Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000995
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64089/2023
LH/08196/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

21st August 2026

Before

DUPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Ó CEALLAIGH KC

Between

RH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Yong, instructed by TMF Immigration Lawyers
For the Respondent: Mr Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Namibia who seeks protection in the United Kingdom. Her application was refused by the respondent in a decision dated 21 November 2023. The appellant appealed that decision, and her appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Rao in a decision dated 3 December 2025.
2. Permission to appeal was granted on 25 April 2026 by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick. It now comes before me to determine whether FTTJ Rao made a material error of law.
Grounds of appeal
3. The grounds of appeal are as follows:
a. Ground 1: The FTTJ erred in failing to take account of relevant evidence and failing to make material findings of fact;
b. Ground 2: The FTTJ gave improper and/or inadequate consideration to the evidence including background information;
c. Ground 3: The FTTJ failed to consider all the relevant evidence in respect of the appellant’s claim that there were very significant obstacles to her reintegration.
4. UTJ Ruddick granted permission on all grounds, though she clearly had reservations about the arguability of Ground 2.
5. The respondent provided a Rule 24 response on 13 May 2026 maintaining that the determination contained no material error of law.
6. The appellant has also made a Rule 15(2A) application seeking to rely on further evidence. It is not suggested that any of that evidence was relevant to the case before the FTTJ. The parties agreed that the application was not relevant to the question before me unless there was an error of law and the matter were to proceed in the Upper Tribunal. Accordingly I have not addressed it.
The hearing
7. Ms Yong relied on her grounds of appeal.
8. In respect of Ground 1, she submitted that the appellant’s father’s failure to act against her was the key finding in respect of the risk she faced as a result of her sexuality. This finding was however made without consideration of the appellant’s evidence. In particular, this finding did not address the appellant’s account that she had hidden her sexuality from the point that she was caught with her girlfriend in accordance with her father’s wishes. Nor did the finding address the fact that the period when her father had not taken action against her was the period during which she had agreed to marry a man and to disguise her sexuality. This was the reason that she had not suffered harm.
9. The FTT had accepted that the police had dropped the investigation of the “kissing” incident [35] at her father’s instigation. It had also accepted that it was reasonably likely that the appellant had been the subject of threats from her family, including that she would be forced to marry and that she would be killed [31]. As UTJ Ruddick pointed out in the grant of permission these were significant findings of fact. The FTT had already accepted that the appellant’s uncle was opposed to her sexuality and was a prominent figure within a traditional authority [30].
10. In considering whether the appellant had a sufficiency of protection the FTT gave no consideration to the appellant’s father’s accepted role as a former police officer [30]. The fact that he would have influence – and on the FTT’s findings had already used that influence to secure the dropping of an investigation into a sexual assault on the appellant – was clearly a material factor. However it did not feature at all in the FTT’s analysis of sufficiency of protection.
11. In respect of Ground 2 Ms Yong took me to the letter and report from Clifford Chance. This dealt with the question of internal relocation. The FTT asserted that this report was of “limited assistance”, in part because it had been submitted relatively late, and in part because the parties’ submissions on it were said to have been limited. This report detailed evidence of ill-treatment of the LGBTQI+ community across Namibia and referred to under-reporting of violence. The FTT was not entitled to admit this report and then decline to deal with it: the FTT should have dealt with the report once it was admitted. Moreover, no consideration was given to the appellant’s uncle’s prominent role in deciding that the appellant could safely relocate.
12. In respect of Ground 3 Ms Yong submitted that the appellant if returned to Namibia would not have family support. She would be returned as a lone female. There is a considerable stigma attached to homosexuality and she would be unable to access public services including the medical treatment that she requires.
13. In respect of disposal, Ms Yong submitted that should an error be found, the facts as previously found should be retained and the matter remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
14. For the respondent Mr Nappey relied on the respondent’s Rule 24 response.
15. In respect of Ground 1 he submitted that it was clear that the FTTJ had considered the relevant factors and evidence. While he accepted that the FTTJ had not referred in the decision to the fact that the appellant had agreed to undergo marriage and keep her sexuality secret during the period she had not come to harm, the failure to consider this did not amount to a material error of law.
16. Mr Nappey said his stronger case was in respect of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. As FTTJ Clarke had pointed out refusing permission at first instance, the FTT was entitled to find that although the local police did not pursue the assault claim because of the appellant’s father’s influence, they would take an entirely different view of a claim of forced marriage. The FTTJ at [35] clearly did make this distinction.
17. In any event, even if there were an error in respect of risk the consideration of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation was adequate. All relevant factors were considered in respect of sufficiency of protection. The consideration of internal relocation rightly examined the CPIN. Namibia is a large country in which internal relocation is clearly feasible.
18. In the Rule 24 response, the Respondent noted that the FTT was not required to refer to every item of evidence. Read fairly and as a whole, the assertion that crucial evidence was overlooked was not made out. There was no proper basis for concluding that the substance of the evidence was missed, nor was it apparent how any additional reference to specific material would have led to a different outcome.
19. In respect of Ground 2 Mr Nappey noted that the grounds of appeal only referred to the report of Professor Bosewell which was not the basis of Ms Yong’s oral submissions. The FTT had given adequate reasoning for the rejection of the report of Professor Bosewell. In respect of the letter from African Rainbow Family that was not a matter referred to in the grounds of appeal, and it had not been referred to in the skeleton argument before the FTT. He relied on Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) India [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC). The reference in the grounds at [11] to “the evidence including the background country information” was not sufficient. In any event, the FTT clearly considered other evidence at [44] including the CPIN.
20. The Rule 24 response states that it is unclear how the appellant’s father being a former police officer supports a finding that there would be a lack of sufficiency of protection throughout Namibia, particularly given the appellant’s status as a Namibian citizen with a clear right of residence. The FTTJ expressly considered the expert report prepared by Clifford Chance and relevant CPIN material, and was entitled to conclude that the appellant could internally relocate and would have access to sufficient protection.
21. In respect of Ground 3 Mr Nappey relied on the refusal of permission of FTTJ Clarke who had held:
“At [61] to [64] the Judge addresses the issues of very significant obstacles and was perfectly entitled at [61] to rely on their earlier findings “in respect of persecution, protection and relocation” without repeating them. At [66] to [72] the Judge conducts an assessment on Article 8 outside the Rules that discloses no error of law.”
22. Contrary to Ms Yong’s submissions, the FTT had implicitly engaged with the submissions in respect of her ability to access services and support by virtue of the findings at [61].
23. The appellant’s appeal skeleton argument did not raise difficulties in accessing medical support. There was a significant quantity of medical evidence. However it had not been the appellant’s case that she could not access medical support: it had been her case that she could not reintegrate because she was vulnerable. There was no evidence in support of the proposition that she could not obtain adequate medical support, and that had not been the appellant’s case before the FTT.
24. Should there be an error of law Mr Nappey’s submission was that the matter should be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking.
25. In reply Ms Yong submitted that it was not explained why, if the appellant’s father was able to manipulate local police, he could not manipulate another police force upon her return to another area. While the burden of proof remained on the appellant in the context of internal relocation, the examination had to be a holistic one (MB (Internal relocation – burden of proof) Albania [2019] UKUT 392 (IAC)).
26. In respect of Ground 2, she submitted that the issue in respect of the report by Clifford Chance was clearly included in paragraph 11 of the Grounds. On Ground 3, the issue in respect of ability to access medical care was made in oral submissions.
27. Overall she maintained that the determination was unsafe and that the matter should ne remitted for reconsideration.
28. I reserved the decision.
Decision and reasons
29. By her Ground 1 the appellant argues that the FTT failed to take account of material evidence. In particular, while the FTT accepted that the appellant was indeed gay, and had indeed been threatened by her family as a result, the FTT did not accept that she was at risk. This was because her father had never actually harmed her. It is also said that the FTTJ failed to take into account that the appellant hid her sexuality, and the reasons for that.
30. In my view there is an error of law here. The appellant’s case is that following her discovery she was acquiescing to her father’s wishes (and those of several men in her wider family). She agreed to marry a man. She cut off her relationship with her partner. She agreed to hide her sexuality. In those circumstances, the fact that she was not harmed during this period cannot rationally be considered to support a case that she was not at risk (certainly without violating the principle in HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rev 1) [2011] 1 AC 596). However the FTTJ clearly considered that it did – and indeed this was a central finding, arguably the most critical finding made in respect of credibility [36]. It was plainly material.
31. It is further argued by the appellant that in concluding that she would have a sufficiency of protection, the FTT failed to take account of the fact that the appellant’s father is a policeman and had previously used his influence to prevent a sexual assault on her being prosecuted. Her uncle was also on her case a Chief of their tribe, and accepted by the FTT to be “a prominent figure within a traditional authority” [30]. It is clearly the case that these two factors were the central basis on which the appellant had submitted that she could not access a sufficiency of protection or internal relocation, and it is equally clear that neither is addressed by the FTTJ in the section of the determination dealing with sufficiency of protection [40-51]. That too is an error of law.
32. The potential influence of the appellant’s father and uncle are however dealt with in the section on internal relocation [58]. The appellant submits that this was inadequately reasoned. In my view the reasoning here is, if terse, adequate. I have considered whether this reasoning might be straightforwardly transferred to the consideration of sufficiency of protection, and I do not consider that it can because it presupposes an element of distance between the appellant and those who would harm her. I have some concern at the possible conflict between the FTT’s conclusion that the appellant’s father would be unable to locate her in such a large country [58], and the later conclusion that she would if returned be able to rely on contact with her mother and relatives [62]. That seems on its face to potentially raise a risk of discovery that should at least have been considered; however that is not a matter raised in the grounds and is in any event immaterial in view of my conclusions on Ground 2.
33. It follows that I find that Ground 1 discloses a material error of law in respect of the appellant’s claim to be at risk in her home area, and in respect of sufficiency of protection, but not in respect of internal relocation.
34. By her Ground 2 the appellant argues that the FTTJ’s consideration of the objective evidence available included material errors. It is submitted that the FTTJ failed to rationally consider the expert evidence and failed to take into account the specific tribal aspect of the risk she would face on return.
35. Ms Yong in oral submissions focussed on the Clifford Chance report. Mr Nappey objected to that on the basis that it was not properly within the scope of the grounds of appeal. I do not consider that the grounds of appeal can be read so narrowly. Indeed, it is clear that the author of the Rule 24 response understood that the question of whether the Clifford Chance report had been adequately considered was in issue since that was a matter specifically addressed [5]. Mr Nappey too was able to deal with the issue, and had permission to amend been required I would in the circumstances have granted it.
36. I consider that the appellant is right to say that the FTT was required to engage with the substance of this report in deciding that the appellant could internally relocate. As submitted by Ms Yong, the FTT was not entitled to accord the report little weight because it was submitted late: it should either have been admitted and accorded such weight as was warranted, or not admitted at all. It is not in my view permissible to adopt a “half-way house” of admitting late evidence but reducing its weight.
37. The FTT stated [43] that the parties did not address her “in a significant way” about these items, and characterised the appellant’s submission as being that “society considers homosexuality to be wrong”.
38. The question of internal relocation is dealt with in the Clifford Chance report at [9]. It asserts, with sources provided (including but not limited to the CPIN), that LGBTQI+ people face “violence and threats throughout the country”. It goes, on any rational view, significantly beyond the question of whether society considers homosexuality to be wrong. In my view, once the FTT had admitted this evidence and the appellant had expressly relied on it, it was required to give it consideration and either accept or reject its conclusions. The failure to do so was a material error of law that vitiates the FTT’s conclusions on internal relocation.
39. I do not however accept that the FTT failed to consider the appellant’s uncle and the tribal context in deciding that the appellant could internally relocate. As noted by UTJ Ruddick his position was clearly dealt with [58].
40. It follows that Ground 2 is made out and the FTT’s conclusions on internal relocation disclose a material error of law.
41. By her Ground 3 the appellant argues that the FTTJ failed to consider the discrimination the appellant would face as a lesbian in terms of access to healthcare, and whether that might amount to very serious obstacles to her reintegration.
42. The respondent’s position is that in fact, these matters are addressed in detail at [60-72] of the determination. The FTTJ undertook a careful assessment of whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration, drawing on earlier findings and providing adequate reasons for the conclusions reached.
43. Mr Nappey makes the point that the skeleton argument before the FTT did not suggest that the appellant would be unable to access medical care due to discrimination. Ms Yong, counsel who appeared at first instance, asserts in terms that this was an argument made orally. I note that the grounds of appeal squarely place this issue at the heart of the appellant’s case on appeal. The Rule 24 does not suggest that these matters were not before the FTT, which might have put the appellant no notice that a transcript was required. On the contrary it asserts that these issues were adequately considered by the FTT [6-7]. In the circumstances, applying Abdi & Ors v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455 at [25], I accept Ms Yong’s account that this matter was raised before the FTT.
44. The FTT rejected the appellant’s case that her sexuality and medical conditions created very significant obstacles to her reintegration [60]. In so concluding the FTT did not address the substance of the appellant’s medical conditions at all, still less the treatment for those conditions and whether she would, as Ms Yong submitted before her, be unable to access it due to discrimination. While the FTT’s conclusions in respect of the wider Article 8 question at [68] suggest that the practical information on those conditions before her was limited, there was apparently uncontradicted evidence (see e.g. appellant’s witness statement at [37]) that the appellant was on medication for significant pain relief as well as for depression. Her ability to access comparable support was plainly relevant to the question of reintegration. I conclude that the failure to address this element of the appellant’s claim gives rise to a further material error of law.
45. It follows that Ground 3 is also made out.
46. I note the passage of time and that the appellant’s intention to adduce further evidence, as well as the nature of the error I have found in the credibility assessment. I do not accept the appellant’s submission that parts of the determination can properly be preserved.
47. In the circumstances I consider that this matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing with no findings of fact preserved.
Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Rao of 3 December 2025 did contain a material error of law. It is set aside. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing with no findings of fact preserved.

Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 August 2026