Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000895

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59139/2024
LP/05941/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19th June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEACH

Between

LL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Moriarty, Counsel instructed by David Benson Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 11th December 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State made on 20th March 2024, refusing his protection and human rights application.
Background to the appeal
2. LL is an Albanian national who arrived in the UK clandestinely in 2014 and claimed asylum on 23rd April 2020.
3. The appellant states that he was recruited to deliver illegal drugs in Albania and was then threatened to smuggle people from Albania to Greece. He states that when he refused to continue to work for the gang, he was beaten and threatened. The appellant states that he did not report the gang to the police because he thought that they would kill him. The appellant further states that his partner’s family do not approve of their relationship. He states that his partner, AM, had an abusive childhood and is no longer in contact with her family. AM is a dependent on the appellant’s claim as is their daughter, AL, who was born in the UK in 2020. AM fears return to Albania as an unmarried partner with a child which her family will view as illegitimate.
The First-tier Tribunal decision
4. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The judge found that the appellant had been involved in illegal drug dealing from 2008 and that he was forced to smuggle people between Albania and Greece [18] which he did on 3 occasions in 2010 [20] She found that the appellant lived in Greece between 2006 and 2013 and lived for 8 months in Italy in 2013 [19]. The judge found that, overall, the appellant had given a consistent and credible account that he was a victim of trafficking/modern slavery [22]. She accepted that the appellant was subject to persecution between 2006 and 2010 but found that, after the initial threat, there was no further threat and the appellant remained in Greece until 2013 with no problems [26]. The judge found that the appellant had sought to embellish his claim by stating, in his witness statement, that he had been beaten on his return to Albania in 2013 [26] and did not accept that he had been beaten. She found that there was no evidence of ongoing interest in the appellant and no evidence that the gang were a powerful gang who had influence over the police [27].
5. The judge found that AM gave credible evidence that she was subject to domestic violence from her father because of her relationship with the appellant [29] but that AM was able to obtain medical evidence and relocate to another area of Albania for 4 years [30]. The judge found that AM would be at risk in her home area but not in Tirana or other larger cities [31]. She further found that there would be no risk to AM as the mother of an illegitimate child because she would be with the appellant and it was unlikely that they would reveal that they were not married [31]. The judge found that there was mental health help available to the appellant and AM [32].
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. On 25th February 2026, the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal on grounds 2, 3 and 4 but refused permission on ground 1.
The ground of appeal
7. The appellant put forward 4 grounds of appeal.
Ground 1
8. The appellant submitted that the judge made inconsistent and contradictory findings about whether the appellant fell within the Refugee Convention. The grounds submit that the judge accepted that the appellant was a victim of trafficking and then appeared to accept that he was a member of a particular social group but then found that there was no Refugee Convention reason. Permission was not granted on this ground because it was not considered to be a material error of law. I have included it in this decision because Mr Moriarty made a tentative submission that if a material error of law were found to have occurred on ground 2 with regard to the assessment of risk to the appellant from the trafficking gang, then this ground potentially became of relevance and the Upper Tribunal should consider it.
Ground 2
9. The appellant submitted that the judge failed to give adequately reasoned credibility findings. The grounds submitted that the judge failed to give sufficient reasons for finding that the appellant had not shown that the gang had influence within the police. The grounds asserted that the judge erred in finding that the appellant did not give details of the gang members and that she gave inadequate consideration to the country information which was before her. The grounds further asserted that the judge failed to apply the HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) [2010] UKSC 31 principles having found that the appellant and AM would conceal that they were not married for fear of mistreatment.
Ground 3
10. The appellant submitted that the judge failed to undertake a proper best interests assessment with regard to the appellant and his partner’s child, AL. The grounds asserted that the judge failed to make any findings with regard to the best interests of the child.
Ground 4
11. The appellant submitted that the Judge reached inadequately reasoned conclusions regarding her Article 8 proportionality assessment by failing to take account of relevant considerations including the best interests of AL. The grounds asserted that the judge failed to give proper consideration to the respondent’s delay in considering the asylum claim. The grounds further submitted that, having found that there were exceptional circumstances, the judge should have allowed the appeal.
The Rule 24 response
12. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 3rd March 2026. The respondent, submitted that the judge had given clear reasons for finding that the appellant would not be at risk from the trafficking gang and was entitled to reach the conclusions she reached. The respondent further submitted that AM’s father would not be aware that she had returned to Albania and the gang would not be interested in whether the appellant was married. The respondent asserted that, whilst the use of the word ‘exceptional’ was unfortunate, the judge did assess the interests of the child and balanced the factors for and against the appellant in her proportionality assessment.
The hearing
13. I heard submissions from both parties and indicated at the end of the hearing that I reserved my decision. The submissions are fully set out in the recording of the proceedings.
Error of law decision
14. I bear in mind that an appellate Tribunal should be wary of setting aside a decision by a lower Tribunal. In doing so I apply what was held in in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]. I further bear in mind what was said in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] and what was held in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72].
15. Mr Moriarty, in his submissions, said that the respondent had accepted, in the reasons for refusal letter, that the appellant was a victim of trafficking, that he feared he would be murdered by his traffickers and that his past persecution underpinned his ongoing psychiatric issues. He said that it had also been accepted that AM was abused violently by her family and that she has a genuine fear. Mr Moriarty submitted that the Judge found that the appellant gave credible evidence that the gangs had a surveillance system but then suggested he did not provide sufficient detail to show that they were connected to an OCG. He submitted that this was an error because the appellant gave details in his account and the judge took no notice of those. He further submitted that the judge found that there was a risk to AM in her home area, that having an illegitimate child was a risk factor and that the appellant and AM would not disclose that they were not married because of a fear of mistreatment but did not consider whether HJ (Iran) meant that they fell within the Refugee Convention.
16. Ms Nolan, in her submissions, submitted that, when the decision was read as a whole and in context, there was no error of law. She submitted that it was clear from the decision what had been decided and why. Ms Nolan further submitted that the Judge had provided adequate reasons for finding that there was no risk to the appellant and to AM (other than in her home area). She submitted that the judge had made reference to the country information and had given adequate reasons for finding that there was insufficient evidence to show that the gang was a powerful gang. Ms Nolan further submitted that the judge found that the appellant and AM would not disclose that they were not married because of a risk of mistreatment and not a risk of persecution and she did not, therefore, have to go on to consider the HJ (Iran) principles.
17. The judge considers the risk to the appellant from the trafficking gang [26, 27] including considering whether there was evidence that the gang had any influence over the police. She makes specific reference to the details given by the appellant noting that he provided limited information. The judge has specifically noted that the appellant did not provide full names or details about their connections or the gang’s power in Albania. Her assessment of whether this particular gang would be interested in and able, to trace the appellant on his return to Albania took account of the fact that there are high levels of corruption in Albania and that gangs have infiltrated surveillance systems in Albania. The judge’s assessment of risk must be read as a whole. At [26], she clearly sets out that the appellant was able to remain in Greece in 2013 without problems despite that being very near in time to the date when he stole the €2,000.00 from the gang. She finds that he was initially threatened on his phone but that there were no further communications and the appellant was able to return to Albania in 2013 without difficulty; the judge having rejected the appellant’s account that he had been beaten up on return in 2013. The judge’s findings about the lack of information about the power of the gang in Albania was one part of that assessment but it is clear from her assessment that she also took account of the fact that the appellant had apparently ceased to be of interest to the gang by 2013, that he was able to return without problems to Albania in 2013 and that a further 12 years had passed with no evidence of ongoing threat from the gang. It is in that context that she also addresses the lack of information from the appellant to show that the gang had the power or interest to find him if he now returned to Albania. I find that the judge has given careful consideration to the evidence which was before her and that she has reached cogent findings which were open to her on the evidence. I find that the judge’s consideration of the risk to the appellant from the trafficking gang is not a material error of law.
18. The judge finds that AM would be at risk in her home area and goes on to consider any risk to AM if she relocates to another area of Albania [31]. She finds ‘given that they are in a stable, long term relationship, I find it reasonably unlikely that either would reveal they are not formally married. I find that this behaviour would arise out of a fear of mistreatment.’ The reading of that sentence suggests an inconsistency; on the one hand, the judge finds that the appellant and AM would be unlikely to disclose that they are not married because they are in a stable, long term relationship yet on the other hand, the judge finds that the decision not to disclose this would arise out of a fear of mistreatment. The judge granting permission to appeal was also the same judge who heard the appeal and she did not suggest that there was a typo in that sentence so that it should read ‘I do not find that this behaviour would arise out of a fear of mistreatment.’
19. Ms Nolan submitted that a finding that the behaviour arose out of a fear of mistreatment was not the same as a fear of persecution. It is correct to state that mistreatment may well not amount to persecution but without some assessment of the likelihood of the level of mistreatment that might arise as a result of the disclosure that AM is not married to the appellant and that AL is therefore technically ‘illegitimate’, it cannot be said that the level of likely mistreatment is not such as to amount to persecution. This is particularly so when the case law confirms that the illegitimacy of a child may be a relevant factor when considering whether there is likely to be a risk of persecution on return. Whilst that that caselaw relates to trafficked women, the legitimacy or otherwise of a child remains a relevant factor to be assessed when assessing risk and ability to seek protection. It is also relevant when assessing whether the decision of the appellant and AM not to disclose their marital status is as a direct result of the mistreatment they may receive once it is known. Once a finding was made that the appellant and AM would not disclose that they are formally married because of a fear of mistreatment, it was then incumbent on the judge to go on to apply the HJ (Iran) principles and to assess whether the level of mistreatment was sufficient to amount to persecution. Unfortunately, the judge did not do this. I find that this is a material error of law.
20. The appellant also submitted that the judge did not properly consider the best interests of AL and that the proportionality assessment was inadequate. The judge makes reference to there being a young child [34] but does not give clear consideration to the effect on AL of returning to Albania with her parents and whether this would be in her best interests. Ms Nolan submitted that the Section 55 duty was not a duty placed on the Tribunal but she acknowledged that consideration was necessary as part of the application of Article 8 in the Tribunal [CAO v SSHD [2024] UKSC 32]. She submitted that the judge had addressed this in finding that the AL was a young child who would be returning as part of a family unit and whose parents would be able to provide support to each other.
21. It is correct to state that the judge found that the parents would be able to provide emotional support to each other, that they would be able to access medical help and that they would return together. However, there is no clear assessment of AL’s best interests. The only reference to AL is a reference to her being a young child. Equally, whilst the judge makes reference to the delay in the asylum claim being decided, she does not give her reasons for finding that this was not a factor which might form part of the balancing exercise in favour of the appellant. She states ‘There has been a long delay in deciding their claim, which has been taken into account’ but it is unclear whether this has been taken into account as a factor for or against the appellant. There has been no clear application of the principles in EB (Kosovo) v SSHD [2008] UKHL 41. There has also been no assessment of the effect of the parents’ decision not to disclose that they were not married if they returned to Albania in the assessment of the best interests of AL or the overall proportionality assessment. I find that these are material errors of law which have a direct impact on the Article 8 assessment.
22. The judge found that ‘the appellant’s and AM’s circumstances are exceptional due to their abusive pasts and mental health issues’. It was an unfortunate use of the word when she then went on to find that the decision to refuse their human rights claim was proportionate. The test under GEN 3.2(2) of Appendix FM states that where the requirements of Appendix FM are not met ‘…the decision maker must consider, on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would render refusal of… leave to...remain a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because such refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences…’ That is, arguably, a two stage test; firstly, that there are exceptional circumstances and secondly that those exceptional circumstances mean that the refusal of leave would lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant, AM or AL (or all three). However, in using the word ‘exceptional’ in relation to the appellant’s and AM’s circumstances, the judge then had to clearly engage with the unjustifiably harsh test and give clear reasons for finding that the consequences were not unjustifiably harsh if finding that the decision was a proportionate decision. It is not clear from the judge’s decision that this is the test that she had in mind when making her proportionality assessment having found that the circumstances of the appellant and AM were exceptional.
20. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did involve the making of an error of law on grounds 2, 3 and 4 except with regard to the Tribunal’s assessment of whether the appellant remained at risk from the trafficking gang. Permission was not granted on ground 1 and in any event, it is not a material error of law given that I have found that the Tribunal’s assessment of the appellant’s fear of the trafficking gang is sustainable.
21. I have considered whether to retain the appeal before the Upper Tribunal but the material errors of law relate to credibility issues and it will be necessary for there to be a credibility assessment undertaken as a result. In those circumstances, I find that it is appropriate for the decision to be partially set aside and for the appeal to be remitted to be reheard before the First-tier Tribunal. The Tribunal’s findings with regard to the appellant’s risk of persecution from the trafficking gang and AM’s risk from her family in her home area are preserved.

Notice of decision
1. The First-tier Tribunal decision did involve the making of an error of law.
2. I remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge. For the avoidance of doubt, the findings of fact with regard to the appellant’s risk of persecution from the trafficking gang and AM’s risk from her family in her home area are preserved.

F Beach
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
12th June 2026