Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000860
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52032/2023
LP/00111/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOBBS

Between

TA
ANONYMITY ORDER MADE
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr. E. Banham, Counsel instructed by Virgo Solicitors Ltd.
For the respondent: Ms. J. Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appeal came before me to remade following the error of law decision promulgated on 15 May 2026.

The hearing

2. The appellant attended the hearing with his Personal Adviser. He was assisted by the interpreter, Mr. K. Gerima, who confirmed before proceeding that they both fully understood each other. The language used was Amharic.

3. The appeal proceeded by way of submissions only. The appellant left the hearing during these submissions as he was feeling tired and unwell. His Personal Adviser accompanied him. Mr. Banham confirmed he was content to proceed. The interpreter remained, and took notes so that he could summarise the submissions should the appellant return. However, he did not return to the hearing.

4. I heard oral submissions from both representatives. I reserved my decision.

5. I had before me the documents contained in the composite bundle (525 pages “CB”), the appellant’s supplementary bundle (41 pages, “SB”), the addendum report from Dr. I. Ngade (5 pages), and the CPIN Ethiopia: Internal Relocation, September 2025 (the “2025 CPIN”). I was referred by Ms. Isherwood to the case of SU (Expert reports – format) Bangladesh [2026] UKUT 00317 (IAC).

6. The issues before me were, in relation to the asylum claim, whether the appellant would be able to internally relocate, and in the alternative in relation to Article 8, whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into Ethiopia.

7. The findings relating to the appellant’s credibility, and the lack of sufficiency of protection in his home area, are preserved ([26], [31] and [32] of the First-tier Tribunal decision).

8. The standard of proof on the asylum claim is the lower standard, reasonable likelihood.

Decision and reasons

Internal relocation

9. I have carefully considered whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to internally relocate. As was submitted by Mr. Banham, I find that the respondent proposed in the decision that the appellant could internally relocate to Addis Ababa. He submitted in relation to the respondent’s 2025 CPIN that it was not only the information at [18] of Annex A: City information, Addis Ababa, which applied, but that the whole of the CPIN should be considered. This was acknowledged by Ms. Isherwood.

10. The 2025 CPIN states at [2.1.1]:

“A person fearing ‘rogue’ state actors and non-state actors is likely to be able to internally relocate to another area of Ethiopia, particularly to the larger cities such as, but not limited to, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. This will depend on the nature of the threat and the person’s circumstances.”

11. I have carefully considered the appellant’s personal circumstances, with reference to the preserved findings and the evidence before me. I find that the appellant is a 22 year old man of Amhara ethnicity. He is an Orthodox Christian. He suffered discrimination and persecution growing up due to his race and religion. He was kidnapped as a child by a group of men who tried to convert him to Islam and assaulted him. He experiences chronic facial pain and mental health problems as a result. He left Ethiopia in 2018 when he was 14 years old. He was an only child. His mother lives in Ethiopia, but he has lost contact with her. He was informed of his father’s death by his mother when was about ten years old. The appellant has only lived in Jijiga in Ethiopia. He has never lived in any other area of Ethiopia, including Addis Ababa. I find that he has no friends or social network in Ethiopia.

Medical evidence

12. I have first considered the appellant’s mental health. For the hearing in the First-tier Tribunal the appellant provided two reports from the Helen Bamber Foundation, a psychological report by Dr. Natasha Smyth dated 2 April 2024 (pages 135 to 173 CB) and a scarring report by Dr. Phyllis Turvill dated 5 June 2024 (pages 174 to 205 CB). In Dr. Smyth’s opinion the appellant fulfils the criteria for diagnoses of PTSD and depression. For the hearing before me the appellant provided a report from Mr. Dashmir Thaci, Integrative Psychotherapist, dated 4 September 2026 (pages 3 to 32 SB).

13. Ms. Isherwood did not challenge the appellant’s diagnoses. She submitted that less weight could be given to Mr. Thaci’s report for a number of reasons: the Tribunal did not have the solicitors’ instructions; the report had been produced after one interview with the appellant; it was not clear what the “relevant medical and clinical information contained within the documentation supplied” was which Mr. Thaci had considered (page 6); further the Tribunal did not have any up-to-date GP records, and there was no evidence to corroborate Mr. Thaci’s statement as follows (page 9):

“At the time of assessment, efforts were being made through his professional support network to facilitate urgent GP support because of concerns regarding his deteriorating psychological wellbeing and suicidal thoughts. I was subsequently informed that, following the urgent GP appointment on 3 September 2026, he was prescribed citalopram 10 mg.”

14. In relation to this specific point, I find that I do not need corroboration of this statement of Mr. Thaci. While I will consider the overall weight that I can give to his report, I find that I can rely on this statement as a statement of fact. It was not submitted by Ms. Isherwood that this statement was false, or that Mr. Thaci would lie about a matter of fact. Ms. Isherwood submitted that there was no evidence as to how the appellant obtained an urgent appointment, but I do not need to know this. She submitted that in the GP records which were before the Tribunal, covering 2021 to 2023, the appellant had not raised anxiety or depression with his GP. I attach little weight to this submission as the fact that he had not reported it to his GP does not mean that he did not have symptoms, especially given that the respondent did not challenge his diagnoses, and he has a diagnosis of depression.

15. Further relating to this point, Mr. Banham referred to Mr. Thaci’s description of the appellant’s day-to-day functioning (page 20 SB). Given this level of functional difficulty, it was not surprising that the appellant had not sought mental health support earlier. I accept this submission. Mr. Thaci states on page 20 SB:

“[The appellant’s] psychological difficulties are associated with significant functional impairment. His social engagement is markedly restricted, and low motivation, fatigue, anxiety, disturbed sleep and concentration difficulties interfere with his daily activities and ability to pursue educational or occupational goals. His limited social support and current inability to maintain reliable contact with his mother further increase his vulnerability.”

16. This is further borne out by the description of his current psychological presentation (page 9 SB):

“He reported persistent low mood, hopelessness, reduced interest and pleasure, low motivation, fatigue, poor appetite and significant social withdrawal. He described feeling tired, exhausted and emotionally overwhelmed and struggling to cope with his current psychological state.”

17. Ms. Isherwood also criticised Mr. Thaci’s report on the basis that he had relied largely on what the appellant told him. However, I find that the appellant’s experiences as outlined in the report were accepted by the respondent. Mr. Thaci’s description of them is consistent with what has been accepted. In relation to what the appellant about his mental health, I have considered below the process of the assessment and report.

18. I have considered the weight that I can attach to this report having taken into account the submissions of both parties. I have taken into account the case of SU, and the factors set out in the headnote. I find that Mr. Thaci is a psychotherapist. He is aware of his duty as an expert (page 3 SB). He has provided his CV, and all references are cited. He is clear that he does not practise as a psychiatrist and does not provide diagnoses. In relation to Ms. Isherwood’s criticism that the instructions had not been provided I find that this is mitigated by the very clear description by Mr. Thaci of the remit of his report:

“I do not practise as a psychiatrist and do not provide psychiatric diagnoses. Where I have been asked to consider [the appellant’s] psychological condition, I have addressed his symptoms, their severity and functional impact, and their consistency with recognised patterns of psychological distress. Where diagnoses have previously been made by other appropriately qualified clinicians, I identify them as such and do not present them as diagnoses independently made by me.”

19. Further he sets out in detail what he has been asked to consider, and what opinion has been sought, effectively setting out his instructions (page 5 SB). He correctly declines to make any comments on the availability and adequacy of mental health services in Ethiopia as these fall outside his professional expertise. Neither does he express any opinion as to the credibility of the appellant’s account, although there is no challenge to the appellant’s credibility before the Tribunal.

20. While Mr. Thaci only interviewed the appellant once, he has clearly set out on page 7 how he assessed him, and what screening measures he used. He considered his account alongside the documentary evidence which was before him (page 6 SB). I find having taken into account his qualifications and experience, and the fact that he has clearly set out his remit and is aware of his duty to the court, that reliance can be placed on this report.

21. I have considered the contents of the report. I find that the description of the appellant’s mental state is consistent with his diagnoses, and with the other evidence including the evidence from his Personal Adviser. As Dr. Thaci himself states when considering whether the appellant was exaggerating or feigning his symptoms: “His reported symptoms were broadly coherent with his presentation during assessment and with the pattern of psychological difficulties previously documented by Dr Smyth” (page 16 SB).

22. Dr. Thaci states that the appellant’s symptoms “indicate substantial current impairment across emotional social and day-to-day functioning” (page 10 SB). He states that the appellant was experiencing suicidal thoughts on a daily basis. While he denied having a current plan, Dr. Thaci states (page 12 SB):

“The absence of current intention, planning or preparatory behaviour is clinically relevant. It does not, however, remove the significance of recurrent daily suicidal ideation involving identifiable methods.”

23. I find that the description of vulnerability factors is particularly significant (page 12 SB):

“There are also a number of current vulnerability factors, including the frequency of his suicidal thoughts, severe psychological symptoms, hopelessness, social isolation, living alone, absence of a meaningful friendship network, inability currently to contact his mother, absence of psychological treatment, disturbed sleep and continuing uncertainty regarding his immigration circumstances.”

24. I find that all of those, bar the uncertainty regarding his immigration status, would be the same were he to be removed to Ethiopia, where he does not have a network and where he would be socially isolated. I will address the issue of absence of psychological treatment below.

25. Dr. Thaci highlights the deterioration in the appellant’s mental health since the assessment in 2024 when the appellant denied suicidal or self-harming thoughts. He states that this “represents a clinically significant deterioration in [the appellant’s] psychological and risk presentation since the previous assessment” (page 13 SB).

26. Under the heading “Clinical formulation and professional opinion”, Dr. Thaci states (page 14 SB):

“[The appellant] currently presents with a substantial level of psychological distress characterised by severe depressive and anxiety symptoms together with prominent trauma-related symptoms. These include intrusive recollections, recurrent nightmares, avoidance, disturbed sleep, concentration difficulties, social withdrawal, diminished interest and pleasure, low energy, hopelessness and recurrent suicidal ideation.

His current symptoms are associated with significant functional impairment across his social and day-to-day functioning.”

27. Dr. Thaci considers the impact of return to Ethiopia, given that the appellant “experiences the prospect of return to Ethiopia as highly threatening”. He does not “express an opinion regarding whether [the appellant] would objectively be at risk”. He states (page 22 SB):

“In my professional opinion, threatened or actual removal to Ethiopia would carry a substantial risk of significant deterioration in [the appellant’s] psychological state. This could reasonably include increased anxiety, trauma-related distress, intrusive recollections, disturbed sleep, hopelessness, withdrawal and reduced day-to-day functioning.”

28. He notes that this is “broadly consistent with the previous psychological evidence”. He states that it could also increase the frequency or intensity of his suicidal thoughts. In relation to treatment in Ethiopia, he states that country-specific evidence falls outside his professional expertise. However, “from a psychological perspective, continuity of appropriate treatment, professional support and suicide-risk monitoring would be clinically important”.

29. I have also considered the letter from the appellant’s Personal Adviser (pages 40 and 41 SB). It was submitted that little weight could be given to the statement in his letter about the appellant’s “extremely poor mental health” as he was not a medical professional. I find that some weight can be attached to this statement as the medical evidence before the Tribunal is that the appellant suffers from PTSD and depressive disorder. It is also consistent with the contents of the contemporaneous report from Dr. Thaci. I further accept Mr. Banham’s submission that the very fact that the appellant still has a Personal Advisor and is still being supported by the local authority at the age of 22, when the usual age for this kind of support to end is 21, is evidence that the appellant still has need of significant support.

30. Taking all of the above into account I find, in reliance on the evidence of Mr. Thaci, that the appellant has significant mental health problems which are likely to deteriorate on return to Ethiopia. I find that his mental health problems affect his ability to function on a day-to-day basis. I find that the evidence shows that he requires help to access mental health services.

Expert evidence from Dr. Ngade

31. I have considered the expert evidence from Dr. Ngade. He provided a report when the appeal was made (pages 112 to 134 CB). He then provided two addendum reports, one dated 3 January 2025, and one dated 7 September 2026 (pages 33 to 39 SB). The first addendum report addressed the respondent’s criticisms of his report, and the second one addressed the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s criticisms. On both occasions, the criticisms were essentially that some of the conclusions in the report were generic.

32. In summary, Ms. Isherwood submitted that the second addendum report did not address the issue of the generic conclusions, and that Dr. Ngade’s evidence could not be relied on. Mr. Banham accepted that some of Dr. Ngade’s conclusions lacked footnotes. However, he submitted that, while the respondent had concerns, she accepted that Dr. Ngade was a credible expert. He contributed to COI reports. There had been no attack on his credentials, and the reports had not been “heavily criticised”. He further submitted that Dr. Ngade’s conclusions were in line with the background objective evidence.

33. Dr. Ngade’s opinion is that internal relocation is not reasonable. In his initial report, at [6.4.3], he states (page 127 CB):

“It is highly improbable that internal relocation will offer [the appellant] safety, given not only his Christian faith but also his ethnicity, which serves as a significant marker of identity in Ethiopia. While religious conflicts continue to occur, insecurity in Ethiopia predominantly involves ethnically-based armed groups. For example, in 2021, during the surge of Tigray nationalism, government forces retreated, and the TPLF regained control of the Tigray region, subsequently advancing into the Afar and Amhara territories (where [the appellant] comes from). Such scenarios strongly suggest that relocating within the country would not provide [the appellant] with the necessary protection he seeks.”

34. Later at [3] he states (page 130 CB):

“In my informed view, internal relocation would not enhance his safety. This is particularly true given that the targeting of Christians extends across the country and is not confined to a specific area. Furthermore, considering Ethiopia’s deep ethnic divisions and the role ethnicity plays in fuelling violence, moving to other regions may expose him to risks from various ethnic militia groups throughout Ethiopia.”

35. In his first addendum report at [3(vi)] he states:

“To further substantiate my previous opinion (6.4.1 – 6.4.3) that internal relocation is not a viable option for [the appellant], I refer to research by Atnafu, which indicates that the Amhara people are a minority caught between the policy of ethnic federalism and the ruling class's relentless desire to marginalize the Amhara, who are considered to be former leaders of Ethiopia (Atnafu 2018). This ideology endangers the Amhara people in relation to other ethnic groups. Therefore, internal relocation for [the appellant] would be risky and is not a viable option for him.”

36. Later in the same report he states:

“3) In my informed view, internal relocation would not enhance his safety. This is particularly true given that the targeting of Christians extends across the country and is not confined to a specific area. Furthermore, considering Ethiopia’s deep ethnic divisions and the role ethnicity plays in fuelling violence, moving to other regions may expose him to risks from various ethnic militia groups throughout Ethiopia.” (page 3)

37. In his second addendum report he stated at [21]:

“Since my last addendum, the situation has worsened. Increased political instability in the Amhara region has led to a further erosion of the rule of law, making safe internal relocation effectively impossible for someone with [the appellant’s] profile. The state’s capacity and willingness to protect individuals perceived as outsiders—especially those with his background—remains severely limited.”

38. I have considered the background evidence, and Mr. Banham’s submission that the expert evidence is consistent with this. I was referred to the USSD 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (pages 322 to 336 CB). This refers to attacks on Orthodox Churches in Addis Ababa by the police. It states that “police in Addis Ababa forcefully disrupted a religious service at St. George church, near Menelik Il Square, after an Adwa Day […] celebration led to a confrontation between police and youths. [….] The EHRC said security forces “overreacted” and needlessly assaulted people, used tear gas, plastic and lethal bullets, and other excessive measures. The security forces injured older persons and children and killed at least one civilian, according to the EHRC.”

39. I was also referred to the UNHCR report dated June 2024 (pages 337 to 360 CB). Mr. Banham submitted that this was evidence of the number of IDPs (internally displaced persons) moving to Addis Ababa and bringing their own views, which led to ethnic tensions and divisions remaining in Addis Ababa. He submitted that taking the evidence of the USSD and the UNHCR, Dr. Ngade’s conclusions about ethnic divisions in Addis Ababa were reasonable conclusions to make. He submitted that it was also consistent with the CPIN Ethiopia: Background information, including internal relocation, September 2020, at [13.1.5] which states (page 246 CB):

“As Ethiopia’s commercial capital and with a history of inter-ethnic coexistence, Addis Ababa attracts significant migration from the regions. Inter-ethnic clashes – and associated blockades and road closures – in some parts of the country are an impediment to freedom of movement and internal relocation…”

40. He referred to the 2025 CPIN at [18.5.3] which states:

“The same source added: ‘Reportedly, the authorities established checkpoints across the region to prevent Amharas from travelling to Addis Ababa, raising concerns of ethnic profiling.’”

41. He submitted that this reflected the conclusion of Dr. Ngade. At [26] of the second addendum report Dr. Ngade states:

“Regarding the reach of persecutors, the threat is not geographically confined to the Somali region. The deep ethnic polarization in Ethiopia means that an individual from his specific background is marked as an “outsider” in most parts of the country. Addis Ababa, while cosmopolitan, does not offer a “safe haven” given the volatility of the current socio-political environment and the specific targeting of Amharas. The risks of being targeted by non-state actors or local militias, combined with the lack of state protection, render internal relocation “fraught with challenges” and, in my professional opinion, not a viable or reasonable option.”

42. Ms. Isherwood submitted that his conclusions in the second addendum report were “short and concise”. However, I find that these should not be read in isolation but together with his original report. I further find that the background evidence referred to by Mr. Banham from the UNHCR and the USSD corroborates his conclusions.

43. I have considered the 2025 CPIN. Ms. Isherwood referred to [2.1.4] which states, in relation to Addis Ababa that it “records the highest net gain of internal migrants [….] Notably, internal migrants make up 42.2% of Addis Ababa’s total population”. At [2.1.7] it states that “sources do not indicate that ethnic based discrimination occurs in Addis Ababa”. However, as set out above at [37], I was referred to [18.5.3] by Mr. Banham which is evidence of checkpoints preventing Amharas from travelling to Addis Ababa. This is in the same CPIN.

44. Regarding religion, Ms. Isherwood pointed to the evidence that over 40% of the population of Ethiopia were Orthodox Christian [2.1.6]. At [5.4.2] it states that “Islam does not receive the same level of recognition as Christianity”. However, I was referred to evidence from the same CPIN relating to the views of Orthodox Christians on mental health. The 2025 CPIN states at [12.7.4]:

“One of the biggest factors is the stigma and discrimination of mental health issues in Ethiopia. A majority of the people in Ethiopia follow Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity. Some followers of this form of Christianity believe demonic possession is the cause of mental health issues, which could prevent people from speaking up on these issues ... “

45. I find that this not only goes to the issue of the appellant being able to access mental health support, but also to his ability to gain support from the Orthodox Christian community in Addis Ababa. The appellant’s personal circumstances mean that he will likely experience rejection from the Orthodox Christian community on account of their belief that he is demonically possessed.

46. Ms. Isherwood referred me to those parts of the CPIN which showed that youth employment was 57.4%, and higher in males at 69.4% [6.8.1]. This is not a high rate, and the likelihood of the appellant being able to work given his mental health is low. She also referred to the evidence of social safety nets in section 8. At [8.1.2] it states that “the Ethiopian government has implemented several social safety net programs to support poor and vulnerable populations”. She submitted that assistance was available. Mr. Banham referred me to [16.2.2] of the same CPIN which states:

“The MMC June 2023 report noted that most returnees to Ethiopia had not received support upon their return, with only 38% (189 out of 504) reporting they had received any assistance.”

47. Further, at [16.3.2] it states:

“A 2025 IOM report observed that: ‘Returning migrants, especially returnees with limited financial resources or requiring psychosocial support, are often subjected to stigmatization and struggle to reintegrate into some communities. Migrants also often return to weak economies with limited resources to facilitate successful socio-economic reintegration. A sense of shame and fear of stigma prevents returnees from accessing services further delaying their rehabilitation and reintegration’”

48. Mr. Banham submitted that the appellant’s mental health and his need for psychosocial support would mean he would be stigmatised. He submitted that the respondent’s own evidence showed that the appellant would struggle to reintegrate. He submitted that additional difficulties would result as he would not be able to obtain the Addis Ababa city ID, or kebele. He referred to [18.8.1]. The kebele is “a key document required to formally reside and participate in many aspects of life in the capital”. Sources stated that “one needed a city ID to live in AA and that people without the ID risked arrest and detention from the police” [18.8.2]. At [18.8.6] it sets out the documentation required to obtain one.:

“‘The RHRO said that to get a Kebele ID card, a person needs:
• to be resident for 6 months or more in AA
• accommodation or a sponsor
• 3 witnesses
• If moving from another part of Ethiopia to AA, a person needs a letter of authority from the kebele where they were previously resident.”

49. He submitted that this would be an additional bar to the appellant obtaining the support which he needed to integrate, and meant that internal relocation to Addis Ababa would be unreasonable.

50. Ms. Isherwood referred to the CPIN as evidence that there was a strategy in place in Ethiopia with services and treatment available for mental health problems. Improvements were being made. Mr. Banham referred to the same evidence to show that the appellant would not be able to access care and would suffer stigmatisation. I have set out above the relationship between the appellant’s faith and stigmatisation and why this would mean that he would not be able to seek support from the Orthodox Christian community in Addis Ababa. At [12.7.1] it states that the widespread stigma and discrimination in Ethiopia has contributed to underutilisation of available mental health services. At [12.7.2] while it refers to “significant strides” having been made in recent years, it also states that access to care is still a problem. It states that less than 1% of those affected can access continuous care. The medical evidence recommends continuous care for the appellant (see [28] above). At [12.7.5] it refers to a 2025 report that found that while the quality and responsiveness of primary healthcare services have generally improved, mental health services declined.

51. I find that the appellant will not have any support in order to access mental health services. Given that his day-to-day functioning is so poor, and that he has struggled to access mental health services in the United Kingdom where provision is better, and where he has support from the Local Authority, that he will be unable to access the necessary mental health care and treatment in Ethiopia.

52. Taking all of the above into account, and having found that I can rely on the expert evidence from the appellant which is consistent with the respondent’s 2025 CPIN when read as a whole, including the separate chapter on Addis Ababa, I find that it would be unreasonable to expect the appellant to relocate to Addis Ababa. I find that he would be returning as a young man with significant mental health problems, with no family or social support network in Ethiopia, let alone in Addis Ababa where he has never been before. He has never lived in Ethiopia as an adult. It is accepted that he was kidnapped as a young boy in Ethiopia as a result of which he suffers from both physical and mental health problems. His only family member in Ethiopia is his mother and he has currently lost contact with her which is causing him further distress. I find that I can rely on the expert report in relation to ethnic divisions in Addis Ababa. While the appellant is Amhara, the respondent’s own evidence shows that there have been blockades to prevent Amhara accessing Addis Ababa. Further, while he is of the majority faith of Ethiopia, Orthodox Christian, his mental health problems mean that he is unlikely to be accepted by that community, and so likely to be denied support.

53. Accordingly, I find that the internal relocation is not reasonable for the appellant given his personal circumstances. I find that his asylum appeal succeeds.

54. I further find, for the same reasons as set out above, that the appellant would face very significant obstacles reintegrating into Ethiopia, and his appeal succeeds on Article 8, private life.

Notice of Decision

55. The appellant’s appeal is allowed on asylum grounds.

56. The appellant’s appeal is allowed on human rights grounds.

Kate Hobbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
10 October 2026