Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000739
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58809/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

SMR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Not Represented
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant (is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a 24 year old citizen of Bangladesh. He appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulholland (the Judge) to dismiss his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of protection and human rights claims to remain in the United Kingdom. Pursuant to section 12(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the issue for me is whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.
2. I maintain the anonymity order that was made by the Judge because the appellant has made a protection claim and an order is necessary lest anything said or done in these proceedings gives rise a risk to the appellant in his home country.
Background
3. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 3 October 2022 with permission to do so as a student. Having arrived, he stopped attending classes, and in January 2023 claimed asylum, stating that he feared persecution by the state authorities in Bangladesh because of his support for the political party Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shabir (BICS) and having been the subject of ill-treatment for that reason in the past. He submitted court papers to the respondent which he said showed that a fabricated criminal prosecution had been brought against him. He stated in interview that he had a hearing problem and had been advised to use olive oil to assist with that.
4. The respondent did not accept the appellant’s claim, finding in her decision dated 20 March 2024, his account to be internally inconsistent, lacking in detail, implausible, and inconsistent with external information. The respondent found that the appellant’s removal would not be incompatible with the private life the appellant had established during his brief stay in the United Kingdom and accordingly refused the protection and human rights claims.
5. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. In support of his appeal he submitted a bundle of evidence which included a witness statement in which he said that he was in fact a supporter of the Bangladesh national Party (BNP) (not BICS) and had been an active member of the BNP’s student wing, the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chatra Dal (BJCD). The appellant said that while in the United Kingdom he had made posts on Facebook which opposed the government in Bangladesh. In a supplementary bundle of evidence the appellant additionally submitted a medical report from Dr Raj Persaud which concluded that the appellant suffers from a serious psychiatric disorder, including the possibility of major depression, that he would not receive the correct medical treatment in Bangladesh, that he would not be fit to give an accurate of fair representation of himself and his situation and that he had expressed suicidal ideas and made a serious attempt on his own life. The supplementary bundle also included a report from Dr Farooqui who is based in Bangladesh and who said that the appellant could not get the psychiatric support he needs in Bangladesh. The respondent served a review in which she maintained her decision to refuse the appellant’s asylum and protection claims.
6. The appellant’s appeal was heard by the Judge on 5 November 2025. The appellant did not give evidence at the hearing. Having heard submissions from the two representatives the Judge reserved her decision.
The Judge’s Decision
7. The Judge promulgated her decision on 22 December 2025. In that decision she found that the appellant’s account had been fabricated to support a weak asylum claim ([56]). The Judge was not satisfied the appellant was a member of either the BICS or the BNP. The Judge was not satisfied the appellant was subject to court proceedings in Bangladesh or that he had received adverse attention in that country as a result of his political opinion. The Judge was not satisfied that the appellant had been involved in politics while in the United Kingdom or that the appellant had genuine political opinions at all. Instead the Judge found that the appellant had attended demonstrations in the United Kingdom in an attempt to bolster a weak claim. The Judge found the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh and that he would not be at risk on return to that country.
8. The Judge found that the appellant’s removal would not be incompatible with the appellant’s Article 8 Convention rights. Although the appellant claimed to be the father of a child born in the United Kingdom, the Judge found that the appellant did not have a family life with that child. The Judge concluded that removal would not have unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant and that balancing the appellant’s private life against the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control, the applicant’s removal would be a proportionate. The Judge attached little weight to the conclusions of Dr Persaud which she found to be unreliable and found that the appellant had not established that his removal would be incompatible with his Article 3 Convention rights.
The appeal to this tribunal
9. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to this Tribunal by another First-tier Tribunal Judge on five grounds which asserted:
1. Mistake of fact: The Judge reduced the weight to be attached to the report of Dr Persaud on the basis that the appellant’s GP records had not been provided to him, when in fact the evidence showed the GP records had been provided.
2. Failure to apply guidance on vulnerability: having accepted the medical evidence that the appellant was unfit to give evidence, it was irrational for the Judge to then find his account not to be credible because it was vague and lacking in detail.
3. Irrational treatment of documentary evidence
4. Legal misdirection about sur place activity: the Judge dismissed the risk arising from the appellant’s political activities in the United Kingdom because they were “self-serving”.
5. Failure to apply the correct legal test when considering Article 3 and Article 8: the judge dismissed the Article 3 claim on the sole basis treatment is available in Bangladesh and reached a perverse conclusion that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Bangladesh.
10. The appellant’s appeal was initially listed on 22 April 2026. At the time the hearing was listed the appellant was represented by Zyba Law, however at 19:15 hours on 21 April 2026 Zyba Law informed the Tribunal that they no longer acted for the appellant. The appellant did not attend the hearing scheduled on 22 April 2026 and in the circumstances Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Deakin decided to adjourn the hearing. The appeal was thereafter listed to take place before me today1.
11. The appellant was notified of this hearing by a notice being sent to his last known email address, posted to his last known address and on the morning of the hearing a message was left on the voicemail of his last known mobile phone number. I was satisfied that all reasonable steps had been taken to notify the appellant of the hearing and that it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing pursuant to rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules notwithstanding the fact the appellant was not present. I therefore heard submissions from Ms Everett on behalf of the respondent before I reserved my decision.
Analysis
12. I am satisfied that the grounds of appeal do not identify an error of law in the decision of the Judge. I explain that conclusion by reference to the five grounds of appeal advanced, in the paragraphs below.
Ground One
13. This was the ground that led to the grant of permission to appeal on the basis that it was arguable that the Judge made a mistake of fact. It is suggested that the Judge erred at [103] of her decision when she was analysing the report of Dr Persaud and said the following:
103 The Psychiatric report states that it was difficult to establish a diagnosis because the Appellant was guarded and because of difficulty with the language barrier. Page 92 lists the documents considered. There is no mention of the GP records which would have provided a more reliable picture of the Appellant’s issues. The conclusion is based on inadequate material. There is no record of the mental health state examination or reasoning given. There is extensive reference to the state of healthcare in Bangladesh (95-96) yet the expert has not declared any expertise of that. I attach little weight to the conclusions.
14. Ground one asserts that this analysis by the Judge “is demonstrably incorrect” because there was evidence before the Judge that the appellant’s solicitors had sent the appellant’s “NHS medical records” to Dr Persaud for review. It is immediately clear however that at its highest this evidence does not demonstrate that the appellant’s GP records were provided to Dr Persaud.
15. The Judge was, contrary to the grounds, entirely correct when he said that Dr Persaud made no mention of the GP records when listing the documents he had considered at page 92 of the hearing bundle:
In preparing this report I understand my duties to the court. I have complied with that duty and address this report to the court. I read various documents including NHS medical records in the form of a sick certificate.
16. It is not clear from this summary whether the “NHS medical records in the form of a sick certificate” is the same as the “NHS medical records” that Zyba Law say they sent to Dr Persaud. What is very clear however is that Dr Persaud makes no reference to GP records in this list of the documents he has considered just as the Judge states in her decision. Neither does Dr Persaud refer to GP records in any other part of his report or when explaining his opinion. Far from the Judge being mistaken about what Dr Persaud said he had considered therefore, the Judge has reflected both the list of considered documents and the report as a whole when stating there is no mention of the GP records which would have provided a more reliable picture of the appellant’s issues.
17. The mistake of fact asserted in ground one is simply not established and this ground must therefore fail.
Ground two
18. Ground two similarly is based on a false premise which does not reflect the finding actually made by the Judge. It is said in ground two that “At paragraph 6, the FtT accepted the medical evidence that the Appellant was ‘not fit to give evidence’ due to his severe mental health condition”. What the Judge in fact said at [6] of her decision was this:
The Appellant decided not to give evidence and submit himself for examination because of mental health issues as described in the medical reports.
19. The Judge did not therefore “accept” that the medical evidence was that the appellant was not fit to give evidence but simply recorded at [6] the appellant’s decision not to give evidence. Contrary to this ground, the Judge explicitly found the report of Dr Persaud to be unreliable and gave it, including Dr Persaud’s opinion that the appellant’s “memory problems and mental illness means he would not be able to give an accurate or fair representation of himself and his situation”, little weight.
20. Contrary to the assertion in this ground there was nothing “incoherent” in the approach of the Judge. Instead the Judge gives entirely rational and reasonable explanation for why she found that the appellant’s memory problems could not be explained because of mental health issues, noting at [25] “at the time of the interviews, he never mentioned suffering from any mental health issues despite being asked. He said he was fit and well and understood the interpreter”. Similarly at [32] when assessing the appellant’s inconsistent accounts about which political party he supported, the Judge said: “I do not accept that the Appellant’s mental health issues would have led him to make things up and there is little evidence that he was suffering from mental health issues at the time he made the claim that he was a leader of the [BICS}. He never mentioned this at interview and he said he was fit and well”. Again at [39] the Judge states “The GP records have been produced. There is no mention of the Appellant suffering from memory issues or that his condition could cause him to be unable to reliably recall his account or make it up”.
21. The Judge therefore comprehensibly and coherently rejected the suggestion that the appellant’s inconsistent, vague and lacking in detail account, was the result of mental health issue which caused him memory problems. This was a rational and reasonable conclusion to draw from the evidence adduced.
Ground three
22. Ground three is likewise based on a false premise. Contrary to the suggestion made in this ground, the Judge did not reject a verification report that had been adduced “because it ‘repeated the contents of the documents’”. It is not clear where this suggestion comes from, as it does not accurately reflect what the Judge said at [46] of her decision. The ground goes on to complain that the Judge “engaged in circular reasoning” and that the Judge dismissed the evidence in the verification report because she disbelieved the appellant. Again this is not an accurate description of the Judge’s decision and it is not clear what is the basis of this unfounded assertion. In fact the Judge gives a number of reasons at [46] – [50] of her decision for why the reliability of the document was undermined. Those reasons include internal inconsistencies in the evidence (see [46] and [47]), incomplete evidence (see [47]), a failure to take reasonable steps to verify the documents (see [48] and the prevalence of corruption and fraud (see [49]).
23. Contrary to this ground of appeal, the Judge unquestionably did apply the relevant principles from A (Tanveer Ahmed) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 00439 making specific reference to that case and the guidance it provides at [28].
Ground four
24. Once again this ground of appeal bears little comparison to the Judge’s decision. It is said that that at [74] of her decision the Judge dismissed the risk to the appellant arising from the appellant’s political activities in the United Kingdom “solely because they were ‘self-serving’”. The Judge does not however refer to the appellant’s activities being self-serving in that paragraph and she certainly does not dismiss risk to the appellant on that basis. Instead, at [74] the Judge records her conclusion that the appellant has not drawn enough attention to himself through his activities in the United Kingdom to give rise to him being at risk on return. That conclusion did not involve an error of law.
Ground five
25. Following the same theme, ground five makes the incorrect assertion that the Judge dismissed the appellant’s Article 3 Convention claim “on the sole basis that medical treatment is ‘available’ in Bangladesh.” In fact the Judge was not persuaded that there were substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy. This conclusion was based only in part on the availability of mental health treatment in Bangladesh, but also on the unreliable evidence that was adduced of the appellant’s medical condition.
Conclusion
26. The grounds of appeal can therefore be seen to be inaccurate and misleading. They do not identify an arguable error of law in the Judge’s decision.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge did not contain an error of law and shall stand.
The appeal is dismissed.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 July 2026