Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001001
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58452/2023
LP/08864/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7 September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

K K
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr B Hawkin, instructed by David Benson Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka born in 1983. He appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Manuell (the judge) dated 24 October 2025 dismissing his appeal against the refusal of his protection claim on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.

2. The appellant entered the UK on a Tier 2 sportspersons visa on 13 August 2019. He claimed asylum on 2 November 2019 and his application was refused on 3 October 2023. The respondent accepted the appellant was a member of the LTTE but did not accept that he is of adverse interest to the authorities due to his political activity. The respondent did not find the appellant’s account to be credible and concluded that section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 applied.

3. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the judge did not accept the core of the appellant’s claim and he did not find the appellant to be a credible witness. At [46], the judge found that “the appellant’s evidence was marked by a large number of inconsistencies, as well as by serious and cumulative implausibility.” The judge concluded:

“73. The Tribunal has found that the Appellant was of no interest to the Sri Lanka authorities when he left Sri Lanka. He was issued with a passport, either once or twice. No one was looking for him. There was no credible evidence that he is reasonably likely to be on a stop list or a watch list. It is unlikely that the Sri Lankan authorities have either the resources nor the inclination to spend endless hours searching the internet for people with low level TGTE connections. There was no credible evidence that the Appellant was likely to have been identified from any of the photographs he provided. In any event, as noted, his sur place activities have been no more than a face in a crowd.

74. Applying KK and RS (above), the Appellant is unlikely to be questioned by the authorities on return. His identity is not in doubt. He can travel on his own Sri Lankan passport. He is not a person of interest. The fact that he has a wife and three children in Kilinochchi can be readily verified. His travel history of extensive time spent in Dubai and in the United Kingdom is typical of Sri Lankans seeking work abroad and is not unusual. Claiming asylum in the United Kingdom is not unusual. Being Tamil is not in itself a risk factor.

75. The Tribunal has disbelieved the majority of the Appellant’s evidence. As the Appellant’s separatist views are not genuinely held, the Tribunal finds that he will have no conscience-driven reason to express such views in the future. He claimed no involvement in any post war political activities prior to leaving Sri Lanka. His claim that he “had fought at home” (as made in his oral evidence) was untrue as he had never engaged in combat. There will be nothing for him to declare and he can resume his previous life in Kilinochchi with his family at his rice mill: HJ (Iran) (above) applied.

76. The Tribunal accordingly finds that the Appellant has failed to show that he has an objectively founded fear of returning to Sri Lanka and that he would be at real risk on return. His asylum appeal is dismissed.”

Grounds

4. In summary, the grounds submit that the judge failed to engage with relevant evidence, misapplied country guidance, made speculative adverse credibility findings and the hearing was procedurally unfair.

5. Permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Kamara on 26 April 2026 for the following reasons:

“2. It is arguable that the judge failed to apply the guidance in GJ and Others (post-civil war: returnees) Sri Lanka CG [2013] when assessing the risk to the appellant on return to Sri Lanka even on the basis that much of his account was rejected by the judge.
3. It is further arguable that there may have been an error of approach in the judge’s findings on credibility for all the reasons set out in the grounds.
4. I am less persuaded by the procedural unfairness point given that the grounds accept that the appellant had the opportunity to provide an explanation for credibility issues which emerged at the hearing. Nonetheless, permission is not refused on any ground.
5. The appellant will be required to demonstrate the materiality of any alleged errors at the error of law hearing.

Submissions

6. Mr Hawkin relied on the grounds and made submissions on errors in respect of the judge’s credibility findings and the judge’s failure to apply country guidance. It was accepted the appellant is a Tamil and he had been in the LTTE. Mr Hawkin submitted the judge’s finding at [49], that the appellant was injured as a civilian, was flawed because the relevant issue was the appellant’s membership of the LTTE not whether he was a combatant. The judge’s finding at [56], that the appellant’s claim to have scars from torture was not supported by the expert evidence, was wrong because the opinion of Mr Goutos at [8(e)] of the scarring report stated:

“Nail deformities: The appearance of the two first toenails is consistent with an avulsion mechanism of injury both in terms of shape deformation as well as irregularity of colour.”

7. Mr Hawkin submitted that there was evidence to support the appellant’s account of torture and the remainder of [56] was problematic because it was unrealistic that the appellant would disclose his minor involvement with the LTTE. The judge’s findings at [57] contradicted those at [56] and failed to take into account [170] of GJ that: “given the prevalence of bribery and corruption in Sri Lanka, having left Sri Lanka without difficulty was not probative of a lack of adverse interest in an individual.” The appellant’s account of his arrest and release on payment of a bribe was consistent with the country guidance and the judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting it.

8. Mr Hawkin submitted it was accepted the appellant was a member of the LTTE and he was injured during the closing stages of the conflict in 2009. The appellant had fled the fighting which could have resulted in his betrayal to the authorities. The judge’s adverse credibility findings were flawed and therefore his assessment of risk on return was flawed. Dr Sockalingam’s evidence was not challenged and it was not open to the judge to find that the appellant’s low level involvement with the TGTE would not put him at risk on return. There was a real risk the appellant would be perceived to have a significant role in Tamil separatism applying KK and RS (Sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2021] UKUT 130 (IAC).

9. Mr Ojo adopted the observations of First-tier Tribunal Judge Buchanan who refused permission to appeal. The judge did not find the appellant to be credible because of the large number of inconsistencies and serious and cumulative implausibility in his account at [46] and the delay in claiming asylum at [68]. The judge did not require corroboration but contrasted the appellant’s ability to provide some documentary evidence with his inability to provide documentary evidence to support other parts of his claim. At [51] to [56], the judge rejected the appellant’s evidence of his role within the LTTE which was consistent with country guidance. The appellant accepted he was a non-combatant at [53] and the judge’s finding that he had an administrative and insignificant role in the LTTE was open to the judge on the evidence before him. The grounds lacked merit.

10. In response to Mr Hawkin’s submissions, Mr Ojo submitted the appellant’s own evidence was inconsistent with his claimed fear. The judge’s finding that the appellant was of no interest to the authorities was open to him given the appellant’s evidence that he was taken to hospital in Colombo where he remained for a significant amount of time. The appellant’s injury to his toenails was at the lower end of the scale under the Istanbul Protocol. The appellant’s ability to leave Sri Lanka had to be considered in the light of the other credibility points. The judge did not accept the appellant was arrested and detained in 2017. The judge properly considered the risk factors in the country guidance and adopted a holistic approach in respect of Dr Sockalingam’s evidence.

Conclusions and reasons

11. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2], the Court of Appeal held:

“The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court
to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many
cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
(ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
(iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
(iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
(v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
(vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
12. In this case, the judge rejected the core of the appellant’s claim because of the numerous significant discrepancies in the appellant’s account. The judge’s reasoning could have been better expressed but it cannot be said that his conclusions were not open to him on the evidence before him.

13. The judge’s finding at [49] was open to him given the appellant’s admission in oral evidence that he had never fought for the LTTE at [28] and his evidence in his statement that he was injured in 2009 whilst running away from the Sri Lankan army who were shooting at the public.

14. I am not persuaded by Mr Hawkins submission that the judge’s finding at [56] was wrong given Mr Goutos’s opinion in the concluding paragraph of his report:

“The question whether the scars are consistent with a history of torture is very challenging for me to comment on given my lack of certainty regarding the exact aetiology of the trauma to the skin and the motives of any perpetrators involved in the incidents reported.”

15. The judge’s finding at [57] was not contrary to country guidance. The judge found that the appellant’s account went beyond the payment of a bribe and was implausible. In any event, the judge’s finding at [57] was not capable of undermining his overall adverse credibility finding and was not material to the decision to dismiss the appeal. The grounds rely on a selection of the evidence rather than the whole of the evidence before the judge.

16. There was no procedural unfairness as alleged in the written grounds of appeal because the appellant was given an opportunity to explain the discrepancies in his account in oral evidence. The judge did not require corroboration but was entitled to rely on a lack of evidence which the appellant ought reasonably to have been able to produce if his account was true.

17. It is apparent on reading the decision as a whole that the judge adopted a holistic approach and considered all the evidence in the round. The judge gave adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claim to have been arrested, detained and tortured in 2017 and his finding that the appellant was of no adverse interest to the authorities was open to him on the evidence before him.

18. The judge took into account the unchallenged evidence of Dr Sockalingam and, at [27], the appellant agreed in oral evidence that he was not a prominent member or organiser of the TGTE because he did not want to create problems for his family in Sri Lanka. There was no misapplication of country guidance. The appellant’s claim does not bring him within the risk categories of KK and RS.

19. I conclude that there is no material error of law in the judge’s decision dated 24 October 2025 and I dismiss the appellant’s appeal.

Notice of Decision

Appeal dismissed

J Frances

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 August 2026