Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000735
PA/04490/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 1st of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

TALHA AZIZ PATEL
(no anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Jegede, Solicitor at SAJ Legal
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

At: Manchester Civil Justice Centre on the 11 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of India born on 5 April 1987.
2. On 1 December 2025 the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decisions to refuse to grant him leave to remain on either protection or human rights grounds. The Appellant sought permission to appeal against that decision to the Upper Tribunal. On 13 February 2026 permission was granted in respect of only one of the four grounds advanced by the Appellant: that the First-tier Tribunal had arguably erred in failing to expressly consider whether the Appellant qualified for leave to remain in the UK on private life grounds, in particular whether he could demonstrate that there were “very significant obstacles” to his integration in India, thus meeting the requirement of the relevant Immigration Rule.
3. When the appeal came before Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato on 30 June 2026 the Secretary of State, that day represented by Senior Presenting Officer Dr Ibisi, was prepared to accept that there was an omission to consider the arguments advanced by the Appellant in respect of Article 8. The First-tier Tribunal had dismissed the Appellant’s Article 8 claim on the grounds that it was one which “stands and falls” with the protection claim. Dr Ibisi accepted that this was not entirely accurate, and that the Appellant had in evidence and submissions relied on matters that were not related at all to the protection aspects of his claim. Judge Lodato accepted that Dr Ibisi’s concession was correct and directed that a further hearing be convened in order to determine whether the Appellant should be granted limited leave to remain on human rights grounds.
4. A transfer order was signed by Principal Resident Judge Mandalia on the 15 July 2026 and so the matter now comes before me.
5. At the hearing the Appellant gave evidence before me in clear spoken English with a notable Northern accent. He adopted all three of his witness statements dated 1 August 2025, 21 October 2025 and 4 September 2026. He answered some supplementary questions. I then heard some brief evidence from his cousin Ms Vali. I noted that the Appellant’s sister, who is in the UK on a spouse visa, was prepared to give evidence but due to complications arising in her pregnancy she was unable to attend court: Mr McVeety indicated that he was prepared to accept her written evidence without challenge. I then heard submissions from Mr Jegede and Mr McVeety and reserved my decision. Before I give my decision and reasons, I would like to acknowledge that Mr Jegede did an outstanding job in preparing this appeal. The Appellant should know that there really is no more than could have been said in his favour.
6. I begin with considering the provision relating to ‘private life’ under the Immigration Rules.

‘Very Significant Obstacles’
7. In Appendix Private Life the Secretary of State has set out her policy on the circumstances in which leave will be granted on private life grounds. The relevant paragraph for the purpose of this appeal is PL 5.1 (2):
PL 5.1. Where the applicant is aged 18 or over on the date of application:

1. (a) the applicant must have been continuously resident in the UK for more than 20 years; or

2. (b) where the applicant has not been continuously resident in the UK for more than 20 years, the decision maker must be satisfied there would be very significant obstacles to the applicant’s integration into the country where they would have to live if required to leave the UK.
8. The leading authority on how that test should be interpreted remains Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813. At [14] Sales LJ holds that the question of whether someone is capable of integrating in a given country “calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it”. In Parveen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932 at [9], Underhill LJ confirms that the phrase erects a self-evidently elevated threshold but cautioned against glossing it: the task is “simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on … and to decide whether they regard them as ‘very significant’”.
9. The Appellant has been in this country since 2010. He therefore left India as a 23 year old and has not been back there since. He tells me, and I accept, that he was a student when he left and that he has no experience of working there. The Appellant told me in oral evidence that his parents remain in the family home. He last spoke to them about a month ago. His mother is a housewife; she has diabetes and is frequently unwell. His father did run his own shop but is now retired.
10. The central issue in the protection appeal before the First-tier Tribunal had been whether the Appellant was at risk from money lenders who had funded his journey to the UK and study here. Judge Alis had found, in findings upheld by Judge Lodato, that the loan had in fact been made to the Appellant’s father, but that no harm had arisen from the lender.
11. Mr Jegede, on the Appellant’s behalf collated some impressive information about the economic situation that the Appellant would face on return to India. He does not have a Aadhaar card, and although he would be entitled to one, this could take up to six months. Without a card a citizen is not entitled to welfare payments or other state benefits in India. The Home Office had pointed to the Appellant’s educational achievements since he came to the UK to suggest that he would be well placed to find work upon returning home; Mr Jegede produced evidence to show that in fact the unemployment rate for graduates in India is nine times higher than the rate for the unskilled or illiterate. Mr Jegede submitted that in these circumstances there would be no safety net for the Appellant upon his return.
12. Although there is no medical evidence before me, and no formal diagnosis of any mental health condition, I accept the evidence of the Appellant and the various witnesses who confirm it, that he has found the past few years of uncertainty very difficult to cope with. He feels depressed and hopeless, and is worried about his future.
13. I have considered all of that. I accept that the Appellant will be disappointed to go back to India. He and his family have invested a lot in him coming here, he has worked hard and I accept that he has no doubt become wedded to the idea that he can remain here. The reality is however that the difficulties that the Appellant will face in readjusting to life back in India fall far short of the elevated threshold imposed by the rule. This requires not just that there are “obstacles” to his integration, but that these are “very significant”: this means, in effect, that he will be unable to, or would find it extremely difficult, to re-establish a private life for himself there. That is clearly not the case. He has never worked in India, but he lived there until he was 23 and is obviously familiar with the language, culture and way that society operates. His parents are still there, as are, presumably, friends and other extended family members that he left behind in 2010. It is clear from the many testimonies that have been produced that the Appellant is a pleasant and kind individual who goes out of his way to help others: qualities that will make it very straightforward for him to make new friends.
14. He will be able to live with his parents, even if only in the short term, and once he has found his feet will be able to work to support himself, just as he has done here. I appreciate that the economic situation for graduates may be difficult in India, but if the Appellant needs to earn money to support himself, he can do so by getting a job that is less skilled than his qualifications would perhaps merit. That is precisely what graduates to here, faced with the difficult job market: they take any job that they can, in order to pay the bills. Although I have had regard to the Appellant’s current lack of a Aadhaar card, this is not something I have attached any significant weight to, given that the Appellant does not have to claim welfare benefits because he is able and willing to work. I do not underestimate the challenges that the Appellant will face re-acclimatising to life in India, but these fall well short of amounting to the very significant obstacles required by the rule.

Article 8 ECHR
15. Although Appendix Private Life purports to delineate the extent to which an individual may rely on his private life as a means to remaining in the UK, it is agreed between the parties that in fact it does not. That is because nothing is said in the rules therein about the claimant’s life in the UK.
16. I accept that the Appellant enjoys a private life in the UK. The evidence on this matter is uncontroversial. Mr McVeety accepted, on behalf of the Secretary of State, that the Appellant is one of four siblings in the UK. His two sisters and a brother are all married here and have spouse visas. Nor is it in issue that the Appellant enjoys a warm relationship with them, their families, and a wide circle of family friends and acquaintances. The bundles contain numerous letters of support for him, testifying to his generous character and moral standing in his community. He volunteers at his local mosque.
17. The Appellant has, since August 2026, been living with his cousin Ms Vali. Her evidence was that he is a welcome houseguest, who helps her out with childcare for her two children and does things for her around the house. Ms Vali runs her own business, a takeaway called FT Smash Limited, and she has said that if he is permitted to stay, she will offer the Appellant employment.
18. I accept that the decision to refuse to grant the Appellant leave to remain is an interference with that private life because the effect of it will be that he has to leave the UK.
19. I now turn to consider whether or not the decision to interference with the Appellant’s private life, is in all the circumstances, reasonable or proportionate.
20. I must here have regard to the public interest factors set out in s117B Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
21. The maintenance of immigration control, including adherence to the immigration rules, is in the public interest. The Appellant came here lawfully with leave to enter as a student, but has since 2016 been an overstayer. His attempt to regularise his position by claiming asylum has failed. He does not presently meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules. This is therefore a factor that I must place significant weight upon.
22. It is in the public interest that persons who seek leave to remain in the UK are able to speak English because that ability means you are more likely to integrate and you are less of burden on the public purse. The Appellant spoke excellent English before me, and I note his postgraduate level studies in the UK. This is not a matter that weighs against him.
23. It is, for the same reasons, in the public interest that persons who seek leave to remain are financially independent. The Appellant is not allowed to work at the moment, but I accept that he has never claimed public funds and I see no reason to reject Ms Vali’s evidence that she would give him a job if he succeeds in his claim. I have not therefore weighed this factor against the Appellant.
24. The real difficulty for the Appellant, in terms of the law that I must apply, are the provisions found at s117B(4) and (5) Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002:
(4) Little weight should be given to—

(a) a private life, or
(b) a relationship formed with a qualifying partner,

that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully.

(5) Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person's immigration status is precarious.
25. As I note above, I accept that the Appellant has built a meaningful life here for himself and that is a right protected by Article 8. It is however qualified and limited protection. It is only protected in cases of flagrant or unlawful interference. It is for that reason that the statute reads as it does: private lives established when leave is either precarious or non-existent can only attract a ‘little weight’. This means that even taking into account the Appellant’s good character, and the fact that he did wait four years for a decision from the Respondent, his rights are unable, as a matter of law, to outweigh the public interest in upholding this refusal.

Decisions
26. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss the appeal on protection grounds is undisturbed.
27. The decision in respect of Article 8 ECHR is remade as follows: the appeal is dismissed.
28. There was an order for anonymity made by the First-tier Tribunal, maintained by Judge Lodato. That was made on the basis that there was an ongoing protection claim, and that the UK’s obligation to maintain the integrity of the international refugee framework outweighed the presumption in favour of open justice. As the case no longer involves any protection issues, I find no reason to maintain the order and it is discharged.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
28 September 2026