Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000869
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55674/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7 May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HUGHES

Between

KK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Nwachuku, Counsel.
For the Respondent: Mr Sheikh, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 30 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission a decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘The Judge’), promulgated following a hearing at Birmingham on 12 December 2025, in which the Judge refused her protection and Human Rights appeal.
2. The basis of the appellant’s claim is recorded at length by the Judge at [5a], which I propose to summarise as follows: The appellant is a Thai national transgender woman who experienced discrimination in Thailand because of her transgender identity. She borrowed money to undertake gender reassignment surgery, and when the appellant was unable to repay the loan she was threatened, assaulted, and forced into sexual exploitation by the money lender and his gang members. The appellant was exploited in this way for a period of three months, before making good her escape. Consequentially, the appellant contracted HIV, syphilis and developed mental health challenges. The appellant is estranged from her family in Thailand and remains fearful of return because of the gang and societal discrimination of transgender women there. There is an insufficiency of state protection, and internal relocation would be unduly harsh. At [7i] the Judge recorded the appellant’s submission that the appellant had previously attempted to go to Bangkok to live but was tracked there, kidnapped and further abused, demonstrating that internal relocation had already been tried and failed. Those same factors would similarly present very significant obstacles to integration.
3. The Respondent’s decision dated 16 February 2024 accepted the appellant’s transgender identity and that she had received threats from an illegal moneylender, but maintained she did not face a real rick of persecution on return. It was contended that the appellant would benefit from state protection from persecution, and that internal relocation was an option open to her.
4. The Judge’s findings are set out from [14] of the decision under challenge. He found the appellant to be a truthful witness, who had experienced very traumatic life events which had left severe mental and physical problems. However, in surprisingly brief terms, the Judge proceeded to find against the appellant in all other respects at [16-22].
5. In her application for permission to appeal the Judge’s decision, dated 22 December 2025, the appellant alleges the Judge had erred in law in several respects, helpfully summarised by Judge Dhanji when granting permission to appeal on 24 February 2026 as follows:
3. The appellant advances five grounds of appeal. These are, as pleaded, as
follows:

i. Ground 1 – The Judge failed to apply the principle that serious past persecution is a strong indicator of future risk.
ii. Ground 2 – The Judge made legally flawed findings on the issue of sufficiency of protection.
iii. Ground 3 – The Judge misapplied the law when deciding the issue of internal relocation.
iv. Ground 4 – The Judge mischaracterised the asylum ground of appeal.
v. Ground 5 – The Judge made a number of material errors of law when considering and deciding the article 8 ECHR ground of appeal.

4. Ground 2 is arguable. Whilst I note that, at paragraph 19 of the Decision, the Judge states that he had “considered all the references made by both parties to the country information” when deciding the issue of sufficiency of protection, the Judge arguably failed to actively engage with the country background evidence before him, particularly the evidence relied on by the appellant, or give reasons for preferring the Respondent’s submissions on what the evidence before him showed.

5. Ground 3 is arguable. In my judgment, the Judge arguably failed to take into account, as part of his analysis of the issue of internal relocation, that the appellant had previously attempted to relocate to Bangkok but had been tracked down and attacked there by those she fears. The Judge also arguably failed to take into account, a number of factors relevant to the question of whether internal relocation would be unduly harsh, as argued in the grounds.

6. I do not consider it appropriate to limit the grant of permission. I therefore grant permission to appeal on all grounds.
6. No Rule 24 response was filed on behalf of the respondent.
7. In this error of law hearing Ms Nwachuku relied upon the skeleton argument prepared by her instructing solicitors. Whilst her instructions were to pursue each of the five pleaded grounds, her focus was very sensibly upon grounds two and three, as identified by Judge Dhanji. Mr Sheikh, in short, submitted that there had been no material errors of law. I mean no disrespect to either advocate by not selling out their submissions in full; I have considered them carefully.
Discussion and analysis
8. As a general matter, I remind myself that appropriate judicial restraint should be exercised before interfering with the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. A person challenging a decision must have regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at [2], Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26], and Hamilton v Barrow and Others [2024] EWCA Civ 888 at [30-31], which I have.
9. I propose to deal with grounds 2 and 3 at the outset.
10. Ground 2 contends the Judge made irrational and legally flawed findings on the issue of sufficiency of protection. Ms Nwachuku clarified that the challenge was concentrated on the inadequacy of the reasoning behind the findings.
11. It is right to say that the Judge’s findings on sufficiency of protection at [19] are very brief. The gain no greater force by repetition herein. In reaching the conclusion that there was “ample evidence that the authorities would take that matter seriously” the Judge failed to engage in any meaningful with the substantial country evidence before him, as referenced and summarised in the detailed appeal skeleton argument that was before him dated 7 February 2025. That evidence was capable of demonstrating systemic corruption within Thai law enforcement, a documented overlap between police actors and organised criminal networks, and well-established difficulties faced by victims of trafficking in securing protection. The Judge’s approach, that the appellant had failed to explain why the “general” evidence of widespread corruption was relevant in her case, was wholly inadequate reasoning for why that evidence, which went to the heart of the issue of sufficiency of protection, was rejected by him.
12. I have concluded that in his assessment of the sufficiency of protection available to the appellant in Thailand, the Judge failed to consider material evidence. That error of law further infected his short consideration of the very significant obstacles that the appellant was said to face on return.
13. It follows that I find ground 2 made out.
14. Ground 3 addresses the issue of internal relocation, and at its heart is again a failure to engage with critical evidence, namely the appellant’s case that she had already attempted to relocate internally, and that the attempted failed.
15. Mr Sheikh submitted that he could find no evidence within the appellant’s bundle before the First-tier Tribunal Judge in this regard.
16. The Judge did not specifically record that evidence within his decision, but no criticism can attach to that; to recite evidence is usually unnecessary and inconsistent with the goal of concise, issues-based decisions. What is important, however, is when the Judge summarised the submissions made by counsel on behalf of the appellant as to internal relocation (at [7 ii], he set out “The appellant had previously attempted to live go to [sic] Bangkok but was tracked there, kidnapped and further abused such that internal relocation had already tried and failed.” I do not propose to speculate as to what oral evidence was given before the Judge at the hearing, but I find it inconceivable that the Judge would have recorded the above submission without remarking that there had been no evidence consistent with that submission, if that had been the case.
17. The Judge’s findings at [20] failed to address the issue of the previously failed attempt at internal relocation one way or another. This, of course, should be considered in the context of his finding at [15] that the appellant was a truthful witness. Having failed to do so, the conclusion that “I am not satisfied that the gangs would have the ability to track away from the area where she was originally exploited” demonstrates both a failure to consider material evidence and inadequate reasoning. That went to the heart of the consideration of internal relocation, and was a material error of law.
18. It follows that I find ground 3 made out.
19. In the circumstances, I need not consider the remaining grounds.
20. Applying AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I am satisfied that it would be appropriate to remit this matter so that the appellant has an opportunity to present her appeal on a proper footing once more before a First-tier Tribunal Judge. Whilst there was little apparent factual dispute between the parties at the previous hearing, I was not invited to preserve any findings.
Notice of Decision and Directions
21. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside for the reasons set out above with no findings preserved.
22. The remaking of the decision in the appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Birmingham.
23. Usually, directions are left to the FTT, but to assist with ensuring that the next hearing is effective at the FTT, I make the following preliminary directions to assist.
(i) By no later than 28 days after the promulgation of this decision the appellant must upload to the MyHMCTS online portal an up to date and consolidated bundle of evidence upon which reliance will be placed at the re-hearing of this appeal before the First-tier Tribunal.
(ii) By no later than 14 days following the upload of the appellant’s consolidated bundle of evidence the respondent must undertake a meaningful and pragmatic review of this appeal and upload the same to the MyHMCTS online portal.
(iii) The appeal will be relisted by the First-tier Tribunal as a priority on the first available date thereafter. A Thai interpreter is required.

Leighton Hughes
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
1 May 2026