Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-000882
UI-2026-000883

First-tier Tribunal Nos:
LH/00623/2025 & LH/00624/2025
HU/62172/2023 & HU/62173/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

12th June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STERNBERG

Between

AISHA HABIB & EMADULLAH HABIB
(NO ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr. Raja Rashid, counsel, instructed by Ahmad & Williams Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr. Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP/Hybrid on 20 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellants, who are siblings and who are both citizens of Afghanistan, were granted permission to appeal the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Freer (‘the Judge’) who dismissed the appellants’ appeals by a determination dated 1 December 2025, following a hearing which took place in Birmingham on 17 November 2025. That appeal challenged the Respondent’s decision to refuse their applications for entry clearance for the purpose of settlement dated 7 September 2023.
2. First-tier Tribunal Judge Louveaux granted permission to appeal on 24 February 2026. In granting permission, Judge Louveaux observed at [4] ‘Grounds 2 and 4 are arguable. However, because applications to the Upper Tribunal inevitably result in all grounds being argued, often without adequate notice being given to the Upper Tribunal, permission is granted on all grounds.’ I have doubts about the correctness of such an approach, granting permission on all grounds when the permission judge considered only some of the grounds to be arguable. However, both parties prepared for the hearing on the basis that all grounds were in issue and I have considered all of the grounds of appeal in this decision.
3. The hearing took place before me on 20 May 2026. Mr. Rashid appeared by CVP link for the appellant and Mr. Tufan appeared in person for the Respondent. At the start of the hearing I confirmed with the parties that I had all the relevant documents. I then heard submissions from Mr. Rashid for the Appellants and from Mr. Tufan for the Respondent, Mr. Rashid replied. I received a composite bundle running to 674 pages in advance of the hearing together with the Respondent’s rule 24 response. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision, which I now give.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. To understand the Appellants’ challenges the judge’s decision, I summarise that decision with as much brevity as I can. At [1]-[13] the Judge set out their introduction, summarised the applications made by the Appellants, the applicable law and the requirements of Immigration Rule 297 and the issues in the appeals. These were: whether there was sufficient evidence that the Appellants’ sponsor could maintain them, whether a hospital letter diagnosing both Appellants with depression is accurate, the applicability of section 55 if the Borders Act 2009, proportionality, whether immigration rule 297(i)(e), (ii) and (v) are met and article 8 ECHR outside of the immigration rules as well as discrete related issues relating to whether the sponsor has sole responsibility for the Appellants’ upbringing and whether they were under 18 at the date of the application. The judge explained that anonymity was not required, listed the documents they had considered and referred to relevant case law including TD (Yemen) [2006] UKAIT 49 on whether the sponsor exercises sole responsibility for the Appellants.
5. At [14]-[44] the Judge summarised the course of the hearing. The Appellants’ father (the sponsor) and his eldest son gave evidence regarding his earnings , the family situation, immigration status, care for the Appellants and his support of them. The Judge summarised the evidence of the Appellants brother’s and the submissions of the parties.
6. The Judge set out their findings at [45]-[66]. They considered the sponsor and the Appellants’ brother had been credible in so far as they made admissions against self-interest. The Judge gave a series of reasons as to why they considered a letter from a hospital diagnosing the Appellants with depression was not credible. These reasons ran to 12 sub-paragraphs at [47]. The Judge considered the evidence regarding the Appellants’ birth certificates to be imperfect but their family relationships was established. The Judge considered the significance of the missing death certificate of the Appellants’ mother. The Judge concluded that the sponsor is not a reliable and credible witness of fact, he failed to show he did make important decisions, there was some evidence of transmission of funds but it was not clear if they were essential funds. There were no witness statements from extended family members and it was not safe to speculate as to their role. The Judge found that the Appellants had not shown on the balance of probabilities that the other parent has died, nor that no other person took important decisions in their lives. Adult family members live in the same building as them. As at the date of the hearing the Appellant are adults and can work. The Judge turned to consider at [67]-[77] whether there is a refugee convention issue relating to Aisha Habib and concluded that there is not due to a lack of credible supporting evidence.
7. At [78]-[80] the Judge explained their conclusions on the application of the Immigration rules, in particular that Rule 297(i) is not met by credible evidence regarding sponsorship. At [81]-[82] the Judge concluded that the Appellants do not satisfy immigration rule 297(i) and doubted the evidence they relied on regarding maintenance and accommodation.
8. Finally, at [83]-[99] the Judge considered the Appellants’ article 8 ECHR rights claims outside of the immigration rules. The Judge found that these claims fail, applying the criteria in section 117B of the Nationality Asylum and Immigration Act 2002 and carrying out the requisite balancing exercise. The Judge rejected an attempt to resurrect a refugee convention claim under the head of article 8 ECHR. The Judge found that absent evidence of family life, the refusal is proportionate. The appeal was therefore dismissed.
9. In setting out the Judge’s judgment I observe that the Judge drafted and prepared it in an individualistic style. It is not the function of this Tribunal on this appeal to critique the style or approach of the Judge’s drafting of their judgment, unless it reveals any material error of law.
Grounds of Appeal
10. The appellant advances five grounds of appeal:
a. The Judge fell into material error in assessing whether the sponsor had sole responsibility and regarding the evidence of the death of the Appellants’ mother;
b. The Judge failed to conduct a proper proportionality assessment, especially given Aisha’s vulnerability;
c. The Judge’s treatment of the medical letter was unfair and irrational;
d. There was an error in the assessment of financial maintenance findings which are contradictory and inadequately reasoned;
e. There was procedural unfairness because the Judge ought to have adjourned to allow the Appellants to present further financial evidence (albeit no such application was made to the Judge).
11. I consider these grounds in turn below. Before doing so, I record that the Appellants’ supplementary skeleton argument prepared for the hearing sought to reshape the issues raised by raising a new ground 5, relating to developments in the Country Situation in Afghanistan. I indicated to Mr. Rashid at the hearing that permission had not been granted to pursue this ground of appeal and I was not minded to permit him to do so applying the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370 approving the Upper Tribunal’s judgment in Lata (FTT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 and the Upper Tribunal’s decision in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC). Mr. Rashid did not seek to persuade me that he could raise this ground without permission, did not apply for permission to do so and did not take the point further.
12. I also raised with Mr. Rashid at the hearing a number of concerns that I had regarding the citation of authorities in the Grounds of Appeal and Supplementary Skeleton Argument to which I will return at the conclusion of my decision. I make clear that I have considered the merits of each Ground of Appeal separately from the issues regarding the citation of authority and other matters which I set out below in the post-script to this judgment.
The Rule 15(2A) application
13. Although it was only dealt with briefly by the parties, I record for completeness that I refuse the application made by the appellant to admit further evidence under rule 15(2A). I do not accept that it contains evidence that was unavailable or could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence. In so far as it relates to the country situation in Afghanistan that evidence is not relevant to any of the live grounds of Appeal. Notwithstanding submissions in the Supplementary Skeleton Argument to the contrary, Mr. Rashid accepted that at least some of this evidence, including evidence of the Sponsor’s travel to Afghanistan, pre-dated the hearing before the Judge and could have been provided for that hearing. Since my focus is on whether the Judge’s decision contains any material error of law, I do not consider material post-dating the Judge’s decision assists me in carrying out that analysis.
The Law
14. The Appeal comes before the Upper Tribunal to decide first whether there is a material error of law in the judge’s decision, and if it does, to re-make the decision or to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
15. As the appellant seeks to overturn the judge’s findings of fact on issues in controversy between the parties, the approach I should take is set out by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74; [2024] 1 WLR 1626, by Underhill LJ at [50]-[51]:
50. … I should recapitulate the approach that should be taken in considering whether the FTT made an error of law. At para. 72 of his judgment in HA (Iraq) (but with reference to the appeal in AA (Nigeria)) Lord Hamblen said:
"It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently – see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account – see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out – see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope."
51. Mr Malik relied on that passage but added some further points by way of amplification. The only one that I need mention is that in AA (Nigeria)1 in this Court Popplewell LJ said, at para. 34:
"Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so."
16. In IA v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 the Court of Appeal reviewed a large number of cases on the application of article 8 ECHR to relationships between adult siblings and parents and adult children. The Court held at [116]-[125] (emphasis in original):
“The correct test to apply to determine if there is family life between adult siblings under article 8(1)
116. We are clearly of the view that the correct test is the one enunciated by the ECtHR in Kumari at [35] and by the House of Lords in Beoku-Betts at [39]. Bearing in mind the huge amount of authority cited and summarised at [42]-[84] above, we should perhaps, despite the common ground between the parties, explain that conclusion in a little further detail.
117. First, this is an area in which the domestic courts have universally demonstrated their willingness to follow the consistent jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Even if some of the domestic decisions may have provided divergent interpretations of the additional elements of dependency test, none has suggested that they wanted to depart from ECtHR jurisprudence.
118. Secondly, many of the cases, both ECtHR and domestic, actually concern family life between parents and adult children, rather than between adult siblings. No case has suggested that the legal test is different in the two types of case.
119. Thirdly, all the cases make clear that the exercise of deciding whether there are the necessary additional elements of dependence involving more than the normal emotional ties is a fact-sensitive exercise that is to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
120. Fourthly, financial dependency and dependency created by physical or mental disability both play a part in the evaluation. It is not, however, necessary to show that one sibling is completely reliant on their care and support in their daily life. In other words, none of the cases go so far as to require exclusive or complete dependency.
121. All these points are, in our judgment, pretty well self-explanatory from our summary of the cases at [42]-[84] above. But there are two points that merit a little more explanation: (a) the meaning and function of what we have described as the “real, committed or effective support” test taken from Sedley LJ’s judgment in Kugathas at [17], and (b) why exclusive or complete dependency is not required.
122. The real, committed or effective support test is, in our judgment, as we have already intimated at [68], on a proper analysis different from the additional elements of dependency test. Dependency may in one sense be the other side of the support coin. But “real support” may be provided without any serious dependency. Even “effective support” might be provided without there being meaningful dependency. As Sedley LJ himself acknowledged in Kugathas, the real, committed and effective support test was a reading down of the additional elements of dependency test. The FTT said the same at [25] where it acknowledged that the sponsor’s real, committed and effective support of family was short of the family being dependent on the sponsor.
123. In our judgment, it would be going too far to say that it is wrong to test whether there are additional elements of dependency by reference to the real, committed or effective support provided. But real, committed and effective support is not the test itself, because the level of real support, for example, may be minor or insignificant, whereas the word “dependency” denotes a significant relationship. This is not a semantic point. The ECtHR used the word “dependence” in S v. UK in the context of “cohabiting dependents”, which were its starting point (see [42] above).
124. The domestic cases (e.g. PT Sri Lanka at [30]) were not wrong, for example, to point out that a cohabiting child would not necessarily lose their family life with its parents or even their siblings on their 18th birthday. But that is because the relationship of dependence would subsist at that point.
125. In our judgment, it is undesirable to lay down hard and fast rules as to how the additional elements of dependency test should be applied. It obviously requires some dependence, and dependence is more than the existence of support, even if that support is qualified by the adjectives real, committed or effective. Kumari makes clear that it is harder for adults to demonstrate the necessary dependency because family life is normally limited to the core cohabiting family. The examples in Kumari at [38]-[39] (see [50] above) make clear the kinds of physical or mental dependency that might qualify. They are not exhaustive, and dependency may take many forms, as Kumari at [37] and [41]-[43] also reminds us. So far as exclusive dependency is concerned, on the particular facts of that case, Alvarado made clear that it was not always required to establish family life. Moreover, whilst one person being completely dependent on another might normally satisfy the additional elements of dependency test, it is not the only way that the test can be satisfied as the cases we have cited demonstrate.”
17. I set out further relevant authorities in my decision below.
Ground 1: sole responsibility and the evidence of the death of the Appellants’ mother
18. Mr. Rashid relied on the grounds of appeal and submitted that country position has to be taken into consideration, circumstances in Afghanistan are not in dispute. There have been specific issues in terms of the Taliban taking over. The evidence before the Judge was that the Appellants’ mother had died 20 years earlier. The evidence below was that death certificates were not obtainable at that stage. The Appellants had not been able to obtain evidence of this. The Judge made findings about the sponsor and the credibility of the witness before the sponsor. The judge deals with the issues of credibility at paragraph 46, and 53-57. On the issue of the missing death certificate the Judge did not make reference to the difficulties in registering a death 20 years ago. The Judge set out what they would have expected to see. That was not a finding it was open to the Judge to make in light of the evidence they had and there was a failure to provide reasons as to why they rejected the evidence. In relation to the missing documentary evidence, the Judge required documentary evidence to substantiate all aspects of the Appellants’ claim, that was not evidence that was available to the appellants. They could not register their mother’s death 20 years ago. There was a failure to consider that and to make findings as to why that was not credible. The Judge should have set out the evidence from the sponsor and the Appellants and have given reasons for rejecting that, on how deaths were registered 20 years ago in Afghanistan. That infects the determination with an error of law, requiring the Appellants to produce evidence without making findings on their explanation as to why they were not able to do so.
19. Mr. Tufan submitted that the judge remarked that some evidence could have been provided. There is nothing wrong with the approach the judge took to the assertions made by the appellants and the sponsor. There could have been evidence of the appellants’ mothers death. The Judge’s conclusions undermine the Appellants’ credibility.
20. In assessing this ground, I note that it seeks to overturn the judge’s findings of fact on an issue in controversy between the parties, the judge having heard the sponsor and the Appellants’ brother give evidence and be cross-examined and having assessed the documentary evidence on which the Appellants’ rely.
21. Therefore, the approach I should take is set out by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74; [2024] 1 WLR 1626, by Underhill LJ at [50]-[51]:
50. … I should recapitulate the approach that should be taken in considering whether the FTT made an error of law. At para. 72 of his judgment in HA (Iraq) (but with reference to the appeal in AA (Nigeria)) Lord Hamblen said:
"It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently – see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account – see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out – see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope."
51. Mr Malik relied on that passage but added some further points by way of amplification. The only one that I need mention is that in AA (Nigeria)2 in this Court Popplewell LJ said, at para. 34:
"Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so."
22. In general terms, I agree with Mr. Tufan on this ground. First, the judge gave clear and reasons for finding that the Appellants had not provided evidence showing that their mother had died. The Judge correctly noted at [50]-[53] that no death certificate had been produced for her and that death certificates can be obtained in Afghanistan. Contrary to the assertion in the Grounds of Appeal and in Mr. Rashid’s submission that the Judge took too inflexible approach to this issue, the Judge went on to say that he would have considered alternative evidence from a Muktar on this issue. The Judge also found that the assertion that the Appellants’ mother had died was not corroborated by any of their extended family who were said to live in the same building. This was not a rejection of the Appellants’ evidence but an explanation as to why the evidence they had presented did not satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules. The Judge’s findings as to why the Appellants could not meet Immigration Rule 297(i)(d) were expressed clearly and concisely and reveal no error of law.
23. Second, as to sole responsibility, the Judge explained at [51] and [58]-[62] that the sponsor was unable to show sole responsibility under Rule 297(i)(e). Having found an evidential insufficiency in relation to the death of the Appellants’ mother, the Judge properly went on to consider what evidence there was that the sponsor had had sole responsibility for the Appellants’ upbringing. Having accepted that the Appellants lived in the same building as other extended family members, it was open to the Judge to find that there was no evidence from other family members living in very close proximity to the Appellants as to what responsibility they had for the Appellants, if any. The Judge also rightly found that the sponsor’s claim to have visited Afghanistan was not corroborated by either stamps in his passport or photographic evidence. Whilst absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, the Judge was entitled in my view to find that the sponsor had not established that he had had sole responsibility for the Appellants upbringing based on the paucity of evidence to support this claim.
24. Third, contrary to the claim in the Grounds of Appeal and supplementary skeleton argument that the Judge treated the sponsor’s long absence as decisive, this is not what the judgement shows. It was a factor which the Judge took into account. They were entitled so to do. They did not treat the sponsor’s long absence from Afghanistan as the sole or decisive evidence on this issue but took it into account as one of a number of relevant factors.
25. I reject this ground.
Ground 2: the proportionality assessment
26. Mr. Rashid submitted that Aisha Habib is a young woman residing without her parents in Afghanistan. Section 55 only applies to children under the age of 18. It does not apply to children over the age of 18. This was an entry clearance application. The Judge’s proportionality assessment should have taken into account the circumstances of the Appellants at the time of the decision. The Judge dealt with article 8 from paragraph 83 onwards. The Judge found that refusal was proportionate but did not make an explicit finding that there was, or was not, family life. Overall, the Judge went on to consider proportionality, but did not consider the extent of family life before conducting the proportionality assessment. The Judge had a duty to set out the extent that family life exists. It is unclear what weight is afforded to family life. The Judge does not set out what factors were considered.
27. For the Respondent, Mr. Tufan submitted that the judge considered and conducted a proportionality assessment in detail. He did not find that there was no family life. Section 55 of the 2009 Act could not have been triggered in circumstances where the Appellants are now over 18. Simply being female in Afghanistan would not be sufficient to suggest that human rights are triggered. There is nothing material in this challenge.
28. First, in analysing these submissions I bear in mind the decision in Yalcin, set out above. This ground of challenge turns on the assertion that the Judge ought to have reached a different conclusion on the evidence before him, should have conducted the balancing exercise differently and therefore should have concluded differently on the issue of article 8 ECHR. In my judgment, at is heart, this ground amounts to little more than a disagreement with the Judge’s findings and conclusions, having had the benefit of hearing the evidence called on behalf of the Appellants, cross-examination and submissions from both parties on it immediately thereafter. I do not consider that the Judge’s reasoning contains any error of law with respect to the matters raised under this ground.
29. Second, the grounds asserted that the duty in section 55 of the Borders Act 2009 applies to persons under 18 at the time of an application for Entry Clearance but over 18 at the time of an appeal hearing. Mr. Rashid initially sought to suggest that the Tribunal should approach matters on the basis of how they stood at the time of the refusal decision. However, having re-considered the terms of section 82 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the repeal of section 85A of that Act (which came into force as 20 October 2014) he abandoned that argument in his reply submissions. For the avoidance of doubt, no authority was placed before me to support this line of argument and I reject it.
30. Third, at its height this ground amounts to a disagreement with the Judge’s approach to article 8 ECHR and proportionality. The Appellants criticise the Judge for not making an explicit finding that there was family life between the Appellants and the sponsor. However, it is obvious that the Judge considered that there was family life between the Appellants and their father, since they went on to conduct a proportionality assessment. The Judge’s findings that there was no family life on visits or by moder means of communication at [86] explained the nature and quality of the family life that existed rather than being a finding that there was no family life at all. The factors the Judge took into account at [83]-[99] were proper matters for the Judge to take into account. The fact that the Appellants would have preferred the Judge to have come to a different conclusion or to place greater weight on certain matters such as discrimination against women in Afghanistan, (which the Judge expressly considered at [95]-[97]) does not reveal any material error of law in their approach or conclusions. I remind myself that I should be slow to interfere with the findings of fact a specialist First-tier Tribunal and I decline to do so. I do not consider the judge’s conclusions on that evidence to be irrational. Further, and in any case, I accept the Respondent’s submission that in light of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in IA, any error on the part of the Judge on this ground would not be material in circumstances where it is apparent that the Appellants were unable to show additional elements of dependence beyond normal emotional ties. As IA explains at [113] and [118] that is the correct test to apply when considering if there is family life between parents and adult children.
31. For these reasons, I find that ground 2 does not give rise to any error of law.
Ground 3: the Judge’s assessment of the medical letter
32. Mr Rashid submitted that Ground 3 relates to the judge’s reasons for rejecting the letter from the hospital. The judge should have considered an exercise assessing the reliability of the document. The findings in paragraph 47. The Judge held that they could not attach much weight to the document. The Respondent did not assert that the document was forgery. The judge was considering the reliability of the document. The evidence of mental health issues was also supported by oral evidence from the sponsor. Even if little weight was afforded to the letter it still demonstrated that there were mental health issues, the judge disregarded this. This links to ground 2, failure to consider the oral evidence. These matters should have been considered in the proportionality exercise.
33. For the respondent Mr. Tufan submitted that the Judge went to some length in considering the medical evidence provided. There is nothing in the criticisms of their approach to this issue. Paragraph 46 records that the Judge found the sponsor credible insofar as they made admissions against self-interest, but later found them not to be credible on the facts.
34. First, I do not consider there is any merit in the Appellants’ submission on this ground. The Judge gave a detailed series of reasons for rejecting the letter relied on by the Appellants in the judgment at [47]. Their criticisms of that letter ran to no less than 12 separate sub-paragraphs. Each individual matter relied on by the Judge might not in and of themselves have justified giving that evidence little weight, but collectively and cumulatively they undoubtedly do provide a proper basis for that finding.
35. Second, at its heart the challenge on this ground is to the weight that the Judge gave to the letter. Applying Yalcin, I remind myself that weight was quintessentially a matter for the Judge. It is not this Tribunal’s function to substitute its own view of the appropriate weight to attach to a particular document or piece of evidence.
36. Third, I reject the assertion in the Grounds of Appeal that the Judge either reversed the burden of proof or required the Appellants to prove the authenticity of the letter beyond reasonable doubt. This is not what the Judge did. As to the sponsor’s oral evidence on the Appellants’ mental health issues, the Judge explained their reasons for not finding the sponsor’s evidence not to be credible, concluding that the sponsor was not a reliable and credible witness of fact at [56]. The Judge’s observation at [46] that the sponsor and the Appellants’ brother made admissions against self-interest by accepting having visited Afghanistan was an introductory matter rather than being the end point of their assessment of their credibility. In those circumstances the Judge was entitled to conclude as they did and to reject the sponsor’s evidence regarding the Appellants’ state of mental health.
37. This ground of appeal fails
Grounds 4 and 5
38. In support of these grounds, Mr. Rashid submitted that these grounds relate to financial maintenance. The Judge failed to make a complete analysis of whether the maintenance requirements are met or not. There is a contradiction between paragraph 54 and paragraph 78 of the Judge’s findings. The Judge found that the evidence of finances is patchy but earlier found that the evidence was sufficient to accommodate and maintain the appellants. The Judge had a significant number of bank statements before them and evidence of earnings including from HMRC and evidence of accounts for the sponsor. The Judge found the sponsor was not a reliable witness of fact, there was documentary evidence to establish the sponsor’s circumstances. The Judge’s assessment at paragraph 82 turns on future ability to maintain the Appellants after they arrive. The Judge should have looked at the income of the family, their living costs and the requisite income support level. The Judge elaborated on this point at paragraph 90 when looking at article 8. The Judge found the sponsor’s income was not reliable given that he is an uber driver. The Judge did not properly consider current circumstances and was speculating what might happen to the sponsor’s job in future. As to Ground 5, there was no application to adjourn the proceedings to obtain further financial information.
39. Mr. Tufan submitted that the Judge noted that the financial evidence was incomplete at paragraph 55. However, the Judge then found at paragraph 56 that the sponsor was not credible. The Judge made findings that the sponsor did not meet the requirements of the rules and made findings for article 8 purposes. The Judge found and gave reasons as to why article 8 was not met and would not be disproportionate. IA was handed down the day before the hearing. Applying that decision, any error would not be material as the Appellants could not succeed as matters stand.
40. I can state my decision on these grounds of appeal with brevity. First I do not accept that there is a contradiction between paragraphs 55 and 78 of the Judge’s judgment. At paragraph 55 the Judge found that the financial evidence relied on by the Appellants was incomplete. The Judge found that overall the financial requirements of Immigration Rule 297 were likely to have been met. However, that paragraph was immediately followed by paragraph [56] which contained the Judge’s conclusion that the sponsor was not a reliable and credible witness of fact. In any case, the Judge’s conclusion at [78]-[82] was that the requirements of Immigration Rule 297(ii)-(v) have been ‘mostly’ met to the required standard, even if the evidence of maintenance was ‘patchy’. More importantly, in light of the Judge’s conclusion that the Appellants did not meet rule 297(i), any error in relation to maintenance and accommodation is not material in circumstances where the Appellants could not succeed under rule 297 in any event. In light of my rejection of the Appellants’ arguments under ground 1, even if there had been any error in the Judge’s observations regarding the sponsor’s ability to maintain the Appellants at [82], it would not be material for the reasons I have given, namely that the Appellants could not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules in any event.
41. Second, I do not consider that the Judge’s findings in relation to article 8 EHCR and their observations on the sponsor’s income at [90] can be imported into their earlier findings regarding the requirements of Immigration Rule 297. At [90] the Judge was considering the question of whether the Appellants would be financially independent under section 117B(3) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 when considering the issue of article 8 ECHR. That required a separate assessment from that conducted under Immigration Rule 297(iv) and (v). I consider that the Judge conducted both exercises properly. Their conclusions on article 8 were, in my judgment, unimpeachable.
42. Third, whilst Mr. Rashid submitted that the Judge engaged in impermissible speculation about what might happen to the sponsor’s work as an Uber driver in the future and made comments about the growth in driverless taxis, I do not consider that there is any merit in that submission. As I observed at the hearing, rule 297(iv) and (v) both use the words ‘can and will’ when requiring an assessment of accommodation and maintenance. The word ‘will’ is necessarily forward looking. There was no error in the Judge’s consideration of what may happen in the future when the Immigration Rules expressly required them to consider this. Even if the Judge’s remarks about the rise of driverless taxis being ‘no pipe dream’ were not strictly relevant, they appeared at paragraph 90 in the context of article 8 ECHR, not when the Judge considered whether the requirements of the Immigration Rules were met. I do not consider the Judge’s conclusions on article 8 contain any material error of law as I have explained under the head of Ground 2 above.
43. Fourth, Mr. Rashid accepted at the hearing that there had been no application to adjourn to permit the Appellants to obtain better evidence on the issue of maintenance. Therefore, there is an air of unreality about Ground 5. It asserts that the Judge should have adjourned to allow the Appellants to obtain better evidence of their financial circumstances even though they made no such request to the Judge before or at the hearing. I reject this ground as wholly without merit and unarguable. I shall return to it in the post-script to my judgment below.
44. Fifth, whilst I refused to admit the material relied on by the Appellant under rule 15(2A) I have considered it in any event de bene esse. I do not consider that it shows that the judge fell into an error of law. It is updating evidence that might be relevant if the decision were to be remade, but it does not show any material error of law on the part of the judge.
45. Sixth, as I have noted at [11] above, Mr. Rashid did not pursue the ‘amended’ ground 5 contained in the Supplementary Skeleton Argument which was, in fact, an attempt to raise a wholly new Ground of Appeal on which permission to Appeal had not been granted.
46. These grounds of appeal fail.
Notice of Decision
47. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision did not involve the making of an error of law.
48. The appeal is dismissed.
Post-Script
49. On reading and re-reading the Grounds of Appeal and Supplementary Skeleton Argument, both of which were signed by Ahmad & Williams, the solicitors for the Appellants, a number of things caused me concern. These included the following matters:
a. In the Grounds of Appeal at paragraph 2.2 and in the Amended Skeleton Argument at [21] the case of AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 was cited as authority for the proposition that a flexible approach should be taken to obtaining documents from countries where state structures are weak or disrupted. As far as I can see that case is not authority for that proposition.
b. In the Amended Skeleton argument at [14] and [16] the case of R (on the application of Matusha) v SSHD [2021] UKUT 0175 was cited as authority for the proposition that a contextual approach is needed to Afghan evidence. Matusha (which is correctly cited) is a case about the approach to obtaining leave to remain by deception. It concerned an Albanian, not an Afghan national. The words ‘contextual and nuanced’ were placed in quotation marks in paragraph 16 of the Amended Skeleton, as if they were a quotation from that authority. Neither of those words appear in the Tribunal’s judgment in Matusha.
c. The same paragraphs of the Amended Skeleton Argument referred to a Court of Appeal case which was said to be ‘AA (Afghanistan)’ as support for the same proposition. However, the citation that followed in fact led to a case called AA (Nigeria). It, too, does not contain any support for the proposition for which it was cited at those paragraphs.
d. Paragraph 29 of the Amended Skeleton Argument referred to a case purporting to be about DNA evidence and proof of paternity (which as I explain below I will not name) and gave a citation for that case of [2023] UKUT 00121. On searching for that case I could only find the case of PW v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2023] UKUT 121 (AAC). That decision is not from the IAC, and is not in any sense concerned with DNA evidence and proof of paternity.
e. Paragraph 36 of the Amended Skeleton Argument made reference to a case said to be relevant to an assertion of procedural unfairness in relation to the original ground 5. The citation given for that case was [2013] EWCA Civ 1345. That is a Court of Appeal case called Bracking v SSWP. It is not a case about procedural unfairness. I was able to find a Court of Appeal in case with the name matching that given in paragraph 36, with a different citation from 2020, but that case was not about procedural unfairness either, it was about curtailment of leave to remain.
f. The original Ground 5 in the Grounds of Appeal (paragraph 6.1) asserted that the Appellants has suffered a ‘clear injustice’ because they could have produced better evidence of maintenance and support. That paragraph concludes ‘the Appellants must not be prejudiced by the tribunal's refusal to consider readily available, corroborative evidence that substantiates their case.’ As I have explained at [43] above, there was no refusal by the Judge to refuse to consider readily available evidence. The Appellants did not adduce that evidence and they did not ask for an adjournment to do so. As I note at [43] above, there is an air of unreality about this ground; it is divorced from the reality of what actually happened at the hearing before the Judge.
50. This unhappy sequence of incorrect and misleading citations of case law and factually incorrect assertions in the Grounds of Appeal and Amended Skeleton Argument caused me substantial concern about the way in which both documents had been drafted and presented to the FTT (to obtain permission to appeal) and to this Tribunal on the appeal. It seems to me that an Artificial Intelligence Large Language Model may well have been used to draft or amend both documents.
51. I have not set out the names of the cases which appear to me to be likely to be hallucinations because this decision will be published online on the Tribunals Decisions website. The inclusion of cases which are, or may be, fake may perpetuate the loop of such cases being cited by AI if this decision is scraped by a Large Language Model.
52. I indicated to Mr. Rashid at the hearing that I had questions about the citation of case law in the Grounds and Amended Skeleton Argument. As I have noted above, Mr. Rashid adopted those documents at the start of his oral submissions. He did not draw to my attention the issues with citation of case law. When I asked him to take me to the paragraph in AH (Sudan) which supported the proposition for which it was cited in the Grounds of Appeal and Amended Skeleton argument, he was unable to do so. I took him through each of the authorities referred to at [49](a)-(e) above and he was not able to assist me with how they were authority for the propositions cited in the Grounds and Amended Skeleton Argument (in the cases at (a) and (b)) or to show that they existed at all (in the cases at (c)-(e)).
53. Accordingly, I indicated at the close of the hearing that I was considering the question of wasted costs of my own volition and referral to a Hamid judge to consider whether either the solicitors and counsel acting for the Appellants should be referred to their respective regulators, independently of my conclusions on the substantive grounds of appeal.
54. The decision of Dove J and UTJ Lindsely in MS (Professional Conduct; AI Generated Documents) Bangladesh [2025] UKUT 305 (IAC) explains the likely consequences of the misuse of large language models. I bear that decision closely in mind in taking this course.
55. Before making any decision on wasted costs or on referral to a Hamid Judge I will give the Appellants’ solicitors and counsel an opportunity to respond in writing, if appropriate in the form of a document supported by a statement of truth. I require an explanation as to:
a. How the Grounds of Appeal and Supplementary Skeleton Argument came to be drafted;
b. What use if any was made of Artificial Intelligence to do so;
c. What checks were made of the citations in both documents before they were submitted to the FTT and the UT;
d. What supervision was in place by the person drafting those documents;
e. What checks Mr. Rashid made of the citations in those documents in preparing his submissions for this appeal; and
f. Why Mr. Rashid did not draw to the Tribunal’s attention the issues with the citation of authority in both documents until prompted to do so in answer to the Tribunal’s questions.
56. I now set those directions in the Notice to Show Cause below.

D Sternberg

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 May 2026

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.

6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email

SOLICITORS AND COUNSEL SHOW CAUSE NOTICE

Notice to Show Cause to Ahmad and Williams Solicitors and Raja Rashid of counsel

1. Further to the decisions in R (Hamid) v SSHD [2012] EWHC 3070 (Admin), R (Sathivel & Ors) v SSHD [2018] EWHC 913 (Admin) and R (Shrestha) v SSHD [2018] UKUT 00242 and particularly Ayinde v The London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1040 (Admin) and MS (Professional Conduct; AI Generated Documents) Bangladesh [2025] UKUT 305 (IAC) Ahmad and Williams Solicitors and Raja Rashid of counsel are both separately directed to each file and serve a signed witness statement responding to the following points no later than 4pm, 14 days after the date on which these directions were issued. It is to be sent by email to utiaclondonlawyers@justice.gov.uk
(i) Ahmad and Williams Solicitors shall identify the person responsible for the case.
(ii) Ahmad and Williams Solicitors shall identify the person who drafted the grounds.
(iii) Ahmad and Williams Solicitors shall provide an explanation for the fact that the cases listed at [49] of the substantive appeal decision above are not authority for the propositions for which they are cited (in the cases at [49](a) and (b)) and why the cases listed at [49](c)-(e) cited in the Amended Skeleton argument placed before the Upper Tribunal are not available on BAILII or the National Archives Case law website, and explain why the citations for those cases in fact relate to other cases which are of no possible relevance to the propositions for which they were cited.
(iv) Ahamd and Williams Solicitors are to state explicitly whether an AI large language model such as ChatGPT was used to draft the grounds or not.
(v) Ahmad and Williams are to explain how the Grounds of Appeal and Supplementary Skeleton Argument came to be drafted and in particular explain what use if any was made of Artificial Intelligence to do so, what checks were made of the citations in both documents before they were submitted to the FTT and the UT and what supervision was in place by the person drafting those documents;
(vi) Mr. Rashid of counsel is to explain what checks he made of the citations in those documents in preparing his submissions for this appeal; and
(vii) Mr. Rashid is to explain why he did not draw to the Tribunal’s attention the issues with the citation of authority in both documents until prompted to do so in answer to the Tribunal’s questions.

2. On receipt of the response the Upper Tribunal will consider whether it is appropriate to refer the matter to the SRA and/or BSB for further investigation in line with the recommendations of the Administrative Court in Ayinde or to set further directions on the issue of wasted costs of its own motion.

3. Failure to respond to these directions will lead to the matter being referred to the SRA or BSB.

Signed: D Sternberg Dated: 22 May 2026