Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000972
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/69003/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
17th August 2026

Before

DEPUTY CHAMBER PRESIDENT PLIMMER

Between

SA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Forrest, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Melville Street, Edinburgh, on 13 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq, who originates from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (‘KRI’). He has appealed with permission, against a First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) decision dated 31 October 2025, dismissing his appeal on asylum and human rights grounds.
2. I have continued the anonymity order made by the FTT, as the requirements under the Refugee Convention in this particular case outweigh the demands of open justice. No party sought to argue otherwise.
Background
3. The appellant has a lengthy immigration history but it can be summarised for the purposes of this decision. The appellant entered the United Kingdom (‘UK’) in 2019, and claimed asylum the next day. This was refused and his appeal against that decision was dismissed in a FTT decision dated 17 August 2021 (‘the 2021 FTT decision’). The appellant made further submissions relying upon fresh evidence but this was also refused. This led to the decision under appeal.
4. The appellant’s asylum claim was summarised in the FTT decision at [2]. The appellant claims to be an atheist who has opened a Facebook account and posted anti-Islamic posts whilst in the UK. He received threats from individuals in Iraq and fears persecution upon return for reasons relating to his atheism and his Facebook posts. In that regard he relied upon a country expert report by Dr Pargeter dated 12 November 2024. He also claims he will be unable to obtain the relevant identity documentation to safely make his way from Baghdad to his home area.
5. Having heard evidence from the appellant and having taken into account the 2021 FTT decision and the further evidence relied upon, the FTT dismissed the appellant’s appeal and provided careful, comprehensive reasons for doing so. I summarise the FTT’s reasoning below.
(i) 2011 FTT decision. The FTT noted at [19] that the starting point is the 2021 FTT decision and in particular the finding in that decision that the appellant’s alienation from Islam did not lead to any major falling out with his family, with whom he had not lost contact, and could be expected to meet him at the airport with his CSID.
(ii) Country expert. The FTT addressed the country expert report at [20] observing that this added little to the material contained in the Country Policy and Information Note on Iraq – Religious Minorities, September 2024 (‘the CPIN’) and the two examples of persecution of atheists in the IKR in 2013 and 2014 were not indicative of any pattern of persecution.
(iii) Facebook account and posts. The FTT noted at [21] that many of the posts uploaded to the appellant’s Facebook account are anti-Islamic in nature, and this account was only opened in September 2021, after the 2011 FTT decision, but the posts appear to be from a limited timeframe of June-August 2023 and attracted very few comments. The FTT acknowledged at [22 and 23] that the appellant attempted to provide his full Facebook account in accordance with XX (PJAK-sur place activities-Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC) but most of the posts were untranslated and of limited value; although the posts that were translated were anti-Islamic in nature, these attracted very limited attention given the very small number of comments. At [24] the FTT noted the appellant’s reference to threatening posts received from two individuals in the IKR but found these to be “a one off from over two years ago”. At [25] the FTT concluded that the appellant did not genuinely hold anti-Islamic views and drew particular attention to the timing of the opening of the appellant’s Facebook account, the fact that the posts of consequence were limited to the months leading to the fresh claim submissions in September 2023, and there was no evidence of further similar posts.
(iv) Alternative finding if a genuine atheist. At [26] the FTT went on to consider the appellant’s risk in the IKR if he was a genuine atheist on the premise that the primary finding that he was not an atheist was mistaken. The FTT concluded that even if the appellant is an atheist, he would not be persecuted in the IKR and he would not be active in expressing his beliefs.
(v) Risk on return – imputed political / religious opinion. The FTT concluded at [27] that the appellant ‘s critical Facebook posts were opportunistic in nature and he could be expected to make a timely closure of his Facebook account, which would neutralise any risks arising from past posts, in accordance with XX.
(vi) Westernisation. The FTT noted at [28] that the claim to be at risk because of the appellant’s perceived “Westernisation” was inextricably linked to his anti-Islam claims, which failed for the reasons provided.
(vii) Identity documentation. The FTT concluded at [29] that the appellant’s updated witness statement simply reiterated evidence found to be unreliable and rejected in the 2021 FTT decision, and the photographs of the appellant at the Iraqi embassy added little. In those circumstances, the 2021 FTT findings were adopted: the appellant had a CSID in the IKR and could be met at the airport by family members.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. In a decision dated 3 March 2026, the appellant was granted permission to rely upon the four of the six grounds of appeal submitted - grounds 2, 4, 5 and 6.
7. At the beginning of the hearing Mr Forrest withdrew reliance upon grounds 5 and 6. He was correct to do so. As he acknowledged the recent Court of Appeal decision of KD v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 349 clarified the correct approach to Devaseelan (Second Appeals – ECHR – Extra-Territorial Effect) Sri Lanka) [2002] UKIAT 00702, [2003] Imm AR 1, such that grounds 5 and 6 were bound to fail.
8. That left grounds 2 and 4. Mr Forrest relied upon the grounds of appeal, the rule 25 response and the skeleton arguments. However, Mr Forrest accepted that grounds 2 and 4 are both predicated upon the FTT’s alternative finding that the appellant was an atheist, in the event that the primary finding that the appellant does not hold genuine atheist views was wrong. I enquired how these grounds could give rise to material errors without a challenge to the primary finding that the appellant’s atheism / anti-Islamic outlook was rejected. Mr Forrest made two submissions in response. First, he sought permission to rely upon an amended ground 3 (in relation to which permission had been refused). In order to do so he also required permission to rely upon fresh evidence relating to the appellant’s Facebook posts not before the FTT. At the hearing I gave reasons for rejecting this application which I summarise below. Second, Mr Forrest submitted that the FTT clearly had doubts about the primary finding, otherwise it would not have made alternative findings. I can detect no hesitation or doubts emerging from the FTT’s clear and careful reasoning on the primary finding and I reject that submission.
9. I considered the brief application to rely upon fresh evidence and to renew the application for permission to appeal in relation to ground 3. Ground 3 alleges that the FTT finding that the appellant’s sur place activities in the form of his Facebook posts was not genuine because they occurred in a limited timeframe is irrational. It was said that timing alone cannot undermine genuineness. It was also submitted that historical activity is less important than future conduct. Permission to appeal was correctly refused on this ground. The FTT was entitled to reach the finding that the appellant was not a genuine atheist, for the reasons it provided. Although Mr Forrest sought to renew ground 3, he was in fact seeking to rely upon an entirely new ground of appeal. The appellant now sought to argue that the FTT was mistaken in fact to find the posts were only made in a limited timeframe. To do so he required permission to rely upon a Facebook Activity Report post-dating the FTT decision, which appeared to show that there were more posts over a longer period of time than the evidence before the FTT indicated. I asked whether the posts now sought to be relied upon were translated and Mr Forrest admitted they had not been. Whilst passing reference was made to R (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 in the skeleton argument (without citation), Mr Forrest did not outline the test or explain how it could be met here. No reference was made to Ladd v Marshall criteria.
10. The appellant has sought to renew his application for permission significantly out of time. The application was required to be made 14 days after the FTT refused permission on ground 3: 17 March 2026. The application was not made until 7 August 2026, nearly five months later. This is a serious and significant breach. The skeleton argument that makes the application (without completing the appropriate UT forms) offers no explanation for the delay in obtaining the Facebook report and no explanation for failing to obtain such a report for the FTT.
11. There are therefore no reasons provided why the report could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use before the FTT. In the absence of translations of the relevant posts (which I was not taken to) it cannot be said that the report would have had an important influence on the result. The evidence may be credible but without translations as to the content that is unknown. There are no compelling reasons to grant an extension given the subject matter sought to be relied upon. I therefore declined permission to rely upon the fresh evidence. Absent that evidence, there are no compelling reasons to grant an extension of time to rely upon what was said to be an amended ground 3 but is in fact a new ground of appeal.
12. Without any challenge to the FTT’s primary factual finding before me, Mr Forrest was unable to establish that any errors in the alternative finding were material. It follows that the remaining grounds of appeal are not made out.
13. The Court of Appeal have recently underlined the importance of procedural rigour in AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370 and SSHD v Hirtie [2026] EWCA Civ 1000, which highlighted the established procedural principles in Lata (FtT: Principal Controversial Issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC), [2023] Imm AR 1416, and embedded in the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. The appellant’s legal representatives have not approached this matter with the procedural rigour that is to be expected. There remains the possibility of a properly explained and presented Facebook report supporting a fresh claim for asylum but that is a matter for the appellant and his advisors, and not the UT.
Conclusion
14. I therefore conclude that the FTT made factual findings entirely open to it on the material available to it. The grounds of appeal in relation to which permission has been granted do not contain a material error of law.
Decision
The decision of the FTT does not contain a material error of law and is dismissed.

DCP Plimmer
Deputy Chamber President Plimmer

14 August 2026