Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001022
UI-2026-001023
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56189/2024
PA/80531/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

31st July 2026

Before

The Hon. MR JUSTICE LAVENDER, PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

Between

AA
AB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Banham, counsel instructed by Barnes Harrild & Dyer
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
(1) Introduction
1. The appellants have been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing their protection appeals, following a hearing which took place on 20 October 2025.
(2) Anonymity
2. The anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal is continued. We have considered the public interest in open justice, but we conclude that it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection because of the need for confidentiality.
(3) Factual Background
3. The appellants are a married couple with three children. The first appellant, AA, is the wife and the second appellant, AB, is her husband. They are Kurdish citizens of Iraq.
4. The appellants’ adult daughter has been recognised as a refugee. Their teenage child is dependent upon AA’s claim. They have had a third child since arriving in the United Kingdom.
5. AB arrived in the United Kingdom in October 2018. His previous asylum claims were refused and his appeals against those decisions were dismissed by way of decisions dated 7 August 2019 and 27 February 2023, principally for want of credibility. AB submitted further submissions on 1 March 2024. AB’s claim is based on the same facts as his previous claims and was refused by way of a decision dated 22 October 2024.
6. AA arrived in the United Kingdom with her two children in November 2022. Her protection claim was refused by way of a decision dated 21 February 2024. That claim was based on her fear of violence if returned to Iraq as a result of: (a) a video recording of her having sex with AB; and (b) her having protected her eldest daughter from female genital mutilation (‘FGM’) and forced marriage, against the wishes of AB’s family. AA also states that she has no access to her identity documents.
7. Both AA and AB appealed the respective decisions and their appeals were linked before the First-tier Tribunal at their request.
(4) The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
8. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the issues for consideration were the credibility of the protection claims, documentation, whether there were very significant obstacles to reintegration and whether the decisions would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellants or their children. The judge was invited to depart from the findings of the judges who had dismissed AB’s previous appeals.
9. It suffices at this point to record that:
(1) The judge concluded, in relation to the ‘sex tape’ issue, that there were ‘multiple difficulties’ with the appellants’ evidence, owing to inconsistencies, implausible aspects and vagueness.
(2) As for the FGM issue, the judge noted inconsistencies as to when AA claimed to have undergone this process and the judge found that the evidence of the appellants’ adult daughter regarding the basis of her own claim was vague.
(3) The judge found the appellants to be entirely lacking in credibility in relation to their claims that they could not access their identity documents.
(4) The judge concluded that there would be no disproportionate interference in the appellants’ human rights nor those of their children.
(5) The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
10. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:
(1) Making a material mistake of fact and misdirecting herself in relation to a WhatsApp conversation involving, and a letter from, the mayor of the appellants’ home area, by wrongly stating that the contents thereof were ‘factually incorrect.’
(2) Error in the treatment of the evidence as to the reasons for the eldest daughter’s refugee status and failure to consider its implications for the protection and Article 8 claims.
(3) Failure to give primary consideration to the best interests of the children or to evaluate the family’s rights collectively.
(4) Failure to conduct a structured proportionality assessment or to make a finding on whether removal would cause unjustifiably harsh consequences.
(5) Failure to consider ‘Robinson-obvious’ matters in respect of Article 8.
(6) Failure to apply and properly weigh section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘the 2002 Act’).
11. Permission to appeal on all grounds was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst, who remarked that, although grounds 3-5 had less merit, the grant of permission was not limited, to avoid artificially restricting the scope of the arguable points in the appeal.
12. The respondent filed no Rule 24 response.
(6) The Error of Law Hearing
13. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, either to re-make the decision or to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
14. A consolidated bundle was submitted on behalf of the appellants, containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellants’ and the respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal. Also included was a rule 15(2A) application seeking permission to rely upon post-hearing witness statements from the appellants and their adult daughter. Those statements accompanied the said application. Lastly, a short skeleton argument was provided on behalf of the appellants.
15. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
(7) Discussion
16. In view of the guidance given by the Court of Appeal, including at paragraph [77] of KM [2021] EWCA Civ 693; [2021] Imm AR 1361, we acknowledge that judicial restraint should be exercised when examining the reasons given by a judge of the First-tier Tribunal for their decision and that it should not be assumed too readily that the judge misdirected themselves. In this case, [77(2)] is pertinent, in that a court or tribunal should be slow to characterise as an error of law what is no more than a disagreement with the judge’s assessment of the facts.
17. We have also been assisted by [77(3)] of KM:
“Third, where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account (per Lord Dyson in MA (Somalia) at [45]).”
18. We conclude that none of the grounds are made out and that there was no material error made by the First-tier Tribunal. Our reasons are as follows.
(7)(a) Ground 1
19. It is contended that the judge made a material mistake of fact in her consideration of one facet of the evidence at [47] of the decision. In that passage, the judge described a WhatsApp conversation involving, and a letter dated 12 February 2024 (‘the first letter’) from, “a person who is said to be the mayor of their home area.” The grounds argue that the judge was wrong to find that the letter contained a ‘factually incorrect’ claim, namely that the appellants left Iraq at the same time.
20. The first letter states, as the judge correctly noted at [47], that AB “faced a social issue in 2015 and he fled along with his wife and children to abroad.” At [5]-[6] of the decision, the judge correctly set out the appellants’ immigration history, including that AB left Iraq seven years earlier than AA. There was therefore no mistake of fact made by the judge in relation to the content of the first letter.
21. In the hearing, Mr Banham made a new submission, which did not form part of the grounds of appeal, in that he contended that the judge failed to consider a letter from the mayor dated 30 April 2025 (“the second letter”), in which the earlier error was corrected. We do not find that the judge was unaware of the second letter. Although the judge did not refer to it in her decision on the appeal, she stated in her decision refusing permission to appeal that it was considered by the Tribunal at the time of the appeal.
22. Moreover, even if Mr Banham were right that the second letter was overlooked, we do not accept that considering it would have led to the judge placing any weight on the mayor’s correspondence as a whole:
(1) The second letter was sent in response to a request from the appellants’ daughter that the error in the first letter be corrected. There is no indication from those messages that the mayor had any personal knowledge as to when each appellant left Iraq. In any event, the true position was known to the judge and set out, as we have stated, at [5]-[6].
(2) The first letter states that AB faced a ‘social issue’ before he left and that he would face ‘social problems’ if he returned, which the judge made no error in finding to be an ‘understatement if what he is actually facing is death by honour killing.’
(3) The second letter contains a similar statement that AB left because of a ‘social issue,’ but says nothing about what would happened if he returned. We conclude that, had the judge directly addressed the second letter, it could have had no material impact on the weight which was attached to the mayoral evidence.
23. At this point we note that the judge made varied and detailed negative credibility findings in relation to both appellants at [30]-[46] which go to the core of their claim to fear honour killings. Those findings, which are unrelated to the mayoral correspondence, are unchallenged. We therefore reject Mr Banham’s claim that the judge’s finding in relation to the mayoral letters was fundamental or material to the judge’s overall credibility assessment. The judge found, in effect, that the mayor added nothing to the appellant’s account.
7(b) Ground 2
24. In ground 2, issue is taken with the judge’s conclusion, said to appear at [64], that the evidence of the appellants’ daughter was vague as to why she was granted refugee status. For the sake of clarity, we set out what the judge said at [64] and [65].
64. On the one hand, the objective evidence in the CPIN makes clear that in Iraqi society the barbarity of honour based violence against women and girls can be provoked by the most normal and every day of human behaviours, and so had the first appellant assisted her daughter to avoid FGM, and forced marriage, and to flee the country, against the stated wishes of the male relatives, it is entirely plausible this would provoke honour based violence. In addition the respondent has accepted the appellants’ daughter is sufficiently at risk to justify a grant of asylum, which is consistent with the appellant’s case.
65. On the other hand, the evidence of both appellants about the first appellant’s specific experiences in helping her daughter avoid FGM, and forced marriage, is variously inconsistent, implausible, and vague, and the daughter’s oral evidence about why she was granted asylum is also vague. When asked to give the reasons she was granted asylum, her answer was “because the reason was my life was at risk and when they realised that having talked to them about my issues, my problem, they accepted my account.””
25. The grounds are somewhat misleading, in that the quotation provided is incomplete, not entirely accurate and fails to identify that the impugned finding appears at [65].
26. The grounds refer to the daughter’s witness statements, which are said to give a full account of the claim which led to her being given refugee status, but this misses the point, since the judge was clearly referring solely to the daughter’s oral evidence as to why she was granted asylum and the judge was entitled to make the observation which she did.
27. There is reference in grounds 1 and 2 to the judgment in Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367; [2005] INLR 377. However, we are not assisted by these arguments, as this was not a case where the judge simply dismissed potentially supportive evidence owing to earlier negative credibility findings. On the contrary, the judge’s findings on the mayoral correspondence and the daughter’s oral evidence were arrived at for separate reasons to those given by the judge in relation to the appellants’ oral evidence. Lastly, on this point, we note that it is was only after completing her consideration of all of the evidence that the judge arrived, at [67], at a conclusion as to the appellants’ claims concerning FGM and forced marriage. We note that the judge stated that she had ‘reviewed all the evidence in the round’ and we accept that she did so.
(7)(c) Ground 3
28. It is contended in ground 3 that the judge made no discrete findings as to the best interests of each of the appellants’ three children and, further, did not evaluate the family’s ‘rights’ collectively.
29. Mr Banham accepted that the judge found, at [85], that Article 8(1) was engaged between AA and the adult daughter and that the judge referred, at [87], to the best interests of the children.
30. The judge did not merely refer to the children’s best interests, but, in addition, made a clear finding that their best interests lay in remaining together with their older sister and their parents.
31. The judge carried out a full examination of the Article 8 arguments put on behalf of the appellants. Mr Banham was unable to point us to any aspect of the evidence which the judge neglected to consider.
32. We further note that the judge remarked, at [90], that the evidence as to why it would be upsetting to separate the dependent children from their adult sibling was:
“…very limited and lacking in detail. I am not told how they are involved in each other’s lives, what the daily structure of their family life is like, who helps with what, or any other details about how they live together.”
33. In those circumstances, the judge cannot properly be criticised for not conducting a more detailed assessment of the children’s best interests.
34. We have decided not to admit the witness statements dated 11 June 2026 which accompanied the Rule 15(2A) application and which have clearly been crafted, following the promulgation of the judge’s decision, to respond to the judge’s findings on a range of matters, including the impact of separation. The judge cannot be criticised for not considering evidence which was never adduced at the hearing. In any event, Mr Banham accepted that these statements did not take the case much further and he did not refer to them.
(7)(d) Ground 4
35. This complaint, which Mr Banham characterised as more of an observation, was that there was a failure to conduct a proportionality assessment or to find whether removal would cause unjustifiably harsh consequences. However, the latter point is addressed by the judge at [93], where a clear finding is made that there would be no such consequences.
36. Mr Banham pointed to the absence of a consideration of the five factors set out in Razgar [2004] UKHL 27; [2004] Imm AR 381. In relation to this argument, we observe that: the judge found at [85] that there was family life and at ]87] that the decision to remove the appellants would separate them from their adult daughter; and at [87-93] the judge carried out an adequately detailed proportionality assessment. While there is no direct reference to the lawfulness and necessity stages of the Razgar analysis, we do not accept that, if the judge had expressly addressed those stages, that would have benefitted the appellants in any way. Indeed, Mr Banham made no such argument.
(7)(e) Ground 5
37. Ground 5 sets out a series of factors which are described as “Robinson-obvious,” applying Robinson [1997] EWCA Civ 3090; [1997] Imm AR 568, and which it is said the judge failed to consider. We note Mr Banham’s acceptance that there was no evidence before the judge regarding any of them. Indeed, he accepted that the purported quotation from the adult daughter’s witness statement in paragraph 17(f) of the grounds of appeal was not in fact taken from that witness statement.
38. Given Mr Banham’s helpful stance, we need do no more than refer to [69] of the recent judgment in AL [2026] EWCA Civ 370, which restates the Robinson principle, emphasising that it relates solely to Refugee Convention claims:
“The principle in Robinson is a narrow principle. It is limited to points of refugee law which favour a person who claims to be a refugee, and which are 'obvious' and arguable with 'strong prospects of success'. The reason for that principle is that it is necessary to enable the United Kingdom to comply with its obligations under the Refugee Convention.”
(7)(f) Ground 6
39. The final ground contains an allegation that the judge failed to apply and weigh section 117B of the 2002 Act, with specific reference to section 117B(6), which provides as follows:
“In the case of a person who is not liable to deportation, the public interest does not require the person's removal where—
(a) the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and
(b) it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the United Kingdom.”
40. Mr Banham did not seek to rely on the claim in the grounds that the “spirit” of this provision or “the principles underlying” it should be applied in relation to the appellants’ adult daughter, who was not a qualifying child. That term is defined in section 117D(1) as meaning:
“a person who is under the age of 18 and who-
(a) is a British citizen, or
(b) has lived in the United Kingdom for a continuous period of seven years or more;”
41. We note that it is, rightly, not argued on the appellants’ behalf that their two minor children satisfy this definition.
(8) Notice of Decision
42. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
43. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 July 2026