Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000759
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/76074/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9 June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ZUCKER

Between
SS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs C Johnrose, of Counsel instructed by Lei Dat & Baig Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms S Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant, now 48 years of age, is a citizen of Iran who on 30 July 2024 made application for international protection as a refugee on the basis of his sexual orientation, as a gay man and on the basis of his religious beliefs as an agnostic. On 4 November 2024 a decision was made by the Respondent to refuse the application. The Appellant appealed. His appeal was heard in the First tier Tribunal at Manchester on 18 December 2025.
2. In a Decision dated 19 December 2025 the First-tier Tribunal, finding that the Appellant was an unreliable witness with respect to his sexual orientation, and had failed to establish that he would be at risk as an agnostic in Iran, dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
3. Not content with that decision the Appellant applied for permission to appeal to this tribunal. There were essentially four grounds in which it was submitted that the Judge at first instance erred. These are that the judge:
(a) failed properly to assess and engage with the medical evidence;
(b) failed to consider, or adequately reason on, evidence concerning the Appellant’s one-nightstand in the United Kingdom;
(c) unfairly relying on an adverse credibility point concerning the Appellant’s failure to ask his sister to destroy his laptop, which is said not to have been put to him; and
(d) inadequately considering the social media evidence.
4. Although the judge who, on 18 February 2026, determined the application for permission to appeal, granted permission on all grounds it is clear that it was the first ground which weighed heaviest in the decision. In granting permission on the first ground the judge wrote:
“The medical records arguably show progressive disclosure of relevant history, including reference to anal intercourse well before the refusal decision, and it is arguable that the Judge’s reliance on the date of explicit disclosure as undermining credibility did not adequately grapple with the broader context of the consultations and SS’s reliance on interpreters, nor with the possible cultural and psychological barriers to explicit early disclosure. The late-served NHS letter dated 8 December 2025, recording symptoms of PTSD linked to SS’s claimed persecution in Iran, does not directly prove the underlying events but provides additional arguable support for the contention that SS may have faced difficulties in giving a full and consistent account.”
Upper Tribunal Hearing
5. Although this was the Appellant’s appeal, I was interested to hear from Ms Lecointe in the first instance on grounds (a) and (b). It was agreed by her that if I found there to be an error of law, which she contested, and if on any remaking it were found that the Appellant was in fact a gay man from Iran that that would be the end of the matter and that any other HJ (Iran) [2010] UKSC 31 considerations need not be adjudicated upon.
6. The only significant reference to the medical evidence of the Appellant which was before the judge at first instance appears at paragraph 35 of the Decision and Reasons in which the judge wrote:
“The Appellant has provided his medical records from September 2024. He did not mention he was gay to his GP until December 2024 after he had received his Refusal Letter. The Appellant visited his GP in September 2024 to complain of an anal problem. He said this was worse after anal sex but did not say this was a same sex encounter”.
7. Ms Lecointe submitted that what the judge wrote demonstrated sufficient consideration of the medical evidence, noting in particular that the Appellant had not mentioned that he was gay until December 2024 after receiving the refusal letter. However, Ms Lecointe did agree that the judge could have been, “more elaborate (sic) with the examination and reasoning”.
8. Ms Lecointe then reminded me of the guidance in the case of Volpi v Volpi [2002] EWCA Civ 464 in which Lewison LJ said:
“The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached”.
Error of law
9. The above is, of course, helpful guidance. However, I find that in a case such as this where the medical evidence so strongly corroborates the Appellant’s case it is necessary for a judge to explain with rather more reasoning than the judge did why it was rejected. Without doing so the decision lacks balance and gives the appearance of unfairness. It is not clear, for example, what the significance was of the observation that the Appellant did not inform his GP that he was gay until December 2024 after having received the Refusal Letter. Was the Judge suggesting that there was recent fabrication? If so, what did the judge make of the Appellant having stated that he was gay both at screening (on the very day that he arrived in the United Kingdom) and later in his interviews? Why ought the Appellant to have mentioned that he was gay to his GP before having attended hospital where he was treated on 22 September 2024 for anal pain and bleeding with the working diagnosis of “anal pain following sexual intercourse”, with a letter, dated 28 September 2024, being sent by the hospital to the Appellant’s GP referencing an anal tear…following anal intercourse”? Still further the Judge in commenting that the Appellant had not told his GP that the injury was caused by anal sex “but did not say this was a same sex encounter”, leaves open the possibility of some other mechanism for the injury despite there being no suggestion of the same in the medical evidence, the Refusal Letter or any sufficient suggestion of the injury being self-inflicted but rather a working diagnosis at least consistent with anal sex and a homosexual encounter .
10. Whilst the guidance in Volpi v Volpi (supra) is good guidance it remains trite law also that the reader of a decision must be able to understand why they have been unsuccessful. In my judgment the judge failed sufficiently to engage with the evidence and failed to deal, in particular ,with the evidence of the one-night-stand in September 2024 so that grounds (a) and (b) are made out.
11. On the third ground there was no “Rule 24 Notice”. Ms Lecointe could not assist me with whether questions relating to the laptop were put. However, Ms Johnrose, who appeared at first instance, told me that no questions were put which Ms Lecointe did not dispute. I therefore find that the third ground is made out also.
12. I did not find it necessary to explore the fourth ground.
Remaking
13. Having found an error of law the question for me was whether to remit the case to the First- tier Tribunal or remake it. After a little discussion with the parties Ms Lecointe agreed that it was open to me, not only to remake the case but to do so on the basis of the evidence that was before me noting that the evidence had been tested in the First tier.
14. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) Taking the Appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a convention reason?
(b) Does the Appellant fear persecution for that convention reason?
15. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(c) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
(e) The Appellant could not internally relocate.
16. Given the issues as agreed before the First-tier Tribunal and the concession properly made therefore by Ms Lecointe I need not concern myself with the issues at paragraph 15 above. It will be sufficient if I find that the Appellant is gay.
17. Contrary to the findings of the judge at first instance I have found the evidence in support of the Appellant to be overwhelming. It is of note that he took the opportunity to tell the Respondent that he was gay on the very first day that he arrived in the United Kingdom. He also mentioned at the same time that he was agnostic.
18. The Appellant was then interviewed substantively on two further occasions being 22 August 2024 and 11 October 2024. On both those occasions he referenced being gay and, I find, answered the questions as they were put to him. The point is taken that the Appellant later made rather more of being agnostic than he initially had done. However he makes it clear that being gay was his major concern, which is understandable because that had been discovered whereas the fact that he was agnostic was not known to others and so he was not in immediate danger.
19. As I look to the medical evidence I struggle to see, having regard to the standard of proof, what other likely explanation there is for the injuries to the Appellant other than same sex intercourse as he describes particularly in the context of all the other corroborative evidence in the medical records for anal treatments. I have already pointed to the fact that it was not suggested that the injuries for which the Appellant was being treated were self inflicted but rather there was a working diagnosis at the hospital at least consistent with the Appellant’s claim.
20. Additionally, the Appellant has produced a letter of support from an LGBT organisation and other supportive evidence pointing to a gay lifestyle here in the United Kingdom such as attendance at gay events and subscriptions to gay websites.
21. I make clear that before coming to a final view in this matter I have taken into account each of the points set out in the Reasons for Refusal Letter of 4 November 2024. I have already dealt with the point taken at (a) in the Refusal Letter in which it was suggested that the Appellant did not explain that he was also at risk because of his agnosticism. Insofar as it is suggested that the Appellant was in any way vague in his replies at interview, I simply disagree, all the more so in the context of a man from Iran where the attitudes to his sexuality are so different to here. It would be surprising if the Appellant had not been at the very least nervous and embarrassed. I do not find that the Appellant kept pictures of himself and another having sex on his laptop inconsistent with his claim but rather I find it to be a neutral point depending on the Appellant’s perceived risk. I note the discrepancies which the judge at first instance weighed in the balance together with the pons taken in the Refusal Letter, but in my view, they are insufficient to displace what I consider to be the overwhelming evidence in support of the Appellant being gay.
22. Having found the Appellant to be gay it is not necessary for me to go further in this matter.
Decision
The appeal is allowed on asylum and human rights grounds (articles 3 and 8). I also make a full fee award.

D G Zucker
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 May 2026