Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No.: UI-2026-000795
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55345/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 21st of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MONSON

Between

MH (IRAN)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: None.
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals from the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Balroop promulgated on 29 June 2025 (“the Decision”). By the Decision, Judge Balroop dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent made on 31 July 2023 to refuse his protection claim in which he maintained that he had a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Iran as he had fled from Iran with an adverse profile as an anti-government protestor with a visible Christian tattoo, and he had since been engaging in political activities and Christian worship in the UK.
Relevant Background
2. The appellant is a national of Iran, whose date of birth is 29 March 2005. On 7 September 2022 he applied for leave to enter as a student. He was granted entry clearance in that capacity from 24 September 2022 to 28 October 2024. The appellant entered the UK legally on his student visa on 11 October 2022.
3. The appellant is recorded as claiming asylum at Heathrow Airport. He did not present his passport, as he had disposed of it. However, the Interviewing Officer was able to ascertain from the Home Office system that the appellant had been issued with a student visa.
4. In his unaccompanied asylum-seeking child welfare form, he said that his reason for coming to the UK was that he and his mother had attended a protest, at which she was arrested, and so he had attacked a policeman. So, if he went back, his life would be in danger. His mother had organised everything for him to come to the UK. His mother had paid for everything.
5. The appellant made a witness statement in support of his asylum claim dated 25 April 2023, and he was given a substantive asylum interview on 28 June 2023.
6. The appellant’s claim was that he had explored Christianity after the death of his brother in a car accident, and he had had a Christian Holy Cross tattooed on his hand. The Basij spotted his Christian tattoo and beat him up, breaking his arm. On another occasion, the Basij arrested and detained him for 1.5 days after he resisted an attempt by them to take his bike. During his detention, they photographed his tattoo. His mother had paid 1.4 million tomans for his release.
7. He did not know the date of his arrest by the Basij but it was 2 or 3 months before he had attended a demonstration in Nazai Abad, Tehran. He had attended demonstrations in Nazai Abad on unknown dates in 2022, protesting about the lack of freedom and the clothing restrictions on young people. He broke CCTV cameras and smashed glass. At another demonstration he had encountered plain-clothes members of the authorities, and he struck one with a stone to aid his friend Sajid’s escape. After escaping the authorities at this demonstration, his maternal uncle hid him for 4-5 days before he left Iran illegally on an unknown date.
8. The appellant’s mother had learned that his friend Sajid had been arrested. The authorities were aware of his presence at the demonstration due to Sajid’s arrest. When he arrived in the UK, an Iranian friend had informed him that the authorities had detained and questioned his mother about him. She had informed this friend that she was under surveillance due to the authorities looking for him.
9. In the RFRL, the respondent did not accept that the appellant was of adverse interest to the Iranian authorities, or that he had illegally exited Iran, due to asserted inconsistencies in his account of events in Iran, most notably that he had initially claimed that his mother had been arrested when attending a demonstration with him, and the fact that his claim was inconsistent with information which confirmed that his intent was to leave Iran to attend a boarding school in the UK, for which his family had made a preliminary payment of £10,175 towards the total boarding fees. The respondent also did not accept that the appellant was at risk upon return due to his sur place activities, applying XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 23 (IAC).
10. By the time of the respondent’s review dated 19 January 2024, the appellant’s case had expanded, in that he now said he was at risk of persecution on return to Iran not only because of his political opinion, but also because he was a genuine Christian convert. As to the latter, the respondent noted that the appellant did not start attending Christian services until the end of August 2023, around one month after the RFRL, and 10 months after he had made his asylum claim. The respondent’s case was that the appellant had thereby not shown that he was a genuine convert.
The Hearing before, and the Decision of, the First-tier Tribunal
11. The appellant’s appeal came before Judge Balroop sitting at Hatton Cross on 16 June 2025. Both parties were legally represented. The appellant gave evidence through a Farsi Interpreter, and he was cross-examined by the Presenting Officer. The Judge also received evidence from George Oh, who was a member of the church in Uxbridge that the appellant was attending.
12. In his Decision, the Judge began his discussion by setting out the closing submissions of the representatives.
13. At paras [37]-[41], the Judge gave his reasons for finding that the appellant was not a genuine convert to Christianity. At paras [42]-[45] the Judge gave his reasons for not accepting the appellant’s account of being detained in Iran or of what had occurred at any demonstrations. At paras [49]-[54] the Judge gave his reasons for not accepting that it was reasonably likely that the appellant would be at risk from the authorities upon return to Iran as a result of his sur place activities. At para [53] the Judge found that, as the appellant did not have a genuine religious or political belief, he would not be required to volunteer information about his activities in the UK upon return, and he could delete his social media accounts.
The Grounds of Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
14. Ground 1 was that the Judge had erred in assessing the appellant’s credibility by failing to take into account his vulnerability.
15. Ground 2 was that the Judge’s assessment of the evidence before him was materially flawed, and that he gave insufficient weight to material evidence, in particular the Facebook evidence and the supporting evidence from the Church, including the evidence of Church Elder Kevin Oh (incorrectly referred to in the Decision as George Oh).
16. Ground 3 was that the Judge failed to make findings on material matters going to the appellant’s conversion and practice of his faith.
17. Ground 4 was that the Judge had erred in his assessment of evidence relating to the appellant’s risk upon return and that (1) when assessing credibility, he did not mention the appellant’s vulnerability and the fact that he was on anti-depressants, and the possible effects of that; and (2) the Judge had also failed to make any findings on the risk of the appellant upon his return as a failed asylum seeker, having regard to the oppressive Iranian regime and its conflict with the UK.
The Reasons for the Grant of Permission to Appeal
18. On 10 February 2026 First-tier Tribunal Judge Dixon gave the appellant permission to appeal out-of-time, as he was a Litigant in Person.
19. He noted that the Judge had decided to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness. The grounds pointed out that the Judge did not appear to have taken the vulnerable witness guidance into account in the consideration of the credibility of the appellant’s evidence. This had arguable merit, particularly in terms of the claimed events in Iran. He had considered whether a Rule 35 decision was called for, but on balance it appeared that it was better for there to be full argument as to whether there was a material failure to apply the guidance in the substantive assessment and, if there was, whether it was material. While the other grounds did not appear as strong, permission was granted on these as well.
The Rule 24 Response
20. In a Rule 24 response dated 24 February 2026, Matthew Pugh of the Specialist Appeals Team set out the respondent’s reasons for opposing the appeal. As to Ground 1, at para [3] of the determination the Judge expressly referred to the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No.2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and a sensitive appellant guidance (“the Guidance”). In the light of this impeccable self-direction at the outset, the appellant had not shown that the Judge did not apply the Guidance in full. The mere absence of further reference to it was not sufficient unless the appellant could point to a positive instance of the Judge acting contrary to it.
21. While the Judge may not have referred to the Guidance again, he was clearly mindful of it, because references to the appellant’s age recurred throughout the determination at paras [40], [42], [44] and [48]. The Guidance did not preclude a Judge from finding that, despite the appellant’s age, the inconsistencies in his account were so stark as to render him incredible.
22. The remaining grounds were simply re-argument. In summary, the respondent submitted that the determination contained no, or no material, error of law.
The Hearing in the Upper Tribunal
23. At the hearing before me to determine whether an error of law was made out, there was no appearance by the appellant by 11:15am (or subsequently). I debated with Ms Everett whether the appellant may have delayed by the tube strike, as a consequence of which he would have had to make his way to Field House by overground services or by bus or by a combination of both. But there had been no communication from him to the effect that he was on his way.
24. As I was satisfied that the appellant had received notice of the hearing, and as the resolution of the error of law challenge turned entirely on legal argument, as to which the appellant could not reasonably be expected to make a meaningful contribution beyond what had been pleaded in the detailed grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal, I decided that it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the error of law hearing in the appellant’s absence. Accordingly, I invited Ms Everett to address me on all the grounds of appeal that had been raised.
25. Ms Everett adhered to the Rule 24 Response opposing the appeal. She highlighted the fact that there was no medical evidence before the Judge to show that the appellant was suffering from a mental, psychological or emotional trauma, or disability.
Discussion and Conclusions
26. I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953 at para [36]. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC). Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…”
27. I also take into account the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at para [2]:
“i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for the judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
Ground 1
28. The Guidance falls into two parts. The first part relates to the conduct of the hearing. The second part relates to the assessment of the evidence.
29. Under para 10.3, which is headed “Assessing evidence”, the decision-maker is mandated to take account of potentially corroborative evidence and to be aware: (i) that children often do not provide as much detail as adults in recalling experiences and may often manifest their fears differently from adults; (ii) Some forms of disability cause and result in impaired memory; (iii) The order and manner in which evidence is given may be affected by mental, psychological or emotional trauma or disability; and (iv) the comprehension of questioning may have been impaired.
30. The Guidance goes on to state:
“14. Consider the evidence, allowing for possible different degrees of understanding by witnesses and appellant compared to those who are not vulnerable, in the context of evidence from others associated with the appellant and the background evidence before you. Where there were clear discrepancies in the oral evidence, consider the extent to which the age, vulnerability or sensitivity of the witness was an element of that discrepancy or lack of clarity.
15. The decision should record whether the Tribunal has concluded the appellant (or a witness) is a child, vulnerable or sensitive, the effect the Tribunal considered the identified vulnerability had in assessing the evidence before it and thus whether the Tribunal is satisfied whether the appellant had established his or her case to the relevant standard of proof. In asylum appeals, weight should be given to objective indications of risk rather than state of mind.”
29. In the appeal skeleton argument (ASA), it was submitted that the appellant was already vulnerable prior to leaving Iran as the result of the loss of his father and brother, and also the separation from his mother. Since entering the UK, he had learned of his childhood friend Sajid committing suicide, further to his arrest by the authorities for participating in protests. This had left the appellant very traumatised and he had since been prescribed mirtazapine, an anti-depressant.
30. While the Judge must have been satisfied that the appellant was a vulnerable witness for the purposes of the hearing on the basis of his age and possibly also because of the evidence that he was suffering from depression (which was an undated photograph of a packet of mirtazapine), it did not follow that the appellant’s vulnerability at the time of the hearing had a bearing on the assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s account of past events in the absence of (a) historic evidence that he was suffering from depression or any other mental health issue at the time when he was being interviewed about his claim or (b) medical evidence that he was suffering now from a mental, psychological or emotional trauma or disability. However, the Judge left himself open to an error of law challenge by not overtly addressing this point.
31. Nonetheless, I do not consider that the Judge’s error was material for the reasons given below.
32. On analysis, there were two overlapping vulnerabilities potentially in play in the assessment of credibility. The first was that the appellant was a child when he experienced the claimed events in Iran, and at the date of the hearing he was still only a young adult (the age vulnerability). The second was his putative traumatised state (the mental health vulnerability).
33. Although the Judge did not refer to the Guidance in his credibility assessment, the Judge made overt reference to the appellant’s age on three occasions and he in effect asked himself whether the appellant’s age accounted for inconsistences in his account.
34. At para [42], the Judge did not accept that - regardless to his age at the time – the appellant would be unable to recall the date of his claimed arrest and detention for 1.5 days.
35. At para [44], the Judge said that he had considered the appellant’s age when completing the welfare form, which was 17, and his age when he made his asylum witness statement, which was just over the age of 18, and he did not consider that this adequately explained “such a significant discrepancy” between the appellant’s accounts of what had occurred at the demonstrations.
36. At para [48], the Judge said that he was mindful that the pictures the appellant had produced (comprising screenshots relating to Sajid, religious pictures, pictures of him being baptised and also political pictures) were very relevant to his claim and that he was also mindful of the appellant’s age at the time. The Judge continued:
“However, the Appellant’s inconsistent internal evidence means I give no weight to the pictures.”
37. Although the Judge did not expressly consider in his credibility assessment whether the appellant was also vulnerable on mental health grounds, there was no medical evidence before him which showed or indicated that the asserted inconsistencies in the appellant’s account of events in Iran, or the asserted inconsistency of the appellant only starting to attend church after the RFRL, were as a result of the appellant suffering from PTSD or another medical condition which might impair his memory or which might explain why he only started attending church in September 2023. As to the latter, the appellant’s excuse, which the Judge rejected, was that he did not speak English and did not know where to go. It was not suggested that the appellant was prompted to start attending church by a deterioration in his mental state. There was no psychiatric report, and there was also no disclosure of the appellant’s GP medical records. While there was evidence that the appellant had been prescribed mirtazapine, there was no documentary evidence as to when and for how long the appellant had been prescribed it, or as to the presenting complaint which had led to it being prescribed.
Ground 2
38. On analysis, Ground 2 is no more than an expression of disagreement with findings on the sur place claim that were reasonably open to the Judge for the reasons which he gave. As is highlighted in the Rule 24 Response, the pleader of Ground 2 effectively seeks to re-argue the case by reference to older authorities, such as YB [2008] EWCA Civ 360 and AB & Others. However, the Judge correctly directed himself in accordance with the more pertinent authorities of XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 23 (IAC), S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482 and PS (Christianity) [2020] UKUT 00046 (IAC).
39. A subsidiary point raised in Ground 2 is an argument that the Judge failed to place sufficient weight on the in-person evidence of the Church Elder, Kevin Oh, and the appellant’s own account of his beliefs. The relevant background is that Mr Oh had not made a witness statement, but he was allowed to adopt as his evidence in chief a letter of support made by another Church Elder. This may account for the Judge referring to Mr Oh as George Oh, rather than as Kevin Oh.
40. It is acknowledged in the Grounds that it was a matter for the Judge what weight he attached to the evidence, and I consider that the Judge was not clearly wrong to reach the conclusion that, while Mr Oh had a genuine belief that the appellant was a genuine convert to Christianity, he had in fact been misled by the appellant, as had the other elders of the church.
Ground 3
41. Ground 3 traverses the same ground as Ground 2. It is submitted that the Judge failed to make clear findings on all the relevant matters capable of informing his conclusions, in particular that the appellant’s knowledge of Christianity had not been tested by the respondent at any point during the entire asylum process.
42. I consider that Ground 3 presents as an attempt to re-argue the case by reference to additional considerations which were not canvassed in the ASA.
Ground 4
43. There are two pleaded errors raised in Ground 4. The first pleaded error is the same as that canvassed in Ground 1. The Judge did not err in not addressing the possible effects of the appellant taking anti-depressant medication, as no medical evidence on this topic was before him.
44. The second pleaded error is the Judge’s failure to make any findings on the risk to the appellant upon return as a failed asylum seeker, given the present volatile political climate. I consider that the Judge adequately addressed the case put forward in the ASA on this issue, and that he gave adequate reasons for finding that the appellant would not be at risk as a failed asylum seeker, applying the guidance given in XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 23 (IAC), S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482 and PS (Christianity) [2020] UKUT 00046 (IAC).
Summary
45. For the above reasons, no error of law is made out. The Judge did not err in law in his assessment of the evidence that was before him at the date of the hearing.
Notice of Decision
The decision in the First-tier Tribunal did not contain an error of law, and accordingly the decision stands. This appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
Anonymity
The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in favour of the appellant, and I consider that it is appropriate that the appellant continues to be protected by anonymity for the purposes of these proceedings in the Upper Tribunal.

Andrew Monson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
10 May 2026