UI-2026-000957

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 16 Jun 2026
• Promulgation date: 02 Jul 2026
• Publication date: 21 Jul 2026
• Last updated on: 21 Jul 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000957
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/73906/2024


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 2nd of July 2026


Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE


Between

HD
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr J Greer, instructed by Venire Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr M Diwnycz, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 16 June 2026


DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a national of Afghanistan whose date of birth is recorded as 1 January 2002. He appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 8 October 2024 refusing his asylum and human rights claims.

2. The appellant arrived in the UK by boat on 25 August 2023, having left Afghanistan on 25 May 2022 and travelled via Iran, Italy, Switzerland, Germany and France. He claimed asylum on 26 August 2023. His claim was refused on 8 October 2024 and he appealed against that decision.

3. The appellant claimed to fear persecution by the Taliban because he had previously been caught by them selling alcoholic drinks in his shop, and also because his father and brother had been involved with the army under the previous government.

4. The respondent, in refusing the appellant’s claim, considered that it did not engage the Refugee Convention. The respondent accepted that the appellant was Afghan, that he sold alcoholic drinks in his shop and that his father and brother worked for the previous government of Afghanistan, but did not accept that he would be risk on return to that country. The appellant’s claim that his shop had been raided by the Taliban was not accepted and neither was it accepted that he was of adverse interest to the Taliban. The respondent considered that the appellant had given inconsistent evidence about whether his shop was raided. Further, the respondent noted, with regard to some threatening letters which the appellant had produced and claimed to have come from the Taliban, that they came from the police and not the Taliban. The respondent considered that no weight could be given to the documents. The respondent also considered that the appellant’s evidence about the roles his father and brother had in the previous government was both internally inconsistent and inconsistent with the country evidence. The respondent considered that the appellant did not fall within the risk criteria in relation to Afghanistan. The respondent accepted that if the material facts of his claim were accepted, the appellant could not access sufficient protection from persecution in Afghanistan, but did not accept the material facts of his claim. The respondent considered that the appellant could relocate to Kabul. The respondent concluded that the appellant was not at risk on return to Afghanistan and that his removal to that country would not breach huis human rights.

5. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his asylum claim. His appeal was heard on 23 December 2025 in the First-tier Tribunal. It was conceded by the respondent that the appellant would not be able to seek protection or safely relocate in Afghanistan, if his account was credible. It was also conceded that there was an inconsistency between the refusal decision where the respondent accepted that the appellant’s brother and father worked for the Afghan government and the respondent’s review where that was not accepted. For the appellant it was submitted that there were three reasons why he was at risk in Afghanistan: his Tajik ethnicity, an imputed anti-Islamic view due to the fact that he sold alcohol, and the fact that his father and brother worked against the Taliban. The appellant gave oral evidence before the Tribunal. He claimed that he was an ethnic Tajik, that his father worked for Ahmad Shah Masoud’s organisation and his elder brother worked with the Afghan National Police, that as a shopkeeper he sold alcohol and that as a result of that as well as his brother and fathers’ involvement in the Afghan government the Taliban threatened to kill him. He claimed that his father had a role in resistance against the Taliban and he was tortured as a result.

6. The judge found that none of the reasons the appellant relied on engaged the Refugee Convention. He did not accept that the fact that the appellant sold alcohol before the Taliban came to power imposed on him an imputed un-Islamic opinion and considered that he was more likely to fall into the category of someone who was either perceived to be westernised or had a vague or specific fear of the Taliban for selling alcohol. The judge considered that the background country evidence fell far short of demonstrating that those of Tajik ethnicity faced persecution and did not accept that merely being a member of such a group would engage the Refugee Convention. At its highest, the judge did not accept that the role of the appellant’s father and brother in the government family members would bring him within the Convention, as the CPIN did not indicate that family members of those working for the government would specifically be targeted for persecution. The judge found in any event that the appellant’s claim was not credible, owing to inconsistencies in his evidence. He did not consider the three letters produced by the appellant to be reliable documents, since the appellant said that they came from the Taliban, yet the letters were evidently from the police. He considered that the documents had been tampered with and did not give them any weight. The judge found it implausible that the appellant would have closed his shop before the Taliban took over and that they nevertheless would have either written letters or in any way wished to target or persecute the appellant for previously selling alcohol. He did not accept that the appellant had been targeted because of his Tajik ethnicity and found the appellant’s account of the roles held by his father and brother to be inconsistent. The judge noted that the appellant had not produced any evidence of their claimed roles. He did not accept that the appellant’s father and brother were of adverse interest to the Taliban and did not accept that the appellant would be at risk due to association as a family member. The judge concluded that the appellant would be at no risk on return to Afghanistan and dismissed his appeal, in a decision promulgated on 24 December 2025.

7. The appellant sought permission to appeal against the judge’s decision on five grounds. Firstly, that the judge misdirected himself as to whether the appellant feared persecution for a Convention reason, by conflating the questions of Convention eason and risk. Secondly, that the judge misdirected himself with respect to Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00439 by alleging documents had been tampered with and placing the burden of proving the contrary on the appellant. Thirdly, that the judge gave weight to immaterial considerations and failed to give adequate reasons, making assumptions about the interaction between the police and the Taliban which was not borne out by the country evidence and making assumptions about the Taliban’s enforcement of morality offences. Fourthly, that the judge failed to apply the guidance in MH (Appendix EU, withdrawal of concession) Albania [2025] UKUT 351 (IAC) regarding withdrawal of concessions. Fifthly, that the judge failed to assess risk cumulatively.

8. Permission was granted in the First-tier Tribunal on all grounds.

9. The respondent produced a rule 24 response opposing the appeal.

10. The matter came before myself for a hearing. Both parties made submissions. Mr Greer relied, and expanded upon, the grounds of appeal. Mr Diwnycz, in his submissions, agreed that the judge came close to making an error of law but submitted that there was no error of law, stating that he was not resiling from the rule 24 response.

Analysis

11. I start by commenting on the difficulty I had understanding the respondent’s position. Mr Diwnycz submitted that the forgery allegation vexed him and that there may be an error of law in the way the judge dealt with the Tanveer Ahmed. He made limited comments on the other grounds. Given the lack of clarity in his submissions I had to ask him twice to clarify whether he was in fact conceding that there was a material error of law in the judge’s decision. He advised me that he agreed that the judge came close to making an error of law although ultimately he submitted that there was no error.

12. With that near concession, or at least the lack of clarity in the respondent’s position, in mind, I do find that there is merit in at least some parts of the grounds.

13. The first ground clearly identified an error of law, in that the judge appeared to have misunderstood the guidance in JCK v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100 in relation to section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and conflated the questions of Convention reason and risk. At [17], [19] and [21], the judge appeared to consider that a Refugee Convention reason was only established on the grounds of imputed political opinion and race/ethnicity where there was evidence of persecution/risk, when that is of course not correct. Nevertheless, as Mr Greer accepted, that was not in itself a material error of law requiring the decision to be set aside if the judge’s credibility findings and his findings on risk on return were otherwise sustainable.

14. However I do not find that they are sustainable. Whilst I do not accept that the judge erred in his application of Tanveer Ahmed, I do accept that he erred by making findings on the basis of plausibility without putting that into the context of the country background evidence, leading to a lack of clarity as to how he reached the findings that he did. I agree with what is said in the grant of permission, that the judge failed to provide sufficient reasons to explain why it was implausible that the local police command and the Taliban would be one and the same thing. Further, that there were no adequate reasons given by the judge as to why it was implausible that the Taliban would issue letters after their takeover to persons who had previously sold alcohol. As Mr Greer properly submitted, the Taliban takeover did not suddenly happen overnight but they had control and influence over parts of the country prior to their return to power, and the judge therefore simply failed to explain his findings in that context. Whilst there may be other reasons for doubting the appellant’s account of the events relating to his shop, the reasons given in particular, and relied upon, by the judge were, in my view, inadequately explained.

15. In addition to the above, the grounds also properly identify a failure by the judge to deal with, and resolve, the inconsistency in the respondent’s position on the roles of the appellant’s father and brother, as pointed out at [8(b)]. Whilst that alone would not necessarily be a material error, given the judge’s findings at [20] and [35] on the absence of risk arising from their roles, it nevertheless feeds into the overall unsustainability of the judge’s decision.

16. For all these reasons the decision must be set aside and the matter considered afresh. Given that the concerns with the judge’s decision go to the core of his adverse credibility findings, it seems to me that the matter has to be considered afresh, without any findings being preserved. In the circumstances, the nature and extent of the necessary fact finding requires the matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing.

Notice of Decision

17. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law. The decision is set aside. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be dealt with afresh pursuant to section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and Practice Statement 7.2(b).

Anonymity
The anonymity order previously made is continued.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 June 2026