Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2026-000813
First-tier Tribunal Number: PA/61427/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued

On 13th of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WOODCRAFT

Between

MK
(Anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms P Yong, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms S Lecointe, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Heard at Field House on 30 April 2026
The Appellant
1. The appellant is a citizen of Namibia born on 11 June 1991. He appeals against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 4 December 2025 dismissing his appeal against a decision of the respondent dated 19 April 2024. That decision in turn refused the appellant’s application for international protection. The appellant left Namibia on 29 September 2022 arriving in the United Kingdom on 17 October 2022. He made a claim for asylum upon arrival.
Order Regarding Anonymity.
2. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity, and is to be referred to in these proceedings by the initials MK. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
The Appellant’s Case
3. The appellant’s case was summarised by the judge at [33] of the determination which stated:
“The Appellant states that he fears persecution in Namibia from his paternal uncle, who is described as a leader within the Ovambanderu Traditional Authority. According to the Appellant, following the death of his father on 18 August 2015, his uncle sought to take control of the family property and exerted pressure on [the appellant] to marry his cousin, the uncle's daughter. His refusal to comply with these demands led to threats, and verbal and emotional abuse. The Appellant asserts that he reported these matters to the Namibian Police and the Traditional Authority, but no effective action was taken, which he attributes to his uncle's political connections and influence.”
The judge also noted that the appellant relied upon an expert report from Professor Boswell on country conditions.
The Decision at First Instance
4. At [44] and [45] the judge stated:
“I … accept that the Appellant has had a dispute with his uncle and does not wish to marry his cousin. I note that although the Appellant claims his uncle was trying to, and has, taken his father’s property, this does not feature in any of the complaints he made in Namibia in 2022. I have no documentation to show the father’s ownership of the property or the passing of it to his son and in the circumstances, I do not accept that the property was a material aspect of the dispute between the Appellant and his uncle. I do not accept that the Appellant has been threatened or assaulted as claimed. In summary, that is because his evidence is internally and externally inconsistent in material respects.”
5. The judge referred to two incidents in 2022 which the appellant relied upon, the first was when the appellant was threatened by his uncle who had a gun, “the gun incident” and the second was when the appellant was nearly struck by a car driven by his uncle, “the car incident”. The judge found that the appellant had been inconsistent about these two incidents and in particular in which order they occurred, see [49]. The judge did not find the appellant to be a credible witness and dismissed the appeal.
The Onward Appeal
6. The appellant appealed against this decision raising six grounds of appeal.
Ground 1 criticised the judge for placing weight on the failure to mention the car incident in the appellant’s interview. It was a short interview and the appellant had not been asked about the car incident. The existence of injuries sustained by the appellant were supported by medical evidence.
Ground 2 argued that certain core factors such as the appellant’s reluctance to marry had been accepted by the judge which just by themselves established risk.
Ground 3 was that the judge’s analysis of Professor Boswell’s report demonstrated a Mbangi type error. The judge “refused to accept the expert’s evidence because, before considering the expert report, he had already rejected the A’s account”.
Ground 4 argued the judge was in error in her treatment of sufficiency of protection as she found it existed “without assessing whether protection had been effective in practice or would be effective in A’s particular circumstances.”
Ground 5 argued that the judge had not considered the risk posed by the appellant’s family before wrongly concluding that internal relocation was an option.
Ground 6 argued that there had been a procedural irregularity during the hearing in that the appellant had been cross-examined about his passport without being shown it.
7. The First-tier granted permission to appeal stating: “It is arguable that the Tribunal has made a Mbangi-error in its approach to the expert evidence as the Judge approached the expert report having already made adverse credibility findings against the Appellant. I do not limit the grant but make the observation in relation to Ground 6 that the Judge clearly found that both advocates failed to show the passport to the Appellant and could have done so either in cross examination or re-examination. “
8. The respondent filed a Rule 24 reply in response to the grant arguing that there was no material error in the determination. The judge was entitled to criticise the failure to mention the car incident in the asylum interview because it was “for the appellant to give as much information during his asylum interview on all the issues relating to his asylum claim … if something so serious had happened [the appellant] would have mentioned it.” The judge had dealt correctly with the expert report which he had found to be “helpful”.
The Hearing Before Me
9. In consequence of the grant of permission the matter came before me to determine in the first place whether there was a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal such that it fell to be set aside. If there was then I would make directions on the rehearing of the appeal. If there was not the decision at first instance would stand.
10. For the appellant counsel relied on the grounds of appeal. The judge found the appellant had not mentioned the car incident but the appellant had said he had been abused by his uncle who threatened to kill him and pulled a gun on him. In interview the appellant said "the second time he threatened me". Therefore it must have been clear to the respondent that the car incident was the second incident and thus there must have been a first incident before then. In the very next question, the interviewing officer had not asked the appellant about the first incident with a gun but had gone on to something else instead of asking a follow-up question. The interviewer had asked the appellant where he was living at the time of the incident thus did not give the appellant the opportunity to clarify his claim. The interview record was very brief; there were 45 questions in the space of 14 minutes.
11. There was documentary evidence to support the appellant's claim of the uncle's actions. From the medical notes the judge accepted the appellant had been treated for an injury. In the appeal bundle was confirmation of the date of the car incident. It was wrong for the judge to say there was an omission and therefore wrong to place weight on that matter alone. The judge should have looked at all the evidence which made up the incidents. The judge did not consider the pressure the appellant was under during the interview process. The appellant was vulnerable and had to be interviewed through an interpreter. The appellant was guided in interview by the way the questions were put to him.
12. The documents showed that the uncle was a traditional leader. The judge accepted the appellant did not wish to marry his cousin in Namibia, where forced marriage was still practised. This created a real risk of serious harm contrary to article 3. The expert opinion was based on the assumption that the appellant had complained to the police but the judge had rejected that part of the claim. The judge herself said that she had rejected part of the appellant's claim before turning to the expert's report which was a classic Mbangi error. The appellant had reported matters to the police but there was an insufficiency of protection. The expert said that given the appellant had failed to receive protection in the past he might not receive it in the future either. There was no assessment of protection measures which could be put in place.
13. The Appellant’s passport page contained visa stamps appearing to show travel to South Africa and Botswana in 2016 and 2021. In cross-examination the Appellant was asked where he had travelled and why. He said he could not answer because he did not have the passport page in front of him and did not know whose passport was being referred to. The judge could have put the passport in front of the appellant. The judge had failed to engage with the contents of the expert's report. and speculated when she referred to possible internal relocation to other towns in Namibia.
14. In reply for the respondent, the Presenting Officer relied on the original decision, the review and the rule 24 reply. The judge had made a balanced assessment not only of the evidence but also of the documents. There had been a lack of detail from the appellant to support his application for asylum. If there were omissions in the appellant's interview record the judge was entitled to take that into consideration. The incident with a car crash was one of two life-threatening events. It was reasonable to assume it would be at the forefront of the appellant's mind and thus mentioned by him during the interview. It was the respondent's case that this evidence was otherwise essential to the appellant's case.
15. The complaint about the interview did not demonstrate a material error of law in the determination. There should have been a formal police report produced, the appellant should not have needed to be prompted to produce it. The judge had thoroughly considered the issue of internal relocation see [77] to [82]. The judge was not obliged to set out each and every piece of evidence but she had clearly read all of the evidence before coming to her findings. The use of the word "already" in [72] was not a legal conclusion it was part of her consideration in the balancing exercise. The judge had found the expert’s report helpful but she did not have to itemise each and every point in the report. It should be taken that the judge had read all the documents. It was a matter for the judge what weight to give to the expert’s report. No error of law was disclosed.
16. As to ground six, there was an obligation on the appellant and his representatives to put the appellant's case to the tribunal which would include providing copies of the passport so that the appellant could be properly questioned thereon.
17. In conclusion counsel argued it was not the case that the appellant had highlighted only one of two incidents. The interview record showed the appellant had mentioned a second incident which implied that there had to have been a first incident. The interviewer had not asked about other incidents instead they had moved on to a different scenario. If the interviewer had chosen not to ask follow-up questions for the judge then to rely on omissions ignoring other evidence which substantiated the appellant's account was a material error of law. The judge had said she had rejected the appellant's claim before going on to consider the expert’s report. To say that there was no error was to ignore what the judge had said in this determination. The judge had not applied a balanced approach.
Discussion and Findings
18. The appellant's claim in this case is based on the submission that the appellant was threatened and abused by his paternal uncle who wanted him to marry the uncle's daughter which the appellant did not wish to do. After two of what the appellant described as life-threatening incidents in 2022, the appellant left Namibia and travelled to the United Kingdom where he claimed asylum. The judge did not accept the appellant was credible in his account and did not accept that the appellant had been ill treated or abused pointing to various difficulties in the appellant's evidence. It does not appear that the appellant's claim is based on an adverse interest in him being taken by the Namibian authorities. The appellant fears a non-state actor.
19. The judge considered what influence if any the uncle might have as a traditional leader. The judge noted that the authorities were prepared to accept the appellant's complaint indicating that there was a sufficiency of protection from the uncle. The judge also found that the appellant could internally relocate within Namibia away from the capital Windhoek, where the uncle resided to another town in the country where the judge found the uncle would not have strong connections.
20. Although the appellant has itemised six separate grounds of onward appeal against the First-tier decision, the argument in this case really boils down to two main points. The first is that the judge is said to have misunderstood the evidence about abuse and the appellant’s circumstances, taking points against the appellant which were not supported by the evidence the judge actually received. Secondly that the judge has inadequately dealt with the expert report on country conditions by rejecting the expert’s view that the appellant had unsuccessfully attempted to complain to the police about abuse from the uncle. The judge did not accept that there was anything to complain about but the argument in this case is that the judge decided that issue and then looked at the report (and rejected it) instead of taking a holistic view and looking at all evidence before arriving at any conclusions (the Mbangi error).
21. The judge took an adverse view of the appellant's credibility arising from the appellant's evidence about two specific incidents which the appellant said showed the hostility of the uncle and the threat posed by him to the appellant. The appellant had claimed that abuse started in 2015 yet when asked he could only remember the 2022 incidents. The judge took an adverse view of this lack of detail. Given that the two incidents were the foundation of the appellant's claim for international protection the judge was further concerned by the lack of detail given by the appellant about them. The appellant was particularly short of detail in relation to the gun incident and got into a muddle over which incident occurred when. Both incidents were said to have occurred in 2022 approximately three or four months before the appellant arrived in the United Kingdom when matters could be expected to be still fresh in the appellant’s mind.
22. It was thus reasonable for the judge to take the view that she did that the appellant should have had a better grasp of the account that he was putting forward. Although the appellant sought to excuse his performance in interview it was a very short interview and the appellant had indicated at the outset that he was able to proceed to be interviewed. It was thus open for the judge to consider that the appellant was simply looking for an excuse to explain an incomplete grasp of his own account.
23. Contrary to the grounds of onward appeal the appellant was internally inconsistent with his account. As the judge pointed out at [49] if the gun incident occurred on 31 August 2022 it must have been second in time after the car incident on 1 July 2022 and yet the appellant had also said the contrary. The judge found that the car incident if it occurred must have been second in time because the appellant had fled Namibia after the car incident and there was no time for the gun incident to have occurred.
24. At the end of the interview the appellant was asked if there was anything else he wanted to say. The judge formed the view that if these incidents had indeed occurred it was a glaring omission that the appellant had not mentioned them. It was reasonable to have expected the appellant to add something at the end of the interview covering the two incidents. The appellant did not do this. As the respondent points out in the rule 24 reply it was not for the interviewer to make the appellant's case when the burden of proof lay on the appellant.
25. The second matter upon which the appellant relies is the judge's treatment of the expert’s report. The judge was impressed by the expert’s report stating it was helpful and noting that it was not inconsistent with the respondent's own CPIN. The judge had to set out her conclusions in some form of order. She did so on the basis that the appellant's claim to have found the authorities unwilling to assist him was contrary to the evidence which the appellant himself had produced. At [64] et seq she then assessed the expert’s report. Her references to the report being helpful and not inconsistent with the respondent's own evidence of itself suggests that the judge had considered the expert’s report before putting pen to paper with her own conclusions.
26. The difficulty arises in [72]. The expert had said that given that the appellant had tried on a number of occasions to seek protection from the police but had been unsuccessful there was no guarantee that he would be able to access protection in the future. Earlier in her determination the judge had said at [63] that the existence of a police report indicated the appellant had made a complaint to the police. The judge’s concern was that the inconsistencies and difficulties in the appellant’s evidence meant that she could not rely upon the appellant's claim that the authorities had refused to do anything. Thus the difference between the expert’s report and the finding of the judge was a narrow one. On the one hand the expert accepted that the appellant had made complaints but got nowhere with them. On the other hand the judge accepted that the appellant had made a complaint but could not discharge the burden of showing that the authorities were not prepared to do anything.
27. At the end of the day the assessment of credibility was a matter for the judge not the expert. It was not for the expert to decide that the appellant's account was credible. I remind myself that the judge had the benefit of seeing the appellant give evidence and be questioned on that evidence. The judge was therefore well placed to decide whether the appellant’s evidence was credible. It is clear from the determination that the judge took all of the evidence including the expert's views into account before arriving at her conclusions. I do not accept that this is an example of a Mbangi error.
28. The judge said in her determination at [72] “for the reasons already given, I have rejected that claim”. Whilst the judge could perhaps have explained herself more clearly, the reference to “already given” is pointing the reader back to earlier in the determination not earlier in time. The references to the expert’s report being helpful indicates that the judge was aware of its contents before analysing all the evidence.
29. At [72 ] the judge found that the Appellant could, as the expert also says, access protection from the state. He had not shown himself unwilling to seek that protection, as was evidenced by his approach to various authorities. She further found that the state is able and willing to provide that protection. The CPIN makes clear that there is a generally effective criminal justice system and that forced marriage is illegal. The Appellant has had medical and social worker support and, on the documentary evidence, his approaches to the state have been met with positive responses.
30. The third matter relied upon by the appellant concerned an incident which occurred during the hearing when the appellant was questioned about his passport and his travel. The appellant was represented by experienced counsel who had the opportunity after cross-examination to ask in re-examination for the appellant to be shown a copy of the passport. That did not occur but it was not for the judge to enter into the arena and in in an inquisitorial manner insist that the appellant be shown the passport where his own counsel was not indicating that. This was the point being made by Judge Clarke when granting permission on other grounds. I do not consider that there was any irregularity in the way the judge conducted the hearing.
31. The other matters raised in the grounds of onward appeal are merely disagreements with the judge's cogent reasons given for dismissing the appeal. There was nothing to support the appellant's claim that the uncle had been abusing the appellant since 2015, and nothing to indicate that the uncle had or could reach the appellant anywhere in Namibia. It was open to the judge to conclude that there was a sufficiency of protection given the consistency between the CPIN and the experts report. For those reasons I do not find that the judge made any material error of law in this appeal. and I therefore dismiss the onward appeal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold the decision to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal
Appellant’s appeal dismissed

Signed this 8th day of May 2026

……………………………………………….
Judge Woodcraft
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge