Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001038
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/04622/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 30th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

UATANAURA KAIZUKO
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Brown, instructed by Lawrence Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A McVeety, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 19 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claim.

2. The appellant is a national of Namibia born on 9 July 1999. He left Namibia in July 2023 and travelled by aeroplane to the UK. He applied for asylum on 9 July 2023. His claim was refused on 16 October 2024 and he appealed against that decision.

3. The appellant claims to be a gay man and to have been discriminated against and beaten in Namibia by the local leader of his village and some of his acquaintances because of his sexuality. He fears being ill-treated on return to Namibia.

4. The respondent, in refusing the appellant’s claim, accepted that the appellant was a gay man who had been discriminated against by the leader of the village and his acquaintances, but did not accept that he would be at risk on return to Namibia because there was a sufficiency of protection available to him and he could also safely and reasonably relocate to another part of the country. The respondent noted from the background country evidence that homosexuality was not criminalised in Namibia and considered that available information did not establish that openly LGBTI persons faced a risk of persecution or serious harm from non-state or state actors. The respondent noted that, whilst traditional leaders of villages had some power and influence, it was not at a state level. The respondent noted that by his own admission the appellant had gone to the police station to report the attacks and that they had taken a report of the incident, tried to find the men who had beaten him and issued a restraining order against the leader. The respondent did not consider that the village leader or his acquaintances had sufficient power or influence to be able to locate the appellant anywhere in Namibia. The respondent considered that the appellant was therefore not at risk on return to Namibia and that his removal to Namibia would not breach his human rights.

5. The appellant appealed against that decision. His appeal was heard by the First-tier Tribunal on 12 September 2025 and was dismissed in a decision promulgated on 26 January 2026. The judge noted that the appellant had modified his position at the hearing to being bisexual rather than gay. He noted from the background country evidence that Namibia had made a number of progressive steps in relation to providing a safe place for all its citizens to live and with particular regard to the LGBT community, and that same sex relationships were no longer illegal. The judge considered that the actions of the police to whom the appellant reported the assault confirmed that there was a commitment to provide protection. The judge considered that, in any event, the appellant had only identified one person and a few associates as those that he feared and had failed to demonstrate that that person had the position, power, influence, control, and influence claimed. He found that even if it was the case that the local leader, known as ‘The General`, held some position, there was no evidence to suggest that he could be in a position of power and influence to be aware of the appellant’s return to Namibia, or wish to seek him out, beyond the boundaries of his local township/community. The judge considered that there was a sufficiency of protection available to the appellant and that he could also safely and reasonably relocate to another part of the country. He accordingly dismissed the appeal.

6. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the judge’s decision on two grounds. Firstly, that he had made unclear and/or contradictory findings, finding at [21] that openly LGBT persons faced a risk of persecution or serious harm from non-state or state actors, and that the appellant was a gay/bi-sexual male from Namibia, but yet in the same paragraph [21] that the appellant had not demonstrated to the relevant standard that he had a real and genuine fear of being persecuted for a convention reason. Secondly, that the judge failed to take account of a relevant fact and/or failed to make a proper finding on a material evidential issue, namely that the appellant would be easily identifiable anywhere in Namibia as being a member of the Otumborombonga community, which would make it easy for the leader of his village to come to know of his whereabouts and find him.

7. Permission was granted in the First-tier Tribunal on the following basis:

“The first ground of appeal is that the decision contains contradictory findings. I consider paragraph 13 to be clear, the appellant’s sexuality is not in issue in this appeal. However, it is arguable that findings contained in paragraph 21 are contradictory (although it may be that a key word is missing). It is also arguable that the judge did not make findings on a matter that was material namely the claim that “the General” works closely with the police which is relevant to the issue of internal relocation.”

8. The respondent issued a rule 24 response opposing the appeal.

9. The matter then came before me for a hearing. Both parties made submissions.

10. Mr Brown submitted that ground one raised a procedural issue, in that the judge granting permission ought to have referred the case back for an amendment under rule 31 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 to correct the error under the “slip rule” if [21] was considered to have been a typing error. That had not been done and therefore the Tribunal was bound to consider [21} and decide if there were contradictory findings in that paragraph. With regard to ground two, Mr Brown submitted that the judge had failed to deal with the point raised in the appellant’s statement at [5] as to how his community was distinct owing to the way the people spoke, and that he would be found on that basis. He submitted that that was a material error of law and that the decision should be set aside and the case remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for the decision to be re-made.

11. Mr McVeety agreed that ground one raised a procedural point, in that the judge granting permission ought to have used his powers to refer the case back to the original judge for amendment. He submitted that it was tolerably clear, however, that there was a word missing in [21] given that the findings at [15] to [19] pointed in one direction, namely that LGBTQ people did not face a risk of persecution. The judge had made no positive findings for the appellant and common sense had therefore to be used by this Tribunal. As for ground two, Mr McVeety submitted that even if the judge had failed to consider the appellant’s claim about his community being identifiable, what was relevant was that the judge had given valid reasons as to why the General could not track him down outside his village. Even if that was insufficient, the judge had found in the alternative that there was a sufficiency of protection available to the appellant from the state, a finding that had not been challenged in the grounds.

12. Mr Brown submitted, in response, that the Tribunal could not retrospectively apply Rule 31, so that ground one had to be made out. As for ground two, the judge ought still to have addressed the issue raised by the appellant in his statement when considering reasonableness of relocation which was relevant to the issues of internal flight and sufficiency of protection.

Analysis

13. Ground one relates to the judge’s finding at [21] of his decision, which was:

“On the evidence before me I am satisfied that openly LGBT persons face a risk of persecution or serious harm from non-state, or state actors. He has not demonstrated to the relevant standard that he has a real and genuine fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason.”

14. Clearly, as identified by both parties, the proper approach to the contradictory findings in that paragraph would have been for the judge granting permission to have referred the case back to the original judge to address the matter and amend the decision under the ‘slip rule’, in accordance with Rule 31 of the Procedure Rules. That was not done. However, as Mr McVeety said “we are where we are”. I agree with Mr McVeety that a common sense approach has to be taken to what is obviously, and without any doubt, a matter of the judge having omitted the word “not” before “satisfied” in the first line of [21]. It was obvious because the findings that he had made in the previous paragraphs, from [15] to [19] supported the view that openly LGBT persons did not face a risk of persecution or serious harm from non-state, or state actors, which in turn was consistent with the second half of [21] where the judge found that the appellant “has not demonstrated to the relevant standard that he has a real and genuine fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason.” Mr Brown did not seek to argue that there was any doubt as to whether the judge had made a slip.

15. I note that in the case of MH (review; slip rule; church witnesses) Iran [2020] UKUT 125, as referred to by the respondent in the rule 24 response, the Tribunal decided to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal. However the circumstances in that case were different. The error changed the entire outcome of the appeal. Further, there were other errors identified in the decision making it materially flawed. In the case before me the outcome of the appeal was clear and the issue was simply an obviously missing word in a sentence amongst many other sentences and findings which went in one direction only. As such, I find that the judge made an error in his decision, but it was one that was not material to the outcome of the decision and that, in any event, applying my discretion under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, it does not require the judge’s decision to be set aside.

16. As for ground two it is the case, as accepted by the respondent in the rule 24 response, that the judge did not specifically refer to [5] of the appellant’s statement where he referred to his community being distinct people who could be identified anywhere. However, like the respondent, I consider the omission to be immaterial, in light of the judge’s findings at [20] and [24] that the appellant had failed to show that the General had the position, power, influence, control, and influence beyond the boundaries of his local township/community to wish to seek the appellant out even if aware of his whereabouts, and that his power would diminish at the border of his village. The judge found, as he was entitled to do, that the appellant’s statement alone that the General had such power and influence and the ability and willingness to locate him, was pure unsupported speculation. In addition, as Mr McVeety properly submitted, the judge found that there was a sufficiency available to the appellant from the state in any event. I refer to his findings at [25] to [27] in that regard which, as Mr McVeety submitted, have not been challenged in the grounds. The issue of reasonableness of relocation was fully and properly addressed by the judge at [28] of his decision. In the circumstances I find nothing of merit in the second ground and do not accept that it identifies any material error in the judge’s decision.

17. For all these reasons I do not consider there to have been any material errors in the judge’s decision. The decision that he reached was one which was fully and properly open to him on the evidence available to him. Accordingly I uphold his decision.

Notice of Decision

18. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 June 2026