Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000991
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/68444/2023
LP/11876/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

4th September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

HT
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Janjua, instructed by Morden Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M. Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant has made a claim for international protection. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity order because it considered that the public interest in the UK’s discharge of its obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighed the public interest in open justice in the particular circumstances of this case. I have not been asked to set aside this order, and I agree that it should continue at this stage in the appellant’s appeal.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Vietnam, born in Vietnam in 1986. He arrived in the UK by air on 29 September 2021 and claimed asylum at the airport. He said at his screening interview that he could not return to Vietnam because he had borrowed around £13,000 to pay for therapy sessions for his son, who has special needs, and he could not repay the debt.
3. The respondent did not interview the appellant about his asylum claim until 3 August 2023. At the interview, the appellant repeated that he feared that he would be captured and harmed by a moneylender if he returned to Vietnam. He was asked if these were “all your reasons for claiming asylum”, and he answered, “Yes”. He was also asked if he had ever had any problems in Vietnam due to his religion and he said yes: “Once he was following a gentleman as a pilgrim, the police arrived and dispersed everyone and did not allow any gathering”. The police had “vandalised” and arrested the organiser of the ceremony and made everyone leave. That was the only issue he had ever had. His religion was Luong. He had never been arrested or been politically active in Vietnam, the UK or any other country. He was asked when his problems in Vietnam began, and he said it was in early 2019. He had been targeted by “gangsters” from whom he had borrowed money that he could not repay. In response to a long series of questions, he detailed the ways the gangsters had threatened and harmed him from 2019 until he fled the country in 2021. At the end of the interview, he confirmed that he had nothing to add.
4. On 9 August 2023, the appellant submitted a witness statement in which he raised a fear of persecution for reasons of religion. He said that he had become a follower of Hoa Hao Buddhism in 2017. He then gave a detailed account of having come to the attention of the police four times in connection with his faith: in November 2017 and February 2021, when the police interrupted religious ceremonies in private homes; in August 2019, when the police attended his home because of threats from his creditors and they discovered Hoa Hao materials there; and in May 2021, when he was seen distributing leaflets denouncing religious persecution by the government. On the first occasion, he and his partner were beaten so badly that they required hospitalisation. On the second and third occasions, he was arrested and detained for ten days. He was repeatedly beaten, threatened, interrogated and insulted during his detention before being released after signing a commitment not to engage in anti-regime activity. After each of these first three encounters, he was subjected to ongoing government surveillance. On the last occasion, he evaded arrest, but the police were able to identify him. He later learned that they had come to his home and discovered more leaflets there. He then fled the country.
5. On 14 December 2023, the respondent refused the appellant’s protection claim. The decision-maker noted the inconsistencies between the appellant’s answers at his interview and his witness statement and rejected his claim of religious persecution on credibility grounds. The decision-maker then noted that by his own account, there had been several periods in which the gangsters he claimed to fear could have located him but did not do so. This was not considered “reasonable”, by which the decision-maker may have meant plausible. It was also found to indicate that internal relocation would be available. The decision-maker found, in the alternative, that the country evidence indicated that followers of Hoa Hao Buddhism were not at real risk of persecution and were able to practice their religion freely as long as they did not express political opinions critical of the government. It was noted that the appellant had said at his interview that he had not been politically active in Vietnam or the UK.
6. The appellant appealed. On 6 February 2025, he provided his appeal bundle. This included a witness statement. He gave further details regarding events in Vietnam, in line with his post-interview witness statement. He then explained that he had not disclosed his faith or experiences of religious persecution at his interview due to his poor mental health, his lack of English and his fear that if he were forced to return to Vietnam, the Vietnamese government would persecute him for “disclosing this information to the UK authorities”. He further disclosed that “since arriving in the UK”, he had become a member of the Brotherhood for Democracy. He had attended demonstrations outside the Vietnamese Embassy in April and October 2024, and at the second demonstration he had given a speech. He also submitted: a medical report diagnosing him with severe depression, severe anxiety, and PTSD; private medical records; pictures of scars; a Brotherhood for Democracy membership card; a letter from Brotherhood for Democracy to the appellant, extending a welcome to him “as our newest member”, dated 28 September 2022; photographs labelled as being of him attending demonstrations outside the Vietnamese Embassy in April and October 2024; and country evidence.
7. The respondent conducted a review and maintained her decision.
8. In early July 2025, the appellant submitted a second appeal bundle. This contained: photographs purporting to be of the appellant attending another demonstration outside the Vietnamese Embassy, on 4 May 2025; a document in Vietnamese, with a certified translation, purporting to be a summons issued to the appellant on 6 May 2025, directing him to appear at a local police station in Vietnam on 8 May 2026 for “Investigating on the protest to go against the Vietnamese Communist Party at the United Kingdom on 4th May, 2025”; a picture of an envelope addressed to the appellant in the UK and sent from Vietnam on 7 May 2025; and shipping receipt for the same date; and a witness statement from a practicing Hoa Hao Buddhist who had met the appellant in the UK.
9. The appeal then came before the FtT on 23 July 2025, and in a decision dated 26 August 2025, the FtT dismissed the appeal.
The FtT’s decision
10. The FtT identified the issues in dispute at [1] and summarised the respondent’s position at [2]. At [4]-[6], it stated that it had treated the appellant as a vulnerable witness on account of the mental health issues listed in the medical report, had taken into account relevant guidance and caselaw on the treatment of vulnerable witnesses and had monitored the appellant during his evidence accordingly and given him breaks as and when needed.
11. The FtT directed itself as to the relevant law at [8]-[11].
12. At [12]-[18], the FtT considered the expert medical report. It expressed a number of criticisms of it. They were, in summary, that the report was based on a single consultation and the appellant’s self-assessment, the appellant had not provided the expert with any NHS records in spite of being registered with the NHS and the expert had accepted the appellant’s account without considering the possibility of “another cause” and had expressed opinions outwith his expertise. The FtT further noted that the appellant had said at both his screening and his substantive interviews that he had no mental health issues. It rejected the appellant’s explanation for this omission, which was that “he was not aware that he had any”. The FtT decided to put little weight on the report but confirmed that it would take into account the possibility of difficulties in recall when assessing credibility.
13. At [19], the FtT set out a summary of the appellant’s account of his religious persecution and political activities in Vietnam. This was followed at [20]-[32] by the reasons it was rejected:
(i) The appellant’s evidence had been inconsistent “throughout his claim and [he had] failed to mention key issues of his claim during the asylum interview”; his explanations for his failure to mention these issues at the interview were rejected: he had been interviewed in Vietnamese and had confirmed he understood the interpreter, he had confirmed that he was fit and well and felt safe in the UK, and the questions he had been asked were straightforward;
(ii) Even taking into account his mental health issues, it was difficult to accept that he would not have mentioned distributing leaflets in Vietnam when he was asked if he had ever been politically active;
(iii) At his interview, he had said his faith was Luong. When he was asked at the hearing why he had not mentioned his Hoa Hao faith, he said the religions were similar. “He could not say what the difference was between them other to say there were differences.” This vagueness cast doubt on his credibility.
(iv) He was “unclear in his witness statement how he practices Buddhism in the UK” and in cross-examination he was “unclear what branch of Buddhism he followed and did not understand the difference between the various types”;
(v) Little weight could be put on the statement of his witness because she did not attend the hearing; and
(vi) The photographs of his scars were “inconclusive”.
14. The next section of the determination is entitled “Brotherhood of Democracy – Sur Place Activity”. This began, at [33], with the following description of the photographic evidence:
“The Appellant has provided photographs of him attending demonstrations in the UK. He failed to provide this evidence prior to the Refusal letter. Some photographs show the Appellant in a hi viz jacket with a loudspeaker. The photographs are not dated digitally. No details of the time the photograph was taken can be seen on the photograph or how long the demonstration was for. There is no indication as to what the Appellant was saying or even if the loudspeaker was turned on and what role he had there can be seen. The photographs could be staged and shall be considered in the round.”
15. The FtT then noted that there was “little evidence that those in attendance at the demonstrations with the Appellant have been harassed or intimidated or their families in Vietnam”: [34]
16. The FtT gave little weight to the letter from the Brotherhood of Democracy because no one from the organisation came to the hearing, the letter gave very little detail about the appellant, and “his political activity occurred 11 months before the substantive interview”: [35]. Although this is not spelt out, I consider it clear that the last comment was meant to express the inconsistency between the date on the letter and the appellant’s answers at his substantive interview.
17. The FtT then considered the summons dated 6 May 2025: [37]. As this issue played a key role in his application for permission to appeal, I set the paragraph out in full:
“The Appellant claims that he has been summoned because of his attendance at the demonstration in the United Kingdom. The summons has a printed stamp which calls into question its veracity. The Appellant has not produced a statement from his brother-in-law whom he claims sent it to him here. He did not produce the envelope. He gave 3 different accounts of how he came to know of the summons under cross-examination. Initially he said it was sent to his brother -in -law’s home, and when asked why the authorities would do that then said that it was sent to his wife and then that his wife lived with his brother-in-law and she gave it to him to post to the Appellant in the United Kingdom. I attach little weight to this document.”
18. The FtT then identified a long list of facts that it was required to consider, in line with BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC). These included the theme of the demonstrations in which the appellant had participated, the likely response of the Vietnamese authorities and the appellant’s personal profile. It began, at [39], with the respondent’s policy guidance set out at 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 of the CPIN, Vietnam: Opposition to the state, Version 4.0 (August 2023). It found at [40]:
“I do not accept that the Appellant would specifically receive adverse attention from the Vietnamese authorities given his minimal role in the demonstrations, amongst many other attendees. I have not accepted his account of persecution whilst in Vietnam. He is not known to them.”
19. As to the appellant’s claimed Facebook activities, the FtT noted that he had not produced any evidence of them ([42]) and, in any event, his political activities were not genuine and therefore he could be expected to delete his Facebook account prior to his return: [44]. There was no real risk that his account had already been monitored. The volume of internet and social media activity made it unlikely that the authorities would monitor the Facebook activities of all Vietnamese nationals who are seeking asylum in the UK, and the appellant was not already known to them: [45] The appellant’s attendance at demonstrations was not enough to give rise to a real risk of persecution: [47] The opinions expressed in the medical report about the risk to the appellant on return to Vietnam were based on an acceptance of his account, which had been rejected: [48].
20. The consideration of the appellant’s sur place claim ended as follows:
“49. Even if I am wrong and he is genuinely, politically motivated, I am not satisfied that his low-level activities would give rise to a real risk in Vietnam.
50. Having considered this part of the claim, individually and together, I am not satisfied that the Appellant has demonstrated on the lower standard of proof that he would be at real risk of persecution because of his membership of the Brotherhood of Democracy.”
21. At [51]-[56], the FtT rejected the appellant’s account of being at risk from moneylenders because it was not considered credible that he would have been able to avoid them for extended periods of time by staying at his mother’s home and in company housing, or that they would only have sought him at his mother’s home after he left the country. Both locations were known to them.: [52]-[55] He had not exhausted “all local and other remedies available to him for protection” and there was “little objective evidence” of the moneylenders’ power over the state. His wife had relocated safely, and he could join her.
22. At [57]-[60], the FtT gave very brief reasons for dismissing the appellant’s article 8 appeal.
The grounds of appeal
23. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal four grounds.
Ground One: “Sur Place Political Activity – Arguable Errors of Law”
24. Under this broad heading, the appellant identifies five separate errors:
(i) The FtT made a material mistake of fact when it found that the appellant had not provided the envelope in which the summons of 6 May 2025 had been sent; photos of the envelope and the posting slip were in the bundle;
(ii) The FtT had failed to give any reason for the finding that the “printed stamp” on the summons “calls into question its veracity”;
(iii) The FtT had applied the wrong standard of proof when it found that the photographs of the demonstrations outside the Vietnamese Embassy “could be staged”;
(iv) The FtT failed to apply the principles in YB (Eritrea) [2008] EWCA Civ 360, which, it was submitted, establishes that “monitoring of diaspora opposition activity creates a real risk even where authorities do not have conclusive evidence of participation” and “confirms that the risk arises from the fact of visible, identifiable political activity, not the technical genuineness of the evidence”;
(v) Given the summons and his “visible political activity”, it was irrational to conclude that the appellant was “not known” to the authorities.
Ground Two: “Religious persecution – failure to engage with material evidence”
25. It is submitted that the FTT erred because there was “no structured engagement with trauma-related disclosure delay”.
26. It is further submitted that it is an error of law to treat “omission as determinative”. The appellant then cites E v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 49 and Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 11, but neither case contains this principle. E was concerned with whether a mistake of fact can be an error of law and when new evidence may be admitted on appeal: [91]. I assume the reliance on it here for a completely different principle is the result of an AI hallucination. The principles set out in Karanakaran will be discussed below, but they do not include any such simple and prescriptive rule.
27. The appellant then criticises the FtT for noting the vagueness of the appellant’s evidence about “doctrinal distinctions” and points to evidence in the “bundle” of “daily prayer practice”, “scriptural reading” and “explanation of pure Hoa Hao Buddhism teaching”. I assume this reference is to his two witness statements, as there was no other evidence regarding his faith before the FtT. It is asserted that the FtT failed to assess religious belief “in a culturally sensitive manner”.
Ground Three: “Failure to conduct a cumulative assessment”
28. The appellant says that the FtT erred by analysing past religious persecution, sur place activity, the summons and social media activity in isolation, rather than conducting a “cumulative risk assessment”.
Ground Four: credibility and weighting errors
29. The appellant says that the FtT gave inadequate reasons for discounting “material evidence” and lists the finding that the photographs could be staged, that the summons was “suspicious” due to the printed stamp, and the dismissal of the Brotherhood for Democracy membership “with ‘little weight’”.
30. The appellant repeats under this ground that the FtT erred by failing to engage with trauma-related delay in disclosure. E and Karanakaran are here relied on for the principle that “tribunals must engage systematically with evidence of vulnerability and trauma rather than assuming delays or omissions undermine credibility”.
31. There was no Rule 24 response.
The hearing
32. At the outset of the hearing, Mr Parvar confirmed that the respondent opposed the appeal. I then explained that I would not admit the new evidence that the appellant had included in his bundle of 31 July 2026. That evidence could be considered at the remaking stage, if there was one, but as it was not before the FtT, it could not show that the FtT had erred in law. Mr Janjua did not object to this decision.
33. I then heard very brief submissions from Mr Janjua and more detailed submissions from Mr Parvar. I have taken those submissions into account in reaching my decision.
Legal Framework
34. In deciding whether the FtT made an error of law, I must bear in mind the principles reiterated in numerous cases, most recently in ECO v BB & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 97 at [56]:
(i) The FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently;
(ii) Where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account;
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out;
(iv) The issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference;
(v) Judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so;
(vi) Reasons will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.: Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2](6); and
(vii) An appellate court should avoid “island-hopping”: Fage v Chobani [2014] EWCA Civ 5.
35. The appellant claimed asylum on 1 October 2021, and therefore the FtT was required to approach all of the elements of his claim in accordance with the principles set out in Karanakaran and more recently endorsed in MAH (Egypt) [2023] EWCA Civ 2016. The standard of proof is a “reasonable degree of likelihood”, a “reasonable possibility” or a “real chance”: MAH at [49]-[50].
36. Nothing in Karanakaran speaks directly to the weight that can be placed on an appellant’s delay in revealing key aspects of their claim. The principles it established are far broader. Most relevant here are the principles governing the assessment of evidence:
(i) When deciding whether a person has a well-founded fear of persecution, a decision-maker:
“may have to take into account a whole bundle of disparate pieces of evidence:
(1) evidence they are certain about;
(2) evidence they think is probably true;
(3) evidence to which they are willing to attach some credence, even if they could not go so far as to say it is probably true;
(4) evidence to which they are not willing to attach any credence at all.
[…] the decision-maker is not bound to exclude category (3) evidence as he/she would be if deciding issues that arise in civil litigation.”: [55]-[56]
(ii) “This approach does not entail the decision-maker […] purporting to find “proved” facts, whether past or present, about which it is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities. What it does mean, on the other hand, is that it must not exclude any matters from its consideration when it is assessing the future unless it feels that it can safely discard them because it has no real doubt that they did not in fact occur (or, indeed, that they are not occurring at present).”: [102]
(iii) “Needless to say […] when assessing the future, the decision-maker is entitled to place greater weight on one piece of information rather than another.”: [103]
37. In MAH, Singh LJ (with whom Warby LJ and King LJ agreed) endorsed the following guidance, which had been articulated by Green LJ in SB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 160, at [44]-[46]:
(i) appellant courts will accord due deference to the fact-finder who has assessed an applicant’s credibility;
(ii) the appellate court nonetheless “needs to be able to satisfy itself that the fact finder has at least identified the most relevant pieces of evidence and given sufficient reasons (which might be quite concise) for accepting or rejecting it”;
(iii) there are a “variety of different evaluative techniques” that may be used in assessing credibility. The court “will for instance consider”: (i) the consistency of an account over time; (ii) the consistency of the account with the appellant’s conduct; (iii) country evidence and country guidance caselaw; (iv) the adequacy (or by contrast paucity) of evidence on relevant issues that, logically, the appellant should be able to adduce; (vi) overall plausibility.
38. With regard to plausibility, decision-makers are not required to suspend their own judgement, and it is permissible to find that an account is so far-fetched and contrary to reason as to be “incapable of belief”. The tribunal is “entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality”. However, inferences concerning the plausibility of evidence must have a basis in that evidence and not be based merely on conjecture or speculation: [62]-[63].
39. At [69], Singh LJ reiterated:
“It is well established that this Court will not, on an appeal, readily interfere with findings of fact by the tribunal of fact. This is for familiar reasons, including the fact that the tribunal has considered all of the evidence, including hearing oral evidence; and is an expert tribunal in its field.”
40. Further guidance on credibility assessment is set out in KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) [2017] UKUT 491.
Discussion
Ground One
41. It is clear, as Mr Parvar conceded, that the FtT erred about whether the appellant had included the envelope in which the summons is said to have been sent from Vietnam. Photos of the envelope and the shipping receipt were in the bundle. It is also difficult to know what is meant by the comment about the “printed stamp”. There are two printed stamps on the document, and the FtT does not refer to any country evidence that would suggest that either of them is inconsistent with the document being a genuine Vietnamese police summons.
42. Mr Parvar submitted, however, that these errors were not material. In the first place, with regard to the summons itself, these were not the only reasons the FtT gave for putting little weight on it. It also noted the absence of a statement from the brother-in-law who sent it and found that the appellant had given three different accounts of how he came to know of it. Moreover, any error regarding the summons cannot have made a difference, when seen in the context of the decision as a whole.
43. I will deal with the question of materiality below, after considering all of the appellant’s other grounds.
44. None of the other errors identified under ground one is made out.
45. The appellant says with regard to the photographs that the FtT applied the wrong standard of proof, as reflected in its finding that the photographs “could have been staged”. I am required by the principles set out above at [34], to assume that the FtT knew both what the standard of proof is in pre-NABA claims and how that standard of proof shapes the assessment of the evidence before it. I am also required to assess the FtT’s decision as a whole.
46. When the FtT’s findings are read as a whole, there is nothing to indicate that it departed from established principles governing the assessment of credibility. The FtT expressly referred to the correct standard of proof at [9]-[10] and [50]. It considered the medical evidence prior to assessing credibility and gave cogent reasons (which have not been challenged) for rejecting that evidence. In rejecting the appellant’s account, it considered the appellant’s inconsistency on material issues over time (and his explanation for it), the vagueness his oral evidence on material matters, the lack of evidence that was considered reasonably available, the contents and provenance of the documentary evidence he relied on and (with regard to the account of being pursued by moneylenders) the internal plausibility of the account. All of these are permissible credibility indicators.
47. With regard to the photographs specifically, I find that there is nothing to suggest that the FtT applied the wrong standard of proof. The FtT did not dismiss the photographs simply because they “could have been staged”. The FtT first noted that the photographs had not been disclosed until after the refusal decision; the clear implication is that they could have been created in response to the refusal. It then considered the content of the photographs, focusing on those in which the appellant was wearing a hi-vis jacket and holding a loudspeaker. It noted that there were no digital dates, no indication of what time they were taken, and no evidence of how long the demonstration lasted, what the appellant was saying or whether the microphone he was holding was turned on. The conclusion that the photographs could have been staged was a reasoned finding of fact based on their timing and content. Nor did the FtT entirely disregard the photographs after making this finding. It declared that they would be considered in the round.
48. The FtT’s reasoning here was entirely in accordance with the Karanakaran approach. The FtT considered this aspect of the evidence and decided how much weight to put on it and then proceeded to consider it in the round with the rest of the evidence.
49. The appellant’s reliance on YB (Eritrea) is misplaced. It did not establish either of the principles asserted in the grounds. It established that:
“Where […] the tribunal has objective evidence which "paints a bleak picture of the suppression of political opponents" by a named government, it requires little or no evidence or speculation to arrive at a strong possibility – and perhaps more – that its foreign legations not only film or photograph their nationals who demonstrate in public against the regime but have informers among expatriate oppositionist organisations who can name the people who are filmed or photographed. Similarly it does not require affirmative evidence to establish a probability that the intelligence services of such states monitor the internet for information about oppositionist groups. The real question in most cases will be what follows for the individual claimant. If, for example, any information reaching the embassy is likely to be that the claimant identified in a photograph is a hanger-on with no real commitment to the oppositionist cause, that will go directly to the issue flagged up by art 4(3)(d) of the Directive [i.e. whether the activity was opportunistic].”
50. Nothing in the FTT’s reasoning is inconsistent with this. The FtT took into account the evidence before it of the Vietnamese authorities’ approach to political opposition and the nature and profile of the appellant’s political activities. Moreover, it expressly referred to and applied the far more detailed guidance on the assessment of sur place activities set out in the more recent caselaw, namely AB and XX (PJAK).
51. Finally, there was nothing perverse in finding that the appellant would not be known to the authorities given his “minimal” political activity in the UK. Of course, the finding that he was not known to the authorities cannot stand if the FtT erred in putting little weight on the summons. This fifth ground is therefore parasitical on the first and second.
Ground Two
52. It is trite law that mental health is relevant to the assessment of credibility, including issues of inconsistency and delayed disclosure. What this ground ignores is that the FtT gave detailed consideration to the medical evidence before it and gave cogent reasons for rejecting it.
53. As to the lack of “cultural sensitivity” in assessing the appellant’s religious beliefs, the appellant has failed to identify what aspects of the appellant’s culture were ignored. The appellant merely points to the references in his witness statement to his daily prayer practice, “scriptural reading” and “explanation of pure Hoa Hao Buddhism teaching”. It is entirely unclear why these particular facts or the content of the witness statements more generally set out a cultural context that makes differences between the appellant’s current faith and the faith from which he converted and other forms of Buddhism irrelevant.
54. If the appellant is suggesting that asking him questions about his faith and how it differed from other branches of Buddhism was culturally insensitive because it ignored the fact that doctrinal issues were unimportant to him, this is not consistent with the very evidence the appellant now invokes. In his witness statements, the appellant said that he studied “various texts” and read “hybrid books” to learn about Hoa Hao Buddhism when he converted and that his religious practice including reading the “scriptures” daily. This is not a description of someone for whom the content of his faith – as opposed to, for example, the rituals of practice – is unimportant.
Ground Three
55. Ground three is parasitic on the other grounds. Because I have found that the FtT did not err as claimed in rejecting the appellant’s account of his past persecution and there have been no challenges raised to the FtT’s findings about his (entirely unevidenced) Facebook activity, there was no obligation on the FtT to consider these risks “cumulatively” with the risks arising out of the appellant’s participation in demonstrations.
Ground Four
56. The only submission made under ground four that does not duplicate submissions made under other grounds is that the FtT erred by failing to give adequate reasons for putting little weight on the letter from Brotherhood of Democracy. This is not even arguable. The FtT gave three reasons for putting little weight on it: no one from the organisation came to the hearing to give evidence, there was no detail in it concerning the appellant’s activities, and it was dated 11 months before the appellant’s interview (at which he had said he was not politically active in the UK).
Materiality
57. The test for whether an error of law is material is whether “it is clear on the materials before [the F-tT] any rational tribunal must have come to the same conclusion”: SSHD v AJ (Angola) [2014] EWCA Civ 1636 at [49]. In deciding this question, it is essential to identify the nature and extent of the error and to what extent the decision rested on it. An appellate court cannot simply apply a “blue pencil” to the error and ask if the decision remains sustainable without it.: ASO (Iraq) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1282 at [44]
58. I have found above that the FtT erred with regard to two of the four reasons it gave for putting little weight on the summons. It made none of the other errors of law contended for by the appellant. In assessing the extent to which the decision rested on the errors that were made, I have identified the following aspects of the decision that cannot logically be seen to be affected by them:
(i) The rejection of the appellant’s account of his religious faith and of the persecution he suffered for reasons of it in Vietnam;
(ii) The rejection of the appellant’s account of being pursued by gangsters to whom he was indebted;
(iii) The finding that the letter attesting to the appellant’s membership of the Brotherhood of Democracy since 2022 was worthy of little weight;
(iv) The finding that there was limited information about the photographs, such that they could have been staged;
(v) The finding that there was “little evidence” that others who attended such protests had been harassed or intimidated, or that their families in Vietnam had been; and
(vi) The finding, on the basis of the country evidence before the FtT, that there is “some tolerance for protests” in Vietnam but that those who protest on “political or sensitive subjects” may be subject to police intimidation and may be arrested and subsequently released.
59. I consider that all of these findings are entirely independent of the two errors about the summons and cannot be seen to rest on them.
60. By contrast, the findings that the appellant was not known to the authorities and that his Facebook page would therefore not have been monitored could not stand if the FtT was wrong to put little weight on the summons.
61. I also take into account the other evidence that was before the FtT. The appellant had adduced the respondent’s CPINs on Hoa Hao Buddhism (Version 2.0), “Opposition to the State” (Version 4.0, August 20203) and “Fear of Illegal Moneylenders” (Version 2.0), as well as a DFAT country report on Vietnam published on 11 January 2022. In a supplementary skeleton argument dated 9 July 2025, appellant’s counsel below relied on [3.1], [3.2], [8.1], [8.3], [10.5], [11.4], [12.4] and [13], [14.4] of the CPIN on opposition to the state, and the DFAT report. The respondent did not rely on any country evidence regarding risks to protesters.
62. The country evidence relied on by the appellant and brought to the attention of the FtT can fairly be summarised as follows:
(i) In the respondent’s assessment,
(a) “A person who is a member of an illegal opposition political party and can show that his/her political opposition has come to the attention of the authorities is likely to be at risk of persecution and/or serious harm”: [3.1.1] of the CPIN;
(b) “Those who openly criticise, or are perceived critics of, the government are likely to attract adverse attention from the authorities. Whether a person is likely to be at risk of persecution and/or serious harm will depend upon their level of involvement, their activities, the nature of any criticism, the topics they have been critical about, and any previous adverse interest.”: [3.2.1];
(c) “Whilst there is some tolerance for protests, those who do so on political or sensitive subjects may be subject to intimidation by police and may be arrested and subsequently released. However, in general, this is not sufficiently serious by its nature and/or repetition to amount to persecution”: [3.2.2]; and
(d) “High profile activists are monitored, lower profile activists may be subject to some degree of monitoring, but this is likely to be less than more prominent activists. Those who take part in protests on sensitive subjects such as environmental issues, relations with China, human rights or areas deemed to be in opposition to the state, or during sensitive periods may attract the attention of the authorities.”: [3.2.7]
(ii) Political parties are not allowed to operate, and activists are arrested and prosecuted for social media posts: [8.1.1]
(iii) In 2018, Human Rights Watch described Brotherhood for Democracy as a network of activists inside and outside Vietnam who were campaigning for human rights and democracy in Vietnam, although a 2023 report by Civicus described the group as defunct: [8.3.1];
(iv) According to the Vietnam Human Rights Network’s annual report for 2021-22, the Brotherhood for Democracy was one of a large number of human rights organisations that had been banned and many of whose members were “isolated or imprisoned”: [8.3.4];
(v) The government monitors “known activists”, and the monitoring of “high level activists” is more than of low-level ones. Activists may be placed under house arrest or abducted for short periods of time to prevent them from participating in protests or attending meetings. The authorities systematically block activists from international travel. Various sources described those subject to monitoring and restrictions on their movement as “well-known” or “prominent”: [10.5];
(vi) Overseas human rights defenders and journalists have been targeted with malware: [11.4]
(vii) According to the US State Department 2022 report, “‘Unlike prior years there were no reports of authorities harassing exiled individuals or their families.”: [11.4.3];
(viii) Human rights activists had been arrested in 2021. The number reported arrested ranged from 37-72, with 160-173 people in custody for “exercising their basic civil and political rights”. The arrests were increasingly for online political expression: [13]; and
(ix) Those arrested could be subjected to mistreatment rising to the level of persecution: [14.4.4]
63. Having taken all of this evidence into account, I find that the two errors in the reasons for putting little weight on the summons were not material. This is for the following reasons:
(i) Any tribunal considering the summons would have been required to apply the principles set out in Tanveer Ahmed and view the document in the round, together with all of the other evidence. Given the logically independent and sustainable reasons for rejecting the appellant’s credibility with regard to his account of events in Vietnam, any reasonable judge would have been required to approach the summons with some degree of caution;
(ii) The FtT gave two other sustainable reasons for putting little weight on the summons;
(iii) There was no expert evidence attesting to the genuineness of the summons;
(iv) There was no independent evidence as to what a Vietnamese police summons should look like; this weighs against the FtT’s finding about the stamp but equally means that there was no positive evidence of the document’s conformity with genuine documents;
(v) There was no independent evidence describing a government practice of issuing summonses to low-level demonstrators following demonstrations;
(vi) There is nothing in the country evidence that makes the issuance of such a summons plausible; the country evidence is that the government’s attention is directed at high profile activists and, in particular, online activists; and
(vii) On the specific issue of the targeting of diaspora activists, there was evidence only of malware attacks; moreover, there was a specific finding that “exiled individuals” and their families were not being harassed.
64. For these reasons, I find that the errors with regard to two of the four reasons for putting little weight on the summons were not material.
65. As there were no other errors in the FtT’s decision, that decision should not be set aside.

Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal’s decision of 26 August 2025 is upheld. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 August 2026