Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001010
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51017/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KUDHAIL

Between

SM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Waheed, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant (and/or any member of his family) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or any member of his family). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This has been a remote hearing which has not been objected to by the parties. The form of remote hearing was by video, using Cloud video platform. There were no technical difficulties for the hearing itself and the papers were all available electronically.
Background
2. The appellant is a Bangladeshi national who claims to have been an active member of the BNP student wing, from 2010 and to have served as President of a union branch from 2017. He states that his political activities, including organising meetings and demonstrations and criticising the Awami League, led to repeated attacks by political opponents, a politically motivated court case, threats against his family, and continued adverse interest from the authorities. He further claims that he has remained politically active in the UK through social media and that, despite the fall of Sheikh Hasina, Awami League influence remains entrenched within state institutions, placing him at continuing risk on return. In addition, he relies on his family life in the UK with his settled wife, MK, their child, and her two British children, arguing that his removal would constitute a disproportionate interference with family life.
3. The respondent in her decision accepted the appellant's identity and Bangladeshi nationality but rejected the substance of his protection claim. It was not accepted that he was genuinely involved with the BNP to the extent claimed, that he had been targeted or tortured because of his political activities, or that he was of adverse interest to the Bangladeshi authorities. The respondent considered his account to be inconsistent, lacking in detail and implausible, particularly given that he was able to obtain a passport, secure a student visa and leave Bangladesh lawfully through the airport. As the core account was rejected, the respondent concluded that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution, did not qualify for humanitarian protection, and could safely return to Bangladesh. The respondent further noted that no Article 8 family-life claim had been advanced at the date of refusal, that subsequent marriage and family-life evidence had not been considered, and that his claimed depression had not been medically diagnosed and did not meet the threshold for leave on medical grounds. She refused to give consent for the consideration of the appellants claimed relationship with MK and the children, as this was a new matter.
The Judge’s Decision
4. In the decision the Judge rejected the appellant's account as lacking credibility, finding it highly significant that he was able to obtain a visa, travel on his own passport and leave Bangladesh through the airport despite claiming to be of substantial adverse interest to the authorities. The Judge did not accept the explanation for the delay in claiming asylum, considered it implausible that a politically educated individual would not understand asylum procedures, and found that the appellant had failed to identify any material change in circumstances between his arrival in October 2021 and his asylum claim in February 2022. The Judge concluded that the appellant had simply decided to remain in the United Kingdom. The Judge further found the documentary evidence concerning his BNP profile to be of doubtful provenance, rejected the claim that he had ever been of adverse interest to the Bangladeshi authorities, and did not accept that his sur place activities in the United Kingdom had generated any risk. In assessing current country conditions, the Judge noted the removal of Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League from power in August 2024, considered it implausible that criticism of the former regime would now lead to persecution, and rejected the claimed cyber warrant as not genuine. Accordingly, the Judge found that the appellant would not face persecution on return and would not encounter very significant obstacles to reintegration, given that he had lived most of his life in Bangladesh, spoke the language, understood the culture, remained in daily contact with his parents, had access to family support, and was well educated and employable.
Grounds of appeal
5. The grounds can be summarised as follows:
(a) Ground 1, the Judge erred by rejecting or going behind evidence said to establish the appellant's membership and leadership role within BNP-Student wing BJCD, despite party letters and committee documents relied upon by the appellant.
(b) Ground 2, the Judge failed to recognise a real possibility of persecution on return arising from alleged politically motivated criminal proceedings, continuing influence of Awami League structures, political violence, and land disputes involving a minister who was politically connected.
(c) Ground 3, the Judge's credibility findings were irrational, placed undue weight on timing of the asylum claim and airport departure issues, and failed to apply the principles in RT (Zimbabwe) concerning political opinion and future expression of beliefs.
(d) Ground 4, the Judge failed properly to assess whether there would be very significant obstacles to reintegration in Bangladesh given the alleged political situation and cyber tribunal proceedings.
(e) Ground 5, the Judge failed adequately to consider Facebook evidence, online threats, and sur place political activity relevant to risk on return.
(f) Ground 6, the Judge failed to consider Article 8 family and private life, including the Appellant's marriage to a settled partner, pregnancy, family unit and proportionality considerations.
Permission to Appeal
6. Permission to appeal was granted by Judge Karbani, who found that the grounds disclosed no material arguable error in the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of the protection claim. The Judge considered that the findings in relation to asylum, credibility and risk on return were not arguably flawed. However, permission was granted on the basis that it was arguable that the First-tier Tribunal had failed to make a determination on the appellant’s Article 8 claim arising from his family and private life with his settled partner in the United Kingdom.
Rule 24 response
7. The respondent in her rule 24 response submitted that the permission to appeal decision attempted to limit permission to Article 8 ECHR but the form it takes fails to do so. Accordingly she addressed every ground.
The Hearing
8. At the outset of the hearing I sought to clarify with the parties their position on the grant of permission given the respondents rule 24 observations. Mr Waheed argued that in light of the respondents position in the rule 24 and having considered the permission to appeal decision, he considered rule 34 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 had not been met, specifically rule 34 (4) and 34 (5). Firstly, the permission decision did not address the grounds and provide a statement of reasons for refusal. Secondly, it does not appear that notification of the right to make an application to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal on the refused grounds and the time within which, and the manner in which, such application must be made was sent to the appellant.
9. Mr Wain submitted where the grant is not clear then Safi and others (permission to appeal decisions) [2018] UKUT 388 (IAC), provides guidance. Its states where there is ambiguity in the permission decision then that is to be resolved in the favour of the person that applied for permission. In view of this position, I determined a belts and braces approach was required, therefore I should consider the entirety of the grounds.
10. Mr Waheed made limited submissions in support of the grounds. In relation to Ground 1, concerning an alleged concession by the respondent regarding the appellant's political involvement, neither representative was able to identify the concession relied upon. Mr Wain submitted that he was unable to understand where any concession had been made, whilst Mr Waheed indicated that he had not drafted the grounds and was therefore unable to elaborate on that aspect of the argument. Ground 2 was pursued on the basis of the arguments contained within the written grounds regarding the assessment of risk in light of the post-August 2024 political situation in Bangladesh. Grounds 3, 4 and 5 were likewise relied upon as drafted, with no substantial oral submissions made beyond the written grounds. As to Ground 6, it was accepted that the Article 8 claim constituted a new matter and that consent to its consideration had been expressly refused by the Secretary of State both in the review and at the First-tier Tribunal hearing. Reliance was nevertheless placed upon the fact that a section 120 notice had been submitted three weeks before the hearing. In response to judicial questioning, Mr Waheed accepted that section 85 of the Nationality and Asylum Act 2002 [“2002 Act”] prevented the Tribunal from considering a new matter without the Secretary of State's consent and acknowledged that any challenge to the refusal of consent would properly lie by way of judicial review, although the ground was maintained on behalf of the Appellant.
11. Mr Wain submitted that all grounds were opposed for the reasons set out in the Rule 24 response. As to Ground 1, he argued that the Judge had not rejected the appellant's claimed BNP support but had dismissed the appeal on the basis that there was no current risk, particularly following the change of government. He submitted that reliance on the "balance sheet" approach in Hesham Ali was misconceived, as it relates to Article 8 proportionality and not the assessment of political membership in a protection appeal.
12. In respect of Ground 2, Mr Wain submitted that the challenge amounted to no more than a disagreement with the Judge's findings. The Judge had considered the appellant's political profile, the post-August 2024 political situation, and the claim that Awami League affiliates remained influential within state institutions before rejecting the risk claim. He further submitted that the complaint concerning the alleged land dispute with a former Foreign Minister did not appear to have been raised before the First-tier Tribunal and, applying Lata, the Judge could not be criticised for failing to deal with a matter not argued before him.
13. As to Ground 3, he submitted that the adverse credibility findings were adequately reasoned and that the Judge had considered and rejected the appellant's explanation for delaying his asylum claim. The Judge was entitled to find that an individual with the appellant's educational background would have been aware of asylum procedures and that he had originally come to the United Kingdom to study. He also argued that the Judge had expressly addressed and rejected the submission that deficiencies in communication between Bangladeshi authorities explained how the appellant was able to leave the country lawfully despite allegedly being sought by the authorities.
14. Regarding Ground 4, Mr Wain submitted that the cyber case had been expressly rejected by the Judge and that the "very significant obstacles" argument stood or fell with the protection claim. He noted that no separate Article 8 case based on reintegration had been advanced before the First-tier Tribunal.
15. As to Ground 5, he submitted that the complaint regarding Facebook evidence was similarly no more than disagreement. The Judge had considered the Facebook material, and there had been no distinct argument advanced that monitoring of the appellant's online activities had created a risk on return. Nor had any case been put that Awami League loyalists or supporters of Sheikh Hasina would target him because of those posts. Applying Latta, the Judge could not be criticised for failing to address points that had not been argued or which were not Robinson-obvious.
16. In relation to Ground 6, Mr Wain submitted that section 85 of the 2002 Act deprived the Tribunal of jurisdiction to consider the Article 8 claim because it was a new matter and the Secretary of State had expressly refused consent. The First-tier Tribunal correctly recorded that position and therefore could not make findings as to whether the relationship was genuine and subsisting. Relying on Quaidoo (new matter: procedure/process) [2018] UKUT 87 (IAC), he submitted that any challenge to the refusal of consent could only be brought by way of judicial review and could not amount to a material error of law in the appeal.
17. In response Mr Waheed submitted that the Judge failed to engage with material evidence supporting the appellant’s claim. In particular, reliance was placed upon the appellant’s witness statement, in which he stated that he remained politically active on social media and had received threats online from Awami League supporters. It was argued that this evidence, together with the supporting social media material contained within the bundle, was before the Tribunal and required specific assessment and findings. The appellant further relied upon the evidence concerning a land dispute involving associates of a former Foreign Minister. He claimed that politically connected individuals had unlawfully occupied family property, threatened and persecuted family members, and attacked his uncle, and that attempts to obtain redress had been unsuccessful due to the political influence of those aligned with the Awami League. It was submitted that this evidence formed part of the overall risk profile and was not adequately addressed by the Judge.
18. I reserved the decision.
Findings and reasons
19. With regard to Ground 1, the Judge did consider the documentary evidence relating to the appellant’s political profile at paragraph 13(v). Further, at paragraphs 13(x) and 13(xiii), the Judge assessed the appellant’s claim on the basis that he was a political activist, as asserted. Accordingly, the documentary evidence said to establish the appellant’s political activities would not have made any material difference to the Judge’s assessment that, notwithstanding that profile, the appellant was not at risk on return.
20. As to the submission that the Judge failed to adopt a balance-sheet approach in accordance with Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60, that argument is misconceived. Hesham Ali concerns the assessment of proportionality under Article 8 ECHR and the balancing of the public interest in deportation against an individual’s right to respect for private and family life. It has no application to the Judge’s assessment of risk arising from the appellant’s political profile in the asylum claim. I am therefore unable to discern any error of law arising from this ground.
21. With regard to Ground 2, I note that at paragraph 13(xiii) the Judge gave adequate reasons, grounded in the objective country evidence, for concluding that there was no current risk to the appellant. The Judge expressly addressed the submission that remnants of the Awami League remained in positions of power and influence. The Judge’s findings are consistent with the guidance subsequently provided by the Court of Appeal in MU v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 812, in which Underhill LJ observed at paragraph 17 that: “The truth is that the change of government has wholly changed the picture in such a way that there is no reason whatever to suppose that the respondent will be at risk of serious harm if returned.”
22. The Judge also considered the appellant’s reliance on the alleged family dispute with the Foreign Minister, noting this matter at paragraph 20. In his witness statement, at paragraph 19, the appellant asserted that this incident demonstrated that he and his family had been specifically targeted. However, at paragraph 13(x), the Judge noted that the appellant’s parents, who were also BNP members, continued to reside in Bangladesh without having been detained. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the Judge provided sufficient reasons for rejecting this aspect of the appellant’s claim.
23. In substance, this ground amounts to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s findings of fact and assessment of the evidence. It does not disclose any material error of law.
24. I have carefully considered Grounds 3 to 5. I am satisfied that these grounds amount to no more than disagreements with the Judge’s findings and do not disclose any material error of law. At paragraph 13(vi), the Judge explained why he found it implausible that, despite the appellant’s claimed high-profile political activities, he was able to depart Bangladesh using his own passport without being stopped or detained. The Judge concluded that the appellant was not, at that time, of adverse interest to the authorities. The Judge also found the appellant’s explanation for not claiming asylum promptly to be incredulous, particularly given that he held a Master's degree and was therefore capable of understanding and pursuing available options. Further, the appellant accepted in interview that his intention upon arrival in the United Kingdom was to continue his education. At paragraph 13(ix), the Judge noted that the appellant’s assertion that circumstances had subsequently changed lacked sufficient detail. These were findings properly open to the Judge on the evidence.
25. The grounds are also unclear in their reliance upon “very significant obstacles”. To the extent that it is argued that the risk of persecution itself established very significant obstacles to integration, that argument fails because the Judge rejected the appellant’s protection claim. Having done so, the Judge went on separately to consider the issue of very significant obstacles at paragraph 13(xvi). There is no error of law in that approach. The Judge was entitled to assess the Article 8 claim on the basis that the protection claim had not been established.
26. As to the Facebook evidence, the Judge considered this at paragraph 13(xi) and gave adequate reasons for attaching limited weight to it. Neither the decision nor the bundle before the Judge indicates that any submission was advanced concerning close monitoring or surveillance of the appellant’s social media activity. I am therefore satisfied that this was not a principal controversial issue requiring determination, and the Judge could not reasonably have been expected to address it. See Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC). I am further satisfied that the point was not Robinson obvious. Accordingly, no material error of law is disclosed in relation to the Judge’s treatment of the Facebook evidence.
27. Turning to Ground 6, I note that at paragraph 8 the Judge recorded that the Secretary of State had not given consent for the Tribunal to consider the appellant’s relationship with his partner and her children as a new matter. Mr Waheed submitted that, because a section 120 statement had been filed approximately three weeks before the hearing, the Judge ought to have considered the issue. However, it is apparent from the decision that both parties accepted that the matter constituted a new matter for the purposes of the appeal.
28. Section 85(5) of the 2002 Act provides that the Tribunal must not consider a new matter without the consent of the Secretary of State. In circumstances where such consent was refused, the Tribunal was precluded from determining that aspect of the appellant’s case. The proper route by which to challenge a refusal to give consent was by way of judicial review. Accordingly, the Judge’s decision not to consider the appellant’s relationship and family circumstances does not disclose an error of law.
29. The appellant has failed to establish that the decision of the Judge involved the making of a material error of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

Notice of Decision

The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is not necessary to set aside the decision.

The appeal is dismissed.

S K KUDHAIL
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 September 2026