Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000888
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55330/2024
LH/01124/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 16th of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM

Between

ADEMESKEL HAGOS TESFAY
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: none (the appellant attended the hearing remotely, supported by the sponsor (the appellant’s brother) and Dr Vincent Manning (who acted in the capacity as a McKenzie Friend)

For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is a remaking decision following the identification of a material legal error in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) (FtT) dated 2 December 2025.

2. In an ‘error of law’ decision issued on 15 May 2026 Upper Tribunal Judge Grey set aside the FtT decision in respect of its conclusion that there would be no disproportionate interference with the article 8 ECHR relationship between the appellant, a national of Eritrea now lawfully residing in Uganda as a refugee, and his brother MH, caused by the respondent’s decision dated 10 July 2024 to refuse the appellant entry clearance application.

3. In brief summary, Judge Grey found that the FtT erred in law by failing to consider the MH’s claim to be gay (now a claim to be bisexual), which had been raised in 2019 in respect of his protection claim, when considering whether this could impact on the proportionality of the refusal of entry clearance. Judge Grey stated,

“In my view, the ability of the sponsor to travel to visit the appellant in Uganda was a matter which was properly before the FtT and a relevant matter which should have been considered in the proportionality assessment as part of the Judge’s fact-sensitive analysis. I am persuaded that in failing to consider a material matter in the assessment of the appellant’s claim outside the Rules, the Judge fell into error.”

4. Judge Grey additionally found that the FtT failed to take account of relevant considerations when undertaking the article 8 ECHR proportionality assessment.

“Furthermore, in relation to ground 2, I accept Mr Toal’s submissions that the Judge fell into error in failing to take into account other relevant matters in the proportionality assessment. Although the Judge refers to the sponsor living in the UK “lawfully” there is no reference to the fact he is a recognised refugee in the UK, or assessment of how this matter may impact on the ability of the sponsor and appellant to be able to meet in person either in their country of nationality or potentially elsewhere. Another factor which may impact on this issue and which I find was relevant to consider in the proportionality assessment is the fact that the appellant is himself a refugee in Uganda. Additionally, it is also not apparent from the decision to what extent, if at all, the Judge factored into his assessment the sponsor’s and appellant’s shared family history and the appellant’s emotional dependence on the sponsor, who he states had taken parental responsibility for him after the death of their parents. Having accepted that he could not satisfy the Rules, the appellant’s claim was under Article 8 outside the Rules. The key aspect of the decision-making in determining the appellant’s appeal was the Article 8 proportionality assessment and whether the respondent’s refusal gave rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences. On the basis of the findings and reasoning provided by the Judge at [47] and [48] of the decision, I find that the Judge erred in failing to take into account material matters in considering this question.”

5. The appeal was retained by the Upper Tribunal to be remade on a subsequent occasion. The appellant, who was then represented by Duncan Lewis Solicitors, was given permission to provide additional evidence. A hearing listed for 20 July 2026 was adjourned as a request by Duncan Lewis Solicitors as an exceptional case funding application made to the Legal Aid Agency remained pending and the further evidence had not been obtained as a result. The remaking hearing was then listed for 10 September 2026. In correspondence dated 28 August 2026 Duncan Lewis Solicitors notified the Upper Tribunal that they were no longer instructed to act on behalf of the appellant as their retainer had come to an end. The appeal hearing proceeded with the appellant attending remotely, his sponsor and the sponsor’s wife and Dr Vincent Manning attending in person.

Background

6. The appellant was born in Eritrea on 4 December 2004 and is now 21 years old. His father died in 2007, and his mother died in 2011. MH took responsibility for providing financial support for the appellant and his remaining siblings while the appellant’s elder sister looked after her younger siblings. MH is nearly 12 years older than the appellant. MH is bisexual and HIV+. He is married with two young children.

7. The appellant’s elder sister committed suicide in 2013, and MH took over parental responsibility for his younger siblings (the appellant and his younger brother), assisted by the deceased sister’s best friend. MH fled Eritrea in 2015 and came to the UK in November 2018 whereupon he successfully claimed asylum, being granted refugee status in December 2019. In May 2019 the appellant and his younger brother, together with the sister’s best friend, fled Eritrea to Ethiopia. The appellant lived in Ethiopia with his sibling and AS, the woman who was to become his sister-in-law. MH travelled to Ethiopia in April 2021 and got married to AS in May 2021 before returning to the UK. The appellant resided with AS in Ethiopia before moving first to Sudan in January 2023 and then to Uganda in May 2023 where he now resides. AS lawfully entered the UK in February 2023 to join her husband. The appellant was supported in Uganda by Samuel Teklay, an Eritrean with refugee status in Uganda and a friend of the appellant’s family. The appellant was also being assisted by Philip Dinyato, a Ugandan national and colleague of Dr Vicent Manning and who described himself in his statement dated 20 January 2024 as “recently a friend of [the appellant]”. Mr Dinyato assisted the appellant in officially registering with the Ugandan authorities as a refugee.

8. On 22 January 2024 the appellant applied for entry clearance to join MH. This application was refused on 10 July 2024. In a decision dated 2 December 2015 the FtT dismissed the appeal. The FtT judge found that article 8(1) ECHR was engaged. In order words, that family life protected by the ECHR had been established and that the refusal of entry clearance constituted an interference with that protected relationship. The respondent had not sought to challenge that decision at the ‘error of law’ hearing. The FtT judge however dismissed the appeal because he did not consider that the refusal of entry clearance was a disproportionate interference under article 8 ECHR. This assessment was found to contain a legal error for the reasons explained above.

Remaking hearing

9. At the commencement of the hearing MH confirmed that the appellant had no legal representation. There was no application to adjourn the hearing. It was further confirmed that there were no updating statements and no medical reports. I received a Human Rights Watch Report on the position of homosexuals in Uganda and a United Nations document relating to the killing of refugees in Uganda. The parties confirmed the preserved findings by the FtT judge that protected article 8 ECHR family life existed between the appellant and MH. There were difficulties in utilising the video conference platforms and the appellant gave his evidence through an audio only link.

10. In cross-examination the appellant confirmed that he currently lived alone in accommodation paid for by MH. He and MH had regular telephone contact. When asked whether he had any friends in Uganda the appellant said he had no-one. The appellant claimed that Samuel Teklay informed him that he was not allowed to work in Uganda and that it was not safe for him. I note that there was no evidence from Mr Teklay to this effect and no independent evidence that officially recognised refugees in Uganda were not entitled to work.

11. In cross-examination MH confirmed that he paid for the appellant’s rented accommodation and that they were in regular communication. MH said the people in Uganda (meaning the large Eritrean community) would know about his sexual orientation because he had been imprisoned and he did not want to risk going there. MH had not informed the appellant or his wife that he was bisexual, and he stated that he was granted asylum because he came from Eritrea. MH explained that he has visited Ethiopia and married his wife in that country. MH said that Dr Manning was trying to establish a connection with someone else in Uganda who could help the appellant. Dr Manning would assist the appellant in providing accommodation and financial support. When being examined in respect of the proposed living arrangement should the appellant enter the UK, MH stated that the appellant was an adult now and could make his own decisions.

12. In cross-examination MH’s wife said she did not know whether the appellant had any friends in Uganda, and she did not know whether the appellant may be living with Dr Manning if he came to the UK. She stated that the appellant could stay with her and her husband to start with, and he could then study and work and live by himself. She confirmed that she and MH got married in Ethiopia and that MH remained in the country for 6 months. She also confirmed that there was a large Eritrean community in Ethiopia.

13. Dr Manning is director of CAPS (Catholics for AIDS Prevents & Support), a registered charity. He previously provided a letter in support of the appellant dated 21 January 2024, and a further letter dated 22 September 2024. In his written statements he described weekly meetings with MH to provide him with emotional support, and set out his view of the impact of the decision to refuse entry clearance on both the appellant and MH. In his oral evidence Dr Manning expressed his view that MH looked after the appellant as a parent would a child and testified to the strong emotional relationship between them. Dr Manning described how MH had earlier advised the appellant not to open his front door to acquaintances of the appellant who wanted to persuade him to accompany them on a journey out of Africa. Dr Manning described his visit to Uganda some time ago and stated that he had friends in the country. Dr Manning spoke of the rise of anti-homosexual sentiment in Uganda and the ill-treatment of those who are gay.

14. In cross-examination Dr Manning said he was not surprised that the appellant did not mention MH’s sexual orientation as a reason for not visiting Uganda and that he was not even sure if the appellant was aware of MH’s sexual orientation. Dr Manning understood that the appellant was attending English language classes but was not sure if he did so on a regular basis. Dr Manning stated that the appellant had acquaintances in Uganda, but he saw no evidence that these were close or reliable friends. When asked why people in Uganda would think MH was gay given he was married with two children Dr Manning said that it as not a matter of behaviour and that Uganda was a dangerous place and the risk to MH was too high. Dr Manning stated that the threat to MH emanated from the Ugandan authorities and also from the Eritrean community and that those with HIV and who were LGBT were heavily stigmatised in the Eritrean community.

15. In submissions Ms Everett invited me to revisit the issue of whether family life exists between the appellant and MH in light of the authority of IA [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 and given the evidence from MH and his wife that the appellant is now a grown up and the anticipation that he will eventually make his own way in the UK if granted entry clearance. In the alternative she invited me to find that the decision refusing entry clearance was proportionate. Family life could continue in the same way and there was no impediment to continuing contact. The sponsor was free to visit Uganda and the background evidence did not support the assertion that a tourist from another country with HIV medication would be exposed to any form of ill-treatment in Uganda. MH’s claim to fear the Eritrean community in Uganda was inconsistent with his residence for 6 months in Ethiopia. The evidence indicated that the appellant has acquaintances and went to English classes and it was unlikely that he would not have established a private life given the length of time he lived there.

16. On the appellant’s behalf MH became very emotional and submitted that the appellant, who had undertaken a difficult journey through life, was like his own son and that Uganda was not safe. They were the only ones who could help each other. The appellant only attended English classes for 2 months. MH emphasised that his own health was not good and that the appellant did not feel safe in Uganda.

17. I indicated that I would reserve my decision.

Legal framework

18. It is for the appellant to discharge the burden of proof, to the balance of probabilities standard, in showing that that article 8 ECHR is engaged and that there is an interference with that article 8 ECHR relationship. It is for the respondent to discharge the burden of showing that the interference with the article 8 ECHR relationship is proportionate.

19. S.117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 Act lists certain public interest considerations to which a Court or Tribunal must have regard when determining whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person’s right to respect for private and family life and as a result would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. For the purposes of this particular appeal, these include the considerations that:

(1) The maintenance of effective immigrations controls is in the public interest.

(2) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are able to speak English, because persons who can speak English—

(a) are less of a burden on taxpayers, and

(b) are better able to integrate into society.

(3) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are financially independent, because such persons—

(a) are not a burden on taxpayers, and

(b) are better able to integrate into society.

20. Under GEN.3.2.(1) & (2) of Appendix FM to the immigration rules, where an application for entry clearance under the Appendix does not meet the requirements of the Appendix, the decision maker must consider whether there are exceptional circumstances which would render refusal of entry clearance a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because such refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or another family member whose Article 8 rights it is evident from the information provided by the applicant would be affected by a decision to refuse the application.

21. In IA & Ors v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 (“IA”) the Court of Appeal considered appeal by the Secretary of State against the decision of the UT allowing the appeal of a family of six in Gaza, who appealed the refusal of entry clearance applications to join the brother of the father in the claimant family. In relation to the grounds pursued by the Secretary of State in IA these were summarised at [5] of the judgment as follows:

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (the SSHD) is appealing the UT’s decisions as to the existence of family life and its conclusions on the proportionality balance under article 8(2). The SSHD contended that: (a) on a proper understanding of the law as to the meaning of “family life”, the family and the sponsor did not enjoy family life under article 8(1), (b) even if such family life did exist, the UT was wrong at [166] to consider the free-standing article 8 rights of the family, rather than just those of the sponsor, in undertaking the proportionality balance required by article 8(2), and (c) the UT gave the wrong weight to the risks to the lives of the family and their dire situation in the Gaza warzone, and gave the wrong weight to the importance of UK immigration control and the short-lived family life that had existed in this case.

22. In summarising the Court’s conclusion on these grounds, the judgment states:

9. We have decided that the SSHD’s appeal should be allowed on grounds 1 and 3 and in part on ground 2. Our reasons can be summarised briefly here.

10. First, the consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) has been that “family life for the purpose of Article 8 … is normally limited to the core family and that there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”” (see Kumari v. The Netherlands 44051/20, 10 December 2024 (Kumari) at [35], and Beoku-Betts v. SSHD [2008] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 AC 115 (Beoku-Betts) at [39]). The FTT did not apply that test, but instead asked itself whether the sponsor had provided “real, effective or committed support” to his brother and the family (see [18] and [25] of the FTT decision). The real, effective or committed support test is lower than the additional elements of dependence test. Applying the proper test, neither the brother nor his family had shown that they had family life with the sponsor for the purposes of article 8(1).

11. Secondly, if there had been family life between the sponsor and his family (as found by the FTT), it would have been appropriate to have regard to the unitary nature of that family life (see Beoku-Betts at [4], [20] and [41]-[43]). We accept, however, that, in undertaking the proportionality balance under article 8(2), the court is looking primarily at the article 8 rights of those persons within the jurisdiction of article 1 of the ECtHR (in this case, the sponsor).

12. Thirdly, we have concluded that the UT made several errors in undertaking the proportionality balance under article 8(2). Even if, contrary to what we have decided, family life had existed between the sponsor and the family, the balance should not have been determined in favour of granting the family entry clearance. Very exceptional or compelling circumstances had not been shown. The UT was wrong to pay so little regard to the immigration control policies of the SSHD and the UK Government, as reflected in the Rules, as expressing what was necessary in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK and for the protection of the rights of the citizens of the UK. The UT wrongly over-stated the importance of the family’s short-lived family life with the sponsor (had it existed at all), the best interests of the children of the family and the admittedly serious risks faced by the family in Gaza.

23. When assessing the proportionality of a decision that interferes with a protected article 8 ECHR relationship, the Court of Appeal stated, at [159],

The courts must always, as Lord Reed said, attach considerable weight to the SSHD’s immigration policies at a general level, alongside considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case.

Findings and assessment

24. Ms Everett invites me to find that, in light of the further evidence given at the remaking hearing, relating to the appellant now being older and the anticipation that he will be eventually live independently in the UK, there is no longer a relationship of dependency sufficient to establish a protected article 8 ECHR relationship between the appellant and MH. I remind myself that an article 8 protected relationship between adult siblings will not be established unless there are “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”. Whilst there is some attraction in Ms Everett’s argument in light of the ages of the appellant and MH, the fact that they have not seen each other since 2015 (the appellant was in another part of Ethiopia when MH visited Ethiopia), the absence of any independent expert evidence relating to either the appellant or MH that assesses the impact on each of them of the continued separation, and the evidence given at the hearing relating to the appellant’s development as an adult, the remaking hearing proceeded on the basis that the article 8 ECHR relationship was established and there had been no challenge to that aspect of the decision by the respondent. Given the evidence of the continued financial support of the appellant by MH, their regular communication, and MH’s emotional state when making submissions, I proceed on the basis that the protected article 8 ECHR relationship has been established and that the respondent’s decision constitutes an interference with that protected article 8 ECHR relationship.

25. I proceed to consider whether the interference is proportionate under article 8 ECHR. In so doing I weigh the factors in the appellant’s favour and the relevant public interest factors.

26. I take into account the fact that the separation between the appellant and MH was not voluntary, a factor relevant to the proportionality assessment (SS (Congo) & Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 387; H (Somalia) [2004] UKIAT 00027). MH had to flee Eritrea in fear of persecution. Had he not had a fear for his life the separation is not likely to have occurred. I note the fact that financial and accommodation support is being offered if he is granted entry clearance. MH remits between £220 and 230 to the appellant monthly and would be able to use this money to support the appellant if he was in the UK. In the FtT hearing Dr Manning indicated that he would be able to commit £500 a month if the appellant was successful in his appeal until such time as the appellant was able to obtain employment. I accept that the appellant will be financially independent, but this is a neutral factor (Rhuppiah (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) [2018] UKSC 58). Although the appellant appears to have attended some English classes there is no indication that he has any proficiency in the language, a relevant public interest factor under s.117B(2). A factor in favour of the appellant’s appeal is the evidence that the appellant and the MH have a strong emotional bond and that MH previously took over responsibility for the appellant as a parent would. This must however be balanced against the further evidence at the hearing (detailed at [12] and [13] above) that the appellant is now an adult and able to make his own decisions.

27. When assessing the proportionality of the respondent’s decision I take into consideration the appellant’s particular circumstances. I take account of the appellant’s age, his traumatic upbringing (including the death of his parents, the suicide of his sister and his experience as a refugee). He is now 21 years old and an adult. He gave his oral evidence without hesitation and understood every question asked. There is no evidence before me that the appellant suffers from any physical or mental health issues or neurodevelopmental issues. There is no expert report in respect of the appellant’s social situation or psychological presentation. I note MH’s evidence during the remaking hearing (summarised at [12] above) when he stated that the appellant is an adult now and can make his own decisions. MH’s wife also said that, if granted entry clearance, the appellant would eventually study and work and live by himself (summarised at [13] above). While I accept that there is protected family life between the appellant and MH (mindful of the Court of Appeal decision in IA) and that there exist additional elements of dependency involving more than the normal emotional ties, I find that the appellant is nevertheless a healthy adult who is capable of undertaking employment and making his own decisions.

28. I note that the appellant and MH have not seen each other since 2015, some 11 years. I have already accepted that their separation was not voluntarily. But the fact remains that their separation has been lengthy. I take account of the fact that MH can maintain regular contact with the appellant via WhatsApp, Messenger or direct calls. The refusal of entry clearance will not therefore severe the ability of either MH or the appellant to maintain remote contact with each other.

29. The appellant is not destitute and, on the evidence before me, is unlikely to become destitute. MH sends him remitted between £220 and 230 a month. No issue has been raised in respect of whether the appellant is able to access adequate housing and food in Uganda. While the appellant asserted that he was not allowed to work he claims this information came from Samuel Teklay (without any evidential support from Mr Teklay himself) and not an official source and there is no independent cogent evidence before me that refugees lawfully registered in Uganda are prevented from undertaking employment.

30. I note the appellant’s claim that he had no friends in Uganda. Dr Manning however said that the appellant had acquaintances in Uganda, although Dr Manning had seen no evidence that these were close or reliable friends. There is evidence that Mr Dinyato is able to provide some assistance to the appellant. I also note MH’s evidence that Dr Manning was trying to make a connection with someone else in the country who could assist the appellant, and this is supported by Dr Manning who in oral evidence said he had friends in Uganda. There is therefore a possibility that another trusted adult could be identified in the future to further support the appellant. I therefore do not accept that the appellant is living an isolated existence. Nor does there appear to me to be any reason why the appellant, who is an adult without any physical or mental health issues, would be unable to establish meaningful relationships or friendships in Uganda, either with other members of the Eritrea diaspora (MH claimed it was a large community) or with Ugandan nationals. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that he was vulnerable in Uganda as a refugee and that there had been attacks on Refugees in that country. Whilst I accept that there has been violence against refugees the evidence provided does not suggest there is either systematic or widescale violence against refugees in Uganda. The existence of reported tensions does not mean that this particular appellant is at real risk of being attacked or otherwise targeted or exploited. The appellant is likely to be in a less vulnerable position than other refugees given the financial support he receives from MH.

31. In undertaking the proportionality balance under article 8(2), I am looking primarily at the article 8 rights of MH, the person within the jurisdiction of article 1 of the ECtHR (see IA, at [11]). There is no expert report assessing the impact of the refusal of entry clearance on MH, either in respect of his HIV diagnosis and treatment, or in respect of his mental and physical health. I am nevertheless satisfied, having regard to the written and oral evidence from MH and Dr Manning, and having observed MH at the hearing, that the decision has had, and continues to have, an adverse impact on MH’s emotional well-being. This is not surprising given the close nature of his relationship with the appellant, especially when MH acted in loco parentis following their mother’s death in 2011 and their sister’s suicide in 2013 until his own departure from Eritrea in 2015. The fact remains however that there is no evidence that MH suffers from a diagnosed mental health condition, and there is no reason to believe that MH would be unable to access any treatment offered by the NHS and access any necessary support from his Local Authority. I note that MH has previously received regular emotional support from Dr Manning and there was no indication in the evidence before me that this could not continue, and that a referral for counselling for MH was made following the challenged Entry Clearance decision.

32. As Upper Tribunal Judge Gray pointed out in her ‘error of law’ decision, although it was accepted MH has been granted refugee status in the UK, there was no indication of the basis for that grant and MH had also referred to other protection-related matters in his asylum interview. I proceed however on the basis that MH is indeed bisexual. I must now consider, as part of the proportionality assessment, whether it would be unreasonable to expect him to travel to Uganda to visit the appellant.

33. I take account of the evidence provided relating to the position of homosexuals in Uganda, and I note the terms of the Anti-Homosexuality Act enacted in May 2023. I accept that societal homophobia remains widespread and societal stigma pervasive.

34. MH has never previously been to Uganda. No evidence has been adduced that, as a recognised refugee in the UK, MH would encounter any difficulty in travelling or being admitted to and exiting Uganda. His claim that people in Uganda will be aware of his sexual orientation is speculative and unsupported by any cogent evidence. MH claimed that his sexual orientation would be known because he had been imprisoned in Eritrea. He did not rely on any evidence that actual individuals who were aware of his imprisonment in Eritrea were living in Uganda, and he did not provide any evidence that his imprisonment was a matter of common knowledge or widely known or recognised. Whilst I cannot entirely exclude the possibility, I do not find, on the evidence before me, that there is a real likelihood or ‘real risk’ (applying the lower standard of proof as a precaution) that MH’s imprisonment in Eritrea would be known to the general Eritrean diaspora in Uganda, or to the Ugandan authorities or the general Ugandan population. In reaching this conclusion I note that MH spent 6 months living in Ethiopia where he married his wife after obtaining refugee status. MH’s wife stated that Ethiopia has a large Eritrean community. The fact that MH felt sufficiently safe to spend 6 months in a country with a large Eritrean community militates against his claimed fear in visiting Uganda for a short visit. I do not find it likely, either on a balance of probabilities or even the lower ‘real risk’ standard of proof, that MH would be recognised in Uganda during a short visit, either by the Ugandan authorities or population, or by the Eritrean community.

35. Given that MH’s wife is unaware of his sexual orientation, and given that MH had previously kept his sexual orientation from the appellant, I find he could, in any event, take precautions during any visit to Uganda such as not mingling with members of the Eritrea diaspora or temporally modifying his behaviour. It was not made clear at the hearing in what way MH would need to modify his behaviour for the purpose of a short visit to Uganda to see his brother. MH is married with children, and he did not identify any behaviour or conduct as a gay or bisexual man that would give rise to any fear on his part of ill-treatment in Uganda. But even if MH is required in some way to modify his behaviour so as to avoid the risk of serious ill-treatment on account of his sexual orientation, in the context of a short visit to see his brother I am not persuaded that this would be unreasonable. The position he would find himself in is materially different from the appellants in HJ (Iran) [2010] UKSC 31 who, in order to avoid persecution in their own countries, would permanently need to act discreetly. MH would be visiting Uganda on a temporary basis only. Whilst MH is a refugee in the UK, and he may hold a genuine fear that, if his sexual orientation became known in Uganda, he would be exposed to a real risk of ill-treatment, in my judgment this fear would not be well-founded if he was ‘discreet’. The imposition of having to be discreet, while a restriction on the way he may wish to live his life, would not be unreasonable in the context of a short visit. This is particular so given MH’s wife’s ignorance of his sexual orientation. I do not find that there is a real risk that he will be identified as a gay or bisexual man in Uganda. Whilst MH may nevertheless subjectively feel he may be at risk in Uganda, and this may impact on his decision to visit the appellant, I do not consider that it renders the refusal of entry clearance disproportionate under article 8 ECHR. Nor does there appear to be any reason why MH and the appellant could not meet in another country such as Ethiopia. MH previously visited Ethiopia as a refugee and married his wife there. He demonstrably had no significant fears for his safety when he travelled there. There was no suggestion at the remaking hearing and no evidence that the appellant would be unable to visit Ethiopia as someone who is a lawfully recognised refugee resident in Uganda, or that he would encounter any difficulties returning to Uganda.

36. I have considered the assertion that MH would be identified as being gay or otherwise targeted for ill-treatment as a person with the HIV virus, which would become apparent if he was searched going through customs control. There was however little in the way of reliable background country evidence presented to me that individuals who are identified as being HIV+ would also be perceived as being gay, and still less that possession of HIV treatment medication (as opposed to preventative medication) would establish the same risk. A reference in the 2025 CPIN on Uganda (15.4.10) indicates that there are 1.5 million people living with the AIDS virus in Uganda. I am not satisfied there is any real risk that MH would be targeted in the belief that he was gay merely because he was in possession of HIV treatment medication. Nor was any independent background evidence provided to support Dr Manning’s assertion that there is heavy stigmatisation in the Eritrean community living in Uganda of those who are HIV+ and members of the LGBT community. But in any event, no satisfactory explanation was offered as to how any member of the Eritrean diaspora would become aware that MH was HIV+, and it would be open to MH to avoid mingling with Eritreans during any short visit to see the appellant.

37. The appellant does not meet the requirements of the immigration rules, and, as detailed in IA, I must attach considerable weight to the respondent’s immigration policies at a general level (see also s.117B(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002). I have considered all the relevant facts particular to this appeal and balanced the factors supportive of the appellant’s claim that the refusal of entry clearance constitutes a disproportionate interference with his and MH’s article 8 ECHR rights against the relevant public interest factors. Whilst I accept that there is a relationship of dependency between the appellant and MH, and taking full account of the appellant’s emotional and financial dependency, and the negative impact on MH’s emotional wellbeing, I am persuaded, for the reasons given above, that the respondent has demonstrated that the refusal of entry clearance does not constitute a disproportionate interference with the article 8 ECHR rights of either MH or the appellant. The appellant is a healthy adult who can work, who is capable of establishing friendships and relationships in Uganda, and who has access to adequate accommodation and food. He has not lived with MH since 2015, and they can continue to communicate as they have done by remote means. Nor is there any significant reason preventing MH from visiting the appellant either in Uganda or a third country. Having considered all relevant factors cumulatively I find the interference with the relationship between the appellant and MH is not disproportionate such as to give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is DISMISSED

D. Blum

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 October 2026