The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000748
First-tier Tribunal No:
EA/50070/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

27th October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

ELIZABETA SZEKELY
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms L Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer.
For the Respondent: Ms E Doerr, Counsel instructed by Westkin Law.

Heard at Field House on 11 September 2026


DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This matter was listed before me as a re-making of the decision in the Respondent Ms Szekely’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of her EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS’) application for pre-settled status/leave to remain. This follows Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Deakin’s earlier decision to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (the FtT’/’the Judge’). The FtT decision had allowed Ms Szekely’s appeal and was set aside because this contained material error(s) of law. Judge Deakin’s decision (the error of law decision’) was promulgated on 19th May 2026.
2. Following a transfer order, this matter was listed before me on 11th September 2026.
3. For ease of reference, from now on, I refer to the parties as they appeared below, namely to the Secretary of State as the Respondent and to Ms Szekely as the Appellant.
Factual background and procedural history
4. The Appellant is a Romanian national, who resides with her daughter, the Sponsor, a dual Hungarian-British citizen. The Appellant has been residing with her daughter since 2023 and applied for status under Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules, as a dependent parent of a “relevant naturalised British citizen”, resident in the UK prior to 31st December 2020.
5. The Judge at first instance determined that the Appellant was, and is, dependent on her daughter. The Respondent appealed, with permission, against that decision arguing that the Judge had erred in law on the basis that the Appellant needed to demonstrate that she was dependent on the Sponsor as at 31st December 2020. Consequently, by considering the issue as at the date of the application or hearing, the Judge had misdirected himself in law. Instead, he should have considered whether or not the Appellant was dependent as of the specified date of 31st December 2020.
6. As also referred to below, the ground of appeal pursued by the Respondent and summarised above, was conceded by the Appellant’s advocate in the Appelant’s Rule 24 response and before Judge Deakin on 23rd April 2026. The matter was instead pursued on behalf of the Appellant that the error made was not material, which ultimately was a defence of the Judge’s decision that was not accepted by Judge Deakin.
7. This matter was last considered by the Upper Tribunal on 28th July 2026, when a decision was made to adjourn the remaking hearing, which had then been listed for 30th July 2026. This was in part because the Appellant raised not long before the scheduled hearing that the Respondent’s appeal against the FtT was premised on an incorrect understanding of the operative provisions of Appendix EU, which in turn had been incorrectly conceded by the Appellant’s previous advocate in the Appellant’s Rule 24 response. Thus, the Appellant raised that the errors of law found were also mistaken in law. As a result, this, Judge Deakin vacated the re-making hearing due on 30th July 2026 and issued the following directions:
(i) For the Appellant (Ms Szekely) to file and serve written submissions addressing (a) whether the Upper Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the new arguments raised in her skeleton argument of 22nd July 2026 (and summarised immediately above) and (b) the onward case management of this appeal.
(ii) For the Respondent (the Secretary of State) to file and serve submissions in response.
8. Both parties filed their respective submissions accordingly and the matter came before me on 11th September 2026.
The hearing on 11th September 2026
9. Helpfully, in advance of the hearing, the Respondent confirmed and agreed that, having reviewed the matter and the submissions made in July 2026, it was not necessary for the Appellant to establish dependency as at the specified date, namely by 11pm on 31st December 2020. This was because she had applied as a ‘joining family member’. Consequently, she only needed to establish that the family relationship existed at that date, which was uncontroversial. The Respondent expressly accepted in her written submissions that dependency had to be established as at the date of application, namely 25th November 2023, and it was the Appellant’s case that this was met.
10. The Respondent also stated that there was force in the Appellant’s submissions that an error of law decision could be revisited or reviewed in line with the reported decisions of AZ (error of law: jurisdiction; PTA practice) Iran [2018] UKUT 245 (IAC) and VOM (Error of law - when appealable) Nigeria [2016] UKUT 410 (IAC). The Respondent did not seek therefore to take any fairness or detriment point, accepting that the Upper Tribunal’s task in remaking the decision needed to be done with the correct interpretation of the relevant Immigration Rules.
11. At the hearing before me, I was further assisted by Ms Clewley on behalf of the Respondent. She had been able to have constructive discussions prior to the hearing with Ms Doerr, on behalf of the Appellant. Ms Clewley confirmed that further to the position of the Respondent, set out in the written submissions as summarised above, the matter had been reviewed further and it was accepted that the Appellant had demonstrated dependency as at the time of her application. This flowed from the definition of ‘joining family member’ as a ‘dependent parent’ of a ‘relevant sponsor’. The definitions previously considered as part of the Respondent’s own appeal against the FtT’s decision had been a different set of definitions, not premised on the Appellant being a ‘joining family member’. Ms Clewley conceded therefore that there had not in fact been any error of law in the FtT’s decision and those findings of fact were indeed correct in law.
12. In light of the above, both parties agreed that I should review the error of law decision promulgated on 19th May 2026 and vary this accordingly. This is on the basis that the errors of law found were based on an erroneous ground of appeal premised on an incorrect set of definitions from Appendix EU. This was further compounded by the concession, also erroneous, given by the Appellant’s representative at the time. The Respondent confirmed that she would be granting leave to remain to the Appellant and was content for me to record this here.
13. Pursuant to VOM, the Upper Tribunal’s decision dated 19th May 2026 was only an intermediate determination rather than a final decision, which disposes of proceedings within the meaning of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
14. The procedural history that I have summarised above is unfortunate, since both parties - with the Respondent initiating the appeal to this Tribunal – being mistaken in their understanding of the relevant provisions of Appendix EU. This was only corrected by those representing the Appellant after the error of law hearing. The Appellant’s representative was not mistaken before the FtT but a different representative became so in the proceedings in this Tribunal.
15. It is clear that the Appellant falls in the category of ‘a joining family member’ of a ‘relevant sponsor’ rather than a ‘family member of a relevant EEA citizen’, with the latter requiring presence and dependency as at 31st December 2020. As such sub-para (b)(iii) (rather than sub-para (b)(i) of the definition of ‘dependent parent’ in Annex 1 of Appendix EU is the operative part of the definition that applies to the Appellant. This states:
“(b) (unless sub-paragraph (c) immediately below applies) dependent on (as the case may be):
(…)
(iii) on the relevant sponsor (…) at the date of application and (…) that dependency is assumed where the date of application is before 1 July 2021”
16. For the reasons above and pursuant to AZ, I vary the error of law decision promulgated on 19th May 2026 and find no error in the FtT’s decision. This is as a result of the Respondent’s concession before me, which I consider to be entirely fair and correct in law.
Notice of Decision
17. The decision of the Upper Tribunal promulgated on 19th May 2026 is varied so as to find that the FtT did not error of law.
18. There was no error of law in the FtT’s decision dated 12th November 2025 and this decision shall stand.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22.10.2026