Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000986
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62779/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

14th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RICHARDS

Between

AA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Adejumobi
For the Respondent: Ms S Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 24 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and any member of their family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant or any member of their family, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or any other member of their family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. This is an appeal by the Appellant and his 5 dependents against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 15 December 2025 dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Respondent dated 25 April 2024 refusing his asylum and protection claim made in March 2023.

2. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) found that the Appellant does not fear persecution based on a reason in the Refugee Convention on the basis that he appears to find the Appellant’s account to not be credible. He went on to dismiss the appeal on asylum grounds, Article 3 grounds, and Article 8 grounds.

3. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal and on 3 March 2026 a different First-tier Tribunal Judge from the one that made the initial decision on the appeal decided to grant permission on all grounds.

4. The case then came before us where we considered the bundle of 452 pages and heard submissions. The submissions of the parties have been audio recorded and are thus not repeated here. At the conclusion of the hearing, we reserved our decision which we are delivering now.

5. The Judge did make an anonymity order in their decision and there was no application before us to discharge or vary it. We have had regard to Guidance Note 2022 No.2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private and Kambadzi v SSHD [2011] UKSC 23 as well as the strong public interest in open justice and have decided that the United Kingdom’s obligations towards an applicant for international protection outweigh the open justice considerations and we have maintained the anonymity order

Grounds of appeal

6. The Appellant asserts that the Judge failed to make findings of fact about material issues in dispute between the parties and instead essentially summarised the submissions on behalf of the Respondent and said he was persuaded by them. The Appellant further asserts that the Judge did not provide adequate reasons for their decision.

Error-of-law

7. The role of a First-tier Tribunal Judge can be a challenging one – there are many aspects of the role that all need to be performed adequately in order for their decision to be lawful. In focus in this appeal are the requirements on a Judge to make findings of fact on all material matters and explain their decision adequately.

8. This is helpfully summarised in [9] of R (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 where it gives guidance on common material errors of law including “failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters” and “failing to…resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters”.

9. Of relevance also here in relation to the duty on a judge to provide adequate reasons, is summarised in headnote (2) of MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) which states:

…A bare statement that a witness was not believed or that a document was afforded no weight is unlikely to satisfy the requirement to give reasons.

10. In this case the Respondent’s refusal to accept the Appellant’s asylum claim is founded on their view that the Appellant lacks credibility and as such he is not at real risk on return to Algeria. It was thus incumbent on the Judge to make findings on what relevant aspects of the Appellant’s evidence he accepted, which parts he rejected, and potentially also which parts he could not reach a conclusion on.

11. The Appellant’s claim in relation to risk on return is multifaceted. For example, as outlined at [6] of his witness statements before the First-tier Tribunal:

It is my position that my claim for asylum is based on my fear of being subjected to discrimination and ill treatment at the hands of the Algerian Authorities along with a non-state agent, arising from societal attitudes towards Berbers by the Algerian majority. I also fear being subjected to ill treatment based on my imputed political opinion by virtue of alleged and perceived opposition to the current regime and its associated security apparatus as well as based on my status as a failed asylum seeker.

12. Elsewhere in the Appellant’s evidence he expands on his purported fear of a non-state agent claiming that his refusal to assist a business partner and a senior state official in the arms trade also caused him to fear persecution.

13. The section of the Judge’s decision where he provides analysis, evaluation and findings relating to the asylum claim and the subjective fear test in particular can be found at his [16-23] as follows.

I have considered all of the evidence before me. I note in particular the detailed evidence given by the appellant during the asylum interview, the detailed witness statement and the lengthy evidence given by the appellant during the hearing.

I find that Appellant's immigration history does engage section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004. I note the Appellant's failure to claim earlier following the appellant’s arrival in the United Kingdom. I find that section 8 is engaged and that the Appellant's credibility is damaged. However, whilst the Appellant's credibility is damaged and the appellant’s evidence needs to be subjected to enhanced scrutiny, I do not consider this on its own to be determinative.

In respects of credibility the respondent relied on a number of discrepancies within the evidence which were expanded upon by Mr Maverantonis, who represented the respondent, within his submissions. Mr Maverantonis submitted that the appellant’s account had significantly altered between the screening interview, the asylum interview, and the oral hearing to such an extent as to justify and necessitate adverse credibility findings.

For example in the screening interview the appellant maintained that he had wished to cut business ties with his business partner because the business partner had been accused of money laundering. By the time of the asylum interview the appellant’s case was that his business partner had pressured him to become an arms dealer. Finally by the tribunal hearing the appellant stated that he was wanted by the authorities in Algeria and that an arrest warrant had been issued and that his problems were exacerbated by the fact that he was a Berber. Mr Maverantonis submits that this is not merely a clarification of the claim but significant discrepancy within the appellant’s claim that amounts to 3 different versions of events.

In respect of the recently provided arrest warrant Mr Mavarantonis submitted that it is not credible, given that the appellant maintains that he was investigated over a period of a 144 hours, prior to his departure from Algeria, and was fingerprinted by the authorities (again no mention of this within his screening interview when asked if he had been fingerprinted), that the appellant would not have mentioned this prior to the appeal hearing. When asked, at question 3 of the cross examination, why the appellant had waited three years to disclose this investigation into him by the authorities, his response was that he had forgotten about this.

Mr Maverantonis identified further discrepancies in the appellant’s evidence. During cross examination the appellant had stated that he had not worked in Dubai whilst in the screening interview he had said that he had. Further the appellant was now maintaining that he had not been detained by the authorities and investigated over a period of 144 hours whereas in the screening interview he stated that he had been detained or investigated by the authorities.

Mr Maverantonis noted that the appellant’s wife, who the appellant alleges was assaulted by his business partner prior to her departure, did not attend the hearing and did not provide a witness statement despite this evidence going to the core of the appellant’s claimed fear of his business partner. I further note that in the screening interview when the wife was asked if she wanted to make her own asylum claim she stated that she had come to United Kingdom for a
visit (3.1) and confirmed that she had no fear of persecution in her own right.

In summary Mr Maverantonis submitted that the appellant’s account had changed substantially since the screening interview and was riddled with inconsistencies. I am persuaded by these submissions and find that the appellant has not made out his subjective fear on a balance of probabilities.

14. In our judgment the Judge has failed to make adequate findings on material matters in dispute between the parties and has failed to provide adequate reasons for their decision. These failings in our judgment are central to the determination of this case and are material errors of law.

15. The Judge has failed to make findings on the Appellant’s explanations for the inconsistencies or apparent inconsistencies in his evidence. He was under a duty to do so. Instead the Judge has essentially recited the Respondent’s submissions and said he agreed with it. The Judge has also failed to make findings on other aspects of the Appellant’s claim by which he was claiming subjective fear (see [11-12] above) and are not explicitly addressed by the Judge at all.

16. Furthermore, the Judge has failed to explain why he was rejecting the arguments put forward on behalf of the Appellant at the hearing. Indeed, he does not overtly engage with them whatsoever. Where a relevant material argument is being put forward by or on behalf of an Appellant, a Judge is under a duty to state whether they accept or reject it, and to explain their reasons.

17. For these reasons we find that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 15 December 2025 must be set aside.

18. In terms of disposal, both parties agreed that if we find an error-of-law we should remit the case back to the First-tier Tribunal. We have had regard to [7.2-7.3] of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal as well as the submissions of both parties and have determined that case shall be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing.

19. Nothing in this decision should be taken as an indication of whether or not the Appellant’s appeal will ultimately succeed or not.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal made on 15 December 2025 involved the making of a material error on a point of law.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside and the case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a different Judge than the one who made the decision on 15 December 2025. No findings are preserved.

Judge Richards

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

31 July 2026