Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

and UI-2026-000702
[PA/62090/2023 and PA/62091/2023]

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Promulgated

On 19th of October 2026

Before

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MANUELL

Between

TF
LD
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at FIELD HOUSE
on 14 October 2026

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms I McTierney, Counsel
(instructed by Jain, Neil and Ruddy, Solicitors)
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellants appealed with permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst on 24 March 2026 against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Forster who had dismissed the linked appeals of the Appellants against the refusal of their international protection claims. The decision and reasons was dated 7 August 2025.
2. The Appellants are nationals of Iran, of Kurdish ethnicity, respectively born on 7 April 1996 and 5 January 2004. They said that they worked with their father as kolbars, i.e., smugglers. The First Appellant claimed to have transported political material across the Iranian/Iraqi border. The Appellants claimed that their home was raided by the Iranian police and that their father was arrested and detained. The Appellants said that they are at risk on return because they worked illegally. Since coming to the United Kingdom, the Appellants have engaged in political activities in support of Kurdish rights against the Iranian regime.
3. After reviewing the evidence the Appellants presented and the accounts they provided, Judge Forster reached comprehensive adverse credibility findings (duplicated paragraph numbers in the Judge’s decision corrected in the extracts set out below):
“18. (29) There is no real risk of harm returning to Iran simply because the Appellants are Kurdish. Based on the 2022 CPIN, Iran: Kurds and Kurdish political groups, failed asylum seekers will not be at real risk of persecution or serious harm based on their Kurdish ethnicity alone.
19. (30) There is a pinch point on return to Iran and the question is whether the Appellants would disclose or would have to disclose their sur place activities. This brings them within the scope of HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596.
20. (31) The Respondent submits that the Appellants would be able to delete their Facebook accounts and within three months this would not be visible on the internet and therefore they would not be identified by the authorities. On this basis, the timely closure of the Facebook account would neutralise the risk consequential on having a critical account. I accept this submission.
21. (32) I have rejected the Appellants’ core claim to be at risk from the authorities in Iran because of any real or imputed political opinion. I find that they do not have any deep or genuinely held political opinions. The Appellants did not have existing political profiles. On return it is reasonably likely that they will be interviewed by the authorities. In the circumstances of this case, I find that the Appellants could be expected to conceal their political activities in the UK to avoid persecution given the absence of such political views. They would therefore not be at risk from the authorities on return to Iran. They will be one of many failed asylum seekers returning to their home country.
22. (33) Based on evidence cited in the 2022 CPIN, Iran: illegal exit, any Iranian who leaves the country illegally is liable to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment or face a relatively small fine. There is evidence that in practice people are only given a fine for illegal exit. If a person has left Iran illegally but is not wanted by the authorities, as is the Appellants’ position, only a fine will be issued.”
4. Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst’s grant of permission to appeal was in the following terms:
“It is arguable that the First-tier Tribunal erred when considering the Appellants’ sur place political activity, including posting of anti-regime messages on social media and attendance at demonstrations, by focusing on the issue of the Appellants’ motivation rather than the issue of whether risk arose on return as a result.
It is also arguable that the First-tier Tribunal erred by failing to consider whether the Second Appellant was at risk as a result of the political activities of his family members despite his own lack of participation.”
5. The Respondent served a rule 24 notice opposing the appeal, which was as follows:
“The grounds of appeal are narrowly framed and challenge only one aspect of the First‑tier Tribunal’s decision, namely the assessment of sur place political activities and the application of the pinch‑point on return to Iran, with reference to HB (Kurds).
4. The Respondent submits that the Judge properly directed themselves and assessed the Appellants’ claims against the relevant country guidance and objective evidence applicable to Iranian asylum appeals. The reasoning adopted was legally consistent, balanced, and firmly grounded in established authority.
5. Although the Judge accepted that both Appellants had attended demonstrations in the UK and posted political material on Facebook, it was plainly open to the Judge to find at [21] (note paragraph numbering in the determination was out of synchronisation) that the Appellants could avoid any risk on return by concealing those activities, particularly given the Judge’s finding that the Appellants did not genuinely hold the political views expressed, and that their activities were opportunistic at [27].
6. It is well‑established that where sur place activities are found to be contrived or opportunistic, a Tribunal is entitled to consider whether an appellant can reasonably be expected to avoid disclosure on return. This approach is consistent with the country guidance framework governing Iranian cases.
7. The grounds acknowledge at paragraph 2 that the Judge was fully aware of, and expressly considered, HB (Kurds). It therefore cannot be said that the Judge failed to address the pinch‑point analysis. Having considered all relevant factors—pre‑flight history, sur place conduct, likely questioning on return, and the Appellants’ credibility—the Judge was entitled to conclude that the Appellants would not face a real risk of persecution at the point of return.
8. This assessment must also be viewed in the context of the Judge’s adverse credibility findings in relation to both Appellants’ pre‑flight accounts, made at [13]–[22], which are not challenged in the grounds. Those unchallenged findings properly informed the Judge’s conclusions regarding motivation, profile, and risk
9. The Respondent places reliance on the recent Court of Appeal judgment in S v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 1482. At paragraphs [53]–[57], the Court of Appeal confirmed that it may be reasonable for a First‑tier Tribunal to conclude that an Iranian appellant who has engaged in opportunistic sur place political activity would not be required to articulate political opinions on return, and could reasonably be expected to avoid drawing adverse attention by concealing such activity, where it is not genuinely held.
10. The reasoning adopted by the Judge in the present appeal is entirely consistent with the principles affirmed in S v SSHD, and with the established approach to sur place claims in Iranian cases.
11. The grounds amount to no more than a disagreement with findings that were properly open to the Judge on the evidence. They do not identify any misdirection in law, failure to apply relevant country guidance, or irrationality. The determination demonstrates a correct understanding of the legal framework governing Iranian sur place claims and the pinch‑point on return.
12. The Respondent respectfully submits that the decision of FTTJ Foster discloses no material error of law. The Judge applied the correct legal tests…”
Submissions
6. Ms McTierney for the Appellants relied on the grounds of appeal for which permission to appeal had been granted. Counsel submitted that the risk on return presented by the Appellants’ sur place political activities had not been properly assessed. The Judge had erred by focussing on the Appellants’ motivation and not on the perception of the Iranian authorities. Thus the Judge’s reasoning for his findings was inadequate. The decision should be set aside and the appeals reheard before another First-tier Tribunal Judge.
7. Ms McTierney confirmed that the Judge’s credibility findings were not challenged, but the fact was that being Kurdish, working as kolbars and leaving illegally, all of which had been accepted, heightened the suspicion which would attach to the Appellants. The Iranian authorities adopted a “hair trigger” approach. There would be an imputed political opinion.
8. Mr Ojo for the Respondent relied on the Rule 24 notice and submitted that there was no material error of law, merely disagreement with a decision properly open to the Judge. The fact that the core claim had been found not credible undermined the whole case. The evidence of the Appellants’ political activities was on any view limited, one demonstration in Newcastle which had not been near any official Iranian outpost. The alleged risk from being kolbars was not a complaint made in the grounds of appeal. The appeals to the UT should be dismissed.
9. In reply, Ms McTierney submitted that the Facebook screenshots had added weight to the evidence of political activity.
No material error of law finding
10. At the conclusion of submissions, the Tribunal indicated that it found that there was no material error of law, with reasons reserved. The full decision now follows. The Tribunal is not persuaded by any of the submissions as to material error of law made on behalf of the Appellants, much of which simply amounted to an attempt to reargue the appeals. In the Tribunal’s view, the errors asserted to exist in the decision are based on a failure to read the decision and reasons as a whole. The Judge assessed the “pinch point” issue directly and expressly, accepting that the Appellants were likely to be interviewed on return, but not because they were previously known to the Iranian authorities, whether from pre-flight or sur place activities.
11. The Tribunal accepts Mr Ojo’s submissions on behalf of the Respondent. In truth there is little if anything which needs be added to the Respondent’s rule 24 notice, as set out above, which is clear and well drafted, and which the Tribunal endorses. There was no flaw in the Judge’s risk assessment of the return process and the Judge’s findings were open to him.
12. The first and most important point is that the Judge wholly rejected the Appellants’ core case of political association and activity in Iran, so that neither the Appellant was known to the authorities or was of adverse interest. The Judge gave clear and sustainable reasons for reaching his adverse credibility findings about all of the Iranian elements of that claim, none of which has been challenged. In short, he found that the Appellants’ story about their activities in Iran were a fiction, save that they were a kolbar family. The Judge was entitled to take that fundamental lack of credibility into account when assessing the Appellants’ post arrival activities, including their voluminous Facebook postings.
13. The Judge did not commit the error asserted in the grounds of focussing on the Appellants’ motivation to the exclusion of the likely perception of the Iranian authorities. [18] (32) of the decision, reproduced above, addresses the issue of the likely response of the Iranian authorities in precise terms. That paragraph must of course be read in the context of the other paragraphs extracted above.
14. The grant of permission to appeal was in the Tribunal’s view generous at best. The Tribunal finds that there was no material error of law in the decision challenged. The onwards appeals are dismissed. The anonymity direction is maintained.
The Appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellants without their express consent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION
The appeal is dismissed
The making of the previous decision did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision stands unchanged, including the anonymity direction.

Signed R J Manuell Dated 16 October 2026
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Manuell