Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-001560
UI-2026-001559
UI-2026-000838
UI-2026-000839
First-tier Tribunal Nos: EA/50356/2025
EA/52568/2023
LE/00278/2025
LE/01370/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

8th September 2026

Before

The Hon. MR JUSTICE LAVENDER, PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

RAMAZAN SEIDAJ
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Youssefian, Counsel, instructed by Bhogal and Partners Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Terrell, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
(1) Introduction
1. The Appellant is a national of Albania, born on 30 July 1994.
2. The Appellant wants to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis that he is married to a Lithuanian national and they have built a life here together. To that end, he has made a series of applications, resulting in a number of related appeals: he has applied for a residence card as a partner under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (‘the EEA Regs’); he has applied for leave under Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules as the spouse of that same partner; and he has asked for the deportation order signed against him on 27 April 2015 to be revoked.
3. The Secretary of State has consistently refused to issue a residence card, to grant leave or to revoke the deportation order.
4. The matter in issue before us is whether the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law when it dismissed the Appellant’s appeals on all grounds on 9 December 2025.
5. The full history of these appeals in the Upper Tribunal is set out in Judge Bruce’s Note and Directions of 11 June 2026, but here it suffices to record that the effect of Judge Bruce’s decision was to give the Appellant permission to argue three grounds of appeal. These are that the First-tier Tribunal:
(1) erred in law in its assessment of whether the Appellant presents a “genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat” to one of the fundamental interests of the United Kingdom;
(2) failed to meaningfully engage with the facts in its assessment of proportionality, in particular failing to place any, or sufficient, weight on the Appellant’s integration and rehabilitation in the United Kingdom; and
(3) erred in the same respect as in ground 2 in relation to Article 8 ECHR.
6. At the hearing on 21 July 2026 we heard detailed submissions from Mr Youssefian and Mr Terrell. We thereafter gave the parties an opportunity to make further written submissions, which they duly did. Having considered all of this, we have decided to dismiss the appeals, for the reasons set out below.
(2) Relevant Case History
7. The Appellant first entered the United Kingdom in 2013 and claimed asylum.
8. On 7 November 2014, before the Respondent had determined his claim, he was convicted of possession of class A drugs with intent to supply and possession of false documents. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.
9. A deportation order was signed on 27 April 2015 and on 25 June 2015, having only served eight months of his sentence, the Appellant departed voluntarily to Albania.
10. At some stage, he says in April 2017, he came back, entering the United Kingdom clandestinely.
11. The Appellant came to the Respondent’s attention on 22 July 2019 when he was arrested for driving with no insurance. He was subsequently released on bail and, within a week, made the first of his three applications to regularise his position.
12. These applications were all rejected in a series of decisions taken between 2023 and 2025. The Appellant’s discrete appeals against these decisions were subsequently linked by the First-tier Tribunal and heard together. The appeals were dismissed in a written decision dated 9 December 2025.
(3) Error of Law: Discussion and Findings
(3)(a) Ground 1
13. The framework for the First-tier Tribunal’s analysis was Reg 27 of the EEA Regs. Under that provision, the Respondent may take a relevant decision to deport a person, otherwise entitled to residence under the EEA Regs, on grounds of public policy, public security or public health:
“(1) In this regulation, a “relevant decision” means an EEA decision taken on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health.”
“(5) The public policy and public security requirements of the United Kingdom include restricting rights otherwise conferred by these Regulations in order to protect the fundamental interests of society, and where a relevant decision is taken on grounds of public policy or public security it must also be taken in accordance with the following principles—
(a) the decision must comply with the principle of proportionality;
(b) the decision must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the person concerned;
(c) the personal conduct of the person must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society, taking into account past conduct of the person and that the threat does not need to be imminent;
(d) matters isolated from the particulars of the case or which relate to considerations of general prevention do not justify the decision;
(e) a person’s previous criminal convictions do not in themselves justify the decision;
(f) the decision may be taken on preventative grounds, even in the absence of a previous criminal conviction, provided the grounds are specific to the person.
(6) Before taking a relevant decision on the grounds of public policy and public security in relation to a person (“P”) who is resident in the United Kingdom, the decision maker must take account of considerations such as the age, state of health, family and economic situation of P, P’s length of residence in the United Kingdom, P’s social and cultural integration into the United Kingdom and the extent of P’s links with P’s country of origin.”
14. In its analysis of that provision, the First-tier Tribunal began with Reg 27(5)(c). It noted that: the Appellant had committed serious criminal offences, for which he had been sentenced to three years in prison; he had failed to complete his sentence; and, having made a voluntary departure, he had then showed a “flagrant disregard” for English law, making no attempt to regularise his status until he was encountered by the police. He was convicted in 2013 under a different alias and was removed under that name. He had made no attempt to correct these details on the official record. Further, the Appellant had not engaged in any formal rehabilitation during his sentence or since. The First-tier Tribunal gave “good weight” to the trial judge’s sentencing remarks that the Appellant “poses a serious threat to society”. Conversely, the fact that the Appellant had not been convicted since then attracted little weight. Having drawn all of that together, the First-tier Tribunal was satisfied that the requirement in Reg 27(5)(c) was satisfied, that is to say that the personal conduct of the Appellant was found to represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society, taking into account past conduct and the fact that the threat does not need to be imminent.
15. In his submissions on ground 1, Mr Youssefian emphasised that historic offending cannot itself, without more, justify a finding of a present threat. He suggested that all four of the Tribunal’s central points related to historic matters, i.e. the seriousness of the offence, the sentencing remarks, the Appellant’s unlawful re-entry to the United Kingdom and the absence of any formal rehabilitation, could not by themselves logically lead to a conclusion that there was a current propensity to reoffend. In both his written and oral submissions, Mr Youssefian submitted that the Appellant has not committed any further criminal offences for over 11 years and he has gained employment, established a family life and demonstrated insight and remorse. He has been living with his current partner in a stable relationship since 2020 and they have worked hard to establish a business together. Mr Youssefian submitted that the First-tier Tribunal had unjustifiably diminished the weight to be attached to this turnaround in the Appellant’s life.
16. The difficulty with this argument, as we identified at the hearing, is that the Appellant is presently living in the United Kingdom in breach of a deportation order, having entered the country clandestinely. Even setting aside his working (which Mr Youssefian submits was authorised by the Respondent) and his arrest in 2019 for driving without insurance (which does not appear to have led to a charge), it is simply not accurate to say that the Appellant has not committed any further criminal offences. We are grateful to Mr Terrell for identifying the relevant provision. At the date when the Appellant re-entered the United Kingdom, section 24(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 read:
“A person who is not a British citizen shall be guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction with a fine of not more than level 5 on the standard scale or with imprisonment for not more than six months, or with both, in any of the following cases:—
(a) if contrary to this Act he knowingly enters the United Kingdom in breach of a deportation order or without leave;”
17. Further, the test under Reg 27(5)(c) is to be read in conjunction with Schedule 1 to the EEA Regs, paragraph 7 of which sets out a non-exhaustive list of matters considered to be in the “fundamental interests of society”. These include:
(1) at 7(a), ”preventing unlawful immigration and abuse of the immigration laws, and maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of the immigration control system (including under these Regulations) and of the Common Travel Area;” and
(2) at 7(f), “excluding or removing an EEA national or family member of an EEA national with a conviction (including where the conduct of that person is likely to cause, or has in fact caused, public offence) and maintaining public confidence in the ability of the relevant authorities to take such action”.
18. We put it to Mr Youssefian that both of these fundamental interests of society were currently engaged on the facts and that, in those circumstances, the First-tier Tribunal did not need to refer to any other, future threat of harm.
19. Not having had an opportunity to consider the point in detail, Mr Youssefian accepted our suggestion that submissions be filed in writing following the hearing. In doing so, he accepted that the Appellant had indeed committed a further criminal offence when he entered the United Kingdom in breach of the deportation order.
20. Having had regard to that matter, and to the “fundamental interests of society” set out in Schedule 1 to the EEA Regs, we are satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal was plainly entitled to conclude as it did that the test in Reg 27(5)(c) was made out. It follows that we need not address in any detail Mr Youssefian’s additional criticisms of its reasoning, save to say that we do not consider that the First-tier Tribunal appears to have placed very much weight on the lack of formal rehabilitation and that, in any event, its comments on that issue must be read in the context of its emphasis on the Appellant’s early release, voluntary departure, subsequent illegal re-entry, evasion of the authorities and, ultimately, decision to remain here in breach of the deportation order.
(3)(b) Ground 2
21. Ground 2 is, Mr Youssefian accepts, the other side of the same coin. Under this heading he emphasises the very positive things which can be said about the Appellant’s conduct. We accept that the Appellant has now achieved a degree of stability in his life and that he no doubt regrets his behaviour as a younger man. He having met his partner in 2020, we can well imagine how he just put one foot in front of the other and ploughed on with their relationship, leading to marriage, and how, in building a business and a life together, he no doubt hoped, and perhaps believed, that his criminal past would eventually be overlooked and he would be allowed to stay. We do not, however, accept that the First-tier Tribunal shut its mind to all of that in its assessment of proportionality under Reg 27(5)(a). This much is clear from its paragraph 22:
“I accept that there is credible evidence from the appellant and his partner, that they both work in cafes, one of which is owned by the appellant’s sibling and his partner. I find that he has been employed there, as there are payslips and numerous photographs to support this, and that he has been paying taxes as per HMRC records provided. I attach some weight to his claim that he is no longer involved in criminal activity given the indication that he is committed to the family business, works long hours and has evidence of making national insurance contributions. The appellant was apologetic, remorseful and claimed that he was young when the offence happened and that he was now a changed man. I attach some weight to this.”
(3)(c) Ground 3
22. Ground 3 makes the same point, but in the context of Article 8 ECHR. We dismiss this submission on basis that the First-tier Tribunal did weigh those matters favourable to the Appellant in its balancing exercise, as we have set out above.
(4) Decision and Directions
23. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.
24. We were not asked to make an anonymity order and on the facts, we see no reason to do so.

Gaenor Bruce

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25 August 2026