Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000871
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67782/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON

Between

SPMA
Appellant
And

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Gherman, Counsel, instructed by Barnes, Harold & Dyer
For the Respondent: Ms Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House, London in person on 29 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction & Background
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The appellant appeals with permission granted on 24 February 2026 against the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) given on 26 November 2025 (“the FtT Decision”) to refuse the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of her protection claim.
2. The appellant arrived in the UK on 26 October 2021 and claimed asylum on 10 March 2022. The basis of the asylum claim was that the appellant, a Kurd, had joined the Gorran Party in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2009 and in 2018 had campaigned to be elected to parliament in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (“KRI”). She alleges she was threatened by members of the PUK and PDK (two other political parties in the KRI). She claimed asylum on the grounds of her political opinion.
3. The respondent rejected the appellant’s claim for asylum. The appellant appealed and her case was heard before the FtT on 19 November 2025. The respondent accepted the appellant was of Iraqi nationality, Kurdish ethnicity and she was involved in the Gorran Party. It was conceded by the respondent that if the appellant were to be found credible, her asylum claim would succeed.
4. In a determination dated 26 November 2025 Judge Cooper (“the Judge”) dismissed the appellants asylum and humanitarian protection claims. The Judge did not find the appellant’s account of her persecution in Iraq credible. The appellant appeals against that decision.
5. The FtT made an anonymity order in this appeal, and I have considered whether it is appropriate for that order to continue pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (as amended). Having taken into account Guidance Note 2022 No.2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make such an order because the appellant has made an application for international protection and I consider that the UK’s obligations towards applicants for international protection and the need to protect the confidentiality of the asylum process outweigh the public interest in open justice at this stage in the proceedings.
Grounds of Appeal, Discussion and Conclusions
6. In deciding whether the FtT’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I remind myself of the guidance set out by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], (i) the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently; (ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the First-Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account; (iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the First-Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the First-Tier Tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out; and (iv) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law. I also bear in mind the comment from the Court of Appeal in Volpi -v- Volpi 2022 EWCA Civ 464 at 2(vi) that “An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
7. There were four grounds of appeal set out by the appellant.
8. The first ground of appeal was that the Judge made unsustainable credibility findings in relation to the asylum claim.
9. The second ground of appeal was that the Judge made adverse findings based upon an incorrect note of the evidence.
10. The third ground of appeal was that the Judge failed to properly direct herself in relation to XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023.
11. The fourth ground of appeal is that the Judge failed to take objective evidence into account when assessing credibility in terms of documentation.
12. I heard submissions from both Ms Gherman for the appellant and Ms Everett for the respondent. I also had before me Ms Gherman’s written Grounds of Appeal dated 9 December 2025 (“GoA”) and the respondents Rule 24 Response of 3 March 2026 (“Rule 24 Response”). I deal with each ground of appeal below. However, I will deal with the third and fourth grounds of appeal first as I consider that these are less substantial than the first and second grounds of appeal.
Third Ground of Appeal
13. The third ground of appeal was that the Judge failed to properly direct herself in relation to XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023. This related to the finding by the Judge at paragraph 20 of the FtT Decision that the Facebook account print outs provided in the Bundle were of limited evidential value. This was based upon the finding by the Judge that the appellant has not provided the downloads of her Facebook account. Ms Gherman submitted that there was a failure by the Judge to set out why no weight was being attached to this evidence in circumstances where it was not being suggested that the Facebook posts were fabricated or untruthful. In Ms Gherman’s submission this will have impacted on the overall credibility finding. Ms Everett submitted that this finding by the Judge was neutral in relation to the overall credibility assessment and that further the reason the Judge might have wanted to see the download information was obvious and did not require to be set out.
14. I do consider that this issue is a neutral issue as regards credibility. It is clear from paragraph 20 of the FtT Decision that the Judge accepts that the appellant is a member of, and involved with, the Gorran Party. That was not disputed by the respondent. The evidence here simply related to the prominence of the appellant in her activities. The grounds for making an adverse credibility finding are those explicitly set out at paragraph 24 of the FtT Decision. I do not consider that it can be implied, as Ms Gherman suggested, that the findings in paragraph 20 impacted credibility. It is also clear that by referencing XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 in the context of not providing the downloads that the Judge is making the same point that was made in that case having regard to paragraph 7 of the headnote to that case. I do not consider that it requires any further elucidation. I do not consider that there is any failure to give reasons here. In any event I do not accept that it had any bearing upon the overall credibility findings, and I agree with Ms Everett that it was essentially a neutral finding. If there was any error of law then it was not material.
15. I accordingly dismiss the appeal on this ground.
Fourth Ground of Appeal
16. The fourth ground of appeal was that the Judge had erred in law in failing to take into consideration the evidence that there was simply a mistranslation when the appellant is recorded as referring to a CSID when she claims she was referring to an INID and that the Judge failed to take into account the country evidence that supports her account of transitioning from CSID’s to INID’s – Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns, Version 15 October 2025. For the respondent Ms Everett submitted this was simply an attempt to re-argue the point and the Judge gave adequate reasons for concluding that there was inconsistency in the evidence provided by the appellant.
17. At paragraph 21 of the FtT Decision the Judge sets out what she considers to be an inconsistency in the evidence. The Judge refers to the appellant’s interview in the AIR at question 37 onwards) where the appellant states she is not in possession of her CSID card and then the Judge contrasts that with the statement from the appellant dated 9 August 2023 where the appellant states that her CSID is in Iraq. The Judge goes on to reference the explanation put forward by the appellant in her second statement of 1 April 2024 that the appellant was referring to the INID and not the CSID. At paragraph 22 the Judge summarises her reasoning as follows:-
“I do find that the appellant provides differing accounts as to the possession of her CSID. There is a clear distinction between an INID and CSID and for that reason I do not find it plausible that she made an error in relation to the nature of the card she was referring to in interview.”
18. In looking at this point I do consider that it is ultimately an attempt to re-argue the point that was made before the Judge in the FtT. At paragraph 21 the Judge clearly records the different versions provided by the appellant. The Judge also makes express reference to the appellant’s statement of 1 April 2024 where the appellant sets out her explanation for why there are differing accounts. It cannot be disputed that, on the face of it, there are inconsistent accounts. The Judge has clearly considered the evidence and has come to a view. Whether that is a view that I or Ms Gherman agree with is irrelevant. The Judge did not find the explanation plausible and I can discern no error in law in that.
19. For the reasons above I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Second and Third Grounds of Appeal
20. These grounds all deal with the credibility assessment carried out by the Judge. The decision of the Judge turned on credibility. At paragraph 24 of the FtT Decision the Judge sets out her reasons for making an adverse credibility finding. The Judge states:-
“Considering the evidence in the round I do not find the account provided by the appellant to be credible……There are a number of inconsistencies with regard to her reasons for leaving the Gorran Party, strikingly she does not rely on harassment or threats from members of the PUK or PDK in her evidence at the hearing. I also find her account in relation to these alleged threats and harassment to be vague and lacking in any detail. I have already set out my concerns with regard to her account in relation to the CSID. I am not satisfied to the requisite standard that the appellant fears persecution from the PUK and PDK as a result of her political opinion.”
21. The first ground of appeal breaks down into two different parts. Firstly, Ms Gherman submitted that the Judge had specifically referenced “a number of inconsistencies” but had then only dealt with one inconsistency (see paragraphs 24 and 18 of the FtT Decision). This would suggest that there are other inconsistencies that had a bearing upon the credibility finding but the Judge does not reference these. This is in Ms Gherman’s submission a clear failure to set out reasons for the decision. Ms Gherman made reference to MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 00641. Ms Everett submitted that paragraphs 18 and 19 of the FtT Decision provide adequate reasons for the decision and it does not matter if there is a reference to inconsistency or inconsistencies. Secondly, Ms Gherman submitted that the Judge, in finding that the threats the appellant was subject to were “vague and lacking in detail” (see paragraph 24 of the FtT Decision) failed to set out reasons for this finding and failed to put this point to the appellant. For the respondent Ms Everett submitted that it was not necessary to put this point to the appellant, the Judge had considered all the evidence and had come to a view that she was entitled to come to, it was not irrational.
22. The second ground of appeal was that the Judge made a finding for which there was no evidential basis. Specifically, the Judge at paragraph 19 and 24 records that the appellant in giving evidence at the hearing does not cite the main reason for leaving the Gorran Party as the harassment and threats she received from the members of the opposing party. Ms Gherman submitted that this was not a point that was put directly to the appellant at the hearing. Ms Gherman made reference to a transcript of the relevant exchanges that took place before the Judge at the hearing as set out at paragraph 24 of the GoA (and Ms Everett accepted that this was an accurate transcript) where the question of what was the main reason for leaving the Gorran Party was not put directly to the appellant. Ms Everett relied upon the Rule 24 Response where the respondents take the position that “the one and only answer A gave when asked why she left Gorran was its decision to enter a coalition with the KDP. She did not mention harassment. If harassment was an operative cause at all it was secondary. The quotation from a witness statement at 27(b) [of the GoA] does not assist A on this point. There she had put the two reasons the other way around. In other words the FtT J was correct in identifying an inconsistency.”
23. I will consider the first and second grounds of appeal together as I consider that the heart of this challenge is an allegation that there was a failure to give reasons for the Judge’s finding that the appellant’s account is not credible and a failure to put a key point to the appellant (the reason for leaving the Gorran Party). I do have a concern that in focussing on the language of inconsistencies or inconsistency that there is a danger of trying to construe the FtT Decision as a piece of legislation or a contract per the comment from the Court of Appeal in Volpi -v- Volpi 2022 EWCA Civ 464. I consider that the more appropriate approach is to consider the FtT Decision as a whole to determine whether there are sufficient reasons given by the Judge to support the credibility finding. I also bear in mind that the Judge had the benefit of hearing the evidence and that a credibility finding is by its nature a very fact sensitive determination.
24. In paragraph 24 there are three reasons set out by the Judge to support the adverse credibility finding. I paraphrase these as (1) inconsistencies with regard to reasons for leaving the Gorran Party (including not relying upon harassment or threats in her evidence at the hearing); (2) the account in relation to threats and harassment being vague and lacking in detail and (3) the account in relation to the CSID.
25. I have already dealt with (3) under the fourth ground of appeal.
26. In relation to (1) it is clear that the Judge is referring back to her comments at paragraph 18 of the FtT Decision. Here the Judge references the first statement given by the appellant (9 August 2023) and her second statement (1 April 2024) when referencing an inconsistent account. In the first statement the appellant stated she stopped her campaign to become a member of parliament since there were constant harassment and threats (paragraph 8). There was no mention of the coalition with the KDP. She also stated she continued to work with the party after 2018. In the second statement the appellant stated she left the party and was not able to work with them and she mentions that there was another reason for leaving which was that the Gorran Party made a coalition with the government and failed to implement the reform agenda. Considering the comments made at paragraph 18 I do consider that there were inconsistencies in the account given by the appellant both in relation to whether she continued her involvement with the Gorran Party after 2018 and in relation to her reasons for ceasing her parliamentary campaign and involvement with the Gorran Party – was it the harassment and the coalition or just the harassment? I do not accept that there has been a failure to set out the reasons in relation to these inconsistencies in more detail. I consider that there is sufficient detail at paragraph 18.
27. The second ground of appeal is linked to the first ground in that it asserts that the Judge has made a key finding for which there was no evidential basis. That key finding is that the appellant does not rely upon harassment or threats from members of the PUK or PDK in her evidence at the hearing - see paragraph 24 of the FtT Decision. At paragraph 19 of the FtT Decision the Judge states:-
“I do find that there are different accounts given by the appellant in relation to why she leaves the Gorran Party, it is surprising in her evidence at the hearing that she does not cite the main reason for leaving as a direct consequence of the harassment and threats she received from members of the opposing party.”
28. It does appear to me that the Judge places particular emphasis upon this issue. She uses the phrase “strikingly she [the appellant] does not rely on harassment or threats from members of the PUK or PDK in her evidence at the hearing” – paragraph 24 of the FtT Decision and “it is surprising in her evidence at the hearing she does not cite the main reason for leaving as a direct consequence of the harassment and threats she received from members of the opposing party” paragraph 19 of the FtT Decision. The respondent accepts the transcript of the evidence provided by Ms Gherman. The discussion centred around did the appellant leave the Gorran party and why she did not do it in 2013. At no point is the appellant asked to clarify the reason why she left the Goran Party and what was the primary reason. I do consider that if the Judge is going to found upon this point that there does need to be an evidential basis for it and that in the interests of fairness it is a point that should have been put to the appellant directly if the Judge is going to draw a material adverse inference from it. I do consider this to be an error of law.
29. In terms of materiality I do consider that the Judge has attached some importance to the failure by the appellant to rely upon the threats of harassment at the hearing as described in paragraphs 19 and 24. It does, I consider, colour the overall findings on credibility and for that reason I do consider it a material error of law.
30. In relation to (2) is standard practice in cases before the FtT in assessing credibility to have regard to a number of factors – KB and AH (Credibility – Structured Approach) Pakistan 2017 UKUT 491. These include internal consistency of the account; external consistency of the account (with regard to objective evidence); plausibility of the account and the detail of the account. Accordingly, whether the appellant has provided a sufficiently detailed account of what occurred is a relevant area of inquiry for the FtT Judge. Ms Gherman submitted that there were sufficient details given with regard to the threats and harassment and specifically made reference to the evidence provided by the appellant in her first witness statement and in the AIR – as referenced in paragraph 17 of the FtT Decision. However, the detail of the threats provided by the appellant relates to the threats she received immediately before she left Iraq. These would be the threats about the fake sexual video and the car accident. I do not consider that it is these threats that the Judge is referring to in paragraph 24. The Judge is in my view clearly referring to the threats made around 2018. The Judge refers to “these” alleged threats and harassment as a clear reference to the preceding sentence abut it being in the context of her leaving the Gorran Party. The evidence that has been provided by the appellant about the threats in 2018 is set out in her first witness statement and in the AIR (from question 66 onwards). It is that evidence that the Judge finds to be vague and lacking in detail. I do consider that that is an observation the Judge is entitled to make. It is for the appellant to lead her evidence and set out her case. The detail is something the appellant should provide. It is not something that the respondent needs to put to the appellant. The only detail is that provided in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the first witness statement where the appellant mentions constant harassment and threats but does not provide any details of dates or incidents (save for a reference to what occurred to a colleague). I do not consider that there is any error of law in the Judge failing to go into greater detail with regard to the lack of detail around the threats and harassment in 2018 as that is clear from the appellant’s own witness statement and the AIR.
31. For the reasons set out above I dismiss the appeal on ground one and allow the appeal on ground two.
Conclusion
32. For the reasons set out above I find that there is a material error of law (ground two) and the appeal is allowed.
33. I discussed with the parties the appropriate resolution were I to uphold the appeal. Ms Gherman sought a fresh hearing before the FtT with no findings preserved. I consider that that is the correct approach given that essentially this is a case where credibility is in issue.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the FtT did involve the making of a material error on a point of law and the appeal is accordingly allowed.
The appeal is remitted to the FtT to be redecided at a hearing before a judge other than Judge F. M. Cooper to determine the appellant’s asylum and humanitarian protection claims.
None of the findings from the FtT hearing, the subject of this appeal, are preserved.

S NEILSON
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

05.05.26