Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000833
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01805/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

LG
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Wood, IAS
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 18 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Sierra Leone. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.

2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 8 June 2025, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.

3. The appeal arose in the context of deportation proceedings following the appellant's conviction for offences of rape against a woman he had accosted outside a nightclub in the early hours of the morning on 22 December 2022. There were serious aggravating features to the offences in that the appellant acted in a predatory manner by seeking out a vulnerable victim briefly separated from her friends when leaving a nightclub. The most recent offence came against the backdrop of a previous sexual offence which was also predatory in targeting a vulnerable lone female who was sexually assaulted over a prolonged period in her own home after he forced his way into the property. The gravity of the appellant’s predatory sexual offending was marked by a lengthy custodial sentence imposed for the most recent set of offences. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment with an extended sentence of three years. His appeal against deportation was founded on his claim to be at risk of persecution, serious harm or Article 3 conditions on return to Sierra Leone due to his claimed background of fighting on behalf of rebel forces when he was a child and his serious mental health conditions. The judge dismissed his appeal on all grounds.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

4. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on the following grounds:

i. The judge irrationally concluded that he should draw adverse inferences from the appellant deciding not to give oral evidence in support of his appeal and that he was not minded to attach weight to his witness statement.

ii. The judge failed to give lawfully adequate reasons for his findings on the credibility of the appellant’s account and whether he would be at risk of Article 3 conditions on return to Sierra Leone on account of his health conditions.

5. In a decision dated 30 March 2026, a Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge granted permission for both grounds to be argued.

6. The respondent resisted the appeal both in writing in a rule 24 notice and at the hearing. The appellant responded to the rule 24 notice with a rule 25 notice. At the hearing, Mr Wood accepted that the rule 25 notice raised arguments which were not encompassed by the original grounds of appeal. Accordingly, he did not pursue before me the suggestion that the respondent ought to be treated as not challenging the expert report relied upon by the appellant in support of the proposition that he was unfit to give oral evidence. The submissions made in the rule 25 notice about the application of principles derived from Lata (FTT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 and TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48 therefore fell away.

7. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.

Discussion

8. In MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485, the Court of Appeal set out the principles which should guide the analysis of whether judicial reasons are lawfully adequate. Between [34] and [36], Dove LJ drew together the leading authorities:

[34] […] The question which then arises is by what standard those reasons are to be judged in order to determine whether or not they are legally adequate. Whilst given in a different public law context, the observations of Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood in South Bucks County Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at paragraph 36 provide an important statement of principle applicable in the current context:

“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”

[35] Accompanying these principles, it is also necessary to observe that the decision, in this case the FtTIAC determination, must be read as a whole and in context. Part of that context is that examining the determination’s reasons should be approached and undertaken purposefully, with the object of obtaining an understanding of the decision and its basis. It should not be read or construed in a manner more appropriate to a contract or statute. It requires what Lord Bingham MR described as a “straightforward down to earth reading” of the determination which seeks to identify whether there is “room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt” as to what has been decided and why (see Clarke Homes Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and East Staffordshire District Council [1993] 66 P&CR 263).

[36] This approach to the standard of reasons required as a matter of law can be set in the general understanding of approaches to appeals in respect of tribunals within the Immigration and Asylum Chamber provided by Lord Hamblen at paragraph 72 of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] 1 WLR 3784; [2022] UKSC 22:

“72. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probably that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65, para 45 per Sir John Dyson JSC.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] 2 AC 48, para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead DPSC.”

9. In addition to the above statements of principle, the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide whether an FTT decision involved a material error of law was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055. At [26], Green LJ summarised the applicable principles (we have not reproduced those principles which are reflected above in MN (Vietnam) to similar effect):  

[26] Sections 11 and 12 of the TCEA 2007 restrict the UT's jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:  
 
[…]
 
(iv)  The issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at [27];  

(v)  Judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] 4 WLR 145 at para 34;  

(vi)  It is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see R (MM (Lebanon)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 771 at para 107.  

10. In DPP Law Ltd v Paul Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672, the Court of Appeal, in the context of employment proceedings, considered adequacy of reasoning as an error of law. Popplewell LJ, stressed, at [57], the need to consider judicial reasons fairly and as whole without being hypercritical. Appellate restraint is required to read reasons benevolently. “Simple, clear and concise” reasoning was to be encouraged to enable to parties to broadly understand why they had won or lost. Further, it should not be assumed that an element of the evidence which was not expressly discussed was left out of account. While these observations were made in the context of employment proceedings, they are of relevance in the immigration and asylum sphere because this is also a jurisdiction in which decisions are made by expert tribunals attenuated by the need to give appeals anxious scrutiny.

11. With the above principles in mind, I turn my attention to the articulated grounds of appeal.

12. After setting out the appellant’s mental health conditions and presentation, Dr Balasubramaniam, an experienced and expert consultant psychiatrist, discussed his fitness to give evidence in the proceedings at [6.13] of his report: “[LG] does not have the ability to give evidence to the Court, as he is actively psychotic, and he has disordered thoughts”. He repeated this conclusion at [6.15] and [6.26]. Addressing this expert opinion, the judge referred to preliminary discussions he held with the parties during the hearing, at [10]:

[10] I have treated the appellant as vulnerable in light of the report of Dr Krishna Bala Subramaniam of 3 April 2025 and the other available evidence as to mental health. Mr Wood indicated that, in light of paragraph 6.5 of that report, the appellant would not be giving evidence. He confirmed that he had advised the appellant appropriately as to the implications of that, which implications include of course the possibility that less weight will be attached to the appellant’s evidence. I raised with him that the appellant’s witness statement is unsigned. He said that he would make inquiries as to whether there was a signed copy and, at the close of the hearing, indicated that he had been informed a signed copy was not in existence. I indicated that I would not be able to attach any weight to the unsigned witness statement.

13. The judge proceeded to reject the appellant’s factual narrative account underpinning his protection claim between [25]-[31]:

[25] I do not find that the appellant has given a credible account of matters. I factor in that he is to be treated as a vulnerable appellant and I do so. I also factor in that he was a minor at the point at which he left Sierra Leone and it follows was very young at the time of the events he claims to have experienced. Notwithstanding the great need for caution as to drawing adverse inferences from inconsistencies however I find that it is not a credible account. I concur with the points made by the respondent in the refusal. I make the following further observations as to credibility.

[26] There is an unsigned witness statement from the appellant and I attach little weight to that given that I did not hear evidence from him and he did not adopt that statement. I have carefully considered whether it is appropriate to take into account that the appellant did not give evidence. I have at the forefront of my mind that he is vulnerable due to mental health issues. However, I do not consider that to be a good reason for his not giving oral evidence. I acknowledge that there is an opinion that he is not fit to give evidence as indicated in the expert report of Dr Balasubramaniam. However, that conclusion is the briefest of conclusions that an expert can give and it is not supported by any reasoning or analysis at all. There is no consideration of the possibility of his oral evidence being facilitated and accommodated by reasonable adjustments in accordance with the vulnerable appellant guidance. I therefore do not attach any weight to that opinion that the appellant is not fit to give evidence. I therefore consider it to be appropriate to draw an adverse inference from is not giving oral evidence and not being challenged.

[27] I note that in his screening interview at 4.1 5.2 5.4 he refers to having been a soldier for the SLE whereas his subsequent account was that he was a child soldier for the rebel forces. This is a significant discrepancy. This is not something which is amenable to being adequately explained by genuine confusion and memory problems due to mental health issues. It undermines the credibility of the account.

[28] At 56 and 57 of his substantive interview at AB 39 indicates that he fled with his father to Liberia two years after leaving the rebel forces. I do not find it to be credible that he would have been able to remain in Sierra Leone for some two years having apparently escaped the clutches of the rebel forces without repercussions.

[29] The appellant arrived in the UK in 2007 but only claimed asylum in October 2019 after removal directions have been made. I find this to be very substantial delay which further undermines the appellant's credibility. The appellant claims that he did not know about the possibility of claiming asylum before that but this explanation lacks all credibility. His mother had claimed asylum before he entered the UK and would have known about the system. He was living with his mother and has been living with his mother for the vast majority of his time in the UK, certainly prior to 2019. A number of applications were made on his behalf and there have been appeals as well. It is simply inconceivable that he would not have had awareness the possibility of claiming asylum. I find that the delay in only claiming after removal directions had been issued does substantially undermine the account.

[30] Further and in any event, even if the appellant did work as a child soldier for the rebel forces, I do not accept that there is an ongoing risk to him. Much time has passed between when he claims to have being a child soldier and now. That is well over 20 years and his appearance will have changed significantly. It is not reasonably likely that he would be recognised. I further find that there would be sufficiency of protection from non-state actors whom the appellant fears.

[31] In light of the above I do not find that there is a real risk of persecution for the appellant arising from having worked as a child soldier. It follows that I find that there is no risk of breach of Article 3 on that basis either.

14. The first ground of appeal against the judge’s decision contends that he reached an irrational conclusion about the appellant’s fitness to give oral evidence. The first point to note is that there is nothing which could be sensibly characterised as irrational in the judge’s observation that the expert’s conclusion on this point was wholly undeveloped and came close to a mere assertion that the appellant presented as seriously mentally unwell and therefor unable to give evidence. It is not difficult to see why the judge was concerned about the lack of reasoning to underpin this stark and extreme conclusion. It is striking that the judge’s assessment of this issue is several times longer than the line and a half the expert relied upon to conclude that the appellant did not have the ability to give evidence. If there was a deficiency of reasoning it lies with the expert, not the judge. As I observed during the error of law hearing, it is difficult to conceive of what more the judge could have reasonably or rationally said about this thinnest of expert conclusions. The judge had to decide what he was to make of the appellant deciding not to give oral evidence in support of a protection appeal which hinged on his narrative account. There was nothing remotely irrational in the judge drawing adverse inferences from the decision, taken by an appellant who was not said to be lacking mental capacity, not to give oral evidence in support of his appeal. The judge rationally pointed to the lack of any consideration by the expert of whether any adjustments to standard hearing procedure might alleviate his concerns about the ability of the appellant to give oral evidence. Further, at [10], the judge was conspicuously fair in providing the appellant and his representatives with the opportunity to reflect on the position which had been adopted about his ability to give evidence. He also gave fair notice of his concerns surrounding an unsigned witness statement which the appellant sought to rely upon without adopting its contents in oral evidence. I am satisfied that the judge did not reach an irrational or procedurally irregular decision about how he approached the appellant’s narrative evidence.

15. Turning to ground 2, Mr Wood acknowledged that the challenges going to the credibility assessment would be considerably weaker if there was not error in the judge’s decision not to attach weight to appellant’s witness statement and his absence from the witness box. This is because the reality was that it was only the appellant who could speak to the gaps and inconsistencies on the face of his various accounts which the judge alluded to. Without an explanation the judge could meaningfully consider, he could only assess the remainder of the evidence before him. He demonstrably considered, at [25], the appellant’s vulnerability and the fact that he was recalling events which were said to have unfolded when he was a child. However, the judge fully explained why he found that there were significant problems with the narrative accounts. He was more than entitled to find, and fully explained why, he held that there was substantial tension in divergent accounts about which side he fought for when he was a child in Sierra Leone, the implausibility of the length of his stay in the country before fleeing and that the very lengthy delay in claiming protection was exceptionally difficult to reconcile with his and his family’s background of making a series of application for leave to remain in the UK over many years. It simply cannot be sensibly suggested that the appellant has been left in a state of uncertainty as to why the factual building blocks of his protection claim were found to be lacking in credibility.

16. In any event, Mr Wood acknowledged the force of a materiality point drawn from [30] of the decision where the judge concluded that even if the underlying factual claims were credible, so much time had passed that he could not be said to be at risk to a reasonable degree of likelihood.

17. A further strand of the second ground of appeal was that the judge did not adequately or lawfully explain why the appeal was dismissed on Article 3 health grounds. The argument was expressed in this way, at [10]-[11] of the grounds of appeal:

[10] At [32] of his decision Judge Dixon concludes that there would be required treatment and medication available to the Appellant:

“I do not find that removal of the appellant to Sierra Leone would breach Article 3 on mental health grounds applying the test in AM (Zimbabwe). I accept that the appellant has a serious illness, namely schizophrenia as confirmed by the report of Dr Balasubramaniam. However, that report does not indicate that removal to Sierra Leone would lead to suffering of a degree and nature so as to give rise to a breach of Article 3. I find that in any event even if removal would lead to a very significant deterioration in the appellant's mental health, that there would be required treatment and medication available for him. Mr Wood did not pursue the suicide risk element in light of that report.” [Emphasis added]

[11] However, the medical report notes at 6.17 that the removal of the Appellant to Sierra Leone would likely put him under severe stress that would lead to a worsening of his condition. Judge Dixon has failed to adequately reason why the worsening of the Appellant’s already severe mental ill-health would not meet the test set out in AM (Zimbabwe). Further, whilst the country evidence quoted in the Respondent’s decision indicates that there may be medication available to the Appellant, it was argued that his problem is that he is unable to manage of engage with the health care that he needs on his own (see the expert report at 6.19 AB 45). Judge Dixon has failed to explain how the Appellant will obtain the close monitoring that he needs to stay compliant with his medication regime. This lack of reasoning also applies to the findings in [34] where Judge Dixon asserts that the Appellant can and, in effect, will access what medical treatment is available, without explaining how this would happen.

18. The difficulty with above articulation of this challenge is that it loses sight of the reality that it was for the appellant to establish a prima facie case of a breach of his Article 3 human rights which could only have succeeded on the strength of intense suffering following the acceptance that the appellant was not at a real risk of suicide. As recently discussed by the Court of Appeal in SSHD v OSB [2026] EWCA Civ 647, at [38]-[39], it must not be thought that a mere deterioration in health, mental or otherwise, is sufficient to meet the minimum level of severity. This puts into perspective why the judge may not have considered it to be necessary to pass comment on the stress of deportation which may merely worsen the appellant’s condition. Seen in its proper context, the judge was not required in law to say any more than he did about his finding that the appellant could access the necessary treatment needed to manage his condition, which would not reach the required Article 3 minimum level of severity.

Notice of Decision

The decision did not involve errors of law. I dismiss the appeal against the decision which stands undisturbed.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 June 2026