Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000818
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54121/2024
LP/10609/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

8th October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

AH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Unrepresented
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 19 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or children. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a Bangladesh, appeals a determination of FtT Judge Heaven dated 8th April 2026 dismissing the appellant’s appeal. His claim for protection rested on his membership of the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chatra Dal (BJCD), which is the student wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
The decision of the FtT
2. In his key findings the judge recorded as follows:
‘14. I find that the Appellant was a low-level member of BJDC. When asked in interview he stated that he just attended demonstrations, no other involvement [4.1 ARQ] and then later that he was active in politics and made people understand the Awami League is no good [36 AIR] and that he used to go to different meetings and sessions to make people understand [47 AIR]. The Appellant gave similar evidence in court namely that he went to meetings and rallies. The photographs do not assist me as they simply show a gathering of people. I accept that the Appellant was attacked and sustained injuries and I have considered the medical documentation and evidence of scars. I accept that in 2019 that the police probably did not register his complaint given at that stage the ruling party was the AL. I accept that at the time when the asylum claim was made the Appellant did on the balance of probabilities fear persecution in Bangladesh. I must now consider the second stage as set out above at paragraph 12.
15. I do not find the Appellant’s account to be credible namely that a First Information Report (FIR) was issued against him but that he did not know about this before he left Bangladesh in 2022. The Appellant stated that the police threatened his family in their home and raided the house and once they attacked him on the head and foot in July 2019 [AIR 30]. The police are also said to have attended the house when the Appellant was in hiding which is when the Appellant’s parents became worried and arranged for him to come to the UK. Given the Appellant did not leave Bangladesh until 2022 and given the police knew where he lived and indeed attended his house it is not credible that he or his family were not informed of the FIR issued in December 2019 and before the Appellant left the UK. The Appellant says he only became aware of the charge and warrant after he arrived in the UK. However, the Appellant did not declare the FIR when he applied for his visa in 2022 when he was asked whether there were any convictions or other penalties against him.
16. I have considered the FIR and the charge sheet and note that the Appellant’s date of birth is incorrectly stated in both documents (as 23 years of age) and is the same date, despite the passage of time between both documents being issued. I take into account what is stated in the CPIN Bangladesh November 2024 at paragraph 6 on the ease of obtaining fraudulent documents with false information in Bangladesh, including police and court documents (6.5). I consider these documents in the round and alongside the Appellant’s evidence and consider that the documents are not reliable and that the Appellant is not credible in relation to alleged false charges having been made against him.
17. I have considered all the objective evidence submitted on behalf of the Appellant and the relevant CPIN of December 2024.
18. The 2024 CPIN states at 3.1.1 and 3.2.1 that leaders, members and supporter of the BNP and the student and youth organisations are unlikely to face serious harm from the state.
19. I do not accept that the CPIN is unreliable or must be approached with caution. I have considered all the objective evidence submitted on behalf of the Appellant and none of it demonstrates that low-level members of the BNP are at risk in Bangladesh or that the State is unwilling or unable to provide protection. There is some evidence of killings of high-level or well-known BNP activists but the motives for the killings are unclear on the evidence that has been submitted.
20. I note there has been a change of government in Bangladesh and the 2024 CPIN documents at 4.14 that
“The interim government (since its formation in August 2024) has announced a series of reforms. This includes the establishment of commissions on police, the judiciary and anti-corruption. There have been major reshuffles in the police force, and a removal of those loyal to the AL including forced retirement, reinstating, or transferring of police officials, replacement of those implicated in abuses and the arrest of senior officers. The Inspector General of Police and head of the RAB, the paramilitary organisation who have previously been responsible for human rights abuses, and the Supreme Court chief justice who resigned in the wake of the protests have been replaced. Three hundred lower court judges have been transferred or promoted. According to an interview with the International Crisis Group a senior judge noted that there was no longer the level of politicisation and pressure within the judiciary that there had been previously”.
21. I therefore find that even if there are outstanding politicised and fraudulent charges against the Appellant (which I have rejected), there is no credible objective evidence to show that the Appellant would be prosecuted on his return to Bangladesh given the change in government and the reforms that have now been instituted. An article submitted on behalf of the Appellant demonstrates that a corrupt senior police officer was suspended and an investigation launched after the police officer submitted a false report to court seeking to exonerate high -profile individuals accused of involvement in murders committed under the previous government.
22. The Appellant has not explained why he cannot internally relocate within Bangladesh were he to return. Given the change in Government and given that I have rejected the Appellant’s claim in relation to the false charges, I consider that it would not be unduly harsh for the Appellant to internally relocate were he to return. The Appellant remains in conduct with his family and has an education.
23. I do not accept as credible that the Appellant has engaged in political activities in the UK. In any event there is no evidence to suggest any activities would be of concern to the new Government.
24. The Appellant’s explanation for the delay in claiming asylum is not credible given the Appellant accepts that the reason he left Bangladesh was because his parents were concerned for his safety in Bangladesh.
25. I therefore find that there is no reasonable likelihood that:
(a) the Appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return;
(b) that there would be insufficient protection; and
(c) they could not internally relocate.’
Grounds of appeal
3. The grounds of challenge set out that before the FtT it was argued that the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) Bangladesh Political situation version 1 December 2023 was challenged and the updated Country Policy and Information Note should be treated with caution. The judge failed to engage with the submissions on this point and the schedule in the skeleton argument. the judge:
(i) Unfairness – failure to engage with the appellant’s submissions and oral evidence. contrary to MK (Duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC). In particular the judge is silent on whether the CPIN December 2024 should be treated with caution. Over 1.5 million individuals within the civil service and law enforcement remain were affiliated with the former Awami League regime (EVIDNECE) and this undermined the optimism in the CPIN. The judge merely stated she did not accept that the CPIN was unreliable. [19]. The judge failed to engage with material oral evidence (a) such that police raids and harassment occurred routinely around election periods, (b) his account he was in hiding such that he would not have known about legal proceedings before leaving Bangladesh, (c) he had no involvement in preparing the FIR or charge sheet and police do not maintain centralised or reliable database. A judge should consider all the evidence, and these were core submissions. The appellant did not receive a fair hearing.
(ii) Failure to consider material evidence which were referenced and indexed in the skeleton argument. The documents (a) the update order summary sheet from the Chief Judicial Magistrates’ Court (b) the arrest warrant dated 5th April 2023 (c) the independent verification from Advocate Md Izazul Islam (lawyer) in the District Bar Association Moulvibazar. The judge did not refer to these documents such that the appellant is named in an arrest warrant. This was an error of law and contrary to Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439. The letter from the local lawyer who conducted a physical inspection of court records could suffice to support the authenticity of material foreign documents. The judge’s generalised findings did not cure this defect and she merely rejected the document based on paragraph 6,5 of the CPIN and there was no reference to these documents.
(iii) Material misreading of the asylum interview record which led to a mistake of fact.
At paragraph [15], the FTJ states:
“I do not find the Appellant’s account to be credible namely that a First Information Report (FIR) was issued against him but that he did not know about this before he left Bangladesh in 2022. The Appellant stated that the police threatened his family in their home and raided the house and once they attacked him on the head and foot in July 2019 [AIR 30].”
The judge’s assertion that the ‘police threatened his family … and attacked him’ is a misreading of AIR Q 28-30 and collapsed strands together and incorrectly attributed the July 2019 attack and family threats to the police suggesting that the appellant was threatened before he left Bangladesh. There was a mistaken assumption that the police were ‘over targeting’ the appellant prior to his departure from Bangladesh. The grounds state ‘in truth , his account was that only political actors targeted him physically and threatened his family, while police involvement arose only later’.
(iv) Failure to consider the documentary evidence in the round. The judge failed to consider the appellant evidence cumulatively. The judge dissects individual documents in isolation and omits holistic evaluation. The appellant relied on the interlocking of the FIR, the arrest warrant, the Advocate’s verification report, a letter from the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chatra Dal (BJCD) confirming the appellant’s members and political profile, and medical evidence of injuries sustained in July 2019 accepted as genuine. The judge simply rejected the FIR and charge sheet at [16] merely based on age discrepancy and 6.5 of the CPIN on document fraud.
QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) (China) [2021] UKUT 00033 (IAC) held at headnote [3]: “What the case law reveals is that the judicial fact-finder has a duty to make his or her decision by reference to all the relevant evidence and needs to show in their decision that they have done so.”
(v) Irrational and unreasoned findings on risk and state protection in the light of objective evidence. The findings at [17]-[21] were irrational and inadequately reasoned in particular in relation to the reliability and interpretation of the December 2024 CPIN, the risk to low level BNP members, the ability of the state to offer protection. The evidence included and referenced in the appellant’s skeleton argument at [15] –[21], reports of killings and violence against local Jubo Dal and Chhatra Dal members, the Desh Rupantor article evidencing the appointment of AL loyalists and continued extrajudicial killings. The judge failed to explain how claimed reforms could have penetrated to local judicial levels in a matter of months. MB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 85 warned against treating Country information reports as determinative without cross examination against other sources. The judge ignored November 2023 CPIN (Bangladesh: Actors of Protection), at 2.1.5 that security forced employ inhuman treatment with impunity and this was not confined to high level figures. The lower standard of proof for protection as set out in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216. The judge failed to consider if the appellant faced a real risk of serious harm and that local level opposition figures are often more exposed than national leaders.
Grant of permission
4. Permission to appeal was granted by FtT Judge Barker who criticised the length of the grounds (which ran to 56 paragraph) finding them incomprehensible at times but observed it was arguable that the judge failed to consider aspects of the evidence and arguable failed to make adequate findings and give adequate reasoning.
Submissions
5. No appearance was made either by the appellant or on behalf of the appellant. The appellant was notified on 3rd August 2026 of the hearing. The solicitors had forwarded a bundle but there had been no application for an adjournment. Ms Rushforth submitted that I should proceed with the hearing. Further to rule 38 (absence of a party) and rule 2 (overriding objective) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, I concluded that it was fair and in the interests of justice to proceed. The appellant was aware of the date, time and venue of the hearing and from the CE file had chosen to de-instruct his solicitors on 11th August 2026. There has been no further notification. The grounds of appeal were drafted by counsel and the points of challenge fully made to the application for permission to appeal.
6. A rule 24 notice was filed and Ms Rushforth submitted in relation to each of the grounds that
(i) the judge plainly did not accept the Country Policy and Information Note was unreliable [19]. The judge looked at the impact of change of government.
(ii) the judge had not overlooked the lawyer’s contribution but noted she had considered the documents in the round. The documents which the judge considered were the underlying documents which the lawyer themselves considered
(iii) From [14] it was clear that the appellant claimed he was attacked by the Awami League and yet had not registered his complaint and that was consistent with what was said in the asylum interview [4].
(iv) the judge did consider the BJC letter and medical records and the approach to the documentation was open to the judge
(v) the assertion of irrationality was in fact merely a disagreement with the findings
Conclusions
7. I take the grounds in turn.
8. Ground (i): on reading the decision as a whole it is clear that the judge made adequate findings and gave adequate reasons for rejecting the appeal. The judge manifestly addressed the issue on the CPIN and was entitled to rely on the comprehensive updated material. At [19] the judge specifically addresses the question of whether the CPIN should be considered with caution having stated that he the judge had assessed all of the material which would include that which the appellant had submitted. Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at 2(iii) confirms that ‘An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration.’ That is the case here. As the judge properly reasons the ‘Appellant did not leave Bangladesh until 2022 and given the police knew where he lived and indeed attended his house it is not credible that he or his family were not informed of the FIR issued in December 2019’. That was entirely open to the judge.
9. The judge considered the relevant evidence and it was open to the judge to identity the discrepancy within the ‘official documents’ such that he considered ‘the FIR and the charge sheet and note[d] that the Appellant’s date of birth is incorrectly stated in both documents (as 23 years of age) and is the same date, despite the passage of time between both documents being issued.’ The reasons to reject the material were unarguably adequate. Nothing in the grounds founds the assertion that the appellant did not receive a fair hearing.
10. Ground (ii): the judge explained that all the documentation was considered which would include the charge sheet and summary sheet and as pointed out by the judge, the very documents which the judge considered were those underlying documents which the lawyer themselves considered. As the grounds stated a letter from a local lawyer can, in some cases, suffice to support the authenticity of material foreign documents’ but at [16] the judge specifically reasoned that bearing in mind the ‘ease of obtaining fraudulent documents with false information in Bangladesh, including police and court documents (6.5). I consider these documents in the round and alongside the Appellant’s evidence and consider that the documents are not reliable and that the Appellant is not credible in relation to alleged false charges having been made against him.’ That finding was open to the judge in the circumstances, sufficiently well-reasoned and in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 which confirms at [35] that ‘A document should not be viewed in isolation. The decision maker should look at the evidence as a whole or in the round…’. That is what the judge did.
11. Ground (iii): on reading the decision carefully there was no misreading by the judge of the asylum interview which I have re-read in the light of the grounds. From reading [9] – [12] of the asylum interview it was clearly the appellant’s case that the police were also involved in targeting the appellant. It was open to the judge, on the questions posed and answers given by the appellant, to draw the conclusions he did. There was no mistake of fact.
12. Ground (iv): I repeat, the judge plainly read the documentation in the round and holistically. The grounds of appeal refer to Mibanga but S v the Secretary of State [2006] EWCA Civ 1153 confirmed at [32] that there is a danger of Mibanga [2025] EWCA Civ 367 being misunderstood. ‘Judgments in that case are not intended to place judicial fact finders in a form of forensic straightjacket.’ That is the case here when reading the determination as a whole.
13. Irrationality has a very high hurdle, as explained in R (Iran) & Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department*[2005] EWCA Civ 982, at [11] and [12] and the threshold is not met here. The objective evidence in fact includes a selection of articles identifying attacks on high profile individuals (at best the appellant was a low-profile BNP supporter) and the evidence appears to largely predate the updated CPIN 2024 which the judge used. The Desh article is dated November 2024. This grounds not only include a CPIN of 2023 which predates the CPIN of 2024 on which the judge was entitled to treat as more recent and reliable but also makes no reference to MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812 at [16] –[17] which states as follows:
16. Mr Collins' response was that the CPIN did not show an unequivocal picture. He noted that the passage quoted said only that it was "unlikely" that BNP members or supporters would face persecution or serious harm from the government, and he drew our attention also to the final paragraph about the inappropriateness of certification. I am afraid that that is clutching at straws. It is quite clear that the term "unlikely" is used in this context to connote no real risk, and that is unsurprising in the context of the overthrow of the Awami League from whom the feared risks would emanate. In so far as the statement about certification implies a degree of uncertainty, it is evidently related to the possibility of risk to Awami League supporters: without going through the full text of the CPIN, one can see that, as I say wholly unsurprisingly, that is the area where there is the possibility of some risks continuing.
17. The truth is that the change of government has wholly changed the picture in such a way that there is no reason whatever to suppose that the respondent will be at risk of serious harm if returned.
14. There is no material arguable error of law in the FtT decision and the appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

Notice of Decision
The determination of the judge contained no material error of law and will stand.

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5th October 2026