UI-2026-000846
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000846
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/73215/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
2nd November 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LINDSLEY
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA
Between
ER
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Fripp, of Counsel, instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Interpretation:
Ms T Yazdan, in the Afghan Dari language
Heard at Field House on 6 October 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan born in 1993. He is ethnically Tajik and comes from the Andarab province in the north of Afghanistan. He worked in government between 2013 and 2018 in education at the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Authority and also studied for a degree in economics. In 2018 the appellant went to work for the Afghan Ministry of the Interior/ Home Office checking the accuracy of data on salaries and expenses and providing reports.
2. The appellant left Afghanistan to study at Lucknow University for an MBA in June 2019. In August 2021 the government of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, was displaced by the Taliban, officially the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The appellant remained outside of Afghanistan and completed his degree in September 2021. He was then offered the opportunity to study for a PhD in Business Administration in India, and he continued to study there. He applied to come to the UK in 2023 and accepted an offer to study an MSc in International Management at Teesside University. On 6th September 2023 the appellant arrived in the UK with entry clearance to study as a postgraduate student. He claimed asylum on 14th October 2023. The appellant’s appeal against the decision refusing his protection and human rights claim dated 8th October 2024 was dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge in a decision promulgated on 31st October 2025.
3. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt on 5th June 2026 on the basis that it was arguable that the First-tier judge had erred in law as the appellant had arguably unfairly been represented by a prohibited person, and this was, in turn, arguably a procedural fairness issue in light of the fact that the First-tier Tribunal Judge had found the appellant not to be credible in part due to the failure to adduce evidence that was found to be reasonably available. The other grounds were found to have less merit, but permission was granted to argue all grounds.
4. The matter now comes before us to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law, and if so whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
5. There were the following preliminary matters:
• The Panel, with the consent of the respondent, found that material covered by a Rule15(2A) application under the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (to be found at sections B and C of the consolidated bundle) was to be admitted as evidence going to whether there was an error of law by the First-tier Tribunal with the exception of the material relating to the appellant’s conversion to Christianity. The respondent did not consent to the Upper Tribunal considering the Christian conversion as a fresh matter, but it was agreed by Mr Nappey that this decision could be revisited if an error of law was found and the appeal was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing de novo.
• It was agreed by the parties that there was no need for any examination in chief or cross examination of the appellant and Mr Elliot Chappell, solicitor at Duncan Lewis Solicitors, so both simply confirmed that the contents of their witness statements to be true and correct to the best of their belief.
• We admitted a new fifth ground of appeal. Mr Nappey was content that the ground be argued before the Upper Tribunal, and there was good reason why it had been formulated later due to the lack of relevant materials held by Duncan Lewis Solicitors when the original grounds were drafted.
• It was agreed that the first and fifth grounds should be argued first, and only if no error was found on these grounds would we need to hear argument from both parties on the second, third and fourth grounds.
• It was agreed by the parties that if the Panel found that procedural unfairness was made out the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard again de novo.
6. At the start of the hearing, it was also clarified that it was agreed by both parties that the appellant’s caseworker at Amicus Solicitors, the solicitors who had conduct of the preparation of his appeal before the First-tier Tribunal, was Mr Matt/Matthew Burns, who is someone who has been prohibited from working for solicitors firms under s.43(1) of the Solicitors Act 1974. It was also common ground that the SRA are currently investigating Mr Burns and Amicus Solicitors as a result. There was a confused picture from the papers as to whether Mr Burns had also attended the First-tier Tribunal in place of Mr McGarvey. Amicus Solicitors implied that this had been the case in correspondence dated 25th September 2026, whilst Mr McGarvey had said in correspondence that he had attended. We therefore asked the appellant to confirm whether he recognised Mr McGarvey from a picture obtained from his chambers’ website. The appellant confirmed that it was indeed Mr McGarvey who had attended the First-tier Tribunal hearing, which was in keeping with the appellant’s opinion that the person who attended the First-tier Tribunal to represent him had a different voice to Mr Burns, whom he had never met in person but had spoken to over WhatsApp.
Submissions – Error of Law
7. In the grounds of appeal, skeleton argument and in oral submissions from Mr Fripp it is argued, in summary in grounds one and five, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law as follows.
8. In the first ground, it is argued, that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is unsafe due to procedural unfairness.
9. The background is set out as follows. The appellant had instructed Amicus Solicitors, a SRA regulated firm of solicitors, to conduct his case before the First-tier Tribunal after he received the respondent’s refusal notice. The appellant instructed Amicus Solicitors privately having seen the owner, Mr Farid Wardak, on TikTok. He instructed private solicitors as he could not find a legal aid lawyer. He paid Amicus £2500 and was told by Mr Wardak that Matt Burns, a highly experienced caseworker, would prepare his case. Matt Burns clearly drafted the skeleton argument and grounds of appeal as his name appears on these documents
10. The appellant contacted Mr Burns via WhatsApp and Mr Burns said he would prepare the bundle if he sent his interview records and refusal letter, which the appellant duly did. Mr Burns said he would contact the appellant if he needed anything. Mr Burns never contacted the appellant to ask for anything more. The appellant had no meeting with Mr Burns and no other contact except via WhatsApp messaging and calls. The appellant questioned Mr Burns via messaging about the appeal statement which he thought was not sufficiently detailed and did not explain why he was at risk from the Taliban due to his work with the Ministry of Interior. After the appeal was dismissed Mr Burns told the appellant there was nothing he could do, but the appellant begged him to appeal, so Mr Burns lodged an appeal. The appellant says that he had evidence that was not submitted by Mr Burns which is now attached to his much longer statement prepared with his current solicitors Duncan Lewis. The appellant made a complaint against Amicus Solicitors on 15th September 2026, which led to a response which claims that Mr Burns was acting under supervision and a contention that his case had not been adversely affected by Mr Burns involvement.
11. Mr Fripp argues that procedural unfairness arises on these facts in two ways. Firstly, he argues that simply by virtue of the fact that Mr Burns is a prohibited person, and the appellant had no knowledge of this fact and thought he had instructed SRA regulated solicitors, he is not a person to whom the surrogacy principle could apply, as the appellant would not have consented to Mr Burns preparing and conducting his appeal preparation had he known his status as a prohibited person. It is argued that this is not simply an issue of a representative acting negligently or omitting matters which were significant, but of significant involvement of a person who could not be regarded as a representative, as he was not lawfully able to act in that capacity. It is argued had this been known by the appellant and First-tier Tribunal the appeal would not have taken place. Mr Fripp relied upon the case of R v Woodward [1944] KB 118, where the Court of Appeal set aside a verdict where a defendant was allocated counsel by a judge but that defendant did not want the barrister and this was deemed to be unfair due to the appellant’s lack of volition in the appointment of his representative.
12. Secondly, Mr Fripp argued that the hearing was procedurally unfair because Mr Burns had caused the appeal to be prepared in a deficient way. Mr Burns is, by definition, as a prohibited person under s.43(1) of the Solicitors Act 1974, someone who had been convicted of a criminal offence and by virtue of that conviction or other conduct it would be undesirable for him to be involved with legal practice in the view of the Law Society, and further, as observed as arguable in the grant of permission by Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt and is evident looking at the supplementary bundle, failed to lodge documents for the appellant which were in the appellant’s possession and the absence of which was found to lead a lack of credibility on his part.
13. Mr Fripp developed this point by observing that the appellant had expressed concern to Mr Burns that the statement was short and did not properly explain his case, and he had not submitted further evidence as Mr Burns had explicitly said there was no need for this and he, the appellant, had therefore relied upon the assurance from Mr Burns, whom he had been told was an expert caseworker in this field, that further evidence need not be submitted. It is also noted that there was a failure to provide an update in the statement and to respond to the s.8 of the Asylum & Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 points raised in the reasons for refusal letter, and clearly a competent representative would have responded to these issues. It is argued that the new statements show that the appellant had more to say; that the appellant had evidence of his mother’s injury in the form of the photo and would have filed this had Mr Burns requested further evidence and therefore would not have been subject to criticism going to his credibility from the First-tier Tribunal Judge had he been competently represented; similarly he had the screen-shots of his ex-colleague which supported this person now being with the Taliban and would have lodged this if he had been competently represented, and so would not have been subject to criticism for failing to supply this document, and thus to a further negative credibility finding by the First-tier Tribunal Judge; and turning to the issue raised in the new ground five a competent representative would have obtained a copy of the appellant’s passport from the respondent, who held it, and this would have shown that the appellant’s passport was renewed by the previous Afghan regime operating out of the consulate in Delhi, and not by the Taliban as found by the First-tier Tribunal Judge.
14. Ground five asserts that the First-tier Tribunal erred when it relied, when finding the appellant not to be credible, upon his having renewed his passport in 2022 with the Taliban. In fact, the passport was extended in June 2022 in Delhi, and this was done not by the Taliban but by officials of the deposed regime, as is clear from the document itself.
15. In the Rule 24 response, skeleton argument and oral submissions from Mr Nappey, the respondent argues with respect to grounds one and five, in summary, as follows.
16. With respect to the first ground, it is argued that the burden is on the appellant to show that Mr Burns, acting as his caseworker, actually produced unfairness at the hearing. It is argued that Rule 10(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 explicitly makes it clear that where a party has been represented by a person who is prohibited from representing, that does not of itself render void the proceedings or any step taken in the proceedings. Further we are not certain of what exactly Mr Burns did to become a prohibited person, and thus it is not clear that he is not actually an experienced asylum appeal caseworker. Further Amicus Solicitors state that Mr Wardak supervised Mr Burns, and Mr Wardak has not provided a statement and is clearly a properly regulated person. Further the appellant was represented at the hearing of his appeal before the First-tier Tribunal by Mr McGarvey, counsel regulated by the Bar Standards Board. There is no evidence of the complaints/ queries that the appellant raised with Mr Burns about the shortness of his witness statement for the appeal and nor of Mr Burns advising that no further documentary evidence was required. It is argued therefore that the First-tier Tribunal made sustainable findings as to the appellant’s credibility and that the new photographic evidence adduced by the appellant is so insubstantial it could not have affected the outcome even if it had been provided to the First-tier Tribunal, and in addition it has not been shown to have been available at the time of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal.
17. With respect to the fifth ground, it is argued in the skeleton argument that it is unclear if the passport was before the First-tier Tribunal Judge, and that the oral evidence of the appellant, from the Presenting Officers notes, was that the appellant’s passport was extended in Delhi, although the appellant also said in response to a later question that the passport was issued by the passport department. The respondent’s case was therefore that the extension of a passport at an embassy is evidence that the appellant did not have a fear of persecution at that time and is a factor that the First-tier Tribunal could legitimately rely upon.
18. However, before the Upper Tribunal Mr Nappey conceded for the respondent that it could not be said that the Taliban government had renewed the passport based on the evidence of the appellant, or on examination of the passport copy, which showed that it had been renewed in Delhi by the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and not the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, as the Taliban government is officially know. As this was a factor in the First-tier Tribunal consideration of the credibility of the appellant Mr Nappey accepted that it could not be said for certain that the outcome of the appeal would be the same if the judge had not proceeded on the mistaken understanding that the Taliban government was content to renew the passport and that fact undermined the claim that the appellant is a person of adverse interest to them.
19. In light of this concession we found it unnecessary to consider grounds 2,3 and 4. At the end of the hearing the Panel informed the parties that we found that the First-tier Tribunal decision was flawed by error of law due to procedural unfairness, for the reasons we now set out below, and that we would therefore be setting aside the decision and remitting the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard again de novo.
Conclusions – Error of Law
20. We conclude that it is unnecessary to decide whether Mr Burns being a prohibited person with primary conduct of the appellant’s appeal suffices, on the basis of the surrogacy principle and a lack of volition on the part of the appellant as to Mr Burns true status, to lead to an automatic finding that the appeal was procedurally unfair. An obstacle in the way of this argument would clearly have been that the 2014 Rules at Rule 10(2) stipulate that the proceedings or any steps taken in the proceedings are not rendered void by the fact that someone is represented by a prohibited person, but proceedings not being void is a different matter to whether they might thereby be unfair.
21. As recorded above Mr Nappey conceded that there was no evidence at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal from the respondent or the appellant that supported the finding at paragraph 31 of the decision that the Taliban government had renewed the appellant’s passport in 2022. The finding that the Taliban had renewed the appellant’s passport was a key adverse finding going to the appellant’s credibility which was based on an error of fact and so, we find, that Mr Nappey rightly conceded that the assessment of credibility was made unsafe by this error of fact.
22. As we find that there was also potential unfairness given the other evidence which the appellant had available to him which could have addressed other findings against his credibility for non-production of evidence, made at paragraphs 21 to 23 of the decision, and under s.8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004, at paragraphs 14 to 18 of the decision, we conclude that the correct course is to remit the appeal to be heard de novo by another First-tier Tribunal Judge.
Decision:
1. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.
2. We set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
3. We remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Russell.
Fiona Lindsley
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
27th October 2026