Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000789
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57464/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

25th June 2026
Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

KH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Miah of Counsel, instructed by Raiyad Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Gilmour, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) dated 19 December 2025 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s refusal on 29 February 2024 of his protection and human rights claims.
2. Permission to appeal was given by First-tier Tribunal Judge Curtis on five of the seven pleaded grounds, although he substituted what he described as a ‘Robinson obvious’ error in place of one of the grounds. The permitted grounds in short are: the judge failed to undertake a holistic credibility assessment; it was irrational for the judge to reject supporting letters because they had been produced for the purposes of the claim and appeal; the judge misapprehended the number of photographs produced of the appellant with a partner; the judge misdirected himself to the standard of proof applicable to the case; the judge misapprehended the date on which photographs had been taken; and the Judge failed to assess whether the evidence before him but not before the previous judge entitled them to reach a different conclusion. Mr Miah in submissions accepted that the final ground stood or fell with whether the earlier grounds criticising the judges treatment of the evidence succeeded.
3. In her rule 24 response, the respondent argued that none of the pleaded errors were sustainable on a holistic reading of the decision. The judge had properly understood the evidence before them, and had taken a rational approach to the evidence. Ms Gilmour argued that, to the extent that there were any minor misapprehensions of the evidence, they were immaterial given the context of the appeal (previous judicial findings rejecting the appellant’s claim to be homosexual ) and the judge’s comprehensive reasons for not departing from the previous judicial findings.
4. As discussed with the parties, I had significant doubts as to whether the ground substituted by Judge Curtis was truly Robinson obvious; however, the fact remains that he gave permission for it to be argued at this hearing, and so I deal with it below. Nevertheless, it is convenient to deal with the other grounds first for reasons that will become apparent.
5. Ground 3 concerns the judge’s approach to letters from Apanjon, an LGBTQ organisation whose membership is claimed by the appellant. There were three letters before the First-tier Tribunal from Apanjon. The first two letters, dated 25 August 2022 and 21 December 2023 respectively, are addressed to the respondent, are entitled ‘Re: asylum application for the appellant’, are signed by the chairperson of the organisation and confirm the appellant’s membership of the organisation since November 2019 and his regular attendance and use of the organisations services, as well as his attendance at London Pride with the organisation 2023.
6. The third is dated 1 December 2025 and again is addressed to the Home Office and signed by the chairperson, albeit that the chairperson had by then changed his name. Again, the letter confirms the appellant’s membership of the organisation since November 2019 and his regular attendance and the use of its services, as well as attendance at London Pride with the organisation in 2023 and 2024. However, the letter also explains that the author cannot attend the Tribunal hearing on 9 December 2025 but indicates his support for the claim, believing the appellant to be genuinely gay.
7. The relevant paragraphs in the judge’s decision are [78]-[81]:
78. It is the appellant’s evidence that he had been a member of Apanjon since 2019. There are only 2 letters from Apanjon confirming he is gay. I accept, however, that the letters are on an official letterhead and include contact details, as submitted by Mr Mayer. I find on a balance of probability, however, that based on these letters, the appellant is not a member of Apanjon. This is not because the letters are not from who they say they are, but because of the number of letters from Apanjon provided as evidence (only 2) and also the date of such letters.
79. The first is dated 25 Aug 2022. This is dated just before the date of his further submissions of 28 August 2022.
80. The second is dated 1st December 2025 just before the hearing of 9 December 2025. I find this is just too coincidental and makes me feel that on a balance of probabilities, the reason why these letters were written, was to support his asylum application and not because he is a member.’
8. Setting aside for one moment the fact that the judge miscounted the number of letters provided by Apanjon, it is clear that the judge rejected their content because of their coincidence in time with events in the appellant’s claim: his further submissions and his appeal. The judge concluded that they had been written to support his asylum application and not because he was a member. However, the letters were manifestly written to support the appellant’s claim. Indeed, the most recent letter was expressly written to explain the authors inability to attend the appeal hearing. It defies all logic for the judge to reject the truth of what supporting letter says merely because it has been written in support of an application. In short, it discloses an irrational approach to the letters.
9. The other reason for rejecting the veracity of the letters was that only two had been provided. That was manifest factual error on the judge as part. Whilst on its own it might appear insignificant, it is very much a theme in this judgement suggesting that the judge has failed to apply any reasonable scrutiny let alone anxious scrutiny to the appellant’s case.
10. Ground four complains that the judge materially erred in fact when, at [86], he found it damaging to the appellant’s credibility that he had only provided 2 photographs of him with MSR, whereas in fact 12 photographs had been provided of the two together. Ms Gilmour properly observed that the judge found at [85] that the appellant had provided nine photographs of him with a another partner, KU, and at [87] that a total of 20 photographs had been provided for both relationships. Consequently, she submitted, [86] discloses an obvious typographical error, clearly having been meant to record 12 photographs of the appellant and MSR.
11. The problem with that argument is that [33] records MSR being asked in cross-examination, ‘why the appellant had only provided two photographs of them together over this period’. Manifestly, the words ‘two’ and ‘twelve’ are not easily confused and substituting one for the other is not explained away as a typographical error. Instead, I find that it is likely either that the question was (incorrectly) put as recorded, was mis-recorded by the judge in his notes, or that judge misread their notes when writing the decision. Whatever the reason, I am satisfied that the judge found that the appellant had produced only 2 photographs of him together with MSR whereas there were in fact 12 before the judge. The judge made it clear beyond question in [86] that the number of photographs provided of the couple together damaged the appellant’s credibility. While it is possible that the judge might have considered even 12 to be an inadequate number of photographs to support a credible account, I am unable to agree that the end result would inevitably have been the same.
12. Ground six criticises the judge for describing the photographs at [91] as having been taken ‘near to the date of the hearing.’ I agree with the respondent that ‘near’ means different things to different people. However, the appellant had only claimed to be in a relationship with KU between 2022-2023, to have been in a relationship with MSR since then and only to have attended pride in 2023 and 2024. The photographs appear to span that entire period, at least according to the captions given for each one. Even respecting the wide ambit given to fact-finding judges, I am satisfied that it was not reasonably open to the judge to describe photographs claimed to have been taken in 2022 to have been ‘taken near’ the date of the hearing (6 December 2025) without an express finding they had been mis-labelled. ‘
13. Ground two as reframed by Judge Curtis alleges that the judge failed to assess credibility holistically. In particular, Judge Curtis considers it arguable that the judge rejected the appellant’s claim to be homosexual of the basis of a four-year delay in making further submissions alone. The relevant passage in a decision is to be found at 77:
‘77. Further, it took him just under 4 years to produce further submissions. Because of such delay, I find that on a balance of probability, he is not gay. This is not the first time he failed to act promptly to legitimise his immigration status. When his visit visa expired on 30th September 2009. he did not seek to regularise his status until 12 December 2017 when he claimed asylum.’
14. Had the remainder of the decision been error-free, I would have been minded to accept this as merely poor drafting. However, as found above, there then follow a number of factual and legal mistakes which suggest a failure to take adequate care, which in turn may well suggest that the judge had already made their mind up. Certainly, the judge’s inadequate treatment of practically all of the evidence relied on in support of the appellant’s claim suggests an approach coloured by the judge’s view on the delay.
15. As it is, I do not need to find that ground two is made out to be satisfied that the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s factual basis for claiming asylum involved the making of a series of material mistakes of fact and one illogical leap of reasoning amounting to material errors of law, such that it must be set aside with no facts preserved.
Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a matter of law and is set aside.
2. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by another judge with no findings of fact preserved.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 June 2026