Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER) Case No: UI-2026-000755
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/64296/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 8th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMEATON

Between

NA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Did not attend
For the Respondent: Ms L Lecointe, senior presenting officer

Heard at Field House on 6 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant is a national of Bangladesh.

2. She appeals, with the permission of the Upper Tribunal (‘UT’) (Judge Jarvis) against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) (Judge L. Jones) dated 30 September 2025. The FTTJ dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s refusal dated 30 April 2024 of her protection and associated human rights claim made on 22 August 2023.

Background

3. The Appellant claims to be at risk on return because of her membership of a Particular Social Group (‘PSG’), namely women fearing gender-based violence in Bangladesh. She says that she borrowed money from her ex-partner in Bangladesh in order to come to the UK with the intention of him joining her in the future, that the relationship broke down when she was unable to bring him to the UK, and that she and her family have been threatened by him since. She says that he is involved in politics and has local influence so that she would be unable to obtain protection from the police.

4. The claim was refused on 30 April 2024. The Respondent rejected the Appellant’s claim of credibility grounds and maintained that there would be sufficiency of protection and/or a safe internal relocation alternative.

5. The claim was refused on 29 January 2024. The Respondent did not accept that the Appellant had given a credible account of risk on return.

The appeal to the FTT

6. The Appellant appealed to the FTT. She attended the appeal hearing and was represented by counsel. The appeal was dismissed, predominantly on credibility grounds. The FTTJ did not accept that the Appellant had given a credible account and rejected her claim to fear persecution because of her membership of a PSG. He did not engage with sufficiency of protection or internal relocation in the alternative, having rejected the claim on credibility grounds following the step-by-step approach in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100).

The appeal to UT

7. The Appellant sought permission to appeal to the UT on three grounds of appeal as follows:

(1) The FTTJ misdirected himself
(2) The FTTJ failed to consider relevant evidence
(3) The FTTJ failed to give adequate reasons for his conclusions.

8. The grounds of appeal, despite their length, do not clearly identify the errors of law under each of those three headings.

9. Permission to appeal was refused by the FTT (Judge O’Keeffe). The Appellant renewed her application to the UT, out of time. Time was extended and permission to appeal was granted on all grounds by UTJ Jarvis.

10. On 13 April 2026, the Appellant changed her legal representatives from MK Adams solicitors to Lawmatic solicitors.

11. On 14 April 2026, the Respondent filed its rule 24 response together with the Presenting Officer’s transcript of the FTT hearing.

12. On 8 September 2026, the UT sent out a notice of hearing for today’s appeal to the Appellant (by email and hard copy to her home address), the Appellant’s representative (by email) and the Respondent (by email).

13. The email send to the Appellant’s personal account was returned as undelivered. It appeared that the email address had been incorrectly typed. The notice of hearing was re-sent on 29 September 2026 to the correct email address, and has not been returned as undelivered.

14. In accordance with the standard directions, the Appellant was due to file a composite bundle by 22 September 2026. On 23 September 2026, the UT wrote to the Lawmatic solicitors ordering the Appellant to provide a composite bundle to the UT and the Respondent by 24 September 2026. the Appellant’s representatives indicted that they were no longer acting for the Appellant and asked that all correspondence be sent to the Appellant directly.

The error of law hearing

15. I was not provided with a composite bundle although had access to the decision of the FTT, the grounds of appeal, the grant of permission and the Respondent’s record of proceedings from the FTT.

16. The Appellant did not attend the error of law hearing. The clerk made enquiries of her by telephone. She indicated that she was unwell. She was asked to send any information to the Field House email address. An email was received from the Appellant at 10.02am in which she said ‘I won’t be able to come in today. Unfortunately my health condition is not good at all. As I don’t have any solicitors I didn’t know the email address. I do apologise about this matter’. No health condition was identified and no medical evidence was attached.

17. The hearing commenced at 10.25am. I indicated my initial view to Ms Lecointe that the hearing should proceed in the Appellant’s absence. Ms Lecointe confirmed that that would be the Respondent’s position.

18. Under rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (UT) Rules 2008, the UT may proceed with the hearing if:

(a) satisfied that the party has been notified of the hearing or that reasonable steps have been taken to notify the party of the hearing; and
(b) considers that it is in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing.

19. I am satisfied, given the chronology above, that the Appellant has been notified of the hearing, or that reasonable steps have been taken to notify her of the hearing. The Appellant has not suggested in her email or otherwise that she was unaware of the hearing.
20. I am also satisfied that it is in the interest of justice to proceed with the hearing. The Appellant has not identified a good reason for her failure to attend. She di not email the UT in advance of the hearing requesting an adjournment. I do not accept that she was unaware of the email address for the UT. The email address for Field House is written on the Notice of Hearing that was sent to her by post and email. No medical condition has been identified and no medical evidence has been produced to support the Appellant’s assertion that her health is not good. There is nothing before me to reassure me that, if the matter was adjourned, the Appellant would attend on the next occasion. This appeal is against a decision taken in September 2025, over a year ago. There is a public interest in finality of litigation and dealing with matters in a prompt manner. The grounds of appeal have been drafted by counsel and are lengthy. Having considered them, I consider there is little that could be said orally by the Appellant that would take matters further.

Ground 1 – misdirection/failure to consider evidence

21. This grounds of appeal centres on paragraph 19 of the FTT decision. At the FTT, the Appellant’s representative argued that that it was common for men in Bangladesh to support overseas study in the hope of a future immigration advantage for themselves. The FTTJ noted that there was no objective evidence before him that the supported the Appellant’s assertion in that respect but weighed it against the Appellant’s account overall.

22. The Appellant argues that the FtTJ erred in ‘counting this against’ the Appellant’s credibility and should have treated it as a neutral manner.

23. The Appellant has, in my view, mis-read the FTT decision. The FTTJ did not take the absence of objective evidence as a matter ‘counting against’ the Appellant’s credibility. The FTTJ noted that there was no objective evidence and so considered the assertion in the round, against the Appellant’s overall account. That was a logical and proper approach.

24. The Appellant has not identified any misdirection in law or failure to consider evidence. This is a perversity ground. The Appellant has not established that any reasonable tribunal, properly directed, could not have reached the decision reached by the FTTJ.

25. Even if I am wrong, and the FTTJ did take the failure to provide objective evidence of the assertion as a matter counting against the Appellant’s credibility, I do not accept that any such error was material. The FTTJ found the Appellant to be lacking in credibility on a number of matters. Ther is nothing to suggest that this particular finding was in any way determinative. I do not accept that there is any possibility that, if this alleged adverse credibility finding was removed, the FTTJ might have reached a different decision.

26. Accordingly, I do not accept that there was any material error of law in respect of ground 1.

Ground 2 – misdirection/failure to consider evidence/failure to give reasons

27. This ground of appeal challenges four findings by the FTTJ:

(a) Paragraph 23(a)

28. At paragraph 23(a) of the FTT decision, the FTTJ found that the Appellant had given an inconsistent account in respect of the absence of evidence of threats on her mobile phones. At the FTT hearing, she said that her first phone was broken, her second phone was lost, and her third phone was bought in the UK. In her asylum interview, she said that she was unable to provide evidence of the threatening messages because she had changed her phone to avoid receiving threats.

29. The Appellant argues that the FTTJ erred in relying on this alleged inconsistency as undermining her credibility. She says that the FTTJ failed to consider that her answers at the hearing were in response to questions about whether she had evidence of the threats, whereas her answers in interview were about why she had changed her phone. She maintains that the FTTJ failed to consider that there is a difference between changing her phone handset because it was lost or broken and changing her phone number to stop abusive contact. She further argues that the FTTJ failed to explain which aspects of the Appellant’s evidence about the phone he accepted or rejected or why he did so.

30. Thise submissions are nonsensical. The FTTJ clearly identified two different reasons given by the Appellant for why she did not have evidence of the threats on her phone. Those answers are inconsistent and the FTTJ was entitled to rely on that inconsistency as undermining her credibility.

31. There was no misdirection, failure to consider evidence or failure to give reasons. Again, this is in fact a perversity appeal and no such perversity has been identified.

(b) Paragraph 23(b)

32. At paragraph 23(b) of the FTT decision, the FTTJ relied on the fact that the Appellant had given a different account in her oral evidence to that given in her asylum interview and witness statement about why she had given two different names for her ex-partner. In her asylum interview, she said that his family call him by a different name to that used in documents. In oral evidence, she said that one was his Facebook name and that men in Bangladesh use different names from their real names on Facebook. The FTTJ noted that she had not previously mentioned that.

33. The Appellant argues that the FTTJ erred in relying on this alleged inconsistency as undermining her credibility. She argues that the FTTJ failed to consider that both answers may be true, because her ex-partner could have used his family nickname as his Facebook name, or his family could have adopted his Facebook name as his nickname.

34. I do not accept that there is any such error. The Appellant gave two different explanations for why her ex-partner had two different names. There is nothing before me to suggest that she referenced a Facebook name in her asylum interview, or that she referenced a family nickname in her oral evidence. There is nothing before me to suggest that she suggested, before the FTTJ, that her ex-partner’s nickname was adopted by his family as his Facebook name (or vice versa) as the grounds now suggest.

35. There was no misdirection, failure to consider evidence or failure to give reasons. Again, this is in fact a perversity appeal and no such perversity has been identified.

(c) Paragraph 23(c)

36. At paragraph 23(c) of the FTT decision, the FTTJ found that the Appellant’s account in relation to money received from her ex-partner lacked detail, was arguably inconsistent as between the asylum interview and the account given in cross examination and was lacking in plausibility. The reference to an arguable inconsistency was that in cross-examination she said for the first time that she had received the money in cash (hence there was no record of it) but had not previously mentioned that. The reference to an absence of plausibility was the suggestion that such a large amount of money would be given in any case.

37. The Appellant argues that the FTTJ erred in finding that there was an inconsistency. The Appellant had said nothing about the method of payment in her asylum interview and her later evidence that it was received in cash was an amplification, not an inconsistency. She maintains that it is unclear what detail is lacking and that there is no lack of plausibility given that Bangladesh is a notoriously cash economy.

38. I do not accept that there is any such error. Although I agree it is not a classic ‘inconsistency’, as described, the FTTJ was entitled to rely on the fact that the Appellant had not previously mentioned that the money was received in cash, and only raised that later as an explanation for why there was no record of it, as a matter which undermined her credibility.

39. The FTTJ was also entitled to find that the account was lacking in detail. The detail that would be required to substantiate such an account is obvious. If the Appellant only had cash, the FTTJ could have expected her to explain what amount was provided, what she did with the cash, whether she applied for her visa online and, if so, how she paid for it in cash and how she demonstrated to the UKVI that she had sufficient savings if relying on cash only.

40. The FTTJ did not err in finding that the Appellant’s account was lacking in plausibility given that she claimed to have been given such a large amount of money in cash. There was no evidence before the FTTJ that Bangladesh was a ‘notoriously cash economy’ as alleged by the Appellant and that is not a matter about which the FTTJ would have been entitled to take judicial notice.

41. There was no misdirection, failure to consider evidence or failure to give reasons. Again, this is in fact a perversity appeal and no such perversity has been identified.

(d) Paragraph 23(d)

42. At paragraph 23(d) of the FTT decision, the FTTJ concluded that the Appellant had given very little detail about her ex-partner’s claimed political profile and did not know his full date of both. He relied on that absence of detail as undermining her credibility.

43. The Appellant argues that the FTTJ erred by failing to consider that the Appellant might not have been interested in her ex-partner’s political activities and that not all cultures attach equal importance to dates of birth.

44. I do not accept that there is any such error. There is nothing before me to suggest that the Appellant said she was not very interested in her ex-partner’s political activity or that she relied on that lack of interest as an explanation for her lack of knowledge. It was a key part of the Appellant’s claim that she would be at risk on return because her ex-partner had power and influence in the local area due to his political profile. In the circumstances, it was entirely reasonable for the FTTJ to expect that she would be able to give details as to what those political activities were and to rely on her failure to provide such detail as undermining her credibility.

45. There was nothing before the FTTJ to suggest that the Appellant, or nationals of Bangladesh in general, attach little importance to dates of birth and that is not a matter about which he would have been entitled to take, or ought to have taken, judicial notice.

46. There was no misdirection, failure to consider evidence or failure to give reasons. Again, this is in fact a perversity appeal and no such perversity has been identified.

47. Accordingly, I do not accept that there was any material error of law in respect of ground 2.

Notice of Decision

48. The decision of the FTT (Judge L. Jones) dated 30 September 2025 did not contain a material error of law.

49. The appeal is dismissed.

J. Smeaton

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 October 2026