Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000719
UI-2026-000721

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66601/2023
PA/66594/2023
LP/00583/2025
LP/00584/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

2nd August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN

Between

R B
M J
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Swain, instructed by Novells Legal Practice
For the Respondent: Ms A. Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 05 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants have been granted anonymity because the case involves protection claims. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Summary

1. This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the Upper Tribunal’). The Upper Tribunal is an independent decision-making body with powers given to it by an Act of Parliament. This decision is made in the context of the Upper Tribunal’s role in considering statutory appeals from decisions made by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the First-tier Tribunal’).

2. The appellants appealed the respondent’s decisions to refuse their protection and human rights claims. The appellants lodged an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘NIAA 2002’). The appeal could be brought on the ground that removal from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention or would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA 1998’).

3. The First-tier Tribunal heard evidence from both appellants but concluded that they had failed to produce sufficient reliable evidence to show on the low standard of proof that their claim to fear members of another local family as a result of a land dispute was credible. For this reason, the judge concluded that they would not be at real risk of serious harm if they returned to Bangladesh. The appeal was dismissed.

4. The losing party in an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal can apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. If permission is granted, the Upper Tribunal will consider the legal arguments put forward by both sides in the appeal. The Upper Tribunal only has power to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal if it concludes that the arguments put forward by the party that applied to appeal show that the decision involved the making of an error of law: see section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (‘TCEA 2007’).

5. If the Upper Tribunal finds that a decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, the First-tier Tribunal decision will stand. If a decision of the First-tier Tribunal is found to involve the making of an error of law the Upper Tribunal has power to set aside the decision. The Upper Tribunal will then decide whether it will remake the decision or whether the appeal might need to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal.

6. In this decision, the Upper Tribunal is only deciding whether the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law. At this stage, the decision does not go on to decide whether removal of the appellant would breach obligations under the Refugee Convention or would be unlawful under the HRA 1998.

7. The appellants were only granted permission to argue a single ground of appeal before the Upper Tribunal. For the reasons explained in more detail below, the Upper Tribunal has concluded that the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants does not disclose a material error of law that would have made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal. The First-tier Tribunal decision shall stand.

Decision and reasons

8. First-tier Tribunal Judge Cockburn (‘the judge’) dismissed the appeals in a decision sent on 28 August 2025. The judge summarised the case put forward by both parties [4]-[6]. The appellants claimed that there was a land dispute with a local family. In May 2017 this led to a violent clash with the other family, which led to the death of their older brother (‘AS’), the hospitalisation of the second appellant, their father, and their uncle. The appellants claimed that the incident was reported to the police but the perpetrators were released on payment of a bribe. The appellants were taken to Dhaka for their safety where they lived for 2 years until they left Bangladesh to travel to the UK in November 2019 on visit visas.

9. The judge recorded that the respondent did not accept that there was sufficient evidence to show that there was a land dispute. Nor had the appellants explained how or why the people that they fear in their local area might have influence throughout Bangladesh. The respondent also noted various inconsistencies in the documents produced in support of the claim. The respondent’s response dated 04 April 2025 corrected an error in the decision letter. The respondent made clear that she considered that the appellants could access sufficient protection from the Bangladesh authorities and/or would be able to relocate to another area to avoid the people they fear as they had done before [14]-[15]. I note that the respondent’s position was inaccurately recorded at [6(a)] of the First-tier Tribunal decision.

10. The judge turned to consider the credibility of the account [13]-[26]. The judge identified a number of inconsistencies in the evidence, including doubts about the second appellant’s identity, discrepancies in documentary records concerning his age, conflicting dates relating to the death of the appellants’ brother, and other inconsistencies in the documents. The judge found that the documents from Bangladesh could not be relied upon given these discrepancies and the evidence concerning the availability of false documents in Bangladesh. The judge also placed weight on the absence of evidence from the appellants’ uncle in the UK, who was said to have been closely involved with the family, in contact with relatives in Bangladesh, and was instrumental in obtaining the supporting documents. The judge found the appellants’ explanations for their lack of knowledge about their family’s current circumstances and any continuing risk in Bangladesh to be inadequate. Overall, the judge found their evidence to be vague and lacking reasonable detail.

11. The appellants applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on several grounds. The First-tier Tribunal only granted permission to appeal in relation to the first of those grounds. The appellants did not renew the application for permission to appeal directly to the Upper Tribunal in relation to the grounds which were refused permission.

12. The sole ground before the Upper Tribunal is that the judge failed to take into account relevant background evidence relating to Bangladesh.

13. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions because they are a matter of record, but I will refer to any relevant arguments in the decision.

14. I bear in mind that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of a specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings: see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19.

15. Much of the first few paragraphs of the first ground of appeal simply recited the judge’s decision [6]-[9]. At [10] of the grounds it was submitted that the judge failed to address a series of relevant sections of the Home Office Country Information and Policy Note (CPIN) titled ‘Bangladesh: Actors of Protection’ (Version 2.0 – November 2023), which were referred to in the appellants’ skeleton argument. The guidance recorded widespread corruption and inefficiency of the police and judiciary in Bangladesh, which accorded with the appellants’ claim that they were not afforded any redress when they filed a formal complaint by way of an FIR. The first ground went on to say that this should have been taken into account as supportive of the appellants’ credibility, especially when much of the documentary evidence was found to be broadly consistent with their account.

16. At the hearing, Mr Swain argued that the judge’s failure to consider the background evidence contained in the CPIN undermined the whole of the judge’s credibility findings. The background evidence was supportive of the fact that mob violence did happen in Bangladesh. Mr Swain referred to the evidence that had been produced in support of the appeal, including their brother’s death certificate, photographs of his body, a letter from the Union Council, and hospital certificates.

17. I conclude that the first ground of appeal does not disclose any material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal decision for the following reasons.

18. First, the background evidence was only likely to be relevant to the overall plausibility of the appellants’ account and is not, in itself, capable of overcoming the series of specific reasons given by the judge for rejecting the reliability of the documents produced in support of the appeal and the credibility of the appellants’ account. All that the evidence showed was that corruption and bribery is widespread within the police and that some people resort to ‘mob justice’.

19. The judge heard evidence from the appellants and was best placed to assess their reliability as witnesses. The judge found their evidence to be vague and lacking in detail. While some of the evidence was supportive of their account, other evidence was internally inconsistent, including when compared to some of the documents produced from Bangladesh. It was open to the judge to conclude that it was implausible that the appellants could give little detail about the current situation when they are now adults and continue to be in contact with family members in Bangladesh. It was also open to the judge to conclude that it would have been reasonable to expect their uncle in the UK to provide evidence given that he was the person who was said to be in contact with family members in Bangladesh and was the person who obtained the documentary evidence relied on [23].

20. Second, it is not incumbent on a judge to refer to each and every piece of evidence in a decision. It is clear from the decision that the judge considered the evidence that was said to relate to the individual facts of the case [19]. Nothing in the generalised background evidence was capable of making any material difference to the judge’s key unchallenged credibility findings relating to that evidence.

21. Third, nothing in the grounds, even as originally pleaded, specifically challenged the judge’s findings relating to sufficiency of protection or internal relocation. Even if the appellants’ claim relating to the land dispute was taken at its highest, they were able to relocate to Dhaka for 2 years in the past. There was insufficient evidence to show that the non-state actors that they feared were motivated to harm them or had sufficient influence to seek them out throughout Bangladesh. Accordingly, even if the background evidence were capable of undermining the credibility findings, which has not been established, it was not capable of making any material difference to the outcome of the appeal.

22. For these reasons, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law. The decision shall stand.

Notice of Decision

The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of a material error of law

The decision shall stand

M. Canavan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 July 2026