Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000879
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52412/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
9th June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

EMM
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mozham, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 29 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge M. Smith) promulgated on 15 December 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 17 January 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity and those family members parties to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Background:
3. The factual background can be briefly summarised as follows. The appellant is a citizen of Algeria. He, his wife and 3 children sought protection on the grounds that he faced a real risk of serious harm and/or persecution from a man called AK. He claimed that he had been attacked and threatened by this man because, amongst other things, the appellant allowed AK’s brother to work in his workshop after he (the brother) had fallen out with AK. AK blamed the appellant for the business and relationship with his brother falling apart. He attacked him in October 2019 and burnt their house down in 2021 when he was visiting his parents. AK or his agents also repeatedly threatened the appellant and his family with harm.
4. As a consequence, the appellant moved to another place in Algeria between August 2021 – September 2022 but claimed AK found him again and kidnapped his son for two days.
5. After his son’s release the appellant’s family fled Algeria travelling to the UK with a tourist Visa which they had obtained to travel to the UK in order to claim asylum. They entered the UK on 17 September 2022 and claimed asylum the same day.
6. The appellant fears persecution/serious heart at the hands of AK and stated that there was insufficient state protection due to AK’s own profile and connections to those in power and that internal relocation was not feasible or reasonable.
7. The respondent considered his application and, in her decision letter dated 17 January 2024 refused the claim. In the decision letter the respondent accepted that he and his family members were Algerian nationals and that the appellant was threatened and attacked as claimed. It was not accepted he could not access protection from the authorities of Algeria relying on the Country Policy and Information Note Algeria: Actors of Protection dated August 2020. Whilst he claimed to fear AK, the respondent stated that he was considered to be a non-state actor and that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that AK had sufficient power or influence over the authorities in Algeria. As to internal relocation, the respondent set out other areas of Algeria where the appellant and his family members could relocate to. It was not accepted that the appellant demonstrated that there was a reasonable likelihood that AK had sufficient power or influence to locate the family anywhere in Algeria.
8. The FtTJ also recorded the position of the respondent from the review and whilst the decision letter stated that the appellant was “threatened and attacked as claimed” it was not accepted the appellant’s son was in fact kidnapped because in the asylum interview, the appellant said that he was threatened that his son would be kidnapped and this was inconsistent with the later claim made.
9. The appeal came before the FtTJ. At paragraph 11 he identified the “principal controversial issues” as set out in the ASA and the respondent’s review as follows:
(a) whether the appellant is credible;
(b) whether the appellant is efficiency protection in Algeria or can internally relocate:
(c) whether the respondent’s decision is in breach of section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, if the appellant and his family are returned Algeria.
10. In a decision promulgated on 15 December 2025, the FtTJ set out his findings of fact and analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 25-39. The FtTJ took into account the respondent’s acceptance that the appellant and his family had been seriously attacked and that he been consistent about key details of his claim including fearing serious harm from AK. However, the FtTJ rejected the account given that the appellant’s son had been kidnapped for two days when they lived in the place they had relocated to (see paragraph 30(a) and (b)). When assessing the evidence, the FtTJ considered a number of documents that the appellant had sought to rely upon. His assessment was undertaken by applying the guidance in Tanveer Ahmed and at paragraph 32 the FtTJ set out his assessment of those documents. At paragraph 33, the FtTJ summarised the conclusions of the relevant CPIN 2025 and at paragraph 34 set out his conclusions as follows:
(a) I accept, because it is not disputed, that the appellant has been attacked and threatened by AK.
(b) I do not accept that the appellant’s son was kidnapped.
(c) It seems to me the dispute between the appellant and AK is a personal vendetta over the collapse of AK’s relationship (financial and familial) with his own brother. As a consequence, I do not consider this case falls within the convention and any asylum claim is not made out. In any event:
(d) In my judgement there is no evidence to suggest that this is the kind of issue in which the authorities would be unwilling to intervene given its highly personalised nature as opposed to the type of issue that actors of the state may have in interest in involving themselves in.
(e) Whilst the appellant has been consistent that AK has connections to those in authority, I am not satisfied that AK holds any formal position given the limited weight I attach to the documentary evidence for the reasons I have set out above.
(f) I am prepared to accept, because much of the appellant’s “pre-asylum statement” account was accepted, that AK might have some links to an MP. However, because that link appears to have been primarily commercial in nature, and taking matters in the round, I am also not satisfied, even to the low standard, that AK has the ability to influence those in authority or that his aims, in attacking a family would be protected by those in power in these circumstances. I also have no evidence that the particular MP in question would be able to influence other elements of the state at all, or on behalf of an individual who was wanting to pursue revenge attacks.
11. At paragraph 35 the FtTJ stated “Therefore, notwithstanding the established history I am not satisfied that in his particular circumstances, it is established, even to the low standard, that there is insufficient protection for the appellant or his family in Algeria and on that basis the appeal is dismissed”. At paragraph 36 he concluded: “I have taken into account that it is accepted that the appellant has been repeatedly attacked but in my judgement that does not prove, on the facts of his case, that there is insufficient protection for him in light of the evidence about the action taken by the judicial authorities which if genuine, undermines the appellant’s assertion that the police “did nothing”, and does not provide sufficient evidence to show that the objective evidence and conclusions of the CPIN do not apply to the appellant. I should also make it clear that if the “judicial material” is not genuine, that would in my judgement, undermine the credibility of the appellant’s claim such that he would not have proved his case.”
12. At paragraph 38, the FtTJ assessed the issue of internal relocation concluding that it would be feasible, reasonable and would not be unduly harsh for the appellant and his family members to internally relocate within Algeria. Within that paragraph he set out his reasons as follows:
(a) Algeria is a large country with a number of substantial urban centres.
(b) Even if I accepted AK had links to Chlef and Mostaganem, there is no evidence that he has links to other areas further afield.
(c) For the reasons I have set out above I am not satisfied AK has any role in government in Algeria.
(d) Even if he did have some role, I have insufficient evidence to prove he has the means or influence to trace or track the appellant upon return to Algeria. Whilst it was suggested that the appellant might have been traced by biometrics or identity documents, I have no evidence that is a reasonable possibility on these facts and that was not an assertion repeated in evidence before me.
(e) The appellant and his wife are of working age, intelligent with transferable skills that would allow them to compete on the jobs market and successfully settle into a normal life.
(f) I accept returning to Algeria would cause some anxiety in case attacks happened again, but I have no evidence that such concerns would be sufficient to prevent the appellant or his wife or children from leading a normal life and I have taken into account that there is no real risk of AK finding them for the reasons I have set out above, and, in so far as is relevant, my finding as to the fact that protection is available and that the police have been prepared to act.
(g) I note too that the appellant and his wife speak the language and are familiar with the culture.
(h) They would be returning as a family unit.
(i) It appears that they would have in country support as evidenced by documents being sent to them by relatives and friends.
(j) In my judgement it would be in the best interests of the children to remain with their parents in the country of their birth.
(k) I have taken into account that I have rejected the appellant’s account of there being an actual kidnap and so do not accept that it has been proved that their son has been traumatised by that event though have born in mind the natural anxiety of being returned in light of the concessions made by the home office and the nature of the threats and behaviours that have been accepted they faced in the past.
(l) I have noted that I am not assisted by any evidence about the children’s circumstances in the UK that would prevent them integrating into Algeria with the assistance of their parents. I have taken into account their time in the UK and their young age but even now their time in the UK has been relatively limited and, given both parents are Algerian, am satisfied they will have maintained cultural ties to the country of their nationality. For instance, there is no reason to believe that they cannot speak the relevant languages or would not be quickly able to learn them.”
13. The FtTJ concluded that if returned together the family could reasonably relocate to another area of Algeria. He therefore dismissed the appeal.
14. The appellant sought permission to appeal on 5 grounds. Permission to appeal was granted by FtTJ Boyes on 24 February 2026.
15. The hearing took place on 20 May 2026 at the Tribunal. The appellant was represented by Mr Mozham of Counsel, and the respondent was represented by Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer. It is not necessary to set out those submissions as they are contained within the written grounds and relied upon by Mr Mozham and the Rule 24 response relied upon by Mr McVeety. Additionally, both advocates provided their oral submissions. I will consider those submissions when assessing whether the decision of the FtTJ discloses the making of a material error of law.
16. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give.
17. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal and have considered them in the context of the factual appeal and the assessment of the evidence by the FtTJ.
Ground 1:
18. Dealing with ground 1, Mr Mozham relied upon the written grounds.
19. It is submitted that the FtTJ erred in law at paragraph 30 when finding that the appellant was inconsistent in his claim that his son was kidnapped. The FtTJ went through answers in the interview. Mr Mozham in his oral submissions referred to questions 22, 28 and question 70 and said that his answers were consistent with his witness statement.
20. It is submitted that the answers provided by the appellant with regards to the threats of kidnap and harm made towards him do not amount to an internally inconsistent account and there is in fact no such discrepancy. The fact that the appellant was relating the threats made against him by the perpetrator who, it is alleged, also kidnapped the son by carrying out the very same threat is actually consistent with the appellant’s claim in this regard.
21. The FtTJ incorrectly applies this flawed finding at paragraph 32(a).
22. Mr Mozham relied upon the decision of Azizi – [2024] UKUT 65 (IAC) whereby in an Upper Tribunal decision, the tribunal (quoting Uddin [2020] EWCA Civ 338) emphasised an important credibility principle: when assessing credibility, a judge must ask why, if a person has admitted lying about one matter, they did so. A lie on one point does not necessarily imply lies on everything else.
23. The grounds submit that the FtTJ should have assessed why the omission occurred and whether there are innocent explanations and not just infer untruthfulness or incredibility. Mr Mozham submitted that he had been found credible in the first part of his claim.
24. Mr McVeety submitted that the grounds appeared to be advanced on 2 basis. First, the appellant was consistent and that there were no consistencies in his account identified. In this respect, the appellant claimed in his witness statement that his son had been kidnapped and held for two days but then released. However, the questions in interview demonstrate that he had never stated that his son had been kidnapped but had stated he had been threatened with being kidnapped. This is a fundamental difference between the account and the judge was correct to identify that inconsistent evidence. The rule 24 response identifies the FtTJ’s findings on the document at paragraph 32 (e ) (vi) parallel inconsistencies in the documentary evidence.
25. The second basis of the grounds advance appears to accept that the appellant had been inconsistent in his evidence and that the judge should have considered his explanation. However, the FtTJ did consider his explanation but rejected it with reasons as set out at paragraph 30 (b).

Conclusions on Ground 1:
26. I begin consideration of the grounds generally by reminding myself of the decision of Lowe v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 62, in which McCombe LJ stated:
31. Equally, it is to be recalled that judgments at first instance are necessarily an incomplete impression made upon the judge by the primary evidence. This FTT judge reached the conclusion that he did on the issues raised and he expressed himself succinctly on them. This is what Lord Hoffman said on the point in the well-known passage of his speech in the House of Lords in Biogen v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1 at 45:
"The need for appellate caution in reversing the judges evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of impression as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance (as Renan said, la verite est dans une nuance), Of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judges overall evaluation...."
27. I am satisfied that there is no error of law on the basis advanced. Whilst the FtTJ accepted that the appellant had been threatened in Algeria and had been harmed, the FtTJ did not accept the appellant’s account that his son had been kidnapped for two days in a place where the family had relocated to. The relevant paragraphs of his decision set out at paragraphs 30 (a) (i) (ii) and (b).
28. Contrary to the submissions made the FtTJ correctly identified that the appellant had been inconsistent in the account that he had given. Firstly, the FtTJ identified the claim advanced in the initial contact questionnaire dated 22/9/22 at paragraph 4.1, where the appellant had made no reference to his son being kidnapped. It is of note that the appellant in the asylum interview confirmed that what he had set out in the screening interview was correct ( see Q35). Secondly, in his asylum interview (on 16/1/2023) the FtTJ identified the relevant questions where the appellant was asked about events in Algeria and in response had referred to AK threatening to kidnap his son ( see questions 22, 27 and 28 and question 70). When reading those questions in their context, it is plain in my judgement the answers were given to open questions and in a free narrative. For example, at question 22 the appellant was asked, “Do your children face the same risks as you upon return?” The appellant replied, “ yes he threatened to kidnap my son as he said I took away his brother from him and he would take my son away from me and I stopped going to school in 2021 and I decided to flee the country for my children’s safety.” Similarly at questions 27 and question 70. The account given in his asylum interview was different to the account given following his interview in the witness statement paragraph 14 where he referred to his son being kidnapped and held for two days. Thus, the FtTJ was correct in the assessment he made and to reach the finding that the appellant had been inconsistent as to that event. Consequently, the finding was open to him to make on the evidence. As the respondent submitted, the FtTJ had also identified when assessing the documents as set out at paragraph 32 ( e ) (vi) that the document dated 20/2/22 referred to an allegation of “attempted kidnapping” whereas at page 114 the allegation was “kidnapping”. The judge identified contradictions and inconsistencies both in the documentary evidence, and in the appellant’s account as explained by him within that paragraph.
29. In any event and as Mr McVeety submitted, the grounds appeared to accept that the appellant had been inconsistent in his evidence where the grounds set out that the FtTJ should have considered why the omission occurred and whether there had been a truthful explanation. However, that was what the FtTJ did do at paragraph 30 (b), where he expressly took into account what the appellant had said at paragraph 15 of his witness statement where his explanation was provided as to why he had not referred to his son’s kidnapping and the reasons for this. However, the FtTJ went on to consider that explanation as given by him but rejected it for the reasons that he gave. The FtTJ concluded that whilst he took into account a father’s instinct to protect his child, the appellant must have realised the importance of providing frank information to the UK authorities, secondly, the evidence that his son had been kidnapped after they had moved towns and shortly before they came to the UK was key evidence in the case and lastly there would be no grounds for the appellant to believe that the authorities in the UK would approach his son to give his account and even if he had been concerned about that he could have refused permission to allow them to speak to his son on the grounds that it was not in his best interests. Those were factual findings that were open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence.
30. Ground 1 is not made out.
Ground 2:
31. The written grounds submit that the FtTJ erred in law at paragraph 32(c) when incorrectly finding that the appellant had not provided English translations of documentary evidence. The appellant provided documents as well as certified English translations in his appeal bundle (see appellant’s bundle of documents). Therefore, the FtTJ was in error to find that the appellant did not provide translations of documents. Mr Mozham submitted that there was a certified copy of the documents and were translated.
32. Mr McVeety submitted that the documents provided were not certified in the United Kingdom but in Algeria and this had been identified by the FtTJ at paragraph 32 ( c).
Conclusions on Ground 2:
33. I am satisfied that there is no error of law on the basis advanced in ground 2.
34. The FtTJ undertook his assessment of the documents between paragraphs 30 (a), (b), (c), (d) and ( e) (i)-xii) and did so by applying the well-established principles in Tanveer Ahmed and having assessed them “in the round” (see paragraph 32 (a)). Th FtTJ took into account the contents of the documents and set out the contradictory nature of some of those documents when set against the account given by the appellant ( see paragraphs 32 (e) (i) (ii), (ii) (iv) (ix) (xi) and (xii)). The FtTJ’s findings of fact made were that there was no evidence that the documents were judgements authorised in Algeria ( paragraph 32 (b)) and that the appellant’s account as to how he obtained the documents had not been detailed and there had been no evidence as to who had got them or what steps had been taken to obtain them.
35. None of those findings of fact are challenged in the grounds, and the only challenge is made to paragraph 32 (c ) to the finding made that “there is no properly certified translation of the documents”.
36. As submitted behalf of the respondent, where the FtTJ referred to “properly certified translations” the judge plainly meant produced and certified in the UK. The translations of the documents had been undertaken in Algeria. The finding made by the FtTJ was open to him to make but in any event as set out above it was only one of a large number of factual findings made in relation to the documentary evidence produced, none of which have been challenged in the grounds.
37. Ground two is not made out.
Grounds 3 and 5:
38. Mr Mozham in his submissions addressed grounds 3 and 5 together.
39. The written grounds submit that the FtTJ erred at paragraph 38(l) when he failed to conduct a comprehensive and appropriate assessment regarding the welfare of the children as per the duty placed on the respondent under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009.
40. The FtTJ failed to comprehensively look into the respondent’s lack of assessment in this regard and the FTTJ also failed to conduct an assessment. This, it is submitted amounts to a material error of law. The FtTJ accepted core elements of the appellant’s claim and as such it was pertinent to make a finding regarding the welfare of the children in this regard and conclude whether they were at risk.
41. Ground 5 submits that the FtTJ also failed to conduct a proper and comprehensive assessment of the appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim. The case involves three young children who have, to date, lived here for a period in excess of 3 years and 3 months. This is not insignificant. Due to the lack of a coherent and full assessment the determination, it is submitted, has been rendered flawed.
42. In his oral submissions Mr Mozham submitted that the children were at risk from AK in Algeria because they had been threatened and the judge should have considered the risk to them. He further submitted that there was no article 8 consideration. He accepted that whilst the FtTJ had recorded at paragraph 10 there was no article 8 claim, the best interests of the children had been raised.
Conclusions on Grounds 3 and 5:
43. The two grounds can be taken together. Whilst ground 5 asserts that the FtTJ failed to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the appellant’s article 8 claim, that submission fails to take into account paragraphs 8 – 11 of the FtTJ’s decision where the FtTJ properly identified the “principal controversial issues” and expressly recorded as follows, “there is no article 8 claim before me though as requested I have taken into account section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 throughout my judgement and taken into account the needs of the children.” This is also recorded at paragraph 11 (c ). That is consistent with the matters outlined in the ASA where reference is made to the UNCRC and at paragraph 30 article 9 of the UNCRC is cited that children should not be separated from their parents. I agree with the submission made on behalf of the respondent that the ground is an attempt to argue a point that had not been raised before the FtT and as such cannot demonstrate that the FtTJ erred in law ( Lata [2023] UKUT 000163 para 31 applied).
44. Contrary to the grounds, the FtTJ did take account of section 55 of the 2009 Act and the best interests of the children in his decision and did so in the context in which it had been argued. This is reflected in the submission made by Mr Mozham who referred to the children being at risk from AK.
45. When considering this issue, the FtTJ’s factual findings are relevant. He rejected the evidence that the appellant’s son had been kidnapped. He also found that they would be a sufficiency of protection for the family (see paragraph 33) taking into account that the FtTJ did not find that it had been established that AK had connections to those in authority (paragraph 34( e ) and (f) and that it is not demonstrated that AK had the ability to influence those in authority. In addition, the FtTJ found that AK had no links to other areas of Algeria ( see paragraph 38 (a) and (b) and did not have any role in government (paragraph 38(c)). The Judge also found that there was no evidence to demonstrate that he had the means or influence to track the family if returned.
46. The FtTJ expressly consider the circumstances of the family members including the children at paragraph 38 (f) and that whilst the FtTJ accepted return would cause some anxiety he made a finding that there was no evidence that such concerns would be sufficient to prevent the appellant, his wife and the children from leading a normal life and that there was no real risk of AK finding them and protection was available. The FtTJ assessed that the children would return as a “family unit” (paragraph 38(f))and that they would have support on return (see paragraph 38(i)).
47. The FtTJ therefore concluded that it would be in the best interests for the children to remain with their parents in their country of birth ( see paragraph 38(j)). At paragraph 38 (k) the FtTJ stated that he had taken into account that he rejected the appellant’s account of there being an actual kidnap and did not accept that it had been proved that their son had been traumatised by that event although he taken into account the natural anxiety of being returned in light of the concessions made by the Home Office and the nature of the threats and behaviour as based in the past. At paragraph 38 (l) the FtTJ made an observation about the lack of evidence relating to the children’s circumstances in the UK that would prevent them integrating into Algeria with the assistance of their parents. He was correct to make that observation. The grounds do not point to any material evidence before the FTT relevant to the children. Nonetheless, the FtTJ properly took into account their length of residence in the UK which he found was “relatively limited” and was satisfied that the three children would have maintained cultural ties to their country of nationality, given their parents nationality but also there was no reason to believe that they would not be able to speak the relevant languages. The assessment made was consistent with the evidence before the FtTJ and the assessment was undertaken on the paucity of the evidence available. Thus, the conclusions reached overall that the family could return safely as a unit to Algeria was consistent with his assessment of their best interests.
48. It is of note that the grounds do not challenge the FtTJ’s’ assessment of the sufficiency protection or internal relocation. The grounds are not made at.
Ground Four :
49. The written grounds submit that the FtTJ erred in a material way in the decision by failing to give any consideration to the following precedents specifically relating to non-state actor persecution in Algeria.
50. The grounds set out a number of decisions as follows.It is submitted that in MM (Article 3, Article 8, IFA) Algeria CG [2002] UKIAT 1327 the tribunal accepted that the appellant had a genuine well-founded fear of persecution from non-state actors and that the state was unwilling or unable to protect him. This precedent has established, contrary to the FTTJ findings, that non-state actors can establish asylum grounds if state protection is ineffective.
51. It is submitted that in Yousfi v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1997) it was found that the attackers do not need to necessarily be the state itself. Militant or powerful private groups can qualify as persecutors if the state cannot protect against them. It is submitted that in N v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Algeria) [2003] UKIAT 140 the tribunal found that risks from militants/individuals can amount to persecution and it is not necessary that the state must be the perpetrator. This is also contrary to the FTTJ findings. It is submitted that in KO (Algeria) (2024 Upper Tribunal) the tribunal found that when hearing modern Algerian protection claims it accepted that powerful non-state actors (criminal or political) may pose a real risk leading to asylum claims.
52. Mr Mozham sought to bring to the court’s attention that there was an error in the citation at ground 4 paragraph 4 and that it should read AN v SSHD [2003] UKIAT 140.
Conclusions on ground 4:
53. As set out above, a number of decisions were cited on the basis that the FtTJ erred in law by not considering them. However, it has not been demonstrated that those decisions were cited before the FtT. In any event, and as Mr McVeety submitted the FtTJ’s factual finding was that AK was a non-state actor. Whilst the grounds state that non-state actors can establish asylum grounds if state protection is ineffective, that ignores the finding made on the facts of this particular appeal that the FtTJ found there was sufficiency of protection. The grounds do not challenge the assessment made of sufficiency of protection.
54. Further at paragraph 5 of ground 4, an unreported decision is cited on the basis that a powerful non-state actor may pose a real risk. Again, that ignores the factual finding made by the FtTJ with adequate reasons that it had not been established that AK was a powerful non-state actor.
55. In summary, I remind myself of the need for appropriate restraint before interfering with the decision of the FTT, particularly where the judge below was heard and assessed a range of evidential sources relating to the reliability of an account. Not every evidential issue need be specifically addressed and there is no requirement to provide reasons for reasons. The FtTJ had regard to the evidence before him and gave adequate reasons for his decision.
56. For those reasons and having considered the decision of FtTJ Smith in light of the evidence and factual findings made I am satisfied that there is no error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced.
57. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

21 May 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds