Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000885
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50682/2024
LH/00458/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 14th of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILLIAMS

Between

LI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Talacchi of Counsel, instructed by MSR Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr D Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 1 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) dismissing her appeal on human rights grounds. The decision of the Judge was sent to the parties on 1 October 2025.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Macau. Her immigration history was described by the Judge as ‘complicated’, but her most recent application to the respondent was made on 21 September 2023 for leave to remain on the basis of her family and private life. That application was refused by the respondent on 10 January 2024.
3. The appellant is the spouse of a British Citizen, RM. Her application to the respondent was advanced on the basis that there would be insurmountable obstacles to her family life with RM continuing in Macau. The respondent deemed the appellant to fall for refusal on suitability grounds and because she did not satisfy the immigration status and English language requirements. The respondent did not consider there would be insurmountable obstacles to the continuation of family life with RM outside the United Kingdom. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The appeal came before the Judge sitting at Hatton Cross. Both parties were represented. The Judge heard evidence from the appellant, RM, RM’s mother and one of RM’s brothers. The Judge heard submissions from both representatives and reserved his decision at the end of the hearing.
5. By his decision, the Judge dismissed the appeal. Looking at the position under Appendix FM, the Judge found at [19] that the appellant did not meet the suitability, English language and immigration status requirements. At [20], the Judge considered the factors relied on by the appellant which she claimed constituted insurmountable obstacles including the ability of RM to live and work in Macao, sources of financial support open to the couple and the effect of their relocation upon RM’s mother.
6. The Judge then proceeded to consider proportionality and found at [27] that the appellant enjoyed family life with RM, but at [29] found she had not established there was family life between her and RM’s mother.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The appellant sought permission to appeal on four grounds. First, that in considering RM’s entitlement to the State Pension in two years as a source of support, the Judge erred in failing to consider the circumstances at the date of the hearing. Secondly, the Judge erred in finding the appellant could avail herself of the support of her sister-in-law (with whom she lived in China) when in fact she was actually supported financially by RM during that time. Finally, it was said the Judge erred in finding the appellant had not established family life with her mother-in-law and also in failing to consider whether RM enjoyed family life with his mother.
8. Following the practice of the First-tier Tribunal outlined in Bittar (PTA – FTT practice) [2025] UKUT 00277, the application for permission to appeal was determined by the Judge himself. On 24 February 2026, the Judge granted permission on all grounds, although observed permission on grounds 2 and 3 was only granted because of the complications of restricting the grant.

The hearing
9. The hearing came before me sitting at Field House. Both advocates confirmed the 966-page consolidated bundle was all of the paperwork I should have. I heard from Mr Talacchi who amplified the grounds of appeal, and Mr Simpson in reply. Mr Talacchi responded briefly and at the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give with reasons.
Discussion
Ground One
10. The Judge, when looking at the financial circumstances of the couple upon return to Macau, accepted that RM ‘might struggle to find work in Macao’. He then proceeded to state ‘I take judicial notice of the fact that Mr M, who was born in 1960 would be able to retire and claim a state pension in approximately two years’ time’. Mr Talacchi submitted the difficulty with this finding was that the Judge was required to determine the appeal on circumstances as they were at the date of hearing. If it were permissible to consider future changes in circumstance when considering obstacles faced by the appellant, there was no ‘cut off point’ for that consideration.
11. I find there is some force in that submission. I also take into account, as submitted by Mr Talacchi the reality that a person’s entitlement to the State Pension is not automatic but is dependent upon the necessary National Insurance contributions. It is unclear whether there was evidence of the requisite contributions having been made by RM, as only the most recent HMRC documents had been provided in evidence. I also bear in mind that the receipt of a State Pension in two years would be a factor which could be said to improve the lives of RM and the appellant when it fell due, but I do find there was a failure on the Judge’s part to detail how he considered the gap would be filled in the two years between the hearing and the entitlement to State Pension.
12. Where the Judge found RM might ‘struggle’ to find work, and that the move to Macau would ‘involve a significant upheaval’, and a ‘degree of hardship’ for the couple, I am not satisfied that had the Judge not taken into account RM’s future State Pension entitlement, his conclusions on whether paragraph EX.1. was satisfied would have inevitably been the same. I find ground one discloses a material error of law.
Ground Two
13. It is accepted by the appellant that she returned to live in China between 2015 and 2021, prior to her return to the United Kingdom. It is further accepted that the appellant lived with her sister-in-law during this period. The Judge found the appellant was able to live with and was ‘partly supported by’ her sister-in-law for six years. The appellant’s complaint with this finding is that it appears to overlook the fact that she was financially supported by RM during this period, and that this was evidenced by money transfer receipts.
14. I find that this ground is no more than disagreement with a finding which was open to the Judge on the evidence which was before him. He correctly recorded at [20] that the appellant lived with her sister-in-law, a fact which is not disputed. I also find that in recording that the appellant was ‘partly supported’ by her sister-in-law (which was a matter asserted by the appellant’s Counsel below), the Judge was aware that the sister-in-law was not the totality of the support the appellant received during that period. Further, the Judge concludes the appellant would be provided with ‘some limited support’ upon return, which further illustrates his awareness of the nature of the support.
15. Mr Talacchi went slightly further in his oral submissions, submitting that the Judge erred in concluding even limited support would be available to the appellant when there was no evidence before the Judge that the appellant was still in contact with her sister-in-law. I note there is nowhere in the appellant’s evidence where she indicates she has ceased contact with her sister-in-law. In the absence of such evidence, it was open to the Judge to assume that having lived with her sister-in-law for six years, that support could be replicated upon the appellant’s return. I do not find ground two discloses any material error of law.
Grounds Three and Four
16. These grounds are both concerned with the Judge’s assessment of whether family life existed between the appellant and RM with RM’s mother. At [29], the Judge finds:
I am, however, not persuaded that the Appellant has established a family life with her mother-in-law. Prior to the death of Mr M’s father in April 2024, the Appellant’s evidence appears to be that the care she provided to her mother-in-law was much more limited. I do not accept that simply by looking after her mother-in-law between 9am and 5pm some four or five times a week, cleaning for her, cooking her meals and keeping her company, the Appellant has established family life between herself and Mr M’s mother.
17. The appellant’s relationship with RM’s mother, and indeed RM’s relationship with her, were central to their evidence. The appellant provided a supplementary witness statement dated 1 September 2025. This statement, in summary, details the role the appellant claims to play in the life of RM’s mother. She details being the primary carer for her mother-in-law but also states that she has ‘become a vital source of emotional support’ following the passing of RM’s father, to whom his mother was married for 67 years. The appellant details providing companionship and comfort to her mother-in-law.
18. RM provided evidence of the same tenor in a statement dated 1 September 2025, and there was also before the Judge a statement from RM’s mother herself. Her statement details her myriad health conditions, the practical support the appellant provides, and the support provided with her ‘personal wellbeing and emotional needs’.
19. As the Judge observed in his grant of permission, since his decision, the test for family life was considered by the Court of Appeal in IA & Ors v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516. The assessment of whether family life exists was described as a ‘fact sensitive exercise that is to be decided on a case-by-case basis’. In determining whether family life exists, the question is whether there are ‘additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties’.
20. In the instant appeal, the evidence before the Judge was that the appellant (who has been in a relationship with RM since 2008) was effectively the sole carer and source of emotional support following to her mother-in-law who has several health conditions and was widowed in 2024. The Judge’s assessment of the question of family life at [29] of the decision does not address whether any element of dependency existed between the appellant and her mother-in-law but focused on the practical support offered.
21. There is further no consideration, as accepted in the grant of permission, of whether family life existed between RM and his mother. I therefore find the Judge did not give adequate reasons for finding that family life did not exist between the appellant and her mother-in-law. Whilst it does not necessarily follow that the Judge would have found that family life existed, the absence of a detailed consideration of these two points means I do not know whether the outcome of the proportionality assessment would have been the same.
Disposal
22. Having found that grounds one, three and four disclose material errors of law, I set aside the decision in its entirety. Turning to the question of disposal, Mr Talacchi submitted the appeal ought to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Simpson was initially ambivalent however invited me to retain the appeal because there was not a significant need for factfinding.
23. I have considered what is said in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement, AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). The appeal will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be determined de novo.
24. The respondent’s decision was made over two and a half years ago, and I note there were four witnesses who gave evidence before the Judge. The extent of fact-finding is likely to be significant where there is a dispute between the parties as to circumstances for the couple upon return to Macau, and the question of whether family life exists between the appellant, RM and his mother-in-law.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is vitiated by material errors of law.
The decision is set aside in its entirety, with no findings preserved.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing before any judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Louveaux.

CJ Williams

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 May 2026