Card (INID) • Iraq Citizenship certificate • Iraq residency card • Registration Document (1957)
20. Relying on that material it was submitted that the FtTJ indicated that due to the appellant having a copy of his CSID, he would be able to obtain a laissez passer, which 3.4.10 of the CPIN sets out ‘is valid for six months and that it permits a single entry into Iraq’. The FtTJ did not err in this respect.
21. However, the respondent accepted that the FtTJ erred in law at paragraph 52 of the decision by stating that the appellant would be able to obtain an INID at the local CSA office, with only a copy of his CSID (see paragraph 54).
22. Notwithstanding that concession, the respondent submitted that the error was not material in the light of the assessment made by the FtTJ at paragraph 50 that “there is no credible evidence that he has asked the Dutch or the Italian authorities to return the ( CSID) document to him”. The respondent submits that the onus is on the appellant to demonstrate that he is undocumented and that the appellant had made no efforts to obtain his CSID. Therefore, even if the FtTJ erred in her findings at paragraph 52 and 54, the appellant failed to show that he would be returning as an undocumented person given that he knows his CSID is with the Dutch or the Italian authorities. There is no material error of law in the decision.
23. Mr Diwnycz did not seek to resile from the concession in the Rule 24 response recorded above. In his oral submissions, he is submitted that the FtTJ had found that his document did exist and that he had not taken any steps to obtain that documentation and thus it was available to him.
24. At the conclusion of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give.
26. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal.
27. I am further grateful for the assistance given by both advocates in addressing the documents that featured in the evidence in this appeal. There appeared to be some confusion as to what copy documents the appellant had and what they represented and whether or not the appellant in fact had a copy INID. Mr Kerr helpfully took the tribunal to the documents in the composite bundle and that there are copies of his CSID and his Iraqi national ID card along with their translations but no copy INID. Mr Diwnycz agreed that they were as described and that he did not have a copy INID.
28. In order to assess whether the FtTJ materially erred in law when carrying out an assessment of the issue of documentation, it is necessary to set out what findings were made relevant to that issue by the FtTJ.
29. As regards his interview the appellant was asked a number of questions about what documentation he had available to him. At question 23 he was asked if he had an INID, CSID or any other type of ID when in Iraq? The appellant replied, “yes I have ID”. The interviewer asked a follow-up question at question 24 to confirm what type of identity cards the appellant had. The appellant replied, “so in Iraq the documents available are the Iraqi passport, the Iraqi naturalisation ID, civil status ID. So I had all of this.” When asked where it is Iraqi ID documents were at the moment? The appellant replied, “in the Netherlands” ( see question 25). When asked if he was able to obtain any Iraqi ID documentation from the Netherlands, the appellant replied, “no I can’t because I submitted them to the immigration office there like Home Office here, and they are with them now. However, I have copies which have been translated with the help of the solicitor. “ He confirmed later in the interview that he applied for asylum in the Netherlands. At question 67 he was asked what had happened to his passport? The appellant replied, “ when I applied for asylum they asked for any Iraqi documents. So I had Iraqi passport, civil status Iraqi ID and Iraqi nationality ID and I gave them.”
28. As to family members, the appellant had stated in his evidence that his mother and father were in Mosul and that he had a brother who disappeared during the militia and he had two sisters (see witness statement p.29). He further stated that he had some contact with his family on a weekly basis via WhatsApp. They had sent him documents via WhatsApp.
29. Whilst he had claimed that the family were denying his whereabouts so they are not able safely to send him documents, the FtTJ disbelieved the appellant’s factual account as to the events in Iraq and found that he was of no adverse interest to anyone in Iraq. It therefore follows from the evidence before the FtTJ and the findings made that the FtTJ correctly identified that he had copies of his CSID, and Iraqi nationality ID and that the authorities in either the Netherlands or Italy had the original documents as he had described giving them to the authorities in his interview. The FtTJ also found that he had family members in Iraq and would be able to obtain information from them ( see paragraph 42). The FtTJ also found that he had contact with his family which gave rise to her finding at paragraph 52 that he would be able to obtain documents from family members at the airport because his family live in Iraq. Those were the operative and relevant facts for the assessment of the issue of documents.
29. The FtTJ was correct to identify that the appellant came from a former contested area and therefore the respondent had stated the appellant will be returned to Baghdad (paragraph 40) Thereafter the FtTJ’s assessment is not particularly clear. However, the FtTJ correctly applied the CG decision of SMO at paragraph 46, that those not in possession of either a CSID or INID on return, or shortly after return, to Iraq or the IKR are at real risk of serious harm sufficient to breach paragraphs 339C and 339CA(ii) of the immigration rules/ Article 3 of the ECHR. At paragraph 47, is also correct that persons without a CSID or INID would also face significant difficulties in accessing public services, employment and housing are likely to result in destitution sufficient to amount to a breach paragraph 339C /Article 3 of the ECHR.
30. The FtTJ also correctly identifies that the CSID is being replaced with a new biometric Iraqi National Identity Card- the INID and that as a general matter is necessary for an individual to have one of those two documents in order to live and travel within Iraq ( see paragraph 41 and paragraph 53).
31. The FtTJ also correctly sets out that following the replacement of the CSID and the INID nationals in Iraq are no longer to reapply for CSID’s either in Iraq or abroad can only obtain an initial INID in person in the governorate they originate from (see paragraph 48) and that INID’s cannot be obtained while a person is in the United Kingdom . An individual needs to attend the Civil Status Affairs office (see paragraph 54).
32. As the respondent submitted in the Rule 24 response, at paragraph 51 the FtTJ was not in error by stating that the appellant would be able to obtain a laisser passer in the UK based on the documents that he has available namely a copy of his CSID and ID card which would demonstrate his nationality which 3.4.10 of the CPIN sets out ‘is valid for six months and that it permits a single entry into Iraq’. However, as SMO makes clear that is confiscated on entry.
33. The error made by the FtTJ is that at paragraph 52. The FtTJ found that the appellant will be able to obtain an identity document from a family member because his family lived in Iraq. They would be able to meet at the airport and then he would be able to travel to a CSA office to obtain an INID with a copy (photograph) of the CSID (see paragraph 54). The FtTJ did not set out on what basis that finding had been made. I have considered the evidence in SMO (2) and that the Upper Tribunal recorded the evidence of Dr Fatah at Annex A of SMO (2) as follows “if a person has a copy of their CSID and a person to assist them in Iraq they should be able to get a replacement identity document.” However, there is no finding within that country guidance decision to support the finding made that a photograph/copy of the CSID would be sufficient to pass through checkpoints which commence outside Baghdad airport.
34. However, even if the FtTJ was in error in finding that the appellant would be able to use a photograph/copy of his CSID the error is not material because as the respondent submits the appellant has accepted that he has an original CSID that had been issued to him. The appellant was clear in his evidence and as found by the FtTJ that he had left Iraq with his relevant documents which included his original CSID and that the latter document was in the possession of the State authorities in the Netherlands or Italy. There is an original CSID document.
35. Whilst Mr Kerr submits that the FtTJ was required to consider the circumstances at the date of the hearing, there are circumstances where documents are obtained at a later stage . By way of example the FtTJ referred to the laissez passé which the appellant would be able to apply for using the documents he presently has and prior to return. This would be a document obtained at a later stage and still relevant to the issue of whether the person can be can returned in the context of Iraq.
36. Further, and in the context of this appeal the FtTJ made a finding that the documents were in the possession of the State authorities. The onus is on the appellant to demonstrate that he is undocumented and in this regard can be expected to take reasonable steps to obtain or make enquiries relating to his own documents. As the FtTJ found at paragraph 50 there was no credible evidence that the appellant had even asked the authorities to return the documents to him. This was the position when he was interviewed in 2023 yet he took no steps to obtain his own documents or even make enquiries.
37. For those reasons and having considered the decision of FtTJ Beg in light of the evidence and factual findings made I am satisfied that there is no material error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of a material error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.

Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of a material error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

28 April 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds