Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001057
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/65297/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 14 September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

SN
(Anonymity ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Janjua, Morden Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr Parwar, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties are entitled to apply on notice to vary this direction.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of Vietnam, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Tozzi (“the Judge”) dated 15 October 2025 dismissing his international protection and human rights claim.
2. The hearing before me is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I find that there is a material error of law in the decision, then it will have to remade. If I find that there is no material error of law in the Judge’ decision then the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal will stand.
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
3. Permission to appeal was refused by the Judge on 25 February 2026.
4. Permission to appeal was granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge I. Lewis in a decision dated 24 April 2026 following a renewed application to the Upper Tribunal. The Learned Deputy Judge did not grant permission on most of the grounds but said as follows:
“However, the latter part of Ground 4 seeks to challenge the Judge’s findings on credibility and involvement with the Brotherhood for Democracy. Challenge is made to one aspect of the Judge’s reasoning. The Grounds correctly identify that the letter of 18 October 2024 (Appellant’s supplementary bundle, page 8) specifies a “Date of joining” of “25/09/2024”. Accordingly, it does appear that the Judge was in error at paragraph 29 in suggesting that this letter was inconsistent with the Appellant’s narrative. Arguably, this misconception of fact was material because the Judge stated that it “undermines the reliability of his account”.
The Judge’s Decision
5. The Judge referred to the background to the Appellant’s protection claim which was summarised at paragraph 17 of the decision:
“He stated at interview that he joined the Catholic Young Group in 2004 and was motivated to do so as he wished to help poor people. The appellant claimed the Catholic group leader (Ms Xuan) advised him of a protest on 3 April 2017, which he attended along with 7000-8000 people. At interview he said this protest was about the Formosa disaster. The appellant claimed he was arrested on suspicion of being involved with the Brotherhood for Democracy”.
6. At paragraph 19 the Judge continued:
“The appellant then claimed that Ms Xuan was allegedly arrested on 17 October 2017 and a priest organised a demonstration against this, the appellant claiming around 3000 to 4000 protesters attended on 21 October. The appellant was arrested for causing public disorder on his account not for any political activity and was taken to a police station for one night. On each occasion it was a condition of release that he was not allowed to leave his local area and that he would be monitored. The appellant allegedly attended a third demonstration to fight for the special economic zone, he heard of this demonstration from a priest. On this occasion he was able to flee without getting arrested. On 20 November 2017 he was arrested and detained for 1 week, where his parents had to bail him out. He claimed he was accused of being involved with the church leader and was again told not to leave the local area. There was no mention at interview that Ms Xuan was a political figure rather than a church leader, only in his statement of 9 May 2024 did the appellant say for the first time that Ms Xuan was involved with the Brotherhood for Democracy. The account lacked specificity and extremely thin amounting to nothing more than a bare assertion.”
7. The Judge made robust and detailed adverse findings thereafter and against which permission to appeal was refused.
8. Permission to appeal has been granted in respect of paragraph 29 of the Judge’s decision only which states as follows:
“The appellant asserted that he was now involved in the Brotherhood for Democracy in the UK and became member on 25 September 2024, whereas a letter he produced welcoming him as a member was dated 18 October 2024. This was inconsistent and undermines the reliability of his account…”
9. Therefore, it is paragraph 29 of the Judge’s decision which has been the main focus of matters before me.
The Hearing Before Me
10. The Appellant provided a bundle comprising 389 pages. There was a Rule 24 Response from the Respondent.
11. Mr Janju relied on a skeleton argument dated 15 June 2026. He submitted that the Respondent was wrong to state that despite there being an error of law in the Judge’s decision that it was not material. He said that the background material was clear and he referred me to page 80 of the bundle which stated that:
“A person who is a member of an illegal opposition political party and can show that his/her political opposition has come to the attention of the authorities is likely to be at risk of persecution and/or serious harm. Each case, however, must be considered on its facts with the onus on the person to demonstrate that are likely to be at risk. 3.1.2 The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) remains the only legal political party, no other parties are officially allowed to operate (see Political system) 3.1.3 Illegal political parties do exist but tend to be based outside of Vietnam. Groups such as the Viet Tan, and the Provisional National Government of Vietnam are both based in California and are designated as terrorist groups by the Vietnamese authorities. Whilst the group Brotherhood for Democracy has activists outside of Vietnam, Human Rights Watch has noted that activists are also within the country (see Illegal political parties). 3.1.4 Members of illegal political parties are subject to arrest and detention and can be charged under security provisions such as “abusing democratic freedom” and “carrying out activities to overthrow the government”. Those who are members or who have participated in activities organised by groups proscribed as terrorist organisations in Vietnam may be charged with terrorism offences (see Illegal political parties)…”
12. Mr Janju also referred me to further parts of the background material, including as follows:
“The UK Home Office (HO) conducted a Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) to Vietnam between 23 February and 1 March 2019. The Fact-Finding Team (FFT) were informed by various diplomatic sources that: ‘Vietnam does not permit political opposition in the form of allowing opposition parties to operate. Activists are arrested for social media posts with charges often coming under Vietnam’s vague security provisions such as “abusing democratic freedom” and “making, storing, and spreading information, materials, and items for the purpose of opposing the state.” Sentencing is harsh (See also Arrests and Criminal justice system). ‘…Authorities are not afraid of individual activists but they are most wary of people making associations or organising themselves into a political party.”
13. Mr Janjua said that it was not just the dates which were incorrect in the Judge’s decision because the Judge had made an adverse finding in respect of the Appellant’s credibility about being a member of a banned group. I was referred to the letters at pages 320 and 321 of the bundle. Mr Janju submitted that had the Judge not made the error in paragraph 29 then a different conclusion in respect of the case was likely.
14. Asked why the Judge’s error was material, Mr Janjua submitted that the erroneous findings had affected the decision in respect of membership.
15. Mr Parwar relied on the Respondent’s Rule 24 which had been drafted by Mr Wain. That said in part as follows:
“The grounds assert that the FTTJ failed to consider at [27] the entirety of risk associated with political profile of a member of illegal opposition party under the CPIN Vietnam, Opposition to the state, September 2025. It is submitted that this is not a material error of law for the following reasons…
The remainder of this ground challenges the finding at [29] based on a mistake of fact, where the FTTJ incorrectly recorded an inconsistency between the letter from Brotherhood for Democracy dated 18 October 2024 and the account confirming 25 September 2024. It is submitted that whilst this is an error, it is not material considering the remainder of the findings.
The remainder of the finding at [29] placed limited weight on this letter based on nobody attending the hearing to support the appellant’s UK sur place activity within the Brotherhood for Democracy. The FTTJ was permitted to attach weight to the absence of reasonably obtainable corroborative evidence where there was no good reason for failing to obtain it (MAH Egypt [2023] EWCA Civ 216, [86]). The letter was therefore correctly treated with limited evidential weight based on this factor rather than the incorrect dates and inconsistencies...”
16. Mr Parwar submitted that membership was not sufficient to show a material error of law because the Appellant’s case had not been put that way before the Judge. Mr Parwar said that there was a misapprehension when reference was made to background material because illegal activity needed to have come to the attention of the authorities. He said that just because there were rules against a banned organisation, it did not mean that the person was at risk. Mr Parwar referred to the Judge’s ‘heavy’ criticism of the Appellant at paragraphs 26 and 27 of the decision. Mr Parwar said that the welcome letter with the erroneous findings by the Judge were merely sought to strengthen the other findings.
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
17. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
18. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
Consideration and Analysis
19. In my judgment, in an otherwise robust and well crafted judgment, the erroneous findings at paragraph 29 of the Judge’s decision are significant. Mr Parwar and the Respondent’s Rule 24 response accepted that there was an error of law. The Respondent states that the error is not material. That is therefore the issue before mem, namely whether the accepted error by the Judge is material.
20. I have reflected on the submissions. I conclude that in an otherwise well crafted decision and despite the other understandably robust findings, the Judge’s error is material. The reason the error made by the Judge is material is because the Judge’s decision at paragraph 29 very clearly interlinks the findings in respect of the membership letter as a reason for making adverse findings. It was an important reason and an important adverse finding. It is not, as it were, an ‘add on’ which Mr Parwar sought to contend. These findings about the letter made by the Judge were an integral part of the findings. The Judge might have come to a different conclusion had this error not been made.
21. I remind myself that this is a protection and I note the background material which Mr Janjua highlighted to me at the hearing.
22. I reflect on whether I can put the erroneous findings to one side and conclude whether the rest of the decision is sufficient to mean that the Judge’s other findings can stand.
23. Having so reflected on whether the Judge’s decision as a whole is affected or whether there are parts which can remain as retained findings, I conclude that the interlinking of the findings means that it is not possible to separate the adverse findings in a safe manner. In my judgment, the Judge’s error was fundamental and undermines the whole of the Judge’s decision. That is unfortunate, because as I have stated, the Judge’s decision shows the considerable work which was undertaken to prepare it. In this case I conclude that it is not possible to salvage any of the other findings.
24. I therefore conclude that the decision has to be set aside in its entirety.
25. In terms of disposal of the hearing, I apply AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I consider whether to retain the matter for remaking here at the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I take into account the history of this case, the nature and extent of findings to be made as well as the nature of the errors in this case. I further consider it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. I conclude that the appropriate decision in this case is that we remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal.

NOTICE OF DECISION
There decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law and is set aside in its entirety. None of the findings shall stand.
The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing on all issues.

28 August 2026
Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber