Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000841
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/63203/2023
LH/01173/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

24th June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY

Between

HENREY ARCHILESS WILKINSON
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation
For the Appellant: Ms A. Patyna, Counsel instructed by TRP Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J. Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 June 2026
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. This is an appeal brought by the appellant against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) promulgated on 13 October 2025, in which the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim made in support of his application to revoke a Deportation Order against him.
2. The background to this appeal is set out in the papers before me and does not require verbatim repetition herein. In brief, the appellant is a citizen of Jamaica. He first entered the UK in August 2001 when he was 3 years old and was granted indefinite leave to remain on 23 May 2002.
3. On 28 November 2017 at Northampton Crown Court, the appellant was convicted of one count of violent disorder on 30 May 2017 and was sentenced to 19 months imprisonment in a Young Offenders Institution. On 28 February 2018 a deportation order in relation to the appellant was signed which was served on 6 March 2018 together with a decision to refuse his human rights claim.
4. On September 2022 and 17 January 2023, the appellant made submissions in support of an application to revoke his deportation order. The application to revoke the deportation order was refused in a decision dated 1 November 2023 and the respondent provided a supplementary refusal letter dated 29 July 2024.
5. On 25 June 2024 a National Referral Mechanism was submitted in relation to the appellant and a positive reasonable grounds decision was made on 27 June 2024. On 25 July 2024 a decision was made by the respondent to disqualify the appellant from protection as a victim of trafficking/modern slavery.
The FtT Decision
6. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) hearing took place at Birmingham IAC on 13 June 2025. The decision dismissing the appellant’s appeal was promulgated some four months later, on 13 October 2025.
7. The Judge recorded at [7] of the decision the disputed issues between the parties as follows:
1) Whether the appellant’s removal from the United Kingdom would breach his rights under Article 3 of the ECHR on medical and/or destitution grounds.
2) Whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Jamaica for the purposes of the Private Life Exception to deportation.
3) Whether it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s qualifying partner to relocate to Jamaica or remain in the UK without him.
4) Whether there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in the statutory Exceptions under section 117C of the NIAA 2002, which would justify the appellant’s continued presence in the UK.
8. The Judge first addressed the appellant’s Article 3 claim. He found that the appellant had provided a detailed, frank and consistent account of the domestic abuse and bullying he had experienced and found his account credible and supported by the broader evidence.
9. At [18] and [19] the Judge summarised the evidence of Ms Lisa Davies, Consultant Forensic Psychologist, referring to her report dated 22 May 2023, and the follow-up letter dated 2 October 2024. At [20] the Judge summarises the medico-legal report of Dr Kemi Komolafe, Clinical Psychologist at the Helen Bamber Foundation, dated June 2023, and, at [22], the appellant’s GP records for the period between 18 December 2023 and 25 June 2024 and, at [23], the patient records from Heathrow Immigration Removal Centre. The Judge found that the appellant had a long-standing history of anxiety and depression and had been prescribed Mirtazapine.
10. The Judge states at [24] that he is not persuaded the appellant currently suffers from PTSD or requires specialist intervention, stating that although the expert reports refer in detail to the presentation of PTSD symptoms, both reports were now “considerably outdated” and there was no reference to a PTSD diagnosis in the appellant’s GP records. The Judge refers to the fact the only treatment the appellant currently receives is medication and that he has not engaged in counselling since attending eight sessions in 2023, which the experts reports had not considered. Furthermore, the Judge refers to a “divergence of opinion” between the experts in relation to the appellant’s mental health and the risk to him arising from this.
11. The Judge refers to the country conditions report by Dr Luke de Noronha and the Asylos report dated August 2022 at [27] and [28] but concluded that the evidence did not meaningfully advance the appellant's case. The Judge stated that Dr Noronha’s assessment of the risk of destitution and/or exploitation is predicated on circumstances involving individuals without meaningful familial or financial support which did not sufficiently incorporate the appellant’s personal characteristics, and failed to consider the support available to the appellant and his own resilience and “personal attributes”. The Judge refers in this regard to the appellant’s education, having obtained a first class university degree, some work history in customer services, and a period of independent living with his partner. The Judge found that the appellant’s partner would be willing and able to support him in the short-term and that his family could provide him with practical support including guidance based on their own experiences in Jamaica.
12. At [33] the Judge states that the Asylos report is not authored by expert witnesses and that “Dr Noronha’s comments regarding the appellant’s medical conditions must be treated with caution as he is not an expert in healthcare provision and cannot speak to specific conditions or the availability of treatment”.
13. In respect of his Article 3 claim, the Judge found that taken at their highest, the appellant’s medical conditions do not approach the threshold required for an Article 3 medical claim and that he was not persuaded that that any required treatment would be either unavailable or inaccessible to the appellant or that he would face destitution.
14. In respect of the appellant’s criminal offending, the Judge found that there had been a reduction on the appellant’s risk of reoffending and found that his past offending was linked to a traumatic childhood, exploitation by gangs, and underlying mental health issues.
15. At [46] the Judge found, taking forward his previous findings, that the appellant had not established that he would face very significant obstacles to integration into Jamaica. Thus, although it was accepted that he had lived over half of his life in the UK and was socially and culturally integrated in the UK, the appellant was unable to satisfy the requirements of Exception 1 under section 117C Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. In respect of Exception 2, the Judge found that it would not be unduly harsh either for the appellant’s partner to relocate with the appellant to Jamaica or to remain in the UK without him.
16. Having conducted a proportionality balancing exercise for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR, the Judge found that the appellant was unable to demonstrate very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions to deportation. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
17. The appellant claims the decision of the FtT is vitiated by material errors of law in the following respects:
1) An erroneous assessment of the expert evidence and failure to take into account material matters, specifically the experts’ addendum reports provided in the appellant’s supplementary bundle before the FtT.
2) Irrationality and/or a failure to give adequate reasons for departing from the experts’ conclusions.
3) Failure to consider the appellant's history of exploitation/trafficking in the assessment of his prospects to integration into Jamaica.
4) Irrational findings in relation to family support.
5) Irrational analysis of the country expert report.
6) Delay in promulgation of the decision which infected the Judge’s findings.
18. Permission to appeal was refused by the Judge but granted on 30 March 2026 by DUTJ Monson in the following terms:
2. It is arguable that, as pleaded in Ground 1, the FtT Judge’s assessment of the psychiatric evidence was materially flawed because he did not engage with Dr Komolafe’s supplementary letter or the supplementary reports of both experts which the appellant (A) relied on (1) as explaining why their diagnosis of PTSD was sound despite a PTSD diagnosis not featuring in A’s GP records, and (2) as explaining that the apparent divergence of opinion between the two experts as to the extent of the risk of A attempting suicide on return to Jamaica was attributable to A’s fluctuating suicidal ideation.
3. It is further arguable that, as pleaded in the preamble, the arguable error identified in Ground 1 was material to the FtT Judge’s assessment of whether a claim under Article 3 ECHR on mental health grounds was made out and/or whether the private life exception to deportation was made out.
4. The remaining grounds are of borderline merit, but they may be argued.
The Hearing Before Me and Decision on the grounds
19. Ms Patyna adopted the grounds of appeal and relied upon her skeleton argument which addressed those grounds. Mr Nappey relied upon the respondent’s Rule 24 response and responded to Ms Patyna’s submissions so far he could. It is fair to say, following an indication from me, that Mr Nappey did not feel able to robustly defend the decision under challenge, although he was not in a position to formally concede the appeal.
20. I indicated at the hearing that I would allow the appeal on ground 1. I do not consider it necessary to determine the other grounds of appeal because of the impact of my decision on ground 1.
21. Although the Judge made specific reference to the earlier reports of Ms Davies and Dr Komolafe at [18] to [20] of the decision, there is no reference to Dr Komolafe’s supplementary letter dated 4 October 2024 or the addendum reports by both experts dated 4 and 9 December 2024. These addendum reports were provided in response to the respondent’s review. The respondent’s review averred that there was inadequate evidence of the appellant’s mental health, a divergence of opinion between Ms Davies and Dr Komolafe in relation to the appellant’s risk of suicide, and that the appellant had not been diagnosed with PTSD by his GP.
22. Although there is no requirement for a Judge to itemise each and every piece of evidence considered, the fact that the other expert reports are specifically referenced by the Judge by date, and their content summarised, appears to strongly indicate that addendum reports were not considered by him. There is no reference in the decision to the existence of these later reports and their content has not been addressed. Notably, the Judge refers to the expert medical evidence as “considerably outdated” despite the most recent addendum reports being produced within six months of the hearing. Furthermore, the content of the experts’ updating evidence directly addresses the issues regarding the evidence raised by the respondent in her review, which appear to have been accepted by the Judge and adopted as key findings. Given the relevance of the updating evidence, the appellant was entitled to know that the evidence had been considered by the Judge, and, if it was considered, why it was rejected by the Judge. The decision can provide the appellant with no reassurance that this was the case.
23. I have considered the content of the addendum reports/letters in question. Both Dr Komolafe and Ms Davies explain in their addendum reports why they were able to diagnose the appellant with PTSD in absence of such a diagnosis in the GP records, and why they did not consider their diagnosis conflicted with the material which appeared in those records. Furthermore, the addendum report of Ms Davies directly addresses why she considers there is no material divergence between her opinion and the opinion of Dr Komolafe in relation to the appellant’s degree of impairment.
24. As reflected by the Judge at [24] of the decision, the Tribunal remains “the ultimate decision-maker, and expert evidence cannot supplant the Tribunal’s fact-finding function”. The Judge was not required to accept the evidence of the expert witnesses. However, in light of the obvious relevance of the further expert medical evidence, I find that it was incumbent upon the Judge at least to analyse the expert evidence, and, if the Judge was minded to reject it, give findings for doing so. On reading the decision, I cannot be satisfied that the addendum expert reports were even considered by the Judge. The impression is that this evidence was somehow overlooked. This may or may not have been due to the four month delay in promulgating the decision. The reference at [8] of the decision to the Judge having considered all of the material in the case is not, I find, sufficient to discharge the duty to give reasons in respect of the evidence in question.
25. The evidence was plainly relevant to resolving the issues in respect of the appellant’s mental health and bore upon the consideration of his condition at the time of the hearing. The evidence was material to the reasons the Judge gave for finding that he was not satisfied the appellant suffered from PTSD and was directly relevant to the Judge’s finding that here was a divergence of opinion between the two experts.
26. For these reasons, I find that the Judge made a material error of law in the assessment of the expert evidence. Ground 1 is established. The result of this is that the Judge’s conclusions on Article 3, very significant obstacles to integration for the purposes of Exception 1, and very compelling circumstances for the purposes of section 117C(6) are unsafe and cannot stand. This being the case it is not necessary for me to address the further grounds of appeal and I decline to do so in light of my decision to remit the appeal to the FtT for de novo hearing in view of the extent of the fact-finding required to determine the appeal. The decision of the Judge is set aside.
27. It is likely that a significant amount of additional fact-finding is required in order to determine this appeal which could require the Tribunal to hear extensive evidence. Applying paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, I am satisfied that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing so that the appellant can benefit from the two-tier appeal process.
28. The appellant does not challenge the Judge’s findings in respect of Exception 2 based on his family life with his partner These findings are preserved save that it is open to the FtT to revisit Exception 2 if there is a material change in circumstances by the time of the rehearing. No other findings are preserved.
Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is allowed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is vitiated by material errors of law and is set aside.

The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing before another judge.

S. Grey

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 June 2026