Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000743
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/56669/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MOXON

Between

THE ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Appellant
and

ALAA ALKHALAF
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Chakmakjian, Counsel (via CVP)
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer (in person)

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 1 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The ECO appeals, with permission, a decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), dated 5th November 2025 granting entry clearance to Ms Alkahaf. It is argued that the Judge materially erred in law in his positive findings that Ms Alkahaf satisfies the Relationship and Suitability Requirements of the Immigration Rules.

2. I shall hereafter refer to the parties as they appeared before the First-tier Tribunal.

Background

3. The Appellant is a national of Syria.

4. She initially applied for entry clearance to the United Kingdom on 26th February 2022 to join her spouse, the Sponsor, a refugee, under the Family Reunion Scheme. That application was refused as it was not accepted that the Appellant and Sponsor were married. It was noted that the Appellant relied on a marriage contract issued on 11th September 2019, yet the Sponsor stated in his screening interview in October 2020 that he was single. In his Statement of Evidence form, dated December 2021, the Sponsor stated that he was married but gave details of someone other than the Appellant. When asked by the ECO for an explanation, the Appellant and Sponsor both stated that he had provided her nickname and date of birth for fear that information would be shared with the Syrian government.

5. An appeal against that decision was heard on 10th October 2024 by another Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (“the 2024 Judge”). The 2024 Judge dismissed the appeal and rejected the explanation for the discrepancies in the information provided to the Respondent during the application process.

6. Prior to the 2024 Judge’s determination, the Appellant submitted a further application on 26th March 2024, which was refused on 7th June 2024. The Respondent did not accept that the claimed spousal relationship was genuine and relied upon its earlier reasoning and found that the Appellant had sought to rely upon false documents concerning the Sponsor’s purported income.

7. The Appellant claimed that the Sponsor was employed by Dessert Lab NCL Ltd and provided payslips and an employment letter. The Respondent rejected those documents and relied upon a Document Verification Report which concluded that they were false. It was noted that there was no record of the Sponsor’s employment with the company; and the payslips showed a national insurance number that differs from the Sponsor’s. Due to the reliance on false documents, the Respondent concluded that the Suitability Requirements of the Immigration Rules were not satisfied. The Appellant thereafter provided letters from the Sponsor’s purported employer, and the business’ accountant, to address the issues raised.

8. Satisfaction of the Suitability Requirement was conceded by the Respondent within a July 2025 Respondent Review. However, when the appeal was first listed for a substantive hearing in September 2025, the Respondent was permitted to withdraw the concession and the appeal was adjourned for a further Respondent Review, which was subsequently provided and is dated 6th October 2025. In relation to the documents determined to be false, the October 2025 Review detailed:

“The Respondent maintains the position from the RFRL that the Appellant’s application fails on suitability due to providing false documents. The Respondent relies upon the document verification report contained at page 26 of RB, this confirms that at the time of the application there were no records held by HMRC for the claimed employment for the sponsor with Dessert Lab NCL Ltd. It is noted that there has since been letters from the employer and the accountant provided explaining the issue and that this has been corrected, however this is not accepted as a valid explanation and any changes made with HMRC have been made retrospectively with HMRC only after these issues were pointed out within the RFRL.”

9. The appeal hearing was then heard by the Judge on 5th November 2025. The Appellant’s appeal was allowed by the Judge in a determination dated 7th November 2025. The Judge accepted that the marriage was genuine and accepted the explanation in relation to the financial documents. The Judge found that the Relationship and Suitability Requirements were satisfied. The Judge found that the Financial Requirement was not satisfied at the time of the application but that the Sponsor has since become entitled to Personal Independence Payment. The Judge noted that the Appellant would therefore be exempt from the Financial Requirements as of the date of the appeal hearing. Given that the date of the appeal hearing was material when considering Article 8 outside of the Rules, the Judge concluded that in all the circumstances there would be a disproportionate breach of her Article 8 rights if entry clearance was refused.

Permission to appeal

10. The Respondent submitted two grounds of appeal.

11. The first ground of appeal related to the Judge’s assessment that the Suitability Requirement was satisfied. It is argued that there was insufficient explanation of why the Appellant’s evidence was accepted.

12. The second ground of appeal argued that the Judge had failed to take the 2024 Judge’s determination as his starting point when considering the genuineness of the claimed marital relationship.

13. Permission to appeal was granted by another Judge of the First-tier Tribunal.

The hearing

14. It was confirmed at the outset that I had all the relevant documentation being relied upon by the parties.

15. I heard oral arguments from the advocates. Mr McVeety opened his submissions by stating that he would concentrate on Ground 2, which he considered was the stronger of the two grounds. In relation to Ground 1, I asked him what more the Judge could have said to make his decision clear, and Mr McVeety sensibly and properly conceded that he could not answer.

Discussion and analysis

16. Throughout consideration of the appeal, I had regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at paragraph 2:

"The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i. An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii. The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii. An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v. An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract."

17. The restricted jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal was also outlined by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, which at paragraph 26 summarised the settled case authorities:

“(i) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];

(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];

(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];

(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];

(v) judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];

(vi) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].”

18. In addition to the principles above, I also reminded myself of the merits of concise decision writing, as outlined within the ‘Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions’, dated 4th July 2024:

“Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute, and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved.

Stating reasons at any greater length than is necessary in the particular case is not in the interests of justice. To do so is an inefficient use of judicial time, does not assist either the parties or an appellate court or tribunal, and is therefore inconsistent with the overriding objective. Providing concise reasons is to be encouraged. Adequate reasons for a substantive decision may often be short. In some cases a few succinct paragraphs will suffice. For a procedural decision the reasons required will usually be shorter.”

19. It is not the role of the Upper Tribunal to substitute its own view in the absence of an error of law and I have reminded myself of the judgment of Baroness Hale at paragraph 30 of AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49:

“[The decisions of expert tribunals] should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. Appellate courts should not rush to find such misdirection’s simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently.”

Ground 1

20. Pursuant to the 2024 application, the Appellant provided an employment letter from Dessert Lab NCL Ltd together with payslips from that company in relation to the Sponsor’s claimed employment. A document verification report, dated 23rd May 2024, concluded that the documents were false as checks were undertaken with HMRC and the payment of the monies was not corroborated by HMRC records. There was also a discrepancy in relation to the Sponsor’s National Insurance number.

21. The Appellant provided a letter from the Sponsor’s purported employer, dated 20th November 2024, which explains that there had been an accounting error and confirming that the Sponsor was an employee at the material time. A letter from the organisation’s accountants, dated 23rd July 2024, was also provided which similarly outlined that there had been an error.

22. The Judge found at paragraph 15 of his determination:

“In respect of the financial circumstances, I accept the explanation now given (by the employers, Dessert Lab NCL Ltd, and their accountants, Renwick), but not conceded in the second Review of 6 October 2025 by the respondent, who was not represented today, that the sponsor's earnings with Dessert Lab NCL for the period 1 June 2023 to 1 July 2024 are genuine.”

23. The Respondent argues that it is not known why the Judge accepted the explanation and that he had not addressed the issues raised in the Refusal.

24. As I queried during the hearing, and as Mr McVeert sensibly accepted, there was little more that the judge could have said.

25. The Judge’s conclusions cannot be said to be “plainly wrong” (Volpi v Volpi, paragraph 2(i)). He was entitled to give weight to the evidence that he considered appropriate (paragraph 2(iv)) and his balanced consideration should not be set aside unless rationally unsupportable (2(v)). He gave adequate reasons for his decision, namely preference for the explanation provided by the employer and accountant (2(vi)).

26. As held in Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC), at paragraph 14, and referred to within the Grounds of Appeal:

“It is … necessary for First-tier Tribunal judges to identify and resolve the key conflicts in the evidence and explain in clear and brief terms their reasons for preferring one case to the other so that the parties can understand why they have won or lost.”

27. This is precisely what the Judge did, in a determination that was adequately reasoned and compliant with the Practice Directions for concise decision making

28. Ground 1 is therefore dismissed.

Ground 2

29. Within written Grounds of Appeal, and within Mr McVeety’s submissions, it was argued that the Judge had failed to refer to the 2024 Judge’s findings or the evidence that led to those findings. It was also argued that the Judge had failed to explain why the new evidence relied upon by the Appellant had caused him to depart from the findings of the 2024 Judge. It was argued that the Judge failed to adhere to the principles within Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 000702.

30. In Devaseelan it was held at paragraph 39:

“(1) The first Adjudicator's determination should always be the starting-point. It is the authoritative assessment of the Appellant's status at the time it was made. In principle issues such as whether the Appellant was properly represented, or whether he gave evidence, are irrelevant to this.

(2) Facts happening since the first Adjudicator's determination can always be taken into account by the second Adjudicator. If those facts lead the second Adjudicator to the conclusion that, at the date of his determination and on the material before him, the appellant makes his case, so be it. The previous decision, on the material before the first Adjudicator and at that date, is not inconsistent.

(3) Facts happening before the first Adjudicator's determination but having no relevance to the issues before him can always be taken into account by the second Adjudicator. The first Adjudicator will not have been concerned with such facts, and his determination is not an assessment of them.”

31. The Judge identified the determination of the 2024 Judge and explained his reasons for nevertheless finding that the further evidence now provided shows that the relationship and marriage is genuine and subsistig (emphasis added):

“12. The burden of proof is on the appellant and the civil standard of the balance of probabilities applies. The appellant made her application to join her spouse, Abdulaziz K Alhajji (a British citizen, having received refugee status), on 26 March 2024, having failed in her previous application in a refusal decision made on 30 May 2024. That decision had been appealed against, and in a Tribunal decision … of 12 November 2024, her appeal failed on the grounds that the Tribunal did not accept the genuineness of the relationship or marriage. The provisions of Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 00702 apply to the current decision so that the previous decision is the starting point. However, I am satisfied that considerable further evidence has been provided which permits me to depart from that conclusion.

13. I accept that the parties are genuinely married, initially through a religious marriage on 11 February 2019 in Turkey, and in a subsequent proxy marriage in Syria of 5 February 2022. I also accept the sponsor's application why he had previously said (falsely) that he was not married (SCR 1.19), and then in a later interview (AIR 19) identified Naseem Alshaikhou (born on 1 January 1998) as his spouse in his asylum interview. The reason why he gave this false information was due to his fear that the appellant would be harmed by the Syrian authorities if she had been identified in those interviews - despite the interview forms stating that information provided would not be shared with their home country.

14. In light of the further documents provided in connection with the marriage, including the family civil status records of 16 March and 16 September 2025 - and the further explanation contained in the appellant's solicitor Khansaa Lababidi statement of 20 September 2025 - and taking into account the recent visit the sponsor made to Erbil, Iraq, from 11 June to 19 July 2024, in order to join the appellant, I am persuaded that this is a genuine relationship and marriage and the appellant can therefore meet the suitability requirements in respect of the relationship. I accept that the marriage of 11 February 2019 (in Turkey) was not accepted as legally valid, and therefore a legal marriage (by proxy) took place in Syria on 5 February 2022.”

32. The Judge was required to take the findings of the 2024 Judge as his starting point. He was not required to set out those findings within his decision. To do so would have been unnecessary since both parties were aware of the findings. It would have been contrary to the aforementioned Practice Direction. The Judge was evidently aware of the previous decision as he referenced it and Deveseelan at paragraph 12 of his determination. He specified the further evidence that has since been provided, and it is clear from the determination that the further evidence post-dates the 2024 Judge’s determination.

33. Mr McVeety identified paragraph 13 of the Judge’s determination and argued that the Judge had accepted an explanation that had previously been rejected by the 2024 Judge and that this was permissible.

34. However, paragraph 13 must be read together with paragraph 12, particularly the last sentence, and paragraph 14. It is clear, as specifically detailed in paragraph 14, that the Judge found there to be further evidence that tipped the balance in favour of the Appellant’s claim.

35. It is clear from a holistic reading of the determination that the Judge had taken the 2024 Judge’s determination as his starting point, as required by Deveseelan, but then considered the further evidence that had been provided since that decision, as he was entitled and required to do. The Judge found that the evidence supported the claim of genuine marriage and relationship. A holistic reading of the determination shows that this evidence clearly enhanced his view of the credibility of the Appellant and Sponsor and that was then factored into the consideration of whether the explanations given in relation to the information provided during the first application was accepted.

36. I accept that the Judge could have worded that finding better to ensure clarity, but the determination as drafted was adequate and his decision and reasons are clearly ascertainable from the determination. I also accept that the Judge could and should have explained why he was not drawing any adverse inferences from the fact that the some of the evidence does not appear to have been provided to the 2024 Judge, given that some of it would have been available at that stage. However, I note that much of the evidence post-dates October 2024, and would not have been reasonably available in 2024, and I also note that this argument has not been progressed by the Respondent in the final Respondent Review or these Upper Tribunal proceedings.

37. None of the points I raise in the preceding paragraph amount to an error of law, either material or otherwise. The Judge reached conclusions that were reasonably open to him upon the evidence and those conclusions were adequately explained.

38. Whilst another judge may not have formed the conclusions reached by this Judge, his conclusions cannot be said to be “plainly wrong” (Volpi v Volpi, paragraph 2(i)). He was entitled to give the weight he believed appropriate to the evidence that supported the genuineness of the relationship, and which post-dates the 2024 Judge’s determination (paragraph 2(iv)). It is clear from a holistic reading of the determination that he gave balanced consideration and so should not be set aside unless his conclusions are rationally unsupportable, which they are not (2(v)). He gave an adequate explanation for the decision, as particularly outlined in paragraph 14 and his references to relying upon the evidence that had not been before the 2024 Judge (2(vi)).

39. Ground 2 is therefore dismissed.

Conclusion

40. The Judge’s determination demonstrates an adequate analysis of the evidence and is adequately reasoned. He made findings of fact that were open to him. As such, no error of law is made out, either material or otherwise.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.

DUTJ Moxon
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3rd June 2026

Name of Upper Tribunal Judge issuing approval: DUTJ Moxon

Appellant’s Name: Alaa Alkhalaf
Case Number: HU/56669/2024
(UI-2026-000743)

I approve the attached Decision and Reasons for promulgation.

Name: DUTJ Moxon

Date: 3rd June 2026

Amendments that require further action by Promulgation section:

Change of address:

Rep: Appellant:

Other Information: