Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000918
UI-2026-000919
First-tier No: HU/58208/2024
HU/58213/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

14th May 2026
Before

UPPER TRIBUAL JUDGE KAMARA
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHANA

Between

YARA ALIOUNDI
MASA ZAINO
(ANONYMITY ORDERs NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr West of Counsel instructed by Allied Law Chambers
For the Respondent: Ms Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants in this case are a mother and daughter, both Syrian nationals currently residing in Turkey. Their familial relationship to the sponsor, who is based in the United Kingdom, forms the basis of their case. The mother is the sister, and the daughter is the niece, of their sponsor.

2. The sponsor himself has been granted humanitarian protection in the United Kingdom. Their appeals were considered by First-tier Tribunal Clarke, who heard the appeals on 29 October 2021. In a decision dated 12 November 2025, FT Judge Clarke dismissed the appellants' appeals for entry clearance to join their sponsor, Mr Ehab Algondi, in the United Kingdom as his family members.

3. The appellants submitted their applications on 3 November 2023 under the immigration rules, specifically on the grounds of family reunion, pursuant to the immigration rules. In support of their cases, the appellants also placed reliance on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which addresses the right to respect for family life.

4. At the hearing before the Upper Tribunal, both parties confirmed that the appellants did not meet the requirements stipulated by the immigration rules. Consequently, the central issue for determination in these appeals is limited to the appellants’ rights under Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The consideration of the appeal, therefore, focuses exclusively on whether the appellants’ circumstances engage Article 8 and whether they are entitled to entry clearance based on the right to respect for family life under this provision.

5. The respondent acknowledged the familial connection between the appellants and their sponsor, specifically recognising that the first appellant is the sponsor’s sister and the second appellant is his niece. However, despite this acceptance of the relationship, the respondent determined that the appellants had not met the requisite standard of proof to establish that they share a family life with the sponsor as defined under the relevant legal framework.

6. On 27 February 2026, FT Judge Degirmenci granted permission to appeal to the appellants. This permission was given on all grounds advanced in their application. In particular, FT Judge Degirmenci found that it was arguable the FT Judge had failed to make findings on material aspects of the appellants’ claim and had neglected to consider relevant evidence which could potentially impact the outcome of the appeals.
7. We heard submissions from both parties at the hearing. These are recorded in the record of proceedings and are not rehearsed here except where necessary to do so. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision.

8. In her decision, FT Judge Clarke addressed the nature of the relationship between the appellants and their sponsor. At paragraph 3, she clarified that, for the purposes of the hearing, the sponsor will be considered to be the brother of the first appellant and the maternal uncle of the second appellant. However, FT Judge Clarke explicitly stated that she made no findings of fact concerning the existence or nature of this relationship. The sponsor was treated for the context of the hearing, without any definitive conclusions being drawn as to the factual status of their familial ties.

9. The FT Judge undertook an evaluation of whether the respondent was wrong to conclude that there was no family life between the appellants and the sponsor and whether there was a material error of law in the determination of the FT. Ultimately, the FT Judge concluded that such a family life was not established.

10. One of the key considerations was the appellants' move from Syria to Turkey in 2021. They relocated as a family unit, comprising the first appellant, her husband (who is also the father of the second appellant), and the second appellant herself.

11. The FT Judge noted that the sponsor had resided in Turkey from April 2021 until September 2021, after which he travelled to the United Kingdom and has remained there since. In contrast, the appellants continued their residence in Syria. This sequence of events and the respective living arrangements were significant in shaping the FT Judge’s conclusion. The evidence indicated that, following the sponsor’s departure to the United Kingdom, the appellants maintained their own family unit and did not demonstrate ongoing family life with the sponsor as required under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

12. The FT Judge placed significant emphasis on the lack of credible evidence to support the claim that the first appellant’s husband had disappeared, as alleged by the appellant. The FT Judge found that the assertion was not supported by cogent evidence and that “the documentary evidence provided adds little to the case. This is because we do not know the source of evidence for the certificates to be issued, and the certificates were not sent direct from the officials in Syria to the UK but made their way indirectly, and the paper trail is lost”.

13. Furthermore, the FT Judge scrutinised the sponsor’s actions during his screening interview for humanitarian protection, held on 21 March 2023. During this interview, the sponsor was specifically asked to identify any close family members residing in Syria or elsewhere. The sponsor named his brother but made no reference to the appellants, his sister and niece, despite their claimed familial connections. This omission was highlighted as a significant factor, raising questions about the veracity of the appellants’ family life with the sponsor.

14. The FT Judge also considered the explanation offered by the appellants for this omission. It was argued that, as the appellant was accompanied by her husband at the time, the sponsor believed he was not required to name the sister, in accordance with his cultural norms. The explanation suggested that, due to these customs, the sponsor did not mention his sister or niece by name. However, the FT Judge did not accept this justification, finding it unconvincing and insufficient to explain the sponsor’s failure to acknowledge the appellants as his family members, during his screening interview. The FT Judge noted that the husband is not a member of the family of the sponsor and in any event, he was being asked about his siblings, and the appellants husband is not a sibling.

15. The FT Judge identified significant issues with the credibility of the evidence provided by the sponsor. One notable concern was the inconsistency regarding the sponsor’s marital status. In his witness statement, the sponsor asserted that he had returned to Syria for the purpose of getting married. However, during the proceeding before the FT Tribunal, the sponsor contradicted this account by stating that he never married. This inconsistency raised doubts about the reliability of the sponsor’s testimony and contributed to the overall problematic nature of the evidence presented in support of the appellants’ case.

16. The FT Judge noted there were some limited money transfers from the sponsor to the name of the first appellant for 15 March 2024 $200; 16 June 2024 for $250; 13 September 2024 $190; 20 May 2025 $225 and 15 August $200. They all post-date the application and there is a gap from September 2024 to 20 May 2025.

17. The FT judge stated that there are some limited wage slips but they are from March 2025 to July 2025 and in themselves show limited monthly pay; no deductions for tax or national insurance but this could be because of the lower amounts being received, but the payment is BACS and therefore the sponsor has a bank account into which funds would be paid and from which cash would be withdrawn to remit to the appellants. No other provenance of the money has been provided by way of evidence.

18. Mr West, representing the appellants, advanced two grounds of appeal on behalf of the appellants. He emphasised that the first ground of appeal was decisive, asserting it would determine the outcome of the proceedings. The second ground, which pertained to procedural fairness, was presented as supplementary to the first and could not be considered independently. Mr West made it clear that the procedural fairness ground was inextricably linked to the principal argument, serving to reinforce but not to establish a stand-alone basis for the appeal.

19. Mr West advanced a principal argument regarding the assessment of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He contended that the FT Judge failed to undertake a lawful and proper analysis under Article 8. Specifically, Mr West said that the respondent accepted the family relationship between the appellants and their sponsor. Despite this acknowledgment, the FT Judge did not make explicit findings of fact concerning the existence of the relationship between the appellants and their sponsor.

20. Mr West argued that this omission materially affected the FT Judge’s evaluation of Article 8(1). He asserted that the absence of factual findings on the existence of relationship led the FT Judge into material error, as it prevented the correct application of the legal test required by Article 8. According to Mr West, the appropriate test involves determining whether there are real, committed, and effective ties between family members that go beyond the usual emotional bonds. In his view, the FT Judge’s failure to apply this test resulted in a flawed assessment and undermined the integrity of the decision.

21. The argument advanced regarding the FT Judge’s approach to the existence of the relationship between the appellants and their sponsor is fundamentally flawed. Although the FT Judge did not make explicit factual findings as to whether the relationship exists, it was clearly stated in paragraph 3 of the decision that, for the purposes of the hearing, the sponsor was considered to be the brother of the first appellant and the uncle of the second appellant.

22. We do not accept Mr West’s submission that, although the FT Judge acknowledged the existence of the relationship between the appellants and their sponsor for the purposes of the proceedings, she subsequently failed to accept this relationship in his decision. On the contrary, we strongly disagree with this characterisation of the FT Judge’s approach.

23. The FT Judge’s reasoning, when read in full and in the context of the decision, demonstrates that the existence of the relationship was consistently recognised throughout the hearing and decision-making process. The FT Judge proceeded on the basis that the sponsor was the brother of the first appellant and the uncle of the second appellant, and there was no rejection of this relationship in the final determination.

24. The assessment of the appeal focused on the existence of family life within the meaning of Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, rather than the mere presence or absence of a familial relationship. The FT Judge’s approach was entirely consistent, and there is no basis for the assertion that the relationship was accepted for procedural purposes but rejected in substance at the decision stage. This approach was adopted throughout the hearing, and the FT Judge proceeded on this basis when making her decision regarding the existence of family life.

25. The decision, when read in its entirety, makes it evident that the FT Judge did not reject the existence of the relationship between the appellants and their sponsor. Her findings were not predicated upon the absence of a relationship, rather, the existence or non-existence of a relationship was ultimately immaterial to the outcome.

26. The absence of explicit factual findings regarding the existence of a relationship between the appellant and the sponsor, therefore, does not constitute a material error affecting the FT Judge’s final determination. Although the FT Judge did not make definitive findings on the nature or existence of the relationship, it was evident throughout the decision that the relationship was acknowledged for the purposes of the hearing. The FT Judge consistently proceeded on the basis that the familial connection was accepted, and this approach was maintained when reaching the outcome of the case.

27. Had the FT Judge found that there was no family relationship between the appellants and their sponsor, the appeals would have failed at the outset. In such circumstances, there would have been no basis for further examination or proceedings, as the absence of a relationship would preclude any claim under Article 8.
28. We were referred to the case of IA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 which provides its own useful summary at [10-12] of the principles that are relevant in cases like this involving adult overseas relatives seeking entry under article 8 European Convention on Human Rights outside the immigration. The consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has been that “family life for the purpose of Article 8 … is normally limited to the core family and that there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”

29. The FT Judge determined that, on the balance of probabilities and within the framework of Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, the appellants had not demonstrated that a family life was formed with the sponsor in 2021 before he left to come to the UK after his interlude in Turkey in April 2021 to September 2021, and he has since lived in the UK. The FT Judge found that this limited evidence is not enough. The analysis focused on whether the appellants met the necessary legal threshold required to establish family life for the purposes of Article 8, and the evidence did not support such a conclusion.

30. This finding is crucial, as any assessment regarding interference with family life under Article 8 requires clear evidence demonstrating the existence of family life. In the absence of the required proof, which is on the balance of probabilities, indicating an existing family life, the FT Judge was justified in placing significant weight on the lack of cogent evidence and the specific circumstances surrounding the appellants.

31. The real, effective or committed support test is lower than the additional elements of dependence test required. Clearly applying the proper test, if not explicitly, the FT Judge found that the appellants have not shown that they have a family life or any dependency on the sponsor for the purposes of article 8(1).

32. The FT Judge addressed the obligations imposed by section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. This statutory provision sets out a clear duty for decision-makers involved in immigration or related functions to be properly informed about the circumstances of any child who may be affected by their decisions.

33. In compliance with section 55, the FT Judge undertook a thorough and careful examination of all relevant information and factors relating to the child's situation. This process required consideration of the child's welfare and circumstances to ensure that any decision made would adequately reflect the needs and interests of the child concerned.

34. In this case, the FT Judge found that both appellants can continue to live in Turkey as they have done since 2019 and that there was no credible evidence that they could not continue to do so. The FT Judge also rejected the argument that they cannot continue to live in Turkey because there is no evidence that they had ever sought to regularise their stay in Turkey given that they have been there since 2021.

35. In reaching his decision, the FT Judge undertook a careful and thorough consideration of the best interests of the second appellant. The FT Judge concluded that the welfare of the second appellant would be best promoted by her remaining in the care of her natural parent, namely the first appellant.

36. This conclusion was grounded in the evidence presented during the proceedings, which demonstrated that both appellants are currently residing in Turkey, where they are accommodated and their basic needs are met. Furthermore, the FT Judge noted that the appellants have access to medical care in Turkey, ensuring that their health and wellbeing are safeguarded. The FT Judge’s findings in this regard were firmly anchored in the evidence before the Tribunal and reflected a conscientious assessment of the second appellant’s best interests within the context of the appeals.

37. Upon careful consideration of all the relevant facts, the FT Judge’s conclusion was reached without any material error. The FT Judge’s decision demonstrated a thorough and balanced analysis of all pertinent factors, ensuring that the welfare and wellbeing of the second appellant were safeguarded by her continuing to reside with her mother, the first appellant.

38. The Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. In particular we note the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 states;

“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT.
It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal.

Conclusion

39. We conclude that the FT Judge’s decision is not vitiated by a material error of law. It shall therefore stand.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

Sureta Chana
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

7th day of May 2026