UI-2026-000746
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000746
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/02093/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
2nd November 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAYKIN
Between
MARGARET DEGRAFT AKASSEH
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Unrepresented
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 14 September 2026
DECISION AND REASONS
1. Following an error of law hearing on 11 June 2026, I allowed the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 25 June 2025 and set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal with the findings at paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 preserved. The case came back before me to remake the decision in the Appellant’s appeal against the refusal of her human rights claim and application for entry clearance to join her relative/Sponsor Mr Leo Enorzah in the United Kingdom.
2. The Appellant made an application for entry clearance which was assessed by the Respondent by reference to paragraph 297 of the Immigration Rules. The First-tier Tribunal accepted the Appellant and Sponsor are related as claimed, the Appellant’s parents are deceased and that the Sponsor would be able to adequately maintain and accommodate the Appellant in the United Kingdom without recourse to public funds. The First-tier Tribunal also concluded that in light of the TB certificate that was produced during the course of the appeal proceedings that the Appellant no longer fell afoul of paragraph A39 of the Immigration Rules. Those findings are preserved for the purposes of this decision.
3. The issues to be reconsidered at this hearing are:
(1) Whether there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make exclusion of the child undesirable and suitable arrangements have been made for the child’s care pursuant to paragraph 297(i)(f) of the Immigration Rules.
(2) Whether Article 8(1) is engaged.
(3) If so, whether the refusal decision is proportionate to a legitimate aim.
The evidence
4. The Appellant supplemented her written evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal with two recent bank statements of the Sponsor, five screenshots of communication on Whatsapp, and six recent money transfer receipts.
5. I heard further oral evidence from the Sponsor which is summarised as follows. The Sponsor still lives with his partner Mary in the United Kingdom. They both have ongoing health issues and are awaiting surgery; Mary is not currently working. The Appellant finished her studies about 3-4 years ago, she is not currently studying or working. The Appellant still lives with her sister Patrica. Patrica trained as a midwife but is not currently working. The sister’s rent and daily needs are met from the remittances sent by the Sponsor. The Sponsor sometimes sends the remittances to the landlord who takes the rent out and gives the remainder to the Appellant and her sister. The Sponsor speaks with them both on Whatsapp on a regular basis, at least every week, the screenshots are of the communication between the Appellant and the Sponsor. The Sponsor is responsible for both the Appellant and Patrica; there are no other living family members. He makes sure they are okay, checks if they need any money and provides moral guidance and support.
6. The Sponsor usually visits the Appellant every year but due to his medical conditions he has been unable to visit since 2022. He hopes to be able to travel after the operation he is currently awaiting.
7. Although Patrica had previously indicated that she wished to get married and start a family, she has changed her mind and would now like to study for a master’s degree and move to the USA. The Sponsor does not wish fund further education for Patrica or the Appellant in Ghana because he considers the education is of no value, there are limited job prospects and would be a waste of money.
8. The Appellant wishes to continue her education in the United Kingdom. If the Appellant were able to join the Sponsor in the United Kingdom, she would go to college and help the Sponsor and his partner with the housework.
Submissions
9. The Sponsor had nothing to add beyond what he told me in evidence. Ms McKenzie submitted that there were no serious and compelling circumstances that made the exclusion of the Appellant undesirable. The Appellant is suitably accommodated and supported and still lives with her sister. The evidence of family life was limited and as such Article 8(1) is not made out. In any event, the decision is proportionate.
Decision
10. At the time of the application for entry clearance and decision of the First-tier Tribunal in this appeal, paragraph 297(i)(f) of the Immigration Rules provided:
297. The requirements to be met by a person seeking indefinite leave to enter the United Kingdom as the child of a parent, parents or a close relative present and settled or being admitted for settlement in the United Kingdom are that he:
(i) is seeking leave to enter to accompany or join a parent, parents or a relative in one of the following circumstances:
…
(f) one parent or a relative is present and settled in the United Kingdom or being admitted on the same occasion for settlement and there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make exclusion of the child undesirable and suitable arrangements have been made for the child's care; and
11. The Immigration Rules were amended by HC 295 on 9 July 2026. By paragraph 8.1 and 8.2 of HC 295, paragraph 297(i)(f) of the Immigration Rules was amended to address the position of a child with one settled parent and one parent without leave in the United Kingdom. A new paragraph 297(i)(g) was inserted, which reads as follows:
(g) a close relative is present and settled in the United Kingdom and the applicant has no family other than the close relative in the UK that could reasonably be expected to support or care for them;
12. These changes to the Immigration Rules took effect on 3 August 2026, however, any application before 3 August 2026 is to be decided in accordance with the Immigration Rules in force on 2 August 2026. On 2 August 2026, paragraph 297(i)(f) provided as follows:
(f) one parent or a close relative is present and settled in the United Kingdom or being admitted on the same occasion for settlement, their other parent does not have (and is not being granted) limited leave in the UK and there are serious and compelling reasons to grant the applicant settlement;
13. Although neither party drew my attention to these amendments at the hearing, I have decided it is not necessary to invite submissions on them before reaching my decision. The reason is that the core test remains, as a consequence of the transitional provisions, whether there are “serious and compelling reasons” to grant the applicant settlement. This was addressed by the parties at the hearing. I will, therefore, have reference to paragraph 297(i)(f) of the Immigration Rules in force on 2 August 2026.
14. The meaning of ‘serious’ and ‘compelling’ was considered by the Upper Tribunal in Mundeba (s.55 and para 297(i)(f)) [2013] UKUT 00088 (IAC), at paragraph 34:
34. In our view, 'serious' means that there needs to be more than the parties simply desiring a state of affairs to obtain. 'Compelling' in the context of paragraph 297(i)(f) indicates that considerations that are persuasive and powerful. 'Serious' read with 'compelling' together indicate that the family or other considerations render the exclusion of the child from the United Kingdom undesirable. The analysis is one of degree and kind. Such an interpretation sets a high threshold that excludes cases where, without more, it is simply the wish of parties to be together however natural that ambition that may be.
15. Applying this guidance to the facts of this case, I do not accept that the Appellant meets the high threshold imposed by paragraph 297(i)(f). The Appellant is living together with her adult sister in stable accommodation, and her daily needs are provided for by her Sponsor. Although her sister had previously expressed a wish to marry and start her own family, her wishes have now changed. Whether Patrica is able to pursue further education or move to the USA remains to be seen, but as things stand before me there is no prospect of the Appellant’s living circumstances changing and I find that she will continue to be able to reside in her current home with her sister, supported by the Sponsor for the foreseeable future. Further education opportunities are plainly available in Ghana, whether the Appellant pursues those opportunities is a matter of choice for her and her Sponsor.
16. I find the sponsor’s ongoing support of the Appellant is commendable and I understand both his and the Appellant’s desire for her to join him in the United Kingdom to pursue further education and support the sponsor and his wife around the house but those factors amount to no more than their wish and do not come close to the requirements of the Rule. There are student routes available under the Immigration Rules should the Appellant wish to pursue further education in the United Kingdom.
17. For those reasons, I find that the Appellant does not meet the requirements of paragraph 297(i)(f).
18. Turning to Article 8 ECHR. The Appellant was born on 17 October 2007 and is 18 years of age at the date of the hearing, soon to be turning 19 years of age. Therefore, my analysis of whether family life is engaged must proceed in the context that the Appellant is an adult relative of her Sponsor.
19. Family life is normally limited to core cohabiting family but can be extended to other adult family relationships if they can demonstrate additional elements of dependency involving more than the normal emotional ties. The assessment is fact sensitive, where many factors may be relevant such as financial support, physical and psychological health and a combination of factors (IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 §132).
20. The Appellant and the Sponsor are related as cousins, although I accept that since her parents passed away the Sponsor has taken responsibility for the Appellant and considers her like a daughter. The Appellant and Sponsor have not seen each other since 2022, but I accept they have maintained regular contact by telephone. The evidence as to the substance of the contact was limited. There were some screenshots that showed calls of a few minutes in duration. Aside from generally checking that the Appellant is okay and has sufficient funds, the Sponsor explained to me that in his absence he was concerned about her safety as a young lady and he is worried about her becoming pregnant. These were generalised concerns and not based on any particular facts. He tries to give her moral guidance. The Appellant is financially dependent upon her Sponsor for her accommodation and daily needs.
21. I find that family life is engaged on the facts above. The relationship between the Appellant and the Sponsor is akin to a parental one. Although the Appellant is now a young adult, she remains dependent upon her Sponsor for her daily needs and the situation is essentially a continuation from when she was a child. In those circumstances the additional elements of dependence in my view are made out.
22. I do not accept that there are exceptional circumstances that result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant or her Sponsor for the following reasons:
(a) The Appellant and Sponsor have not previously lived together and have not seen each other since 2022. Family life can continue as it has to date through visits and electronic communication. There is no reason, other than the preference of education system in the UK, why the status quo cannot continue.
(b) The Sponsor has been able to effectively provide financial support from the UK and there is no reason why that would change.
(c) The Appellant and Sponsor maintain regular contact and there is no reason why that cannot continue.
(d) Aside from general moral guidance provided by the Sponsor, there are no particular features of the Appellant’s dependence upon the Sponsor that are exceptional. The main feature of dependence in this case is financial.
(e) The Appellant has access to education should she chose.
(f) Although the Sponsor and his wife would appreciate help around the home whilst they recover from ill-health, there is no reason why any assistance needed must be provided by the Appellant.
23. The appellant does not meet the Immigration Rules under the category she applied for at the time. I am obliged by s.117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to afford weight to the public interest in maintaining immigration control. If the appellant wishes to join her Sponsor and study in the United Kingdom there are potentially other options available to her.
24. In conclusion, I do not consider that the weight attached to the interests of the Appellant and the Sponsor outweigh the weight attached to the public interest in maintaining immigration control. Or in other words, there are no exceptional circumstances that result in unjustifiably harsh consequences to those affected by the refusal of entry clearance.
Notice of Decision
25. The appeal is dismissed on Article 8 human rights grounds.
E Daykin
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
26 October 2026