Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000692
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64240/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5 May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST

Between

VLT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Easty, instructed by Elder Rahimi Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 8 November 2025 dismissing his appeal on protection grounds. The appeal came before me at an error of law hearing on 29 April 2026.
2. For the reasons set out below, I have decided that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved a material error of law. I set aside the decision and remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing.
Background
3. The Appellant is a Vietnamese national who arrived in the UK on 9 October 2022 and claimed asylum on 21 October 2022. The basis of his claim was that he was at risk of persecution because of his political opinion as a supporter of the Viet Tan organisation, which has been designated a terrorist organisation by the Vietnamese government.
4. The Appellant’s asylum claim was refused on 24 April 2025 and his appeal against that refusal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a determination dated 8 November 2025. The First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant had not given a consistent or plausible account and had fabricated his claim for asylum.
5. The Appellant sought permission to appeal, which was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on limited grounds.
6. On 19 February 2026 the Respondent filed a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 contesting the appeal.
7. The appeal came before me at an error of law hearing on 29 April 2026. Having heard submissions from the parties I reserved my decision, which is given with reasons below.
The parties’ submissions
8. The basis on which the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal was that it was arguable the First-tier Tribunal had not given sufficient reasons for rejecting relevant evidence, and/or that the Tribunal had not considered the Appellant’s evidence in light of the available objective country information in the relevant Country Policy and Information Note (‘CPIN’).
9. The Appellant’s appeal focused on three pieces of evidence which it is said the First-tier Tribunal did not consider or give adequate reasons for rejecting: a letter from Rev. Nam (a Catholic priest in Vietnam) and two letters from the UK chapter of the Viet-Tan Party.
10. The letter from Rev. Nam was dated 13 March 2023. It stated that the Appellant had repeatedly expressed his political views, participated in and organised protests (in Vietnam) and that he had been arrested, kidnapped, beaten and harassed by the authorities as a result.
11. The first letter from the UK chapter of the Viet-Tan party was undated. It stated that the Appellant had been a committed member of the Viet-Tan organisation since 2021, and that in Vietnam he had worked with Rev. Nam, organising protests about local corruption and education fees. The letter also stated that the Appellant had been attacked and arrested in several protests, following which Rev. Nam had called for his release. It detailed the Appellant’s continued activities for the Viet-Tan in the UK, which included organising peaceful protest rallies outside the Vietnamese consulate in London, being part of the organising committee fundraising for human rights activists in Vietnam, and being part of an organising committee for a February 2023 seminar discussing human rights issues.
12. The second, shorter, letter from the UK chapter of the Viet-Tan was dated 29 October 2024 and responded to questions about the first letter. It provided screenshots of photographs of the Appellant said to be taken at a Viet-Tan seminar on 26 February 2023, gave details of how the writer had met the Appellant, and gave dates of the protests which the Appellant had helped to organise in London and his fundraising activities.
13. On behalf of the Appellant, Ms Easty submitted that the letters were relevant and potentially material evidence which the judge was required to address in his decision; although the judge was not bound to accept the evidence, he was required to give reasons for rejecting it. The judge had not referred to the letters even indirectly and his failure to do so was material in light of his conclusion not just that he did not accept the Appellant's claim but that the Appellant had fabricated the claim.
14. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms Isherwood submitted that whilst the judge had not referred to the letters, his failure to do so was not material. The judge had stated that he had had regard to all of the evidence, and there were numerous flaws and inconsistencies in the content of the letters which meant that the judge was entitled not to give them express consideration.
Discussion and decision
15. This is an appeal on an error of law and judicial caution is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal as a specialist fact-finding tribunal: HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]. An appeal court is normally bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the first instance judge has taken the whole of the evidence into consideration, and the fact that the judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he has overlooked it: Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48 at [2]. However, where a decision of the First-tier Tribunal in a protection appeal displays an absence of reasoning which explains the conclusions reached by the judge, the appellate court cannot be confident that the Tribunal has carried out a “conscientious and fair” consideration of the appeal: ML (Nigeria) v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 844.
16. Bearing those principles in mind, I have concluded that the First-tier Tribunal erred, either by not considering the three letters or by not giving reasons explaining how the letters were taken into account in the decision.
17. The letters from Rev. Nam and the Viet-Tan party were potentially relevant to the Appellant's appeal in several ways. They provided potential corroborative evidence for the Appellant's account of his activities, arrest and detention in Vietnam; they also potentially supported his account of his sur place activity in the UK. They were potentially relevant to the key issue of the Appellant's credibility.
18. The First-tier Tribunal was of course not bound to accept the letters and the weight to be given to them was a matter for the judge. As Ms Isherwood outlined, there were some obvious inconsistencies between the letters and the Appellant's case; for example, the letter from Rev. Nam referred to the Appellant having been “kidnapped” when that had never been part of the Appellant's case. It would have been entirely open to the judge to give reasons explaining why he rejected the letters or did not give them significant weight. However, whether or not he accepted the letters the judge was required to demonstrate that the letters had been considered, and to give adequate reasons explaining what if any weight was placed on them.
19. There was no reference at all to the letters in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. That is in sharp contrast to the detailed consideration given by the judge to other evidence including the Appellant's asylum interview record (§19-23) and a letter from the Appellant’s wife (§21), and to matters which were not obviously directly relevant to the core of the Appellant's claim (such as whether the Appellant had had to sell his family property to fund his journey to the UK; §18). Notwithstanding the judge’s statement that he had considered the totality of the evidence, it is not possible to ascertain from the decision whether he considered the letters or what part if any they played in his decision taken together with the other evidence.
20. I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal judge erred in not considering the letters, or not giving adequate reasons explaining how they factored in his decision on the appeal. Since the letters were relevant to the reasons given for dismissing the appeal, the error was material to the outcome. I therefore set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on the appeal.
Disposal
21. Having regard to paragraph 7 of the Practice Statement and the guidance in AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, I consider that it is appropriate for the appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a different judge.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law and is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a different judge.

L Hirst

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 April 2026