Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000785
First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/59421/2023
LH/00770/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

7th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

MOHIT ASHOKKUMAR PATEL
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr A. Burrett, instructed by Shah Law Chambers Limited

Heard at Field House on 6 July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. Mr Patel is a citizen of India who arrived in the UK with his parents when he was one month short of his thirteenth birthday. He is now 22 years old and he has applied for leave to remain on the basis of the private life he has formed here as a teenager and a young adult.
2. Although Mr Patel is the respondent before the Upper Tribunal and the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) is the appellant, for ease of reference I will refer to the parties as they were before the FtT. All further references to “the appellant” are to Mr Patel and all further references to “the respondent” are to the SSHD.
3. In a decision promulgated on 14 November 2025, the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) found that it would be a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s private life to require him to return to India and allowed his appeal. The respondent appealed to the Upper Tribunal, and in a decision promulgated on 15 May 2026, I allowed the respondent’s appeal and set aside the FtT’s decision in part. That decision is included as an annex below.
4. This decision is the remaking of the FtT’s decision, pursuant to section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

The findings of the FtT
5. Although I am remaking the FtT’s decision, I am not starting with a blank slate. In my error of law decision, I preserve the FtT’s findings of fact. I therefore begin by setting out the findings that are relevant to my decision.
6. The appellant was born in Mansa Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India in July 2004. He and his parents are citizens of India. They arrived in the UK in June 2017, with visit visas valid until December 2017. The FtT found that it had always been the intention of the appellant’s parents to remain in the UK after the expiry of their visit visas.
7. In his evidence before me, the appellant expressed the fear that he would have to work to support his parents financially if he returned to India. I therefore set out the FtT’s findings about his parents’ ability to rebuild their lives in India on return.
8. The FtT found that the appellant’s parents retained strong cultural ties to India, for example by following Indian news and watching Indian TV. They said in their evidence that they did not socialise outside the British Indian community. They also said that they were being supported financially by members of the British Indian community, but that that support would end if they returned to India.
9. The FtT accepted that the family’s relatives in India “may well have cut them off” because of criminal offending by the appellant’s father, but the appellant’s parents would be able to move to another area of India and rebuild their lives there. The appellant’s father suffered from mental and physical ill health, but he would have access to treatment. Overall, the appellant’s parents would “experience difficulties” on return to India but there would be no significant obstacles to their reintegration.
10. With regard to the appellant, the FtT made the following findings:
“45. When looking at the time of the application [25 June 2022], the third appellant was a minor. I note that he was in the middle of his schooling, but he had spent the majority of his childhood in India. I find that he could have returned at that point in time and continued with his education in India. It would have been in his best interests to remain with his parents then [….]
“47. […] [H]is private life has developed [since June 2022]. He has completed his compulsory schooling and is in the middle of professional qualifications which are not recognised in India. He has built up his own friendships and relationships during his formative late teenage years in the United Kingdom. He is not financially dependent on his parents and has not shown any emotional dependence above and beyond those normally in place between parents and adult children. He speaks English and is not dependent on the state financially. He is of an age when many young men move out of the parental home and begin to start their own life.
“48. Although the third appellant has developed his private life whilst here with precarious or limited status, this was largely down to the choice of his parents. Likewise, the dishonesty on his previous application can not be held against him.”
The hearing
11. At the hearing before me, I had:
(i) The respondent’s Upper Tribunal bundle, of 427 pages, filed on 13 April 2026;
(ii) The appellant’s Upper Tribunal bundle, of 61 pages, filed on 18 June 2026; and
(iii) The appellant’s skeleton argument, of 2 July 2026.
12. The only witness was the appellant, who gave evidence in English. He adopted his statement of 16 June 2026 and then was cross-examined. In answer to Mr Parvar’s questions, he said that he had always lived with his parents. He depended on them financially because he was pursuing his studies. He was not in employment. He spoke to his parents in Gujarati.
13. Mr Parvar put it to the appellant that he would have no difficulties reintegrating in India because he had lived there for the first 12 years of his life and remained familiar with Indian language and culture. The appellant responded that he had spent nine years in the UK, which was a “long time”, and that these had been formative years in which he had completed his schooling and begun his studies for his ACCA qualification. “Going back would cause problems”. Although he spoke Gujarati and was familiar with Indian culture, there were “other aspects” to reintegration “which should be considered”. I asked him what those other aspects were, and he said that the main issue would be that he would have to be the sole earner to support his parents. His father would be unable to work due to his mental ill health and it would be “impossible” for his mother to find work in India because she had never worked in India before.
14. Mr Parvar took the appellant to his recent witness statement, in which he had said:
“Although the ACCA qualification is available in India, the practical reality is that continuing my studies there would be extremely difficult. The main obstacles to continuing my ACCA studies would be the practical aspect. The nearest study facilities are located in Ahmedabad, approximately two to three hours from my home area in Gujarat. Regular travel would be both time-consuming and costly, and relocating closer to the city would involve accommodation and living expenses that I could not afford.”
15. He suggested to the appellant that this meant that he would be able to continue on the same course in India that he is pursuing in the UK. The appellant accepted this, but said that he would struggle without friends to support him in his studies. Moreover, he would have to stop studying in order to work to support his parents. He accepted that “there is work”, but he was concerned that basic salaries would not “be much”. He had not done any research into pay rates or the cost of ACCA courses or other accountancy courses in India, because he wanted to stay in the UK. The only thing he had looked into was where ACCA courses were offered. There were no institutions that did ACCA training near “where I live”. He accepted that many young adults travel in order to complete their studies, but it would be more expensive to live in a city area like Ahmedabad. He concluded, “Meeting basic living conditions is the primary thing”.
16. The appellant further explained that an ACCA qualification was entirely exam-based and can be pursued in three ways: in-person, through distance learning, and through self-study. He was pursuing his qualification through self-study because it cost the least. He did not have any support from a training provider and had no teachers.
17. Mr Parvar suggested that this made the distance to the course provider in Ahmedabad irrelevant, because he could continue to pursue his qualification through self-study, just as he was doing in the UK. The appellant replied that the problem was that self-study was more difficult and therefore more time-consuming, and he would no longer have enough time because he would need to work.
18. Mr Parvar asked the appellant why no friends had come to court to support his appeal. He said that they had not agreed to come, but they had been happy to provide statements and copies of their IDs. He added, “There could be many reasons they are not here. Both of them are abroad as of now”.
19. Mr Parvar then took the appellant through his CV and asked him why there was not more evidence of the work experience he referred to. The appellant explained that he had worked for one employer on a 2.5-month work placement sponsored by his college as part of his course. He had contacted them for a reference and they had asked him to send an email. He had done so, but he had not received a response in time. His other work experience was also part of his coursework. He had worked for only two days each at three different companies, and this had been during COVID, which meant that the work was remote.
20. He was in good health.
21. He did not believe his parents had previously attempted to mislead the Home Office, as the FtT had found. They had simply been unaware of the law.
22. I then asked the appellant to confirm that the ACCA qualification was recognised in India. He confirmed that it was.
23. There was no re-examination.
24. I then heard submissions from both representatives. I have taken them into account but I will not rehearse them here.
25. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Legal framework
26. The legal framework for this appeal is well-established. In summary, the appellant appeals under section 84(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) on the ground that it would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to remove him from the UK. Section 6, in turn, provides that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with a right protected by the ECHR.
27. The appellant relies on article 8 of the ECHR, which provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
“2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
28. In deciding whether the appellant’s removal would be inconsistent with article 8, I must consider the five questions set out by Lord Bingham in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Razgar [2004] UKHL 27 at [17]:
“(1) Will the proposed removal be an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicant's right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) family life?
“(2) If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially to engage the operation of article 8?
“(3) If so, is such interference in accordance with the law?
“(4) If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others?
“(5) If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved?”
29. The only question I need to answer is question five. The respondent accepts that the appellant has established a private life in the UK in the nine years he has lived here, and that his removal would have sufficiently grave consequences to engage article 8. The appellant does not dispute that his removal would be in accordance with the law: he is without leave to remain in the UK and the decision to remove him has been taken pursuant to the Immigration Rules. The Immigration Rules are, in general, assumed to be rationally related to the promotion of the economic well-being of the country.
30. In deciding whether the appellant’s removal would be proportionate, I must follow the directions set out by Parliament in Part 5A of the 2002 Act. Those relevant here are:
“117A Application of this part
“(1) This Part applies where a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts—
(a) breaches a person's right to respect for private and family life under Article 8, and
(b) as a result would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
“(2) In considering the public interest question, the court or tribunal must (in particular) have regard—
(a) in all cases, to the considerations listed in section 117B […]
“(3) In subsection (2), “the public interest question” means the question of whether an interference with a person's right to respect for private and family life is justified under Article 8(2).
“117B Article 8: public interest considerations applicable in all cases
“(1) The maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.
“(2) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are able to speak English [...]
“(3) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are financially independent [...]
“(4) Little weight should be given to—
(a) a private life […]
that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully.
“(5) Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person's immigration status is precarious.”
31. It is not in dispute that the appellant’s immigration status has been unlawful at least since his leave expired in December 2017 and that before that it was, at best, precarious. I therefore must have regard to the consideration that little weight should be given to the private life he has established here. That does not mean I should give it no material weight. Compatibly with article 8, sections 117A and 117B allow for weight to be given to a private established by a person who has been here unlawfully or precariously where the private life has “particularly strong features” or there is some “compelling factor”: Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 58 at [49], [58]; Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 189 at [82].
32. The appellant says that he meets the requirements of Para. PL 5.1 (b) of the Immigration Rules because there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in India. Deciding whether this is the case requires a broad evaluative judgment of whether he will have “a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to his private or family life.”: Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 at [14]. The threshold is “self-evidently elevated […] such that mere hardship, mere difficulty, mere hurdles and mere upheaval or inconvenience, even where multiplied, will generally be insufficient.”: Parveen v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 932 at [9] (citing Treebhawon v SSHD [2017] UKUT 13 (IAC) at [37]). There must be specific factors that “prevent or seriously inhibit” integration: Ackom (aka Bonsu) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 537 at [31].
Findings
33. Although the FtT’s findings were preserved, they were based on the evidence before it. I have the advantage of an updated witness statement from the appellant, two letters of support from his friends in the UK, his medical records and more recent educational and work experience records. I also had the advantage of hearing from the appellant at length.
34. I found the appellant to be a fundamentally honest witness, although at times a reluctant one. He made numerous admissions that undermined the basis on which his case had been put by his representatives and the findings in his favour by the FtT. The FtT had found that the appellant was “not financially dependent on his parents” and was “of an age when many young men move out of the parental home and begin to start their own life”, but at the outset of his oral evidence, the appellant confirmed that he was entirely financially dependent on his parents and had always lived with them. It was clear from his evidence that if he were forced to return to India, he envisioned continuing to live with his parents in their previous home area in Gujarat and to begin to support them financially. It was the appellant’s own witness statement that contradicted the FtT’s finding that the ACCA is not recognised in India, and he admitted that there would be no linguistic or cultural barriers to his reintegration in India, and that work would be available.
35. On the appellant’s own evidence, there would be no significant obstacles to his reintegration in India. Mr Parvar put this to him twice, and I provided him with a third opportunity to address the issue by inviting him to expand on the “other aspects” that needed to be considered. What he ultimately said was that he would be able to find work to support himself and his parents in meeting their basic needs, but that this would require working long hours, given the low wages he expected to earn. The long hours, in turn, would require him to abandon his pursuit of his ACCA qualification. This falls significantly short of constituting a very significant obstacle to reintegration, as defined in the caselaw cited above.
36. I therefore find that the appellant cannot meet the Immigration Rules.
37. On the evidence before me, I do not find that there are any particularly strong features or compelling factors present in the appellant’s private life in the UK. He has completed his secondary education here, obtaining a number of qualifications. This is commendable, and no doubt a testament to his hard work under difficult circumstances. However, there is little evidence of a private life beyond his education. His oral evidence revealed that he is currently pursuing his education entirely through self-study, for financial reasons. This will obviously limit the extent to which he is continuing to form meaningful personal ties through that aspect of his private life. He has no teachers and no fellow students.
38. The appellant’s oral evidence before me was focussed on the impact of removal on his education and career prospects, reflecting Mr Paravar’s line of questioning. However, the appellant had the opportunity to raise anything he liked in his detailed appeal statement, and this provides little evidence of a wider private life in the UK. He says almost at the outset, “I would like to clarify that education has always been one of the most important aspects of my life.” Other than playing cricket in his spare time, the only activity outside of school that he specifically mentions is participation in the National Citizen Service programme. What he says about it is focussed on its positive impact on his communication skills and confidence. He does not say that it was emotionally or psychologically meaningful, or that he formed any important personal ties there.
39. What the appellant says about his life outside his educational achievements and career aspirations is limited and vague:
“Throughout my years in the United Kingdom, I have developed close friendships with classmates, colleagues and members of my local community. These relationships provide me with emotional support, companionship and a genuine sense of belonging. […]
“During my years of education, I formed close friendships with classmates and fellow students from a variety of backgrounds. These friendships have continued beyond school and have become an important source of emotional support, companionship and social stability”.
He provides no detail about any of this.
40. As to the appellant’s friendships, the appellant was unable or unwilling to explain why the two friends who had written statements had not come to court to support his appeal. I nonetheless have given the statements anxious scrutiny. The statement of Vian Maraj is only one paragraph long. Mr Maraj praises the appellant as a “good genuine and reliable person that has always been there for me”, but he gives no detail that would support a finding that there is a strong emotional connection between them. Instead, the statement reads as a sincere character reference: the appellant was always on time, very attentive and “present almost all the time” during classes; he struggled academically initially but his grades improved quickly; and he had no adverse “disciplinary points”. Mr Maraj concludes that it would “make sense” for the appellant to continue his studies and to work in the UK given his length of time here and the difficulties he would face adjusting to the Indian educational system.
41. Mr Tarun Songa gave a longer statement. Although more detailed, this, too, reads essentially as a heartfelt endorsement of the appellant’s good character. He praises the appellant’s “excellent behaviour, discipline and respect towards others”, hard work, academic achievement, sportiness and eagerness to learn. He does say that “Myself and Mohit have been through a lot and he is the perfect person to always come to when you have a problem or going through something”, but there are no details about their friendship, such as how often they speak or see each other, what specifically they have been through together, or any way they have depended on each other in recent years. Mr Songa asserts that if the appellant returned to India, his education would be set back by six years “due to the fact of [the] education system”, but this is not what the appellant says. I find that Ms Songa’s misunderstanding on this central issue indicates that he and the appellant are not particularly close at present.
42. I also find that the failure of either Mr Maraj or Mr Songa to attend court confirms their lack of closeness to the appellant. I note that it was the appellant’s evidence that they had not agreed to come to court, not that they were unable to do so (although in fact, they happened to be abroad in any event).
43. As the appellant explained in his evidence before me, all of his work experience was obtained by his school or college, as part of his coursework. It was very limited in extent, with the longest placement being only 2.5 months and the rest for only a few days. The evidence points against his having established any meaningful ties at any of these workplaces. Not only were most of the placements very brief, they were also remote, and the one employer where he did work in person failed to respond to his request for evidence in support of his appeal.
44. In summary, I have no reason to doubt that the appellant is ambitious, hard-working and respected by his peers. He has not, however, formed strong ties in the UK outside his education. His emotional life remains centred on his parents, with whom he has always lived, and with whom he intends to continue to live and to support financially on return to India.
45. As to the circumstances the appellant would face in India, he accepted that there would be no linguistic or cultural barriers to integration. The FtT found that the appellant’s father’s family might have cut them off due to his father’s criminal offending, but that was a tentative finding. The appellant clearly envisions returning to his parents’ home area, with his parents, and I find that this indicates that they will not be without some support from their family or community there. The appellant may sincerely believe that he would have to work long hours to meet his family’s basic needs, but he has done no research to confirm this belief. Nor has he set out the basis of his belief that his mother would be unable to find any employment simply because she has not worked in India before. I therefore find that the appellant has not established that he would be unable to complete his ACCA qualification – or some other accountancy qualification – in India for financial reasons. The only thing other than his education that he expressed strong feelings about in his witness statement was playing cricket in his spare time, and there is nothing to suggest that he could not continue to do this in India. I accept that the appellant’s father was found to suffer from mental ill health, but it is a preserved finding that he would be able to access treatment in India. Moreover, the appellant has raised no concerns about the impact on him of his father’s mental ill health should they return to India, other than the financial impact of his father’s inability to work.
46. In summary, I find that the appellant has failed to establish that there would be harsh consequences for him if he were removed to India.
Applying the law to the facts
47. I find that it would not be a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s article 8 rights to remove him to India.
48. The public interest in the effective maintenance of immigration control weighs against the appellant. This is because he has lived in the UK unlawfully since December 2017 (at least) and cannot now meet the Immigration Rules.
49. I accept that the appellant bears no responsibility for his parents’ decision to live in the UK without leave, or to make a series of fraudulent applications for further leave. He was a child at the time. Nor do I hold against him his unwillingness to accept his parents’ responsibility for the fraudulent applications in his evidence before me. He is a young man who still lives with and is obviously very close to his parents. He may continue to believe them, in spite of the FtT’s findings, or be unwilling to denounce them in a formal setting.
50. This does not mean, however, that the public interest in the effective maintenance of immigration control is reduced in this case. That public interest is not simply a matter of personal culpability. As described by the House of Lords in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11 at [16], there are many general, public interest considerations that weigh in favour of the enforcement of the Immigration Rules. These include:
“the general administrative desirability of applying known rules if a system of immigration control is to be workable, predictable, consistent and fair as between one applicant and another; the damage to good administration and effective control if a system is perceived by applicants internationally to be unduly porous, unpredictable or perfunctory; […]; the need to discourage fraud, deception and deliberate breaches of the law; and so on.”
51. The public interest in effective immigration control therefore weighs against this appellant, in spite of his lack of personal culpability for his prolonged unlawful residence.
52. There is little weighing in favour of the appellant, given the framework set by section 117A and 117B. I mean no disrespect to the appellant’s hard work and achievements during his nine years in the UK, but the Court of Appeal has made it clear that there must by compelling factors or particularly strong features to an individual’s private life in order to put more than little weight on it, and that this is a high threshold. I find that on these facts, that high threshold is not met.
53. Nor do I find that that the appellant’s removal would have unjustifiably harsh consequences for him. His personal ties to the UK are limited, as detailed above. There is no evidence of current close friendships, and he is pursuing an entirely remote course of studies. He clearly envisages returning to India with his parents, and resettling in their home area. He accepted in his evidence before me that there would be no linguistic, social or cultural barriers to his reintegration. He also accepted that he would be able to find employment that would allow him to meet his and his parents’ basic living needs. The most serious consequence of removal that he pointed to in his evidence was that he might need to interrupt his studies because he would be working long hours. This would no doubt be a serious disappointment to him, but it does not reach the high threshold of a “very compelling case” identified in Agyarko v SSHD [2017] UKSC 11.
54. For these reasons, I find that the appellant’s removal would not be inconsistent with article 8 or unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 July 2026

ANNEX
Error of law decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No:
First-tier Tribunal No:

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

Mohit Ashokkumar Patel
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION LIFTED)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K. Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr. A. Burrett, Instructed by Shah Law Chambers Limited

Heard at Field House on 22 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity order in this appeal due to the vulnerabilities of Mr Patel’s father, who was the lead appellant in the appeal before it. He is not a party to the appeal before me, and the parties agreed that anonymity is no longer required.
2. Although Mr Patel is the respondent before the Upper Tribunal and the Secretary of State is the appellant, for ease of reference I will refer to the parties as they were before the FtT. All further references to “the appellant” are to Mr Patel and all further references to “the respondent” are to the SSHD.
3. The appellant is a citizen of India and was born in July 2004. He entered the UK with his parents in June 2017, when he was one month short of his thirteenth birthday. He has remained in the UK ever since, but he has not had leave to remain in the UK since his visit visa expired in December 2017. The appellant completed his secondary education in the UK and made friendships outside his family, and at the time of the appeal before the FtT, he was pursuing a professional accountancy qualification. The FtT found that he had established a private life in the UK and allowed his appeal because it considered that his removal would be a disproportionate interference with that private life.
4. The respondent says that the FtT gave insufficient reasons for allowing the appeal, in light of the statutory instructions section 117B of the Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002 that “Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person” at a time when they have no lawful immigration status in the UK, or their immigration status is precarious. For the reasons set out below, I agree.
The challenged decision
5. On 24 June 2022, when the appellant was 17 years old, the appellant and his parents made a joint application for leave to remain on the basis of their private and family life. The respondent refused that application, and the appeals against the refusal of the decision were heard together. The appellant before me was the third appellant before the FtT, but because there is no challenge to the FtT’s decision to dismiss the appellant’s parents’ appeals, I will refer to the appellant before me as “the appellant”, rather than the “third appellant”, as he was below.
6. At [9] of the challenged decision, the FtT identified the issues before it as:
(i) Whether the appellant’s father was unsuitable for a grant of leave because of a criminal conviction, his failure to disclose that conviction in his application, or the false statements made in an application for statelessness leave made in December 2019;
(ii) Whether the appellant’s mother was unsuitable for a grant of leave because of her own false statelessness application;
(iii) Whether the appellant was unsuitable for a grant of leave “due to his mother’s false statements on his behalf on the statelessness application”;
(iv) Whether removal of the appellants breach their rights to family or private life as protected by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
7. The FtT directed itself to the relevant law at [12], in the following terms:
“In so far as they rely on article 8 outside the Rules it is for the appellant to show that article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.”
8. With regard to the appellant’s parents, the FtT found at [35]-[42]:
(i) They were both unsuitable for a grant of leave;
(ii) They were not integrated into the UK and had provided no evidence of strong friendships;
(iii) Although their family in India might have cut them off because of the appellant’s father’s criminal offending, the appellant’s parents could rebuild their lives in another part of the country;
(iv) The appellant’s father suffered from mental and physical ill health but would be able to access treatment in India.
9. At [43], the FtT dismissed the parents’ appeals for the following reason:
“when I look at the first and second appellants in isolation, and take into account the public interest in maintaining immigration control, I find that they have failed to show any strong private life in the UK, or that they will face significant obstacles to reintegrating into life in India. I accept that they will experience difficulties, but these do not amount to undue hardship.”
10. The FtT then turned to this appellant’s appeal. It first set out that it would have dismissed the appeal based on the facts as at the date of application, because the appellant was a minor and it would have been in his best interests to remain with his parents, and although he was in the middle of his schooling, he could continue his education in India: [45]. The FtT then set out its reasons for allowing the appeal based on the facts at the date of the hearing:
“47. In relation to the third appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds outside the rules, I find that his private life has developed. He has completed his compulsory schooling and is in the middle of professional qualifications which are not recognised in India. He has built up his own friendships and relationships during his formative late teenage years in the United Kingdom. He is not financially dependent on his parents and has not shown any emotional dependence above and beyond those normally in place between parents and adult children. He speaks English and is not dependent on the state financially. He is of an age when many young men move out of the parental home and begin to start their own life.
“48. Although the third appellant has developed his private life whilst here with precarious or limited status, this was largely down to the choice of his parents. Likewise, the dishonesty on his previous application can not be held against him.
“49. When I conduct the balancing exercise in relation to the third appellant, at the time of the hearing, I find that the balance falls in favour of allowing him to remain in the United Kingdom, largely due to the stage of his professional qualifications and his friendships which extend beyond the Indian community.”
The grounds of appeal
11. The respondent’s sole ground of appeal is entitled “Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters.” Under this heading, the respondent makes the following submissions
(i) A grant of leave to remain outside the Rules on article 8 grounds requires circumstances that are “exceptional or compelling […], but from reading the FTTJ’s findings it cannot be said that this has been made out”;
(ii) The fact that the appellant was undertaking an accountancy qualification did not amount to an exceptional or compelling circumstance, particularly because there was no “guarantee” that the appellant would complete or pass the course and no reason for him to remain beyond its completion. Moreover, the FtT had failed to consider the possibility of the appellant undertaking an accountancy course in India; as quite properly pointed out by the appellant’s in his skeleton argument for this appeal, none of these submissions were made below. I therefore disregard them in accordance with Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC) and AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370.
(iii) It was “entirely unclear” what evidence the FtT had relied on to find that the appellant had established a private life outside his family unit; there were no witnesses in attendance and the FtT had not cited any witness statements from “friends or other [sic] to support this finding.”
(iv) There was no evidence of integration other than the appellant’s studies “and so it has not been shown that the appellant’s removal would breach his right to private life in the UK, particularly when bearing in mind his status is precarious, which should be afforded limited weight, as per the findings of Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 58.”
(v) “Taking the above points into overall consideration”, the findings were inadequately reasoned as defined in Budhatoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 341 (IAC).
12. The FtT granted the respondent permission to appeal in the following terms:
“This is framed as a reasons challenge but correctly identifies Rhuppiah as authority for little weight being given to the private life. The judge has arguably failed to apply section 117B of the NIAA”.
The appellant’s position
13. Prior to the appeal hearing, the appellant submitted a skeleton argument, drafted by Mr Burrett. He submitted that the failure to cite section 117B was not an error of law and that
“the FttJ was clearly mindful of the public interest criteria and applied it substantively. For instance, the Judge was obviously mindful of the fact that the R was in the UK unlawfully but distinguishes his case to that of his parents on the basis that he was a minor on entering the UK and when further applications to stay were made (§37 determination).”
14. It was further submitted that at [38] the FtT Judge was “mindful of the fact that he has to give little weight to private life that was built up unlawfully” and that he “effectively applied the approach endorsed” in Rhuppiah. The heart of the argument is
“the FttJ specifically addressed A’s residence and distinguished his circumstances from those of his parents, recognising how he was not to blame for his status during which he had gained his status [sic] and emphasised his circumstances today having now transitioned from childhood to adulthood. In particular, consistent with Rhuppiah, the Judge placed an emphasis on i), A’s age at the date of hearing, ii) his financial independence, iii) his friendships and iv) the fact that he was part way through a professional course of study of which v) he was unlikely to be able continue in India.”
15. None of these factual findings were irrational, and many of the submissions the respondent made in the grounds about proportionality had not been made before the FtT.
The hearing
16. At the hearing before me, I had sight of the respondent’s bundle of 427 pages and the appellant’s skeleton argument dated 19 April 2026. Ms King and I were present at Field House, while Mr Burrett and the appellant had been granted permission to appear by CVP link due a Tube strike.
17. I heard submissions first from Ms King and then from Mr Burrett. There is no need to rehearse those submissions here, because the recording of the hearing stands as the record of proceedings. I will focus on the most material submissions.
18. At the outset of her submissions, I asked Ms King to clarify whether the respondent’s ground was inadequacy of reasons, as stated in the grounds, or misdirection in law, as stated in the FtT’s grant of permission. She submitted that it was both. In summary, she submitted that section 117B had required the FtT to put little weight on the appellant’s private life because of his immigration status, and the FtT had failed to give adequate reasons for nonetheless allowing the appeal on private life grounds or for finding that the circumstances it relied on in so doing were exceptional or compelling. She further submitted that it was clear from [48] that section 117B(5) had been applied incorrectly, because the FtT had decided not to apply it to the appellant on the sole ground that he was not responsible for having lived in the UK without status.
19. In his submissions, Mr Burrett described the respondent’s grounds as a reasons challenge but he expressly accepted that I could deal with the misdirection in law issue raised more squarely in the grant of permission. He submitted that the findings set out at [47] were based on the evidence in the appellant’s witness statement, his educational certificates and a report by an Independent Social Worker. They were not irrational, and they were sufficient reasons for finding that the appellant had established a strong private life. The FtT had addressed all of the section 117B factors and had specifically acknowledged the appellant’s lack of status at [47]. It was open to the FTT to put less weight on the lack of status because the appellant should not be “punished” for matters that had arisen when he was a child. The fact that the FtT had said that it would have dismissed the appeal based on the facts at the date of application showed that it had taken precariousness into account.
Discussion
20. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I have reminded myself of the principles set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] and of the danger of “island-hopping”, rather than looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114]. I bear in mind in particular that FtT judges should be assumed to know and to have applied the relevant legal principles unless there is clear evidence to the contrary, and that they are not required to set out every step in their reasoning.
21. I nonetheless find that the FtT erred in its application of section 117B, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Rhuppiah and more recently by the Court of Appeal in Butt v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 189. In Rhuppiah at [44], the Supreme Court held that “everyone who, not being a UK citizen, is present in the UK and who has leave to reside here other than to do so indefinitely has a precarious immigration status for the purposes of section 117B(5).” This included those in possession of grants of limited leave to remain and a “legitimate expectation that their leave would ultimately be extended indefinitely”: [39] (citing AM (S117B) Malawi [2015] UKUT 260 (IAC), which was endorsed at [43]). This did not mean that no weight could be put on such a private life. There was a limited degree of flexibility and the requirement to put little weight on such a private life could be “overridden in an exceptional case by particularly strong features of the private life in question”: [49] (citing Sales LJ in Rhuppiah v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 803 at [53]). In Butt v SSHD at [82], the Court of Appeal reiterated that there is some limited flexibility in the application of sections 117B(4) and (5), but held that it was only available if the tribunal identified a “compelling factor”: [67] of [82].
22. I find that the respondent’s reasons challenge is made out because the FtT has failed to identify any “particularly strong feature” of the appellant’s private life in the UK. It pointed to factors that could be expected to arise in many private life claims made by young adults who have spent their formative teenage years in the UK: education, integration, and friendships. There is nothing exceptional here. In his skeleton argument, Mr Burrett described the FtT’s findings as “unsurprising […] bearing in mind that he [the appellant] has resided in the UK for over 8 years having entered as a 12 year old.” That is precisely the problem. It is impossible to understand why the FtT found the appellant’s unsurprising private life “particularly strong”.
23. I further find that this error was linked to a misapplication of section 117B. The FtT was clearly aware of the factors listed at section 117B. At [38], it referred to the requirement to give little weight to the appellants’ private lives because they were present in the UK unlawfully (117B(4)(a)). At [43], it referred to the public interest in maintaining immigration control (117B(1)). At [47], it referred to the appellant’s ability to speak English and his financial independence (sections 117B(2) and (3)).
24. The problem is at [48]. Here, the FtT takes into account that the appellant’s status has been “precarious or limited”, seemingly conflating precarious status with unlawful status and referring to both sections 117B(4)(a) and (5). It then comments that the appellant’s status was “largely down to the choice of his parents”. I agree with Ms King that the FtT is effectively disapplying sections 117B(4)(a) and (5). This is because of the sentence that follows: “Likewise, the dishonesty on his previous application cannot be held against him.” The plain meaning of this paragraph, when read as a whole, is that neither the appellant’s status nor his previous false application can be held against him, because both were the fault of his parents. Although Mr Burrett submitted that the FtT had applied sections 117B(4)(a) and (5) and had simply weighed them less heavily against the appellant, that is not consistent with the structure of the paragraph, nor with the word “likewise”. Indeed, Mr Burrett’s summary of the FtT’s reasoning as that the appellant “should not be punished for matters that arose when he was a child” is more consistent with the FtT having disapplied sections 117B(4)(a) and (5) than with it having applied them flexibly.
25. In addition, even if the FtT applied section 117B(4)(a) and (5) flexibly, rather than disapplying them, it would have been an error of law to do so for the reasons that it gave. Sections 117B (5) is not a punishment for misbehaviour. This is obvious from the fact that it applies even to those who have always been here lawfully with a legitimate expectation of eventually qualifying for settlement. Nor would a focus on culpability be consistent with Rhuppiah and Butt. They describe flexibility in the application of section 117B(5) as arising out of particularly strong, positive features of a person’s private life, not out of reasons for not punishing an individual for their immigration status.
26. Moreover, as set out in Rhuppiah and Agyarko v SSHD [2017] UKSC 11, sections 117B(4)(a) and (5) reflect the respondent’s interpretation of the relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) and must be interpreted and applied in accordance with that jurisprudence. Here, there are two reasons that little weight is put on a private or family life developed when a person’s status is precarious. The first is that knowledge that one’s status (or one’s partner’s status) is precarious is likely to affect the strength of the private or family life that develops: Agyarko at [52]-[53]. It might have been open to the FtT to take into account that when the appellant was a child, he did not know his status was precarious, but this is not a finding that it made.
27. There is a second reason for putting little weight on a precarious family or private life identified by the ECtHR in Jeunesse v The Netherlands (2015) 60 EHRR 17 and endorsed by the Supreme Court in Rhuppiah at [54]. This is that “enabling non-nationals to evade immigration control by establishing a family life while present in the host state unlawfully or temporarily, and then presenting it with a fait accompli” would undermine states’ entitlement to control the entry and residence of non-nationals: Agyarko [54]. To carve out an exception to this principle because the appellant’s parents had done exactly this would be inconsistent with this jurisprudence.
28. I note for the sake of completeness that although the FtT mentioned the public interest in the effective maintenance of immigration control when deciding whether the appellants’ parents removal would be proportionate at [43], it did not do so when considering the proportionality of the appellant’s removal at [45]-[49].
29. For these reasons, I find that the FtT’s proportionality assessment was infected by material errors of law that require the decision to be set aside.
30. I do not consider that any of the respondent’s complaints about the FtT’s fact-finding are made out. The respondent’s ground of appeal was framed as a mixed adequacy of reasons/misdirection in law challenge. It was not framed as a rationality challenge, and she was not granted permission to appeal on this basis. Moreover, the findings did have a basis in the appellant’s witness statement, his educational records and the ISW report. The FtT’s findings of fact are therefore preserved.
31. Taking into account the guidance set out in Majera v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 159, Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, I consider it appropriate to retain this appeal for remaking in the Upper Tribunal. The FtT’s factual findings have not been successfully challenged and although the appellant may wish to provide updating evidence of his private life in the UK, the amount of fact-finding will be limited.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 14 November 2025 is set aside in part.
The appeal will be retained for remaking before the Upper Tribunal.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 April 2026