Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2026-000807
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65068/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9th of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIPLEY

Between

MMD (Philippines )
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hodson, Counsel, instructed by MBM Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Keerthy, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 April 2026

ANONYMITY ORDER

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.

Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant appeals a decision of First-tier Tribunal Bunting (“the Judge”) dated 4 December 2025 dismissing the appellant’s international protection and human rights appeal.

Anonymity Order
2. The Judge issued an anonymity order. Neither party requested that the order be set aside. I observe that the appellant seeks international protection and consider that her private life rights protected under article 8 ECHR presently outweigh the right of the public to know her identity as a party to these proceedings. The latter right is protected by Article 10 ECHR.

Relevant Facts
3. The appellant is a national of the Philippines. The appellant has claimed that she is fearful of her ex-partner because she owes him money and that she is a victim of domestic violence. The appellant relies on a complaint made by her parents to the police that they had been threatened by her ex-partner. The respondent did not accept that the appellant had been subjected to domestic violence or that she was in debt to her ex-partner. If either were true, it was not accepted that she would face a risk on return, or that any such risk could not be addressed by a sufficiency of protection or an internal flight alternative.

First-tier Tribunal Decision
4. The Judge did not accept the credibility of the claim for the following reasons:
(i) The appellant had failed to state in her asylum interview in 2021 that she had been subjected to domestic abuse. In her interview she had not raised any difficulties in their relationship until after they broke up in 2016 [49 – 51].
(ii) The appellant had failed to explain why her ex-partner would wait five years to get back in touch with her family (i.e. until 2021) [52].
(iii) The appellant had not stated in her interview that her former partner was well connected, would be able to track her down or could act without impunity [52].
(iv) The account of the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum was unconvincing. It was not accepted she was unaware of how to apply for asylum. She had failed to mention fear of return or debt in her 2016 application [53 – 54].
(v) The account of having an outstanding debt was implausible. The appellant herself worked but had not made attempts to repay her former debt. Her sister and brother-in-law earned £85,000 but had said they did not have enough money to help the appellant. Their inability to help was not accepted, especially in the absence of evidence of the sister and brother-in-law’s financial circumstances. It was not credible that the appellant and her sister had been unable to save £4000 to discharge the debt in the previous ten years [55 – 58].
(vi) The appellant had raised for the first time in her second witness statement that her former partner was also requesting a high level of interest on the debt. [59]
(vii) There was a pattern of exaggeration [60].
(viii) The Judge placed little weight on the letters from the appellant’s family as they were not detailed and had not been called as witnesses. [ 61]
(ix) There was a lack of expert evidence as to authenticity for the police report, a lack of evidence of the general format of such reports or the report’s provenance. The Judge stated that he was not in a position to say whether it was not authentic and could not place any weight on it. [62]
(x) Taking into account Tanveer Ahmed v. SSHD [2002] UKAIT 00439 and concerns about the appellant’s account, no weight was placed on the documents and statements from the Philippines [63].
(xi) It was not accepted that the appellant was in debt or had been threatened by her former partner [64].
(xii) If the appellant’s account was accepted, she would have substantial difficulties establishing she could not access a sufficiency of protection or an internal flight alternative. [67]

Grounds of Appeal
5. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and relied on three grounds of appeal:
(i) Failure to consider material evidence/erroneous approach to evidence and procedural unfairness
It was argued that the Judge erroneously failed to place any weight on the police report because there was no expert evidence attesting its authenticity. In particular he did not address:
(a) its internal consistency.
(b) its consistency with the appellant’s account.
(c) whether it was typical of police reports in the Philippines.
(d) if its provenance was in dispute.
(e) if it supported the appellant’s appeal.
The respondent had not cross-examined the appellant on the document and thus the Judge’s approach was procedurally unfair.
Having found that there was a lack of evidence to conclude the document was inauthentic, the Judge had failed to explain why he placed no weight on it. The Judge had rejected the report because he had already made an adverse credibility conclusion in respect of the appellant, contrary to Mbanga v. SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367. The judge had not made any clear findings on internal relocation.
(ii) Erroneous and adverse credibility finding
The Judge’s conclusion as to the appellant’s failure to repay the £4000 debt was speculation. It was based on assumptions concerning:
(a) the appellant’s supposed earning capacity.
(b) the household income of her sister and brother-in-law; and
(c) an inferred ability to save.
The was a lack of material evidence to support the Judge’s conclusions. The Judge had rejected the appellant’s claim as to the debt because, in his view, the family would have repaid the debt. He had failed to find whether there was a real risk that the appellant’s account was true.
The Judge had made no findings on sufficiency of protection or internal relocation but only stated that the appellant would have substantial difficulties claiming that these were not available to her.
(iii) Approach to Article 8
The Judge’s erroneous finding as to the protection claim undermined his conclusions in relation to Article 8.
6. By a decision dated 14 February 2026, First-tier Tribunal Judge Curtis granted permission to appeal on the grounds argued.
7. In a Rule 24 response dated 7 April 2026 the respondent argued that the finding in respect of the police report was not material when considered against the other detailed adverse credibility findings. It was additionally argued that the Judge had considered Tanveer Ahmed appropriately. The Judge was entitled to reject the document due to a lack of supporting evidence, the document was not determinative. There was no challenge to the majority of the adverse credibility findings
8. The appellant has prepared a composite bundle. The pagination in this decision refers to the PDF numbering of the composite bundle.
9. Mr Hodson and Miss Keerthy made submissions at the error of law hearing, which have been recorded.

Analysis
10. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing, before reaching a decision. I bear in mind that where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the Tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account (MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 49.) Further, an appellate court should not rush to find an error because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently (AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 693).
Ground 1
11. The primary argument advanced by Mr Hodson concerns the Judge’s consideration of the police report. This is a report (page 211) recording a threat made by the appellant’s former partner on 15 December 2023 at the appellant’s parents’ home. It was stated that he had angrily burst into their house and asked for repayment of the debt the appellant owed him. It was further stated that he threatened to kill them and, although he was like family to them, they were very scared because he has bipolar disease. The document was stated to be an extract from the police report and the incident complained of was a violation of Article 282, comprising grave threats. The copy was issued on 17 April 2024.
12. At paragraphs 24 – 26 the Judge has stated that this document was filed late and admitted at the hearing because, although it had been submitted to the appellant’s solicitors in April 2024, there had been a change of caseworker, and it had not been passed to the new caseworker. The Presenting Officer did not object to the admission of the document but did not accept its reliability either. In the grounds it is recorded that the provenance of the document was accepted, but the decision does not record that concession.
13. Mr Hodson submitted that the Judge failed to make any reference to the evidence in the appellant’s witness statement that her former partner had been harassing her parents every two weeks at their new address and that on 15 December 2023 her parents reported his visit to the police. The incident was also referred to in the appellant’s parents’ letter (page 37). The appellant had also raised in her interview that her parents had moved two years ago and that was consistent with her account that they were being threatened by her former partner.
14. Mr Hodson further argued that the Judge had focused on the non-authenticity of the document and lack of expert evidence instead of whether the appellant had established its reliability.
15. In addition to the Rule 24 submission, Ms Keerthy argued that the Judge had already noted that it was not explained why the appellant’s former partner would start to harass her family five years after they separated. The Judge has also found a pattern of exaggeration. Those findings had not been challenged by the appellant, there was a lack of evidence of provenance of the document, and a lack of evidence of police documents in the Philippines or any supporting evidence. The Judge was entitled to make those findings.
Conclusions as to Ground 1
16. The Judge was correct when he stated that there was no expert evidence to support the authenticity of the police report and nor was there any evidence as to the general format of such reports [62]. As it is for the appellant to establish the reliability of the document, I am satisfied that the Judge could properly find, applying Tanveer Ahmed, that there was a lack of evidence as to how the document had been obtained and how it had been received in the UK. The Judge then goes on to state that he cannot say whether it is not authentic. It is possible that the addition of the ‘not’ is a drafting mistake but, as the sentence makes sense as it is written, it is not safe to find that this is the case.
17. The Judge goes on to conclude with the statement “in those circumstances I do not consider that I can place any weight on this.” The circumstances that the Judge has set out in that paragraph concern the lack of expert evidence, the lack of evidence as to the general format and the lack of evidence to provenance. I am not satisfied that it was open to the Judge to conclude that those circumstances should properly lead him to place no weight on the document. As raised in the skeleton and by Mr Hodson, the Judge has failed to consider the degree to which the content of the police report is consistent with the appellant’s written and oral evidence and the written evidence of her family.
18. I am not satisfied that the contents of paragraph 63 remedy that defect. In paragraph 63 the Judge is considering his prior adverse findings in relation to the appellant’s evidence, but he has failed to demonstrate that he has considered whether the police report would be supportive of and supported by the appellant’s claim.
19. I thus find that the Judge has erred in his consideration of the document. He did not demonstrate that he had considered the evidence in the round, contrary to Mbanga, he has failed to explain why he placed no weight on the document and erroneously referred to a test of authenticity rather than reliability.
20. However, the respondent additionally argues that any such error is not material. I am not satisfied there were adequate findings to conclude that the error is not material. Ms Keerthy has relied on the adverse findings made by the Judge in relation to the application of Section 8, the failure to provide reasons why the appellant’s husband would start harassing her family in 2023 when, according to the repeated information in her interview, he had not done so during the previous five years, her failure to raise (i) debt in her 2016 application, (ii) that she was required to pay a high level of interest until her second witness statement and (iii) domestic violence earlier in her claim.
21. Whilst noting that there was a lack of evidence for why the appellant’s former partner should start harassing her family in 2023, after a five-year gap, the Judge should have taken into account that the appellant had provided a police report that did support that account, and this was consistent with the available written evidence. Similarly, the police report referred to the appellant’s debt and gave an account that her partner had threatened to kill them and was thus supportive of her claim to be indebted and that he was threatening the family.
22. I am satisfied that the Judge’s failure to adequately consider the evidence in the round comprises a material error. As considered the relevant test in ASO (IRAQ) and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1282 ‘ it is not considered that this is a case in which any rational tribunal would have been bound to make the same evaluations and to draw the same inferences from the matters about which there was, and there was not, evidence in this case’. For all the above reasons, I find that the Judge has made a material error of law.
23. In these circumstances there is no need to go onto the separately consider ground 2 and 3. In respect of the former, the police report supported the appellant’s account of being indebted and the reasons the Judge gave for rejecting that account [55-58], were reached without consideration of that evidence.

Remittal
24. I am mindful of the presumption in paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement for the Immigration and Asylum Chambers that appeals should be remade in the Upper Tier Tribunal and find that paragraph 7.2(b) applies. Both representatives agreed that remittal would be the appropriate course in the event of a finding of a material error.

Notice of Decision
25. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 4 December 2025 is set aside in its entirety consequent to material error of law.
26. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Taylor House.
27. The decision is to be remade by a Judge of the First Tier Tribunal other than Judge Bunting.
28. The anonymity order is to continue.

F Ripley
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 May 2026