Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000771
First-tier Tribunal No: DC/50148/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

TWANA OMAR KARIM
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Pantho, Internations Legal
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant is a 46 year old Iraqi national. He came to the United Kingdom on 20 June 2003 and claimed asylum using a false name, claiming to be Iranian and stating that as an ethnic Kurd he feared persecution in Iran where he was being targeted by a prominent Iranian family. Although his asylum claimed was disbelieved and refused, his false identity was accepted by the respondent who thereafter dealt with him as if his false identity and nationality were true. An appeal against the refusal of the appellant’s asylum claim was dismissed in November 2003 but the appellant remained in the United Kingdom despite not having leave to do so.
2. In May 2010 the appellant was granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom under a “legacy” scheme on the basis of his length of residence in the country. The following month he applied for a travel document claiming to have been refused a passport by the Iranian embassy. That application was refused in the absence of evidence from the embassy. A year later the appellant made an application to naturalise as British citizen, using his false identity. In that application he stated that he had not engaged in any activities which might indicate he was not of good character, and declared that all the information he had given was correct. On the basis of that application on 18 May 2011 he was granted British citizenship.
3. In 2016 the appellant changed his name from his false name to his real name by deed poll. The same year he travelled to Iraq to care for his mother. In 2017 the appellant married Havzhin Firouzi in Iraq. In 2019 Ms Firouzi was granted leave to enter the United Kingdom as the wife of a British citizen, and came to join her husband. The couple have two children together who are both British citizens. Ms Firouzi’s leave to remain in the United Kingdom was extended after an application in 2022 in which the appellant again gave his false details.
4. In May 2023 the respondent wrote to the appellant and said she was in possession of information which suggests his true identity is Twana Omar Karim that he was born in the Kurdistan Sulaymaniyah region of Iraq and that he had obtained by British citizenship by deception. The appellant replied to the respondent in October 2023 admitting his true identity and providing his correct identity documents. He said he had given false details on his arrival in the United Kingdom on the direction of the agent who had arranged his travel and who had also provided him with false documents. He argued that he should not be deprived of his British citizenship.
5. On 24 October 2023 the respondent notified the appellant of a decision applying s.40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981, to deprive him of British citizenship on the grounds that it had been obtained by fraud or false representation. The appellant appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal and his appeal was heard on 9 December 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Wilsher (the Judge).
The Judge’s Decision
6. Having set out the background to the appellant’s appeal, at [6] the Judge identified the proper approach to resolving the appellant's appeal in accordance with [58] of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chaudury v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 16:
… the proper approach to appeals under section 40A of the BNA 1981 from decisions of the Secretary of State made pursuant to section 40(3) of the BNA 1981 is:
(i) it is for the FTT to find, in the event of a dispute, as a fact whether there was fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1981;
(ii) the decision of the Secretary of State on the causation issue whether the registration or naturalisation was obtained by the impermissible means is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds, in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1);
(iii) the exercise of the Secretary of State’s discretion to make an order depriving a person of citizenship status is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1); and
(iv) it is for the FTT to consider whether the Secretary of State had acted in breach of other relevant legal obligations, including those arising under section 6 of the Human Rights Act. Although due weight would need to be given to the findings, evaluations and policies of the Secretary of State, the decision was for the FTT;
7. The Judge then proceeded to deal with stages (i) – (iv) identified in Chaudury. Dealing with (i) the Judge recorded at [7] the parties agreement that there had been a material fraud in the form of the false identity maintained by the appellant until 2023.
8. The Judge considered the disputed stage (ii) identified in Chaudury at [8] – [11] of his decision. He noted at [8] that the false representation about the appellant’s identity would have been relevant to his suitability when indefinite leave to remain was considered in 2010 and found that there was nothing irrational in the respondent’s reasons for finding that the appellant would have been refused indefinite leave to remain had the truth been known. At [9] the Judge found that the appellant committed a further fraud when making his application for citizenship in a false identity and failing to reveal his earlier frauds. The Judge found it was “obvious” that this was highly relevant to assessing the appellant’s good character. At [10] the Judge considered the guidance for caseworkers making decisions about the grant of citizenship and concluded that examples in that guidance of when citizenship might exceptionally be granted because a fraud which had been used in earlier application had been disregarded, were not analogous to the appellant’s situation because his fraud had not been disregarded, rather it was not known to the respondent at the time. At [11] the Judge concluded that:
“The maintenance of a false identity in multiple dealings with the Home Office from 2003, including when sponsoring his wife, is clearly a very serious matter. There is nothing irrational or unreasonable in a public law sense for the respondent to have concluded that nationality would have been refused had it been known.”
9. The Judge dealt with stage (iii) briefly at the beginning of [12] of his decision as follows:
The third matter is the exercise of discretion to deprive nationality. It was not put to me that any material factor had not been considered or other public law error committed here.
10. The remainder of [12] of the Judge’s decision was devoted to stage (iv). The Judge found that, in circumstances where a decision would be made about whether to grant the appellant leave to remain in the United Kingdom within eight weeks, the appellant would not be required to leave the United Kingdom during that period, the appellant had not advanced any financial or other evidence of compelling hardship, the appellant’s children would remain at school and his wife at work and there were no medical issues, there was nothing disproportionate in the respondent’s decision.
11. Having found against the appellant in relation to each of stages (i) – (iv) of the process identified in Chaudury, the Judge accordingly dismissed his appeal. The Judge noted however at [13] that there was an “extremely strong” argument for granting the appellant leave to remain in the United Kingdom notwithstanding his prolonged deception.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
12. The appellant sought permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision on three grounds.
13. In ground one it was averred that the Judge erred when dealing with stage (iii) by failing to deal with an argument, pleaded in the appellant’s first skeleton argument, that the respondent had failed to have adequate regard to the fact the appellant had been manipulated and misled by an agent. A second First-tier Tribunal Judge considered this ground arguable and granted permission to appeal in relation to ground one.
14. In ground two it was averred that the Judge erred when dealing with stage (ii) by reaching an irrational conclusion in response to the argument that had been advanced by the applicant that his British citizenship had not been obtained by means of the false representation of his identity. The second First-tier Tribunal Judge did not consider this ground to be arguable noting that the appellant’s case ran contrary to this Tribunal’s decision in Onuzi (good character; Sleiman considered) [2024] UKUT 00144 and permission was refused in relation to ground two.
15. In ground three it was averred that the Judge erred when dealing with stage (iv) by reaching internally contradictory findings that the respondent’s decision was proportionate and also that there were strong grounds for the appellant being granted leave to remain in the future. The second First-tier Tribunal Judge found this ground not to be arguable, noting that the Judge’s observations about a future application for leave to remain were superfluous to the issue in stage (iv) which was about the foreseeable consequences of deprivation.
Renewed application for permission to appeal
16. The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 provide that a person may apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal against the decision of another tribunal if, an application for permission to appeal made to the tribunal which made the decision challenged, has been granted only on limited grounds (rule 21(2)). The Procedure Rules require such an application to be made no later than 14 days after the decision to grant on limited grounds was sent to the appellant (rule 21(3)). In this case the decision granting permission on limited grounds was sent on 18 February 2026 so any renewed application for permission to appeal on grounds two and three should have been made by no later than 4 March 2026.
17. At 16:58 on 29 May 2026 the appellant filed with the Tribunal a renewed application for permission to appeal on grounds two and three. This application was therefore considerably out of time. At the hearing Mr Pantho said he was not pursuing an application for permission to appeal on ground three but he sought to persuade me to extend the time permitted for making the application and to grant permission to appeal on ground two. Despite Mr Pantho’s careful submissions I refused to do so for the following reasons.
18. Mr Pantho realistically acknowledged that the failure to comply with the Tribunal’s Procedure Rules was significant and serious. Not only was the renewed application made almost three months late, it was also made after close of play on the last working day before the hearing of this appeal, leaving the respondent no opportunity to consider the application or prepare to meet it. This was a significant and serious failure to show the appropriate procedural rigour.
19. Mr Pantho also accepted that the explanation for the failure was not a good one. He described how after an unsuccessful search for affordable counsel to take on the appellant’s case, the decision was taken on 29 May 2026 that he, as a Senior Caseworker at the firm of solicitors instructed by the appellant, would advocate on behalf of the appellant at the hearing. This account does nothing to explain why the appellant’s solicitors who have been acting on behalf of the appellant throughout the appeal proceedings, did nothing to comply with the rules of litigation until after the close of play on the last working day of the hearing. Whilst I acknowledge Mr Pantho’s candour and contrition, the explanation provided revealed further the abject failure to recognise the importance of acting with procedural rigour.
20. Despite this Mr Pantho argued that in the circumstances an extension of time should be granted, referring to an absence of previous breaches of the Rules, and arguing that the grounds have some obvious strengths, that it would be proportionate to grant the extension and that the seriousness of the failure could be marked by an award of costs. I am not persuaded however that the Tribunal can overlook such a serious failure to comply with the Procedure Rules and more significantly am not persuaded that granting an extension of time at such a late stage would be consistent with the tribunal’s overriding objective of a fair and just hearing. It is trite to state that the purpose of the Procedure Rules is to facilitate a hearing that is fair to both sides and reflects the public interest in timely resolution of disputes. A failure to comply with the rules therefore fundamentally undermines the intention of a fair hearing. That is particularly true in this situation where allowing an extension of time would significantly disadvantage the respondent and necessarily lead to an aborted hearing and delay. In that respect the effect of allowing the extension would be an undermining of the public confidence in the timely resolution of appeals.
21. Mr Pantho acknowledged that the merits of the grounds of appeal will only be relevant to the question of whether to grant an extension of time where the tribunal could see without much investigation they are very strong or very weak. I disagree with Mr Pantho’s suggestion that ground two is very strong. On the contrary for the reasons given by the First-tier Judge who refused permission, ground two appears particularly weak in the light of the decisions of the Upper Tribunal and the Court of Appeal in the case of Onuzi. In the Court of Appeal’s consideration of that case (Onuzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1337) Bean LJ identified that the case of Sleiman, the authority which formed the premise for the appellant’s arguments in ground two, was recognised as being a decision that could no longer be relied upon.
22. Finally I reject Mr Pantho’s oral submission that grounds one and two are linked and that refusing permission on ground two would restrict my ability to holistically consider ground one. Contrary to this submission, the two grounds of appeal have always been pursued on the basis that they relate to discrete stages of the process described in Chaudury. It is unarguably possible to holistically and fairly consider ground one which relates to stage (iii) without reference to ground two which relates to ground (ii).
23. Having refused permission to extend time, and therefore not admitted the belated application for permission to appeal on ground two, I proceeded to consider ground one.
Ground one
24. At [5] of the first skeleton argument advanced before the Judge by the appellant, the issues for the appeal are identified. “Issue (b)” was identified as whether “R erred in public law terms in exercising his discretion under BNA 1981, s.40(3) in depriving A of British citizenship”. Further detail of “issue (b)” was identified at [12] –[13] of that skeleton argument in which it was argued that the respondent had failed to have “adequate regard” to the appellant being misled by the agent in desperation and when he lacked English skills. It was said that this meant the respondent’s decision was unreasonable because it did not take account of material matters.
25. A second skeleton argument was prepared and advanced by different counsel. Whereas the first skeleton argument predated it, the second skeleton argument followed the Court of Appeal decision in Chaudury and accordingly re-framed the issues in the light of that decision. Issue (b) was re-framed as “Issue 1: Wednesbury unreasonableness” it was said that: “The Appellant continues to rely upon the skeleton argument dated (sic) at [12] – [13] that the SSHD erred in her exercise of discretion regarding the decision to deprive the Appellant of nationality in that she failed to take account of material considerations and / or provided inadequate reasons for her decision”.
26. In the light of these unambiguous passages, it is in my judgment clear that the Judge was wrong when he said at [12], in the passage quoted above, that it was not put to him that the respondent had not considered a material factor or that a public error was committed. Contrary to that statement the two skeleton arguments made it clear that it was being suggested that there was a public law error in the respondent’s consideration of whether to exercise her discretion because, it was claimed the respondent did not take account of the influence of the agent on the appellant.
27. I am not however persuaded that the error made by the Judge when stating that these arguments were not put to him was material to his decision. I reach that conclusion first because, as Ms Clewley submitted, when the Judge’s decision is considered as a whole it is apparent that the Judge did in substance consider the argument that was being made in the skeleton arguments and second, because the conclusion that the respondent exercised her discretion in a reasonable and rational way, was in all the circumstances inevitable.
The Judge did in substance consider the issue
28. When setting out the background to the appeal, at [5] of his decision the Judge recorded the appellant’s explanation for making the false representation about his identity in 2003 and for persisting with that falsehood until 2023. The Judge records that the appellant said he did so because he was young and afraid and relied on the man who had suggested he lie and provided him with false papers. In other words the Judge was demonstrably considering the factual circumstances and arguments raised by the appellant in the two skeleton argument when he considered the appellant’s case.
29. At [8] of his decision the Judge again refers to the appellant’s explanation for the false representations stating: “This appellant gave a false identity during his asylum claim, although he says it was on advice, it was clearly done to maximize his opportunity of staying” Whilst this passage comes during the Judge’s consideration of stage (ii) and the question of whether the naturalisation was obtained by means of fraud it is unquestionably the case that the Judge was considering here and rejecting the explanation which the appellant was claiming meant that the respondent’s exercise of discretion was unlawful. The Judge went on in the same paragraph to identify that the appellant persisted with the false representation about his identity for the next twenty years referring to the appellant’s repeated non-compliance during this time.
30. At [11] the Judge again referred to the appellant repeating the false representations long after the agent had any influence over him, referring to the appellant using the false identity “in multiple dealings with the Home Office” including when sponsoring his wife. The Judge said in this context that there was nothing irrational or unreasonable in the respondent concluding that the appellant would not have been granted citizenship had the repeated use of false representations been known.
31. It is clear from these passages that the Judge had the appellant’s explanation for the false representations he repeated over a period of nearly twenty years well in his mind when considering the appellant’s case. It is equally clear that the Judge considered that the explanation advanced did not mean the respondent’s actions were unreasonable as is evident from his comment “although he says it was on advice, it was clearly done to maximize his opportunity of staying”. In all the circumstances it is tolerably clear that, although he did not address the arguments raised at [12] – [13] of the first skeleton argument and at [4.1] of the second skeleton argument directly and in terms, the Judge did in substance consider and resolve those arguments against the appellant. Reading the Judge’s decision as a whole it is tolerably clear that in the context of the appellant’s repetition of the false representations over two decades for the purpose of maximising his opportunities that the Judge considered the exercise of discretion by the respondent in depriving the appellant of his citizenship was reasonable and therefore lawful.
The conclusion was inevitable
32. That the Judge’s conclusion that the exercise of discretion by the respondent was rational and reasonable and therefore lawful, was inevitable is apparent from a consideration of the decision itself. At [44] of the respondent’s decision, the decision maker lists the submissions that the appellant made as to why the respondent should not exercise discretion in favour of the appellant. Amongst those submissions, were the appellant’s explanation that he was naively following the instructions of the agent. Under the heading “SSHD Response to Representations” the decision maker explicitly addresses that explanation at [50] – [53] of the decision. In those paragraphs the decision maker refers to the fact that all adults are expected to take full responsibility for the information they provide, that the appellant was an adult and fully responsible when he signed his various claims, that the appellant signed multiple declarations confirming that he was aware that it was a criminal offence to provide false information and concludes at [51] “Therefore even if you were able to prove that you were advised or manipulated into making a false asylum claim in a false identity, this would be no mitigation for your deception” The respondent unquestionably did therefore consider or “have regard to” the explanation that the appellant advanced.
33. The decision continued at [52] to explain that the appellant’s regret about making false representations did not mitigate his prolonged and serious deception over many years. At [53] it stated that the appellant’s explanation that he continued to use the false identity because he felt it would cause him greater difficulty if he did not, equally did not provide an acceptable or justifiable explanation for a deception that continued for twenty years.
34. In the light of these paragraphs the argument made in the two skeleton arguments that the respondent failed to take account of material considerations and provided inadequate reasons for her decision to exercise her discretion in favour of deprivation was unsustainable.
35. The situation in this case was very similar to that in Onuzi where the repetition of a false identity and nationality for a period of twenty years and in a series of fraudulent applications was described as “historic and prolonged dishonesty” which led Bean LJ to comment at [36] of his judgment: “There is no public law error in the conclusion of the SSHD’s decision-maker in 2020 that, had the truth been known in 2007, the Appellant would have been refused British citizenship on the grounds that he was not of good character. On the contrary, I do not see how any other conclusion would have been a realistic possibility.” This is another case where the only realistic possibility given the extent of the dishonesty was deprivation of citizenship.
Conclusion
36. Bringing this altogether therefore, I find that ground one does not identify a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. Whilst the Judge was wrong to say as he did at [12] that it was not put to him that the respondent’s exercise of discretion was unlawful, it is apparent from a holistic consideration of the Judge’s decision that in substance he considered and rejected that suggestion. Further it is apparent that no other conclusion would have been a realistic possibility in the light of the respondent’s clear consideration of the appellant’s submission in the decision and the clearly adequate reasons given for rejecting that submission, including the fact that the appellant repeated his false claims about his identity for twenty years and in a series of fraudulent applications.
37. I should finally recognise that Mr Pantho made the submission that the appellant would have been no worse off if he had told the truth in the first place and provided his true identity and nationality. That may or may not be correct, the reality is we cannot know now, more than twenty years after the appellant first made his false claim. This submission however does no more than seek to re-argue the appeal which was considered and dismissed by the Judge. That was not the purpose of this hearing before me, where the issue was whether the decision of the Judge contained a material error of law? For all the reasons I have given I am satisfied that it did not and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Wilsher did not contain a material error of law and shall stand.
The appeal is dismissed.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 June 2026