Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000923
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63622/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

10th June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STERNBERG

Between

AI
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. M Brooks, counsel instructed by Central England Law Centre
For the Respondent: Mr. Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP/Hybrid hearing on 20 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal by the Appellant, AI, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Greer (‘the judge’) who dismissed the Appellant’s appeal by a determination dated 17 September 2025 following a hearing which took place on 12 September 2025. That appeal challenged the respondent’s decision to refuse the appellant’s protection claim dated 23 November 2023.
2. A judge of the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal on 5 January 2026. The judge made an anonymity order given the nature of the appellant’s claim. I maintain that order given the nature of the Appellant’s claim.
3. The hearing took place before me on 20 May 2026. Mr. Brooks appeared by CVP link for the Appellant and Mr. Tufan appeared in person for the Respondent. At the start of the hearing I confirmed with the parties that I had all the relevant documents. I then heard submissions from Mr. Brooks and from Mr. Tufan. Mr. Tufan’s submissions were interrupted by a fire alarm, but I confirmed with all parties that they were content to continue when the hearing resumed. I received a composite bundle running to 295 pages in advance of the hearing together with the Respondent’s rule 24 response. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision, which I now give.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. To put the Appellant’s challenge to the judge’s decision into proper context, it is necessary to summarise that decision in a little detail. The judge began their judgment (at [1]-[4]) by setting out the Appellant’s appeal, the background and the anonymity order that they made. The background to the appellant’s claim is that the Appellant is a national of Somalia who claims he fled Al Shabab in Somalia who had kidnapped his sister and put pressure on him to join them. He claims to be at risk from them. The hearing took place in Birmingham, the Appellant gave evidence with an interpreter.
5. The judge recorded the issues at [5]. The Judge recorded that the parties agreed that there were two issues that fall for determination. These were first whether the Appellant is at real risk of persecution in his home area and second if he is, whether he can reasonably be expected to relocate to Mogadishu to avoid those who seek to harm him.
6. The judge then set out their findings. The judge dealt first with whether the Appellant is at real risk of suffering harm in his home area (at [6]-[15]). The judge found that the appellant had given a reasonably detailed account. His evidence was consistent and his claims are generally plausible. The Respondent’s criticisms of his claim that his home area is not under the control of Al Shabab are not made out and his claims are generally plausible. His travel through Switzerland and France does not undermine his claim. He is a reliable witness in respect of past events. He would be at risk from Al Shabab in his home area.
7. The judge therefore turned to the second issue, whether the Appellant could relocate to Mogadishu to avoid those who seek to harm him (at [16]-[25]). The judge stated that they bore in mind Country Guidance in OA (Somalia) (CG) [2022] UKUT 33 (IAC) and MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 442 (IAC).The judge noted that no updating background evidence was referred to other than an expert report relied on by the Appellant. MOJ states that there is no established presence from Al Shabab in Mogadishu. The judge found that the Appellant would not be at risk from them there. The expert disagrees but their sources predate OA. There is no basis to depart from the Country Guidance cases. The Appellant belongs to a majority clan and would not suffer discrimination, he could seek support from them. A relative helped to pay a people smuggler to transport him to the UK, that indicates he would have financial support from his family. He can develop new support networks as he has done in the UK. He is fit and healthy and could work. He could relocate internally. He is not a refugee. His appeal fails and was therefore dismissed.
Grounds of Appeal
8. The Appellant advances one ground of appeal. In summary the Appellant argues as follows:
i. The judge materially erred in assessing the availability of internal relocation. The judge found the Appellant would be at risk from Al Shabab in his home area but not in Mogadishu. The Respondent’s position is in a CPIN of June 2025 on Somalia - Mogadishu: Al Shabab and the security situation, which records that Al Shabab do not have an overt presence in Mogadishu but can infiltrate the city and have informers, they do not target ordinary civilians but people who support the government and resist the group. The judge found the Appellant did resist Al Shabaab. He cannot safely relocate to Mogadishu. He is from the Maheran clan, based in the Gedo region, they were driven out of Mogadishu are a minority clan and there is no basis to find they have a presence there. There is nothing to show his sister would be able to support him.
9. These grounds were developed in a number of ways in the written grounds of appeal and the submissions Mr. Brooks made at the appeal hearing, which I set out in greater detail below. I was satisfied by the end of the hearing that I had understood all of the points that each side wished to make and that they had each had the opportunity to make all of those points within the structure of the overarching ground of appeal I have summarised above.
The Law
10. The Appeal comes before the Upper Tribunal to decide first whether there is a material error of law in the judge’s decision, and if it does, to re-make the decision or to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
11. As the appellant seeks to overturn the judge’s findings of fact on issues in controversy between the parties, the approach I should take is set out by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74; [2024] 1 WLR 1626, by Underhill LJ at [50]-[51]:
50. … I should recapitulate the approach that should be taken in considering whether the FTT made an error of law. At para. 72 of his judgment in HA (Iraq) (but with reference to the appeal in AA (Nigeria)) Lord Hamblen said:
"It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently – see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account – see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out – see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope."
51. Mr Malik relied on that passage but added some further points by way of amplification. The only one that I need mention is that in AA (Nigeria)1 in this Court Popplewell LJ said, at para. 34:
"Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so."
12. I set out further authorities of relevance in my decision below.
The submissions of the Parties
13. Mr. Brooks adopted the written grounds of appeal and submitted as follows:
i. The grounds of appeal at [5], refers to Al Shabab having a network of informers in Mogadishu. They are able to target people in Mogadishu. The judge found that the Appellant could relocate to Mogadishu and live a normal life. That was based on the appellant having support in Mogadishu. That typically goes to article 8 ECHR, it does not go to sufficiency of protection, the judge has applied their mind to the protection point, which is really about. The emphasis is on the factor of support, whether the appellant can be targeted by Al Shabab, and whether they would target him and whether he meets the definition of an ordinary citizen of no interest, those issues are not related to support. The whole package of conditions must be considered.
ii. The Refusal letter (bundle p.222), says there that internal relocation would not be available to the Appellant. The Respondent’s position was that internal relocation would not be available if the key facts of the Appellant’s claim were accepted. The following paragraph deals with relocation if there is no protection claim.
iii. The First-tier bundle contains the 2020 CPIN. This is a case of refoulment. FTT Judges should be aware of country guidance and the contents of the CPIN. The CPIN from June 2025 at 3.1.2 says that Al Shabab is able to infiltrate Mogadishu and has a network of informants and members there. Paragraph 3.1.3 says Al Shabab targets people who support or are perceived to support the FGS or resist the groups control. The judge found that the Appellant had resisted Al Shabab. Those matters, together with the acceptance of the lack of internal relocation in the refusal letter means the appellant cannot relocate to Mogadishu. The second sentence of 3.1.3 provides a list of people who Al Shabab are able to target. That goes to ability, sources agree Al Shabab is able to launch attacks in Mogadishu, it is a question of ability, not willingness, however, it is a non-exhaustive list. The judge found the Appellant has resisted Al Shabab, he comes within the first paragraph, someone who has resisted the groups control. The inference is that the list is exhaustive and provides a list of people that they are willing to target, that is an inference that should not be drawn from the face of the CPIN.
iv. The judge was in error as to the appellant’s clan, he is not a member of a majority clan. The judge’s conclusion was not made out on the evidence.
v. As to the rule 24 response: that states at paragraph 10 that the Respondent sought to withdraw the concession that internal relocation was not available to the Appellant at the hearing before the judge. There is nothing in the judge’s judgment to record that the concession was withdrawn. There should be an application to withdraw it, it was not, second there should be a good reason for the withdrawal, no good reason has been advanced. The rule 24 response is flawed on legal and factual grounds. The concession was never withdrawn. If there was a degree of perversity in the respondent’s position, it may be sensible for the judge to come to a different conclusion than that agreed by the parties. There is no authority that a judge is bound by a refusal letter, but in circumstances where a concession was made and was not withdrawn, it was incumbent on the judge to give reasons for not following that concession. In the absence of perversity or a reason not to follow the refusal letter the judge should give the concession considerable weight and if they go behind it they should give reasons. Additionally, every presenting officer relies on the refusal letter in their submissions. It is hard to see how the judge reached his conclusions on the face of the material before him. The steps in MH Albania [2025] UKUT 351 (IAC) were not followed. There should be good reasons for a concession to be withdrawn and for a party to address it. The appellant was denied the opportunity to make submissions on whether the respondent should be permitted to withdraw the concession. The Home Office should have made an application to the Tribunal to withdraw it. Internal relocation is not a live issue where the facts of the appellant’s case are accepted which is the phrasing in the refusal letter. Those facts having been accepted the concession should apply.
vi. The lower standard of proof applies to this claim. The respondent’s submission that it is unlikely that the appellant would be targeted has to be seen in that context.
vii. The Judge referred to OA (Somalia) at paragraphs 16 and 19, on the facts of that case, the appellant had previously lived in Mogadishu with his family. The focus was on someone who had clan support in Mogadishu, left there and would be returning there. The facts of this appellant’s case are different, he has never lived there and does not have clan support there. OA holds that a returnee with family and diaspora links is unlikely to be more than a few degrees of separation from establishing contact with extended family or their clan. The judge imported that to paragraph 20 of his conclusions. The factors in OA are relevant to a person returning to Mogadishu, not to a person who had never lived there.
14. Mr. Tufan submitted as follows:
i. The judge was obliged to follow the country guidance cases of OA, itself referring to MOJ. There was no cogent evidence to go behind what was said in those cases, that internal relocation was available to the appellant for all clans. SB (Somalia) [2019] UKUT 00358 is a case where the appellant was a member of a minority clan and the Tribunal found they could get support and could relocate internally. The judge was entitled to look at the facts and the evidence and to conclude that the appellant would be able to receive support.
ii. Simply because the Appellant had previously been targeted by Al Shabab it does not follow that he would be targeted in Mogadishu. The CPIN is not exhaustive as to categories of persons at risk. The fact that a person in the appellant’s position is not explicitly referenced does not take the appellant’s case further. Paragraph 3.1.3 of the 2025 CPIN does not show that anyone in the appellant’s category would be at risk. The paragraph should be read in its context and with the country guidance cases. It is insufficient to show that the appellant will be at risk. The CPIN at 3.1.8 states that the country information does not indicate that there are very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence to depart from the guidance in country guidance cases. That must apply.
iii. As to the issue of the withdrawal of the concession, the concession is not referred to at all by the Judge. The issues are referred at paragraph 5 of the judgment, that records that there is an agreement between the parties that internal relocation is a live issue. The appellant’s expert report focussed on the issue of internal relocation. If internal relocation was not in issue then why go to the trouble of preparing an expert report on this issue? The refusal letter in any event explains that relocation to Mogadishu is available. There is no witness statement from the presenting officer and the judge recorded that the parties agree that internal relocation was an issue for the judge to decide. Whether there was a concession that was withdrawn is not key where the parties were aware of the issues, prepared evidence and made submissions and the judge decided the point. The Appellant was not put at any disadvantage.
Analysis and discussion
15. First, the Appellant seeks to advance the sole ground of appeal in reliance on a CPIN report which was not in evidence before the Judge below. The question of whether the Appellant could internally relocate to Mogadishu was one of the principal controversial issues for determination by the judge and it was a matter on which the Judge made a detailed decision.
16. The Court of Appeal has very examined the approach that this Tribunal should take in these circumstances in the case of AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370. Giving the judgment of the Court Elisabeth Laing LJ reviewed the principal in Robinson v SSHD [1998] QB 929 at [66]-[69], holding at [69]:
The principle in Robinson is a narrow principle. It is limited to points of refugee law which favour a person who claims to be a refugee, and which are ‘obvious’ and arguable with ‘strong prospects of success’. The reason for that principle is that it is necessary to enable the United Kingdom to comply with its obligations under the Refugee Convention.
The Court then reviewed the Upper Tribunal’s decision in Lata, summarising it at [78]-[83] [81] (with emphasis added):
78. In paragraph 27 the UT said, ‘A judge in the FtT can expect clarity as to the remaining issues between the parties by the date of the substantive hearing of the appeal’. It referred to rule 2(4) of the relevant procedure rules (which deals with the overriding objective). ‘The parties’, it continued, ‘are under a duty to provide the FtT with relevant information as to the circumstances of the case, and this necessitates constructive engagement with the FtT to permit it to lawfully and properly exercise its role. The parties are therefore required to engage in the process of defining and narrowing the issues in dispute, being mindful of their obligations to the FtT’.
79. It followed, said the UT, that ‘unless a point was one which was Robinson obvious, a judge’s decision cannot be alleged to contain an error of law on the basis that a judge failed to take account of a point which was never raised for their consideration as an issue in the appeal. Such an approach would undermine the principles clearly laid out in the Procedure Rules’ (paragraph 28). The reference to a ‘Robinson obvious’ point is the decision of this court in R (Robinson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1998] QB 929 (‘Robinson’); as to which, see paragraphs 66-69, above.
….
81. The procedures in the F-tT gave ample opportunities for the parties to clarify their cases: the filing of the ASA, the Secretary of State’s review, a case management review hearing, the start of the hearing, when the judge asks what the issues are, and closing submissions. If by the end of the hearing a party has not identified an issue, a judge is entitled to assume that he or she does not need to decide it. The judge will know about the duty of anxious scrutiny in a protection case, particularly when an appellant is not represented. The duty of anxious scrutiny is not ‘an excuse for the failure of a party to identify …the principal controversial issues in the case’. On the contrary, it was the duty of the parties to identify all such issues. On an appeal to the UT ‘it should be rare indeed for there to be a point requiring anxious scrutiny (which is not Robinson obvious in the case of an appellant)’ to have escaped the notice of the F-tT under the new procedures. Proceedings in the Asylum and Immigration Chamber (‘IAC’) are not ‘some form of rolling reconsideration by either party of its position’ (paragraph 33).
82. The parties must ‘identify relevant issues of their own motion. There is no place for hiding a jewel of a submission in the hope it will purchase favour on an appeal. A party that fails to identify an issue before the FtT that it subsequently asserts to have been essential for a judge to consider is unlikely to have a good ground of appeal before’ the UT. That was not to say that the judge in the F-tT should not be curious, and not ask questions if he or she needed more help. ‘Where, as here, a point has not been identified by the parties, and nor is it one which independently drawn the attention of the judge, it is not an issue which can be appropriately raised for the first time’ on an appeal (paragraph 34).
The Court applied those principles to the facts of AL and approved the decision in Lata at [87]-[100], holding (with emphasis added):
89. It is clear from Lata that it is an appellant’s responsibility to put all her arguments before the F-tT. It is her duty to identify the points which the F-tT is required to resolve in order to decide the appeal. The UT in Lata described those as ‘the principal controversial issues’. That formula is often used in public law to define the duty of a tribunal or other decision-maker to give reasons (see, for example, South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1WLR 1953). There is therefore a deliberate symmetry, on the reasoning in Lata, between the parties’ duty to identify the main issues for the F-tT, and the F-tT’s duty to explain what it has made of those issues. The F-tT must decide those issues, and give reasons for its decision on them. But the F-tT can only decide them, and is only obliged to decide them, if the parties expressly identify them.
90. Nor is the F-tT obliged to decide every single issue which the parties have identified; only those which, in its view, will enable it to decide the appeal fairly. Nor is a tribunal required to comb through the documents and the evidence in search of potential points for either party, whether the appellant or the Secretary of State. I reject AL’s submission that the F-tT was obliged to read Dr Heke’s reports with a view to detecting the three points: the potential force of this argument is attenuated by the fact that the F-tT rejected the assumptions on which the crucial parts of Dr Heke’s reports were based. The F-tT’s function is not inquisitorial.
91. There are two qualifications to that statement. First, if the F-tT does not understand or is doubtful about an issue which is before it, it should ask the parties to clarify that issue so that it understands it. Second, the narrow principle in Robinson means that in some Refugee Convention cases, the F-tT may be obliged to investigate and decide a point which an appellant has not identified. That principle does not apply in this case, not least because the F-tT carefully considered and rejected AL’s claim under the Refugee Convention, and because AL’s argument does not meet the stringent merits test articulated in Robinson.
…
93. The F-tT cannot now, on an appeal on a point of law, be criticised for not considering a case which AL did not advance. The F-tT was invited to, and did, consider two of those points in the context of AL’s article 8 claim. It did not consider the impact of the removal process because it was not asked to (see paragraph 62, above). In reaching that conclusion I have taken into account the explanation of paragraph 16 of determination 3 in footnote 5 of AL’s skeleton argument. But even if the UT misunderstood counsel’s point, the fact remains that the F-tT did not refer to this argument in its painstaking reasons. I again infer from that that AL simply did not make that point to the F-tT. The F-tT held that AL’s removal was proportionate for the detailed reasons which it gave. In the light of that finding, it is inconceivable that, had the F-tT considered the three points in relation to the stricter article 3 test, the F-tT could have found that that test was met.
…
99. Finally, I said that I would comment on this court’s decision in AAZA2. In the light of the new procedural rigour which applies in the F-tT, the duty on the parties to identify the principal controversial issues in an appeal, their many opportunities to do so, and the fact that appeals to the UT and to this court are on a point of law only, I find it difficult to imagine a case in which the application of Lata could result in any injustice, let alone serious injustice.
17. Applying those principles to this Ground of Appeal I do not consider that there can be any criticism of the judge for not deciding the Appellant’s case on a basis which was not put before them. It is correct that the issue of internal relocation was live before the judge. However, it does not appear that the Appellant’s legal representatives placed the June 2025 CPIN before the judge. It does not appear in the First-tier bundle provided to me. It is not referred to by the judge in their judgment, nor is it referred to in the expert report relied on by the Appellant, which was drafted prior to June 2025. In my judgment, the appellant cannot now criticise the judge for not applying or having regard to a particular report which was not placed before them and where there is no explanation for this failing. Applying Lata at [34], as approved by the Court of Appeal in AL, the point of internal relocation was identified by the parties as being in issue. However, the June 2025 CPIN not having been placed before the judge, there can be no criticism of them for not taking it into account.
18. Second, as to the substance of the evidence now relied on by the Appellant, I remind myself that a CPIN is not country guidance and should not be treated as if it were. In this case, the judge correctly identified the relevant country guidance cases and applied them. Bearing in mind the approach that I should take to this issue, as explained in Yalcin, I do not consider that there is any scope for arguing that the judge failed to properly apply the Country Guidance cases, which they expressly said that they took into account. I also accept the submission made by the Respondent that the June 2025 CPIN report itself states at paragraph 3.1.8 that “The available country information does not indicate that there are very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence to depart from the UT’s findings in MOJ (and affirmed by the UT in the case of OA).”
19. Third, and in any event, I do not consider that the Appellant’s submissions in reliance on the CPIN are well founded. The appellant places great weight on the statement at paragraph 3.1.2 that Al Shabab is able to infiltrate Mogadishu and to maintain a network of informants there. The CPIN continues at 3.1.3:
“Al Shabab targets people who support or are perceived to support the FGS or resist the group's control. Sources agree that Al Shabab continues to be able to launch attacks in Mogadishu, mainly targeting people or places linked to the government and its allies, including African Union support forces. It has also targeted business people, NGOs, international aid workers and journalists. The group has reportedly attacked businesses in retaliation for installing surveillance cameras which might detect Al Shabab members linked to the group’s ‘tax’ collection activities. Sources are, however, consistent in stating that Al Shabab does not target ‘ordinary’ Somalis but it has shown little regard in preventing ‘collateral damage’ - civilian casualties – when targeting the government and its allies. Al Shabab uses a range of methods to attack its targets including suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and assassinations (see Al Shabab – Targets).”
20. The appellant submits that he would be considered a person who has resisted Al Shabab’s control. However, it seems to me important to read the first sentence of paragraph 3.1.3 in its context. The remainder of the paragraph sets out the types of people who are ‘mainly’ targeted by Al Shabab. It is beyond argument that the Appellant does not fall into any of the groups described in that paragraph. Mr. Brooks’ forensic argument was that that was not a closed list of people whom Al Shabab target and the judge found that the appellant fell within the category of persons who had resisted Al Shabab. It seems to me that in resolving this issue I must bear in mind paragraph 3.1.8 of the CPIN which states that there is no basis to depart from Country Guidance. Accordingly, I do not consider that this paragraph shows that the Appellant could not relocate to Mogadishu because of risk to him there from Al Shabab. The contents of the CPIN do not change the country guidance in MOJ, recapped in OA at [30]. The judge properly applied the Country Guidance cases in their judgment at [16]-[25] and reached conclusions that were wholly open to them. I do not consider that they would have reached a different conclusion had this CPIN been placed before them.
21. Fourth, the Appellant attacks the judge’s conclusions regarding the Appellant’s clan and his ability to support himself if returned to Mogadishu. It is correct that the judge erred in fact in finding that the Appellant is from a majority clan. However, I do not consider that this is a material error of law in circumstances where the judge took a holistic approach to the support that would be available to the Appellant in the event of his return to Mogadishu and applied the relevant country guidance correctly. I do not accept that the judge was not entitled or permitted to find that the Appellant would be able to receive financial support from his relatives in the USA as he had done previously. There was no evidence before the Judge that the Appellant would not receive this support if he needed it. The judge also took into account the fact that the Appellant is fit and healthy, would be able to work and would be capable of forming and developing support networks with Somali nationals and that he had done so in the UK previously. Cumulatively, the judge was entitled to find that all of these factors showed that the Appellant would be able to relocate internally to Mogadishu. Their approach was entirely consistent with that approved by the Court of Appeal in ASJ (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 282 on the issue of internal relocation to Mogadishu and I do not consider that there is any error of law in their conclusion.
22. Fifth, for completeness, both parties took some time at the hearing to address me on the question of whether the Respondent had made a concession in the refusal letter that the Appellant could not relocate internally in Somalia and whether that concession had properly been withdrawn (if it was made). I do not consider that this issue is entirely clear cut. It is correct that the Refusal letter of 23 November 2023 appears to state that there would not be sufficient protection from persecution in Somalia and that the Appellant could not internally relocate in Somalia. However, it then goes on to state that the CPIN on Al Shabab at that time stated that a person from any clan could internally relocate to Mogadishu. However, regardless of any ambiguity on the face of that letter, the issue of internal relocation was plainly an issue in controversy by the time of the hearing before the Judge. The appellant’s skeleton argument for that hearing provided a list of issues. Issue (d) was as follows: “It is rejected that the Appellant would be at risk on return as the SSHD does not accept that the Somalia authorities are unable to protect him and that he cannot relocate within Somalia.” As I noted at the hearing, the appellant’s representatives went to the trouble of obtaining an expert report which opined on the issue of the viability of internal relocation for the Appellant. The Respondent’s review for the hearing before the judge made clear that this point was in issue at paragraph 4(ii) recording the following as an issue for the tribunal to determine “(ii) Whether there is sufficient protection from persecution or the possibility to relocate in Somalia.” As I have noted the judge indicated that the parties agreed the issues for decision at [5], the second issue being whether the Appellant can reasonably be expected to relocate to Mogadishu to avoid those who seek to harm him.
23. Taking a step back, it appears to me that it was clear to both parties that internal relocation was in issue for the hearing before the judge and that the Respondent had not conceded that the Appellant could not relocate internally. Otherwise, that issue would not have been raised in the counter schedule of issues in the Respondent’s review. It is also significant that the judge describes the issues at [5] as being agreed. Accordingly, I do not consider that a question of withdrawal of a concession arises in these circumstances. If there was a concession that was improperly withdrawn the Appellant suffered no prejudice in the circumstances because he was able to provide expert evidence on this issue and was able to make submissions on the point. Mr. Brooks submitted that the appellant was deprived of the opportunity to challenge the withdrawal of the concession. However, I prefer Mr. Tufan’s submission on this point that whether or not there was a concession which was withdrawn is peripheral in circumstances where the issue was squarely before the judge, the parties called evidence and made submissions on it and the Judge decided it, none of which put the appellant at any disadvantage. Applying Lata, the issues in controversy were properly identified by the parties and were decided by the judge. No material error of law arises in the circumstances I have set out above.
24. Accordingly, applying AL at [82], [89] and [93], I conclude that the issues were clear before the judge and were decided by them. The question of whether there had been a concession which was withdrawn does not appear to have been in dispute before the judge. Internal relocation was in issue was identified as being an issue in controversy at the hearing and that issue was expressly decided by the judge. The Appellant does not appear to have raised the issue of the withdrawal of the concession before the Judge. As explained by the Court of Appeal in AL at [93] the judge cannot now be criticised for failing to decide a case which the Appellant did not advance before them.
25. I reject this ground of appeal.

Notice of Decision
26. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision did not involve the making of an error of law.
27. The appeal is dismissed.

D Sternberg

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 May 2026

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.

6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email