Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000922
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54849/2024
LP/09124/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2nd of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BAGRAL

Between

NA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr. T Hodson, Counsel instructed by MBM Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms. K. Khan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Anonymity
1. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order. The Upper Tribunal’s error of law decision did not discharge or vary that order. Although the remaking of the appeal is confined to Article 8 of the ECHR, the appeal arose from a protection claim and the preserved protection findings remain part of the procedural history. I am satisfied that the anonymity order should therefore continue.
Background
2. This is the remaking of the Appellant’s appeal following the decision of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Anzani dated 14 April 2026. In that decision, Judge Anzani found that the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Webb involved the making of a material error of law, but only in relation to the assessment of the Appellant’s claim under Article 8 of the ECHR. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside to that limited extent. All findings in respect of the Appellant’s protection claim, including the findings on risk on return, sufficiency of protection, internal relocation, Article 3 of the ECHR and very significant obstacles to integration, were preserved. The scope of this remaking is therefore confined to whether the Appellant’s removal would breach Article 8 of the ECHR by reason of her family life with her partner, MC.
3. The Appellant is a national of the Philippines, born in 1976. She entered the United Kingdom as a visitor on 4 March 2016, with leave valid until 1 September 2016. She thereafter remained in the United Kingdom without leave. She claimed asylum on 9 November 2022. That claim was refused by the Respondent on 12 February 2024. Her appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 24 October 2025.
The Hearing
The documentation and preliminaries
4. I had before me a consolidated error of law bundle comprising 551 digital pages. The Appellant further relied on a supplementary bundle for the remaking hearing. A Rule 15(2A) application was made to admit that evidence. The application was made late, but Ms Khan did not object to the admission of the supplementary bundle. She confirmed that she had considered the evidence contained therein. I was satisfied that the evidence was relevant to the issues before me, and that its admission was consistent with the overriding objective. I therefore admitted the supplementary bundle which comprises 186 digital pages.
5. The parties agreed that the remaking was confined to Article 8 of the ECHR, with the focus on whether family life exists between the Appellant and MC and, if so, whether removal would be disproportionate. Ms Khan made clear that the Respondent did not accept that the Appellant and MC were in a genuine and subsisting relationship, and the issue was therefore left in dispute. Mr Hodson contended that family life was established. He nonetheless accepted that the Appellant could not meet the Immigration Rules as at the date of hearing, save insofar as she relied on EX.1 and GEN.3.2.
6. A Tagalog interpreter attended remotely because an in-person interpreter could not be sourced. No issue was raised as to the Appellant’s ability to understand or participate effectively in the proceedings with the assistance of the interpreter.
7. I heard oral evidence from the Appellant, MC, and four supporting witnesses, namely GS, KA, AW and JR, who gave evidence concerning the Appellant’s relationship with MC. It is not necessary to set out their evidence in full. I summarise below the salient aspects of their evidence insofar as they are relevant to the issues I must determine.
The written and documentary evidence
8. The Appellant and MC provided a joint witness statement dated 19 June 2026. The Appellant also relied on her earlier witness statement dated 11 September 2024, and MC relied on earlier statements dated 14 August 2024 and 8 August 2025, and his more recent statement dated 2 June 2026.
9. In her earlier witness statement, the Appellant stated that she met MC through a dating App in late December 2017. She stated that he had supported her emotionally and financially and had sent money to her daughter, son, grandson and mother in the Philippines. She described him as her “rock” and stated that she could not imagine life without him. She stated that she moved to live with MC in April 2023 at their current address, where they have lived together since then.
10. MC’s earlier statement described the development of the relationship from online contact in December 2017, their first physical meeting a few weeks later, and their relationship over several years. He stated that they had spent much of their time together, travelled in the United Kingdom together, and rented a room together in April 2023. He described the Appellant’s support to him during his mother’s terminal illness and after her death in 2019, and his support to the Appellant following bereavements in her own family.
11. In their joint witness statement dated 19 June 2026, the Appellant and MC described the history and development of their relationship, their claimed cohabitation since April 2023, their shared domestic life, and the emotional and practical support they provide to one another. They referred to their wider social and family life, including their friendships, involvement in family events, and MC’s contact with and support for members of the Appellant’s family in the Philippines. They stated that they regarded their relationship as committed and long-term, and referred to discussions about marriage and their future together. They also addressed the likely impact of separation if the Appellant were removed from the United Kingdom.
12. The supporting witnesses gave evidence of their knowledge of the Appellant and MC as a couple. GS said that she had known the Appellant for over eight years, met MC shortly after the relationship began, and saw them several times each month. KA and AR stated that they had known the Appellant and MC for over seven years, spent time with them almost every weekend, and regarded them as part of their family. JR stated that he had known them since 2018 and that they were godparents to his children. AW stated that he first met the Appellant in March 2019 and had socialised with her and MC on many occasions, including during a trip to Edinburgh in August 2022.
13. The supplementary bundle also contained NHS correspondence addressed to the Appellant at an address in Watford, pension statements for MC, a Renters Rights Act signed information sheet, Monzo and Wise transactions from MC to members of the Appellant’s family in the Philippines, photographs covering the period from August 2018 onwards, and Uber receipts showing journeys to or from the claimed shared address.
The oral evidence
14. In evidence, the Appellant confirmed that she and MC began speaking in December 2017 and that their relationship formally began in August 2018. She said that she told MC about her immigration status after approximately four months, in 2018.
15. The Appellant was asked why, during her asylum interview on 1 February 2024, she had answered “no one” when asked whether she had a partner in the United Kingdom. She explained that she did not want to “rush” MC in making any decisions. When asked to explain what she meant, she said that she meant decisions about regularising her immigration status and that she did not want to involve him at that stage. She denied that she had entered the relationship in order to remain in the United Kingdom.
16. The Appellant stated that she currently lived with MC and that they had lived together since 21 April 2023. She was asked about NHS correspondence addressed to her at an address in Watford. She explained that this was the address of a friend who had previously taken her in, and that she had continued to use that address for NHS purposes because of her health and because she did not wish to change her doctor.
17. She was asked about documents addressed to MC at his Romford property. She explained that this was his property and that he attended there to check the mail and the condition of the property, but that he lived with her at their claimed shared address. She accepted that there was no current tenancy agreement, but maintained that other evidence had been provided to show that they lived together there.
18. The Appellant was asked why her children had not provided updated witness statements. She said that they had not been told to do so. She stated that when MC visited the Philippines he stayed at her mother’s house with members of her family, including her mother, her daughter, her daughter-in-law and her grandson.
19. The Appellant confirmed that she and MC had discussed what would happen if she were removed from the United Kingdom. She said that they had discussed it, but that she wished to remain in the United Kingdom because she loved him and that it would have a significant impact on her life if she lost him.
20. The Appellant confirmed that she and MC were godparents to JR’s children. She stated that the mutual friends referred to by GS were AR and KA. She said that she and MC saw KA and AR almost every weekend and that the most recent gathering had been her 50th birthday celebration. She was also asked about the Edinburgh trip referred to by AW. She said that she, MC, AW and AW’s wife stayed together in an Airbnb property.
21. MC was asked about paragraph 35 of his recent statement, where he referred to discussions about marriage and making testamentary provision for the Appellant. He stated that his will had been signed and witnessed the previous weekend, and that his estate would pass to the Appellant and thereafter to her two children.
22. MC said that he became aware of the Appellant’s immigration status approximately four months after they met, in April 2018. He said that he had not been aware, at the time, that the Appellant had not mentioned him in her asylum interview. He said that she had told him that she did not want to involve him at that stage.
23. MC confirmed that he and the Appellant moved in together on 21 April 2023. He was asked why NHS correspondence for the Appellant remained addressed to an address in Watford. He explained that this was where she had lived before they moved in together and that they had not changed the address because they were waiting for the outcome of her immigration status, rather than changing all addresses and possibly having to change them again.
24. He was also asked why his bank statement remained linked to his Romford property. He gave a similar explanation, namely, that he did not want to change all his addresses until the Appellant’s immigration status was resolved. He accepted that there was no current tenancy agreement and said that the only tenancy agreement they had signed was in 2023. He said that the other document signed was the Renters Rights Notice.
25. MC refuted the suggestion that he did not live with the Appellant. He said that they had lived together since 2023. He also gave evidence about his visit to the Philippines, stating that he stayed at the Appellant’s family home with her mother, daughter, daughter-in-law and grandson.
26. MC confirmed that he and the Appellant had discussed future plans if she were not permitted to remain in the United Kingdom. He said that they hoped she could remain, but if not, they would “cross that bridge”. He confirmed that he would visit her in the Philippines.
27. MC was also asked about the supporting witnesses. He gave evidence about JR’s children and the godparent relationship. He said that he and the Appellant visited KA and AR at their home, and referred to recent gatherings, including the Appellant’s 50th birthday gathering. He was asked about the Edinburgh trip and said that he and the Appellant initially went to the Airbnb, and that AW and his wife joined them during the trip. He said that the Airbnb had two bedrooms.
28. In evidence, GS was asked about the mutual friends through whom she had met the Appellant and MC. She identified those friends as KA and AR.
29. KA said that he had witnessed the Appellant and MC together since around 2019 or 2020 and that they had always done things together. He referred to recent gatherings, including the Appellant’s 50th birthday and a recent wedding anniversary.
30. AW was asked about the Edinburgh trip. He said that he, his wife, the Appellant and MC stayed together in an Airbnb property in Edinburgh. He could not recall whether it had two or three rooms, but said that it had at least two rooms and was large.
31. JR was asked when the Appellant and MC became godparents. He stated that this was at the baptisms of his children in 2020 and 2021, and confirmed that his youngest child had not yet been baptised.
The submissions
32. Ms Khan relied on the refusal letter and the Respondent’s review. She submitted that the Appellant had not demonstrated that she and MC were in a genuine and subsisting relationship. Ms Khan placed reliance on credibility concerns. She submitted that the Appellant and MC claimed to have lived together since 2023, but that there was limited documentary evidence showing that they resided at the same address. There were insufficient letters addressed jointly to them at their claimed shared address, no adequate evidence of rent being taken from MC’s bank statements, and recent NHS correspondence continued to show the Appellant at a Watford address.
33. Ms Khan also relied on the Appellant’s failure to disclose MC as her partner in the asylum interview in February 2024. She submitted that this undermined the credibility of the claim that the Appellant had been in a relationship with MC for approximately six years by that point. She further relied on the fact that most documents relating to MC remained addressed to him at the Romford property.
34. In the alternative, Ms Khan submitted that the relationship could be maintained from abroad. She relied on MC’s evidence that he would visit the Appellant. She submitted that section 117B (of the NIAA 2002) factors weighed against the Appellant. She submitted that the Appellant’s relationship was established when her immigration status was unlawful and that little weight should attach to it.
35. In response to a question from the Tribunal as to whether it was accepted that the financial requirements for entry clearance would be met, Ms Khan stated that this was not accepted. She submitted that the specified evidence had not been provided and that the financial evidence was sporadic.
36. Mr Hodson submitted that the existence of family life should be determined on all the evidence taken in the round. He submitted that the circumstances in which the Appellant had been living had to be borne in mind. She had been living with precarious and unlawful status and had been pursuing an asylum claim. He submitted that it was unlikely that people in such circumstances would necessarily have straightforward evidence of their domestic arrangements.
37. Mr Hodson submitted that the explanation for the Appellant’s continued use of the Watford address for NHS correspondence was reasonable. He submitted that it was plausible that the Appellant would not want to change her doctor or disrupt continuity of medical treatment.
38. Mr Hodson relied on the Uber receipts showing that the claimed shared address appeared frequently as a location. He submitted that there had to be a reason why MC was paying for those journeys from July 2024 onwards, unless he and the Appellant were living there.
39. Mr Hodson accepted that there were issues arising from the evidence. However, he submitted that the substance of the relationship was clearly established by the oral evidence of the Appellant, MC and the supporting witnesses. He submitted that the witnesses stood up to cross-examination and gave evidence about gatherings, social contact, the Edinburgh trip and the couple’s relationships with their friends.
40. Mr Hodson submitted that the Appellant’s removal would interfere with family life. He submitted that separation would have very significant consequences and would be unjustifiably harsh. He submitted that the Respondent’s suggestion that the relationship could be maintained through visits and modern means of communication did not adequately recognise the nature of family life.
41. Mr Hodson accepted that section 117B(4) required little weight to be given to a relationship established whilst a person was in the United Kingdom unlawfully. However, relying on Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 58, he submitted that the provision should be read normatively and that little weight does not mean no weight.
42. Mr Hodson submitted that it would be unreasonable to expect MC to live in the Philippines. He relied on MC’s age, his lack of connections to the Philippines, likely social isolation, the climate, cultural differences and his limited ability to adapt.
43. Mr Hodson further submitted that requiring the Appellant to apply for entry clearance from abroad would involve time and stress. He relied on Chikwamba v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 40, as qualified by Alam and Rahman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 30, and submitted that this was a relevant factor in considering proportionality. He submitted that the serious, realistic alternatives were complete separation or MC starting a new life in the Philippines, which he submitted would be unreasonable.
Legal Framework
44. The focus of the Appellant’s human rights claim is based on her family life with her partner. It is accepted that the Appellant is unable to succeed in an application to remain with her partner in the United Kingdom within the Immigration Rules due to her immigration status as an overstayer. Accordingly, the material issue under the Immigration Rules is whether the Appellant can discharge the burden upon her on the balance of probabilities and bring herself within EX.1 of Appendix FM, in particular EX.1(b). Paragraph EX.1.1 reads as far as relevant:
“EX.1. This paragraph applies if
(a) …
or
(b) the applicant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a partner who is in the UK and is a British Citizen, … and there are insurmountable obstacles to family life with that partner continuing outside the UK.
EX.2. For the purposes of paragraph EX.1.(b) ‘insurmountable obstacles’ means the very significant difficulties which would be faced by the applicant or their partner in continuing their family life together outside the UK and which could not be overcome or would entail very serious hardship for the applicant or their partner.”
45. The Supreme Court in R (on the application of Agyarko and another) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 11 considered the legal position for those such as the Appellant and her partner who are in a genuine relationship but where the foreign national spouse has no lawful right to reside in the United Kingdom. What is said there confirms the test which is now applied by paragraph EX.1. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal has confirmed that the factors relevant to that test ought to be considered cumulatively - Lal v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1925.
46. The principle in Chikwamba (supra) has recently been clarified by the Court of Appeal in Alam (supra). Having reviewed the line of authorities following Chikwamba, the Court said this about the principle said to arise from that case:
“107. Those three points mean that Chikwamba does not state any general rule of law which would bind a court or tribunal now in its approach to all cases in which an applicant who has no right to be in the United Kingdom applies to stay here on the basis of his article 8 rights. In my judgment, Chikwamba decides that, on the facts of that appellant’s case, it was disproportionate for the Secretary of State to insist on her policy that an applicant should leave the United Kingdom and apply for entry clearance from Zimbabwe.
…
112. The two present appeals, subject to A1’s ground 2, are both cases in which neither appellant’s application could succeed under the Rules, to which courts must give great weight. The finding that there are no insurmountable obstacles to family life abroad is a further powerful factor militating against the article 8 claims, as is the finding that the relationships were formed when each appellant was in the United Kingdom unlawfully. The relevant tribunal in each case was obliged to take both those factors into account, entitled to decide that the public interest in immigration removal outweighed the appellants’ weak article 8 claims, and to hold that removal would therefore be proportionate. Neither the F-tT in A1’s case nor the UT in A2’s case erred in law in its approach to Chikwamba.
113. Moreover, the Secretary of State did not refuse leave in either case on the ground that the appellant should leave the United Kingdom and apply for entry clearance. I accept Mr Hansen’s submission, based on Hayat, that Chikwamba is only relevant if the Secretary of State refuses an application on the narrow procedural ground that the appellant should be required to apply for entry clearance from abroad. It does not apply here, because the Secretary of State did not so decide. Chikwamba is irrelevant to these appeals. I also reject the appellants’ submission that the UT determination in Younas was wrong; in Younas and in Thakral, the UT’s approach was correct.
114. Rhuppiah does not help the appellants. Even if there is some flexibility in section 117B and section 117B(4)(b), there is, on the findings which the tribunals were entitled to make, no exceptional positive feature of the claim of either appellant which could enable it to succeed. There is, moreover, in each case (and subject to ground 2 in A1’s case), a further negative factor, that is, that family life could continue abroad.”
47. In light of Alam, I must first consider whether the Appellant can succeed under the Immigration Rules by reference to her family life with MC, including whether EX.1 is met. If she cannot, I must then consider whether her removal would nevertheless result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant and/or MC, such that removal would be disproportionate under Article 8 of the ECHR.48. The assessment of whether removal would breach Article 8 of the ECHR is to be undertaken by reference to the circumstances as at the date of the hearing before me. It is for the Appellant to establish, on the balance of probabilities, the factual matters on which she relies, including the nature and extent of any interference with her Article 8 rights. If Article 8 is engaged, it is for the Respondent to justify the interference as proportionate in pursuit of the public interest.
49. When considering the Appellant’s case outside the Immigration Rules, I must also have regard to the public interest considerations in section 117B of the 2002 Act, insofar as they are relevant.
Findings and Conclusions
The relationship
50. I have considered all the evidence in the round even though I may not explicitly refer to all the evidence below.
51. Before turning to the specific concerns raised by the Respondent, I make some general observations about the evidence concerning the Appellant’s relationship with MC. Having heard the oral evidence of the Appellant, MC and the supporting witnesses, and having considered that evidence alongside the documentary evidence, I found that each gave evidence in a generally straightforward manner. Their accounts were, in broad terms, consistent with one another and were not characterised by exaggeration or embellishment. There are, nevertheless, difficulties within the evidence which require careful consideration. I address those matters below before reaching my overall conclusion as to the nature of the relationship.
52. Ms Khan on behalf of the Respondent raised several concerns in respect of the relationship. The matters which require particular scrutiny are the Appellant’s failure to identify MC as her partner at the asylum interview in February 2024, the limited conventional evidence of cohabitation, the continued use of the Watford address in NHS correspondence, and MC’s continued use of his Romford address in financial and other documents.
53. The Appellant’s failure to mention MC during her asylum interview on 1 February 2024 is an adverse feature of the evidence. By that stage, on the Appellant’s account, the relationship had existed for some six years and the parties had commenced cohabitation approximately nine months earlier. In those circumstances, one would ordinarily have expected the Appellant to disclose the existence of such a significant relationship when asked about her personal circumstances. Her explanation that she did not wish to involve or “rush” MC, whether in relation to their relationship or her immigration status, was not entirely satisfactory.
54. However, I do not consider that this issue can be viewed in isolation. The Appellant and MC both gave consistent evidence that he became aware of her immigration difficulties approximately four months after they met. MC said that he was unaware that the Appellant had failed to mention him during her asylum interview and that she had told him she did not wish to involve him at that stage. Although her explanation does not wholly account for the omission, I consider it probable, in the context of her then outstanding protection claim, that the Appellant hoped to succeed in that claim without needing to rely upon her relationship with MC and did not wish to place additional pressure upon him. That provides some context for her failure to identify him as her partner, but it does not entirely explain or excuse the omission.
55. I therefore treat the Appellant’s failure to identify MC during her asylum interview as an adverse factor which requires caution when assessing her evidence. It is not, however, appropriate to determine the existence of the relationship by reference to that omission alone. I consider it alongside the evidence of cohabitation and the wider oral and documentary evidence concerning the history, duration and substance of the relationship
56. There are also shortcomings in the evidence relating to cohabitation. The documentary evidence demonstrating a shared residence is relatively limited. There is no current tenancy agreement and little correspondence addressed, whether jointly or separately, to the Appellant and MC at that address. In addition, recent NHS correspondence remained addressed to the Appellant at the Watford address, while a number of documents relating to MC continued to bear his Romford address. Ms Khan also relied upon the absence of any clearly identifiable pattern of rental payments by MC. However, that matter was not put to either the Appellant or MC in oral evidence, and they were not given an opportunity to address it. I therefore attach no material adverse weight to that matter. Taken at face value, the remaining documentary shortcomings are difficult to reconcile with the claim that the parties have resided together since April 2023 and require careful scrutiny.
57. Having considered the evidence as a whole, however, I accept the explanations given by the Appellant and MC regarding the continued use of those addresses. The Appellant explained that she had previously lived in Watford and continued to use that address for NHS correspondence because of concerns regarding continuity of medical treatment and because she did not wish to change her doctor. MC explained that the Romford address remained his property, that he continued to attend there, and that some correspondence continued to be sent there. Both witnesses gave substantially the same explanation for not changing their administrative records, namely that they wished to await resolution of the Appellant's immigration position before making widespread changes to their recorded addresses. Whilst that explanation does not wholly overcome the lack of conventional documentary evidence of cohabitation, I regard it as plausible and it reduces the weight which can properly be attached to the address discrepancies.
58. There is also evidence which lends support to the claim that the parties have shared their lives together at that address. The Uber receipts show repeated journeys arranged through MC's account to or from the shared address between July 2024 and May 2026. I accept that this evidence is not determinative and does not, by itself, establish continuous cohabitation. It does, however, demonstrate a regular and ongoing connection between MC and that address over a significant period and is consistent with the parties' evidence that they were living together there.
59. I have also considered the photographic evidence, including photographs posted on social media. I attach only limited weight to photographs as evidence of the existence of a genuine relationship because they provide a snapshot in time and can rarely establish the nature, quality or continuity of a relationship without supporting evidence. Nevertheless, the photographs cover a lengthy period, depict the Appellant and MC together at a variety of social occasions, family gatherings and celebrations, and are generally consistent with the chronology of the relationship described in the oral evidence.
60. I place considerably greater weight on the evidence of the supporting witnesses. GS, KA, AW and JR each gave evidence of having known the Appellant and MC together over a number of years. Their evidence extended beyond general assertions that the parties were in a relationship. They described regular social contact, gatherings with friends, a shared trip to Edinburgh including the Edinburgh trip, and the Appellant's and MC's role as godparents to JR's children. Although there were minor differences in recollection, as one would expect when witnesses were describing events occurring over several years, the substance of their evidence was consistent. Importantly, their evidence was also consistent with the account given by the Appellant and MC regarding the development of the relationship and the way in which they presented themselves socially. I found the witnesses to be credible and reliable and I accept that they have known the Appellant and MC as a couple for a considerable period.
61. I also attach weight to the evidence demonstrating the extent to which the parties are integrated into each other's family lives. MC has provided financial support to members of the Appellant's family in the Philippines, as evidenced by the money transfer records. He also travelled to the Philippines, stayed with the Appellant's family, and attended her daughter's graduation. These are matters which are difficult to reconcile with a relationship lacking commitment. Rather, they are indicative of a relationship involving emotional investment, practical support and a degree of integration extending beyond the parties themselves. I also take account of the evidence concerning the emotional support the Appellant and MC provided to one another during periods of bereavement, their discussions about marriage, and MC’s evidence that he had made testamentary provision for the Appellant and her children. Although the signed will was not produced, that evidence was not materially challenged and is consistent with the wider evidence of commitment.
62. I have also considered the social circumstances report prepared following a joint assessment of the Appellant and MC at their claimed shared address. The author records observations made during that assessment and describes the relationship as close and mutually supportive. The report also states that separation would have an adverse emotional effect on both the Appellant and MC. However, much of its content is based on information provided by them during a single assessment. Neither referred to the report or its contents in their oral evidence, and it was not specifically relied upon in submissions. Its contents were therefore not explored at the hearing. Accordingly, while the report is consistent with aspects of the evidence I otherwise accept and provides some support for the nature and quality of the relationship, I attach limited weight to it.
63. Considering the evidence as a whole, the Appellant’s failure to identify MC during her asylum interview and the shortcomings in the documentary evidence of cohabitation require caution. I have treated both matters as adverse features of the evidence. They must, however, be weighed against the consistent evidence concerning the duration and development of the relationship, the generally straightforward oral evidence, the credible evidence of the supporting witnesses, the couple’s shared social life, their integration into each other’s families, MC’s financial support for the Appellant’s relatives, and his visit to the Philippines. The Uber receipts and photographic evidence provide further, albeit more limited, support. Taken cumulatively, that evidence outweighs the concerns I have identified.
64. I find, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant and MC are in a genuine and subsisting relationship and enjoy family life together for the purposes of Article 8(1).
The Immigration Rules
65. It was common ground that the Appellant cannot meet the substantive requirements for leave to remain as a partner because she cannot satisfy the immigration status requirement. She entered the United Kingdom as a visitor, her leave expired on 1 September 2016, and the relationship was formed after that date. The material question under Appendix FM is therefore whether EX.1(b) applies.
66. The question is whether there are insurmountable obstacles to the Appellant and MC continuing their family life together outside the United Kingdom. In accordance with EX.2, this requires the Appellant to establish that they would face very significant difficulties in continuing their family life in the Philippines which could not be overcome or which would entail very serious hardship for either of them. The assessment is fact-sensitive and requires consideration of the practical reality of relocation for each of them. I consider the difficulties identified in the evidence individually and cumulatively.
67. I accept that relocation to the Philippines would involve a substantial change for MC. He is a British citizen who has lived in the United Kingdom throughout his life. His work, friends and social ties are here. He has no independent family or established social network in the Philippines and would face differences of language, culture and climate. Those matters would give rise to genuine difficulties in adapting to life there and I take them into account in applying the test under EX.2.
68. MC was 59 years old at the date of the hearing. His age is relevant, but it is not of itself an insurmountable obstacle. There is no independent evidence that he is unable to relocate, adapt to a different climate or undertake the ordinary activities of daily life. He travelled to the Philippines for approximately three weeks in 2025 and stayed with the Appellant’s family. That visit was limited and does not equate to permanent residence, but it demonstrates that he can travel there and engage with her family and surroundings.
69. There was no evidence before me of any legal, medical or other practical impediment which would prevent MC from seeking employment in the Philippines if he chose to live there. His age may limit the range of employment realistically available, and he may not secure work equivalent to that which he has undertaken in the United Kingdom. The test, however, is not whether relocation would preserve his present employment or standard of living. On the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that his age or employment prospects would give rise to a difficulty which could not be overcome or which would entail very serious hardship.
70. Nor would MC be without support in the Philippines. The Appellant is familiar with the language, culture and practical features of life there. She has adult children and wider family there. MC has met and stayed with those family members. I accept that he may initially experience loneliness or dislocation from his home country, but the evidence does not establish that he would face social isolation of such severity as to meet the demanding test in EX.2.
71. The Appellant can safely return to the Philippines. The preserved findings are that she would not face a real risk of harm and would not face very significant obstacles to integration. She lived there for most of her life and is well placed to assist MC if he chose to relocate.
72. The Appellant has received medical treatment in the United Kingdom, including treatment for gynaecological conditions. There was no suggestion at the hearing that she could not obtain ongoing medical care or treatment in the Philippines. Her medical position therefore does not create an insurmountable obstacle to family life continuing there.
73. Taking all these matters together, relocation would involve real difficulty and adjustment, particularly for MC, but the evidence does not establish very significant difficulties which could not be overcome or which would entail very serious hardship. I find that there are no insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in the Philippines. EX.1(b) is not met.
GEN.3.2 and Article 8 outside the Rules
74. I therefore consider whether refusal would produce unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant or MC under GEN.3.2 and Article 8 outside the Rules. Removal would interfere with their established family life. It would cause distress and disrupt the daily support and companionship which they provide to each other. Modern communication and periodic visits would not replicate ordinary life together. I give those matters appropriate weight.
75. I do not accept, however, that removal would leave MC socially isolated in the United Kingdom if he chose to remain here. He has employment and a network of friends who know and support the couple. The evidence of GS, KA, AW and JR demonstrates regular and continuing friendships and social contact. MC’s own evidence was that the relationship brought him into a wider circle of friends, but there is no evidence that those friends would withdraw their support if the Appellant were removed. He would also remain able to work and to maintain contact with them. Separation would be emotionally painful, but the evidence does not establish that he would be without practical or social support.
76. The social circumstances report is consistent with the conclusion that separation would adversely affect both partners emotionally, although, for the reasons given above, I attach limited weight to it. The evidence as a whole does not establish that either partner would be unable to function independently, that MC requires the Appellant to provide daily care, or that the emotional consequences of separation would amount to unjustifiably harsh consequences. There is no medical evidence of any mental or physical condition which would materially alter that assessment.
77. If MC chose to remain in the United Kingdom, the relationship could be maintained, imperfectly, through electronic communication and visits. MC has already demonstrated an ability and willingness to travel to the Philippines. If instead he chose to relocate, I have found that the difficulties would not amount to insurmountable obstacles. Neither course is attractive, but Article 8 does not secure the couple’s preferred country of residence.
Section 117B
78. I have had regard to the public interest considerations in section 117B of the 2002 Act. The maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest. The Appellant has remained in the United Kingdom unlawfully since September 2016. Her relationship with MC was formed and developed while she had no leave.
79. Section 117B(4) requires little weight to be given to a relationship formed with a qualifying partner when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully. Applying Rhuppiah, little weight does not mean no weight. I have given weight to the genuineness, duration and emotional importance of this relationship. The statutory direction nevertheless remains a consideration in the balance.
80. The Appellant speaks English. As to financial independence, Ms Khan submitted that it was unclear whether the Appellant was financially independent. The Appellant does not work and is supported by MC. There is no evidence that she receives public funds. A person may be financially independent for the purposes of section 117B(3) where maintained without recourse to public funds by a partner. I therefore treat her as financially independent on the evidence before me. Her ability to speak English and her financial independence are neutral factors. They do not weigh positively against the public interest in effective immigration control.
81. The Appellant’s private life was initially established during a short period of precarious visit leave and thereafter overwhelmingly during unlawful residence. Little weight attaches to that private life under section 117B(4) and (5). The preserved finding that she would not face very significant obstacles to integration remains material to the proportionality assessment.
Entry clearance
82. Mr Hodson submitted that requiring the Appellant to return and apply for entry clearance would involve delay, stress and separation, and relied on Chikwamba, as considered in Alam. In light of Alam, Chikwamba does not establish a general rule that removal is disproportionate whenever an application might be made from abroad. Nor was the Respondent’s decision based solely on the narrow procedural ground that the Appellant should leave the United Kingdom and seek entry clearance. The principle in Chikwamba is therefore of limited assistance. I nevertheless take account, as part of the proportionality assessment, of the separation, uncertainty and distress which an application from abroad would be likely to entail.
83. I am not satisfied that an entry clearance application has been shown to be bound to succeed. The bundle contains pension evidence relating to MC, but the specified financial evidence was not identified or analysed at the hearing. Nor was there sufficient evidence to conclude that all other requirements, including accommodation, would necessarily be met. I therefore accept Ms Khan’s submission that the evidence does not establish inevitable success.
84. There was no reliable evidence of the likely period required to determine any application. I accept that there would be a period of separation, uncertainty and stress. In the absence of evidence of its probable duration, however, I cannot find that the separation would be prolonged to an extent which materially alters the proportionality balance.
Overall proportionality
85. In the Appellant’s favour, I take account of the genuine and subsisting relationship, its duration, the emotional and practical support between the couple, MC’s financial support of the Appellant and her family, his visit to the Philippines, the credible evidence of their friends, the photographs showing a sustained social relationship, and the distress which separation would cause.
86. Against those matters stand the Appellant’s lengthy unlawful residence, the formation and development of the relationship while she had no leave, her inability to meet the Immigration Rules from within the United Kingdom, the absence of insurmountable obstacles, and the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control. The preserved findings establish that she can safely return, has family support and can reintegrate. There is no evidence that she would be unable to obtain necessary medical treatment in the Philippines.
87. MC cannot be required to leave the United Kingdom. If he remains, he will retain his employment and the support of established friends, and the evidence does not establish that he would face social isolation. If he chooses to relocate, the factors identified above would make adjustment difficult. For the reasons already given, however, those difficulties would not meet the threshold in EX.2, and he would have the support of the Appellant and her family.
88. I accept that neither temporary separation nor relocation is the outcome the couple wants. Nevertheless, considering the evidence cumulatively, I find that the consequences of the Appellant’s removal would not be unjustifiably harsh. I find that the public interest outweighs the interference with the Appellant’s family and private life.
89. I find that the Respondent has therefore established that the interference is proportionate. The Appellant’s removal would not breach Article 8 of the ECHR.
Conclusion
90. I accept that the Appellant and MC enjoy family life for the purposes of Article 8 and that their relationship is genuine and subsisting. However, the Appellant has not established insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the United Kingdom or exceptional circumstances producing unjustifiably harsh consequences. Her removal would be proportionate.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on Article 8 ECHR grounds.

Signed:

R. Bagral

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 August 2026