Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000764
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59812/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

24th September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHAPMAN

Between

Mr MD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
v

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Unrepresented and no appearance
For the Respondent: Ms S. McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Preliminary matters

1. This appeal previously came before DUTJ Gill for hearing on 23 April 2026 when it was adjourned due to the fact that he was considered to be a vulnerable litigant in person, his solicitors had only just come off the record, the bundle and covering letter had only been sent 3 days prior to that hearing date and there had been no response from his social worker.

2. There had been no contact by the Appellant in the intervening period and CE file shows that the bundle sent to the address on record was returned to the Upper Tribunal on 15 May 2026. I asked my clerk to try and get in touch with the Appellant, but the mobile number provided no longer worked and there was no response to an email sent to the email address on file by 11.30 am. Consequently, given that the hearing had already been adjourned previously it was in the interests of the overriding objective to proceed with the error of law hearing.

Factual background

3. The Appellant is a national of Morocco, born on 26.3.06. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 14 November 2022, aged 16 and made a protection and human rights claim on 23 November 2022. He was placed under the care of Suffolk County Council as an unaccompanied minor. The basis of his claim is that he was born into a very impoverished family who exploited him for the purpose of begging and also drug dealing for his brother’s employer. He feared both his family and his brother’s employer if returned to Morocco.

4. His claim was refused in a decision dated 27 March 2024 and the Appellant appealed against that decision. His appeal came before First tier Tribunal Judge Salh for hearing on 3 December 2025 who, in a decision and reasons promulgated on 21 December 2025 dismissed his appeal. The Appellant was, at that time represented and an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was made on the basis of the following grounds:

(i) error of law regarding the judge’s assessment of internal relocation;
(ii) contradictory findings by the judge as between [29] and [31] of her decision and reasons;
(iii) a failure to make a finding as to whether there would be a real risk on return or the Appellant’s credibility;
(iv) failure to determine whether or not there was a Refugee Convention reason, including the failure to consider whether people with mental health illness are members of a particular social group [PSG];
(v) a failure to conduct a proper assessment of article 3 ECHR, including the argument based on Ainte as to whether material deprivation reached the article 3 threshold in the Appellant’s case;
(vi) whether the erroneous conclusion on internal relocation infected the judge’s finding on whether there would be very significant obstacles to integration on return to Morocco.

5. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted by FtTJ Singer in a decision dated 17 February 2026 in the following terms:

“2. On ground 1, it is arguable that there was insufficient analysis of the medical evidence and country‑expert evidence concerning people with mental health conditions, stigma, and access to treatment, in the context of internal relocation within Morocco. The Judge found internal relocation was “plausible” because of freedom of movement and MD’s “resilience” in travelling through Europe, but arguably without addressing the factors which went the other way.

3. With regard to ground 2, it is arguable that the finding at [29] that MD “would face challenges in seeking protection from authorities if returned, particularly in his home area” lacks consistency with the finding at [31] about his fears of the authorities by reference to the SEF completed when he was a minor.

4. With regard to ground 3 it is arguable that there is a lack of clarity as to what the Judge found about the risk of serious harm in the home area before turning to internal relocation. Also, it is arguable that, while the Judge identified inconsistencies but said she did “not place significant weight” on them, she did not explain what weight was placed on them, nor how, if at all, they affected the assessment of the wider evidence (including expert material) and the ultimate findings.

5. Ground 4 is arguable. The skeleton argument argued mental illness as coming within membership of a PSG, but the Judge arguably did not address this.

6. With regard to ground 5 is it arguable that (given the Judge acknowledged severe under‑funding of Moroccan mental health services at [33] and did not make a finding that Dr Hale’s diagnoses of severe PTSD and major depression was not reliable) the decision failed to make an adequate or clear assessment of whether MD was a “seriously ill person”, or whether he would face a real risk of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline (or significant reduction in life expectancy) on account of inadequate treatment or access in Morocco.

7. On ground 6, it is arguable that the Judge’s assessment of “very significant obstacles to reintegration” was infected by her internal relocation findings, and that she failed to consider the more recent evidence about MD’s mental health and other relevant matters.

8. All the grounds may be argued.”

Hearing

5. At the hearing, Ms Mckenzie helpfully conceded that there were material errors of law in the decision and reasons of the First-tier Tribunal Judge. In particular, Ms McKenzie a concern, set out at ground 2, which was that the judge found that no weight should be placed on the SEF but then later on goes on to find inconsistencies based on the SEF and places great weight on that. She considered that, with reference to ground 3 of the grounds of appeal, that no real credibility finding had been made as the SSHD had not placed the Appellant’s credibility in issue but in light of the judge placing weight on inconsistencies it was not clear how this impacted in terms of the findings regarding sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, which undermined the safety of those findings.

6. I accept Ms McKenzie’s concession that there are errors of law in the decision and reasons of the First-tier Tribunal Judge and that these are material errors, going to the key issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. I find that there are inconsistent findings as between [29] and [31] of the decision and reasons and that, given the Respondent accepted the credibility of the Appellant’s core account, the judge appears to have gone behind this position. This in turn has arguably infected the assessment of the article 3 claim, based both on the Appellant’s mental health and the likely conditions he would face on return to Morocco and also the article 8 claim and whether there would be very significant obstacles to his integration there. I agree with Ms McKenzie that the decision needs to be set aside as a whole and remitted given that fact finding would be needed on all the key issues.

Notice of Decision

7. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains material errors of law and is set aside, with no findings preserved. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before a different judge.

Rebecca Chapman

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Chapman

23 September 2026