Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001043 UI-2026-001045

First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/54594/2024; LH/07215/2024
HU/54595/2024; LH/07216/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 31 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

Between

TA and MA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Not present or represented
For the Respondent: Mr Walker, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. I have made an anonymity order in respect of both appellants as the second appellant is a minor (born in 2022). When I refer to ‘the appellant’ in this decision, I am referring to the first appellant. The appellant is a female citizen of Brazil. She lives with her child, the second appellant, and the child’s father, LA, in the United Kingdom. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal on human rights grounds (Article 8 ECHR) against a decision of the Secretary of State refusing her leave to remain as a family member of LA. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed her appeal. She now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
2. The appellants did not attend the Upper Tribunal initial hearing. I am satisfied that they have been served with the notices of hearing and that it was fair and in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in their absence.
3. The First-tier Tribunal judge helpfully summarised the Secretary of State’s refusal letter at [11]:
In her refusal Letter of 5 April 2024, the respondent set out her reasons for refusing the claim. The appellant could not meet the eligibility requirements of E-LTRP 1.1. to 1.12.She had not been living together in a relationship with her partner akin to marriage for at least two years prior to the date of application. She therefore did not meet the definition of GEN 1.2. She entered on 22 August 2022 and made her application on 2 December 2022. She also could not meet E-LTRP 2.1 to 2.2 as she entered the UK as a visitor. On EX.1, there were no insurmountable obstacles to continuing family life together outside the UK in Brazil. Her partner is also Brazilian and whilst they may experience a material change in the quality of their life, it is not an insurmountable obstacle. There is nothing preventing him from returning with her. Their daughter is also a child and was a couple of months old by December 2022. She can travel back with them. She lived in the UK for 7 months but had resided in Brazil to the age of 27. There was nothing exceptional in the appellant’s appeal warranting a grant of leave to remain within or outside of the Rules given her history and basis for coming here. The bests interests of the child were also considered in the decision.
4. At the hearing in the First-tier Tribunal, the judge heard oral evidence from the appellant and LA. At [23] et seq, the judge found that the appellant did not meet the requirements of GEN 1.2 because she had entered the United Kingdom as a visitor. She had not lived with LA in a relationship akin to marriage for more than 2 years. The judge was not satisfied that the appellant met EX1, there being no very significant obstacles to relocating the Brazil [26]. He found ‘even considering MA’s Section 55 rights as part of the decision-making process’, the child could remain with her mother and live in Brazil pending an application for entry clearance to return to the United Kingdom.
5. I heard the oral submissions of Mr walker for the Secretary of State and then reserved my decision.
6. The grounds complain that the judge erred in law by misunderstanding the immigration status of the second appellant. At [22] the judge wrote:
I have also noted a number of applications have been made for Maria to be registered as a British Citizen, the last one being in May 2025. This is again based on a misunderstanding of the British Nationality Act. Maria’s father was not British when she was born. He got his ILR after she was born. She may obtain the same leave as he has, based on proving dependency. She cannot get Nationality in her own right. The reference to BNA section 10A referring to ILR under Appendix EU is misplaced because her father cannot satisfy Condition 2. He had not applied for, nor was he granted ILR before 1 July 2021 being the cut-off date for EU applications.
7. The grounds are correct to claim that the judge has misunderstood the law regarding the child’s right to apply for naturalisation as a British citizen. Section 1(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 provides as follows:
A person born in the United Kingdom after commencement who is not a British citizen by virtue of subsection (1) or (2) shall be entitled to be registered as a British citizen if, while he is a minor—
(a) his father or mother becomes a British citizen or becomes settled in the United Kingdom; and
(b) an application is made for his registration as a British citizen.
[my emphasis]
However, the grounds fail to explain why the judge’s error would have made any difference the outcome of the appeals. The judge considered the two appeals together under the same Tribunal reference. Upon being granted British citizenship on 3 October 2025, the second appellant’s appeal has ended. Section104 (4A) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides that ‘an appeal under section 82(1) brought by a person while he is in the United Kingdom shall be treated as abandoned if the appellant is granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom’. All arguments relating to the second appellant have therefore been rendered academic. Moreover, there has been no infection of the judge’s analysis by his misunderstanding of the 2002 Act; what the judge says about the child’s circumstances, including her immigration status and the reasonableness of her remaining with the appellant should the latter return to Brazil, were, at the time he reached his decision (that is, before the child became a British Citizen), entirely valid. The appellant herself could not meet the Immigration Rules not least because she had entered as a visitor whilst she would not face significant obstacles to integration in Brazil for the reasons given by the judge which are cogent and rational. The appellant may, of course, submit a fresh application based on her changed circumstances (including her child’s recently acquired nationality) but that is a matter for her. At the date he determined the appeal, the judge reached an outcome which was plainly available to him on the evidence. such errors as he did make are immaterial whilst he did not err in law by failing to anticipate future events. I can find no reason in law to interfere with his analysis either for the reasons advanced in the grounds of appeal or at all.
8. Accordingly, the appeal of the appellant is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
The appeal of MA is deemed abandoned
The appeal of TA is dismissed.

C. N. Lane

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 20 July 2026