Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000766
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68527/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
3rd September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON
PRINCIPAL RESIDENT JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

AA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ilahi instructed by Stonebridge Legal Solutions
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 1 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or children. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, appeals a determination of FtT Judge Clarkson dated 18th December 2025 which dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The hearing took place on 8th October 2025.
2. The appellant is a Bangladesh national who arrived in the UK on 22nd September 2022 ostensibly to study but was unable to pay the fees and he claimed asylum in November 2022 on the basis of his fear of being a Christian convert and then subsequently as being gay. He completed a screening interview on 17th November 2022 claiming asylum owing to his religion [31]. He completed a questionnaire on 11th January 2023 again stating his reason for claiming asylum was based on religion. He made in this interview a passing reference to a friend who was LGBT. In his substantive asylum interview on 26th January 2024 the appellant claimed he was gay.
3. The Secretary of State refusal letter dated 9th July 2024 rejected the appellant’s credibility and refused his claim.
Findings by the FtT Judge
4. In his key findings the judge recorded this:
‘32. Despite the Appellant’s substantive interview being 69 pages long the Appellant does not mention being gay or any risk arising from being gay. He simply says in the last question if there is any thing else he liked to add that his best friend is LGBT and that his parents have threatened him if he tries to contact him again. He does not say he is gay or that a risk arises from that. It is only when subsequently asked if he is LGBT he says yes. The manner and delay I weigh against the Appellant’s credibility.
33. Further, I have considered the CPIN and the societal attitudes towards members of the LGBTI community and the lack of willingness of the authorities to offer sufficiency of protection and do not find it credible that a person would undergo the asylum process and not state that he was gay or that he was in fear due his sexual orientation where he genuinely gay as he would be aware of the risks and discrimination he would face if he were genuine and were to return home.
34. The Appellant failed to explain why it was so important to him to tell his parents that he was a Christian convert before he left, putting himself at risk, but did not tell them he was gay at the same time. I find this indicative of a lack of credibility as to its truth and or to any fear arising from the characteristic of being gay.’
Grounds of appeal
5. The grounds of challenge to the FtT decision set out that the judge:
(i) Failed to address the evidence of TA which was particularly important. He confirmed that TA was granted refugee status on the basis of being gay. The appellant stated he met TA in a nightclub and TA stated that he had seen the appellant kissing other men with ‘passionate kisses’’ and in a gay sauna. If the evidence was accepted, then the judge would have been bound to have accepted that the appellant was gay. As per MK (Duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) if a tribunal found oral evidence implausible, incredible or unreliable it was necessary to say so and for such a finding to be supported by reasoning.
(ii) TA’s evidence was not challenged, and the judge should have accepted the evidence and if the Secretary of State declined to cross examine the appellant it must be taken that the evidence that the Secretary of State does not dispute the evidence. It was striking how little consideration was given to the essential evidence given by TA on this issue and thus the decision was fundamentally flawed.
Grant of permission
6. Permission to appeal was granted by FtT Judge Singer who reasoned it was arguable that the findings should have been made more clearly in respect of TA’s evidence when considering credibility.
Submissions
7. Mr Ilahi submitted, although he was not the representative before the FtT, that the appellant and the appellant’s partner SH and TA gave evidence at the hearing. He relied on the grounds. TA had given evidence that included the appellant behaving in an intimate manner and this was important when considering credibility. The parties were unable to understand why the appeal was rejected and the omission is significant. One of the central issues in the appeal was the sexuality of the appellant.
8. Ms Rushforth accepted that the judge had not expressly set out the evidence of TA but the rejection of the sexuality and the relationship amounted to a complete rejection. The judge unarguably complied with MK (Duty to give reasons) Pakistan.
Conclusions
9. We consider that the grounds are essentially intertwined but nonetheless have addressed them separately.
Ground (i)
10. The judge at [23] stated ‘I have considered all of the evidence submitted by both parties and the oral evidence’; this would include the evidence given by TA.
11. Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at 2(iii) confirms that ‘An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration.
12. At paragraph [30] the judge recorded that the appellant is sufficiently educated that he was able to obtain a place at Brighton University and to make the arrangements to obtain a visa and travel The judge recorded at [31] that when the appellant entered the UK he claimed asylum on the basis of his religious belief The judge noted the appellant claimed asylum in November 2022 and stated in his screening interview dated 17th November 2022 that he was claiming asylum because of his religion ‘That is the only reason I am claiming asylum’. The appellant completed a questionnaire on 11th January 2023’ again saying his reasons for claiming asylum were that he was a Christian’[31]. The appellant’s asylum interview was on 26th January 2024 over two years later, and when his claim was probed during that substantive interview, the record of which spans some 69 pages, he did not mention being gay or any risk arising from being gay. He simply said in response to the last question, whether there is anything else would like to add, that his best friend is LGBT and that his parents had threatened him if he tries to contact him again.
13. Notably, the asylum interview in January 2024 stated at the outset stated ‘this interview is your opportunity to tell us your reasons for claiming asylum. It is very important you do not withhold any information you believe to be relevant to support your claim’.
14. That was the context of the asylum claim, and the judge was unarguably entitled to assess the evidence within that context.
15. The judge recorded, at [32], that the appellant ‘does not say he is gay or that a risk arises from that; it is only when subsequently asked if he is LGBT he says yes’. The manner and delay that characterise the development of the appellant’s claim regarding his sexual orientation, the judge considered weighed against the appellant’s credibility.
16. At [33] the judge took into account the background material and did not find it credible that a person would undergo the asylum process and not sate that he was gay or in fear due to his sexual orientation when genuinely gay, as he would be aware of the risks if he were to return home. The judge also found it incredible that the appellant would find it important to tell his parents he was a Chistian convert before he left, but not tell them he was gay [34].
17. As part of his developing claim the appellant maintained that he realised he was gay when he was in Bangladesh, but he did not ultimately disclose his sexuality until the interview in February 2024. The judge, however, found the appellant had been living in the UK for 3 years and the photographic evidence was ‘very limited’ and referred to the possibility of ‘staged’ photographs so that only little weight could be attached to them. The judge also noted that although the appellant claimed to be gay throughout, there was no explanation why the evidence was ‘recent’ and ‘limited’.
18. The judge proceeded to consider the other evidence.
19. At [35]–[38] the judge made the following findings:
’35. The Appellant says that he is a member of an LGBTQ organisation called Aponghor. He had provided some photos from attending London Pride in 2025 and 2024. Obviously a person does not need to be gay to attend Pride. Along with photos from one ‘party at Aponghor’ there are photographs of him hugging people at Legs800 club, and in other locations. Given that the period of time that the Appellant had been in the UK and living with friends, 3 years, I find the photographic evidence provided by the Appellant very limited. It is also possible to stage photos I bear this in mind when assessing their weight. The limited amount of photos, the lack of further explanation or of these people in the photos being available to give evidence means I add little weight to them. Further, given that the Appellant claims to be gay, an intrinsic characteristic, it remains unexplained why the evidence is recent and limited and I weigh it with the lack of assertion that he was gay prior to 2024 to the Appellant’s detriment.
36. The Appellant’s evidence at the hearing was that he was now in a relationship with Mr SH who is from India and that they are living together. He was cross examined about his relationships and asked if Mr M was his partner and Mr TA was an ex partner as he said in his third interview. The Appellant said Mr TA was not his partner but was his friend and Mr SH is his partner.
37. The Appellant was asked when he met Mr SH and said in May 2024 at Aponghor, but then said he met him in a Bristol club 1.5 years to 2 years ago, Mr SH said that they had met in May 2024 after a meeting in London. They both agreed that they started living together in November 2024 and that Mr SH now works at Bengal spice. Mr SH gave supporting oral evidence that they were living together but they did not provide objective documentary evidence nor did they provide photographic evidence indicative of a relationship of two people living together for almost a year.
38. The Appellant was asked about his partners family and said that his partner was one of 4 siblings, three of whom were male. Mr SH said that in fact he had two brothers and 4 sisters. While I accept that siblings may not be a common topic of conversation when a couple have been living together for a year it would be uncommon to not know the size of their family. While the evidence of Mr SH was not significantly different to the Appellant’s it was very limited in its nature and was not sufficiently supported by objective evidence that the Appellant could have reasonably have shown for a relationship of living together for a year, such as birthday celebration and activities in common as well as how finances were dealt with, and messages to each other. The Appellant was asked to provide further evidence subsequent to this first interview but appears to have failed to do so at the time. He has provided very limited documentary evidence in relation to his activities in the UK which would be readily accessible to him, such as his social media. I find overall the Appellant has failed to avail himself of documentary evidence that he has referred to and or would be readily available to him. I weigh this against his assertions overall and in in particular in his claim to be in a gay relationship with Mr SH.’
20. The judge acknowledged that the appellant was a member of an LGBTQ organisation and that there were photographs but the judge was entitled to conclude, bearing in mind the length of the time the appellant had been in the UK, (and in his statement the appellant stated that he had been a member of the LBGTQ organisation APANGHOR ‘since coming to the UK’ [w/s 10th December 2024 [14]), that the evidence provided was very limited and that the photographs could be ‘staged’.
21. The appellant was cross examined about the nature of his relationships and stated that TA was a ‘friend’ rather than ‘ex-partner’ as ‘said in his third interview’. This was not challenged in the grounds. In his witness statement dated 24th September 2025, TA stated merely that, ‘I know Arif is a gay man as I have seen him at gay clubs, flirting with other men.’ According to the grounds, TA stated that he had seen the appellant kissing other men, and he described such kisses as “passionate kisses” and that he had also seen the appellant ‘in a gay sauna touching other men in a clearly sexual way’. The FtT hearing occurred on 8th October 2025 only two weeks after the date of the witness statement. TA lived in London whilst the appellant lived in Taunton Somerset. The oral evidence as put forward in the grounds and for which there was no accompanying/supporting witness statement from counsel sharply contrasted with the written witness statement of TA and was a significant development of the simple description of ‘flirting’ with other men.
22. The other point identified in the witness statement was the relationship of the appellant with SH. The judge considered the evidence of the relationship given by the appellant and SH, including their oral evidence as set out in paragraphs [37] and [38] of the decision and found there was little evidence indicative of a relationship of two people living together for almost a year. For example, the judge reasoned, SH did not know the number of the appellant’s immediate siblings, and there was no further evidence in support of the relationship, despite the appellant having been afforded the opportunity to provide further evidence following the interview. The judge also noted, at [38] and [39] that there was very limited documentary evidence of the relationship from, for example ,social media that would be readily available to the appellant. There was a distinct lack of overall objective evidence of a relationship.
23. The judge, at [40], rejected the account of the appellant being gay and, in a relationship. The judge said:
‘I have not found the Appellant to be credible in relation to the various aspects that he claims show he is gay….I have considered each aspect of this (sic) claim to be gay that were challenged and found his (sic) to be inconsistent in regard to all of them. I have taken a holistic approach to his credibility and when balanced against the limited evidence of his alleged partner and a few photos of having attended pride and a LGBTI organisation on one occasion and hugging a few men’.
24. There was no challenge to the rejection of the appellant’s initial asylum claim to be a Christian convert. The judge found at [55] ‘I have not found the Appellant to be credible in his account of being gay or his parents or others believing him to be gay and therefore do not find him to be at risk on the basis of this characteristic.’
25. The Court of Appeal in Lowe v SSHD [2021] EWCA 62 referred to and repeated the judgment of Lewison LJ in Fage UK Ltd. v Chobani UK Ltd. [2014] EWCA Civ 5 at paragraph 114 as follows:
“Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them. The best known of these cases are: Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1977] RPC1; Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360; Datec Electronics Holdings Ltd v United Parcels Service Ltd [2007] UKHL 23 [2007] 1 WLR 1325; Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33 [2013] 1 WLR 1911 and most recently and comprehensively McGraddie v McGraddie [2013] UKSC 58 [2013] 1 WLR 2477. These are all decisions either of the House of Lords or of the Supreme Court. The reasons for this approach are many. They include.
i) The expertise of a trial judge is in determining what facts are relevant to the legal issues to be decided, and what those facts are if they are disputed.
ii) The trial is not a dress rehearsal. It is the first and last night of the show.
iii) Duplication of the trial judge's role on appeal is a disproportionate use of the limited resources of an appellate court and will seldom lead to a different outcome in an individual case.
iv) In making his decisions the trial judge will have regard to the whole of the sea of evidence presented to him, whereas an appellate court will only be island hopping.
v) The atmosphere of the courtroom cannot, in any event, be recreated by reference to documents (including transcripts of evidence).
vi) Thus even if it were possible to duplicate the role of the trial judge, it cannot in practice be done”.
26. Ms Rushforth, quite properly in our judgment acknowledges that the judge did not expressly set out the evidence of TA. There is a reference to TA in paragraph [36] of the decision. The question for us is whether any failure to make further references to the evidence of TA is material to the outcome of the appeal.
27. The appellant claims a judge must state the evidence they accept or reject and provide reasons for that assessment. The evidence of TA as set out in his witness statement dated 24th September 2025 is limited. He claims that he known the appellant for two years and to have met the appellant at a gay club through mutual friends in Bristol. He claims they have stayed connected via social media. He claimed he knows the appellant “is a gay man” as he has seen the appellant flirting with other me. He also claims the appellant’s boyfriend SH is very close and dear to him.
28. The judge however had the benefit of hearing the evidence of the appellant and SH and to form a view of their credibility. The judge noted the appellant’s lack of knowledge about the family of SH who he claims to be in a relationship with. The judge noted there was a lack of evidence that would be readily available to the appellant and SH to demonstrate they are in a relationship as they claim. The judge gives entirely cogent reasons for rejecting the claim made by the appellant and SH of their relationship and concluded that the appellant’s claim that he is gay, is not credible.
Ground (ii)
29. The appellant claims there was no cross-examination of TA by the Secretary of State, and thus it can be concluded that the evidence was accepted. In general, a party is required to challenge in cross-examination the evidence of any witness if the evidence should not be accepted on that point. That general rule should not be applied rigidly. Its application depends upon the circumstances of the case, and the criterion is the overall fairness of the hearing. The judge was not obliged to accept the evidence of TA. The judge rejected the appellant’s claim that he is in a relationship with SH as he claims and the appellant’s claim to be gay. The judge clearly weighed the evidence which was found to be wanting. The burden rests with the appellant, and it was open to the judge to reject the claim made by the appellant having considered the wide canvas of evidence holistically.
30. Reading the decision as a whole it is clear in our judgment that judge has said enough to show that care has been taken and that the evidence as a whole has been properly considered in reaching the decision. In the circumstances the judge gave adequate and sound reasoning, and it follows that there is no material error of law in the decision of the FtT and we dismiss the appeal.

Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
The determination of the FtT judge contains no material error of law and will stand.

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29th August 2026