Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001063
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03945/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMEATON

Between

MA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A De Ruano, counsel instructed by Shervins solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Pugh, senior presenting officer

Heard at Field House on 7 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant is a national of Iran.

2. He appeals, with the permission of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) (Judge Parkes) against the decision of the FTT (Judge Revill) dated 17 December 2025. The FTTJ dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s refusal dated 12 April 2024 of his protection and associated human rights claim made on 11 September 2022.

Background

3. The Appellant claims to be at risk on return because of his religion. He claims to be a Christian convert. The Respondent does not accept that the Appellant is a genuine Christian convert.

The appeal to the FTT

4. The Appellant appealed to the FTT against the refusal of his claim. By the time of the appeal hearing, the sole issue in dispute was whether the Appellant was a genuine Christian convert.

5. The FTTJ made a number of positive credibility findings in respect of the Appellant but ultimately concluded that she was not satisfied that the Appellant was a genuine Christian convert and dismissed the claim.

The appeal to UT

6. The Appellant sought permission to appeal to the UT. The grounds (which were not drafted by Mr De Ruano) are not clearly pleaded but were clarified at the outset of this hearing as follows:

(1) The FTTJ failed to make findings on material matters, namely the Appellant’s account of how he came to convert to Christianity and to flee Iran. The Appellant maintains that this was a material part of his claim and the assessment of credibility
(2) The FTTJ placed manifestly undue weight on immaterial matters, namely the failure by his friends to attend the hearing and the failure by his wife to provide an identity document.

7. Permission was granted on both grounds by FTTJ Parkes.

8. The Respondent filed a rule 24 response, in which she submitted that the FTTJ had considered the Appellant’s claimed circumstances in Iran. She noted that the question of what weight to attach to evidence is a matter for the FTTJ and maintained that no error of law had been made.

The error of law hearing

9. I was provided with a consolidated bundle of 155 pages.

Ground 1

10. Mr De Ruano relied primarily on the grounds of appeal, which were drafted in a manner more akin to a skeleton argument. He maintained that the first 14 paragraphs of the Appellant’s witness statement, in which the Appellant addresses how he came to convert to Christianity and how he came to flee Iran, were key to assessing the Appellant’s credibility but were not addressed at all in the FTTJ’s determination.

11. Mr Pugh maintained that the FTTJ had, at least to some extent, engaged with the claimed events in. He maintained that it was appropriate for the FTTJ to focus her attention on the evidence relating to the Appellant’s claimed religious activity in the UK. The FTTJ had engaged with the concerns raised by the Respondent in the refusal decision and that, he said, was sufficient. He submitted that, because the appeal turned on the question of whether the Appellant is a genuine Christian convert, and not whether he has suffered persecution in the past, there was no need to look at events in Iran in any detail.

12. I do not find that the FTTJ materially erred in law. A careful reading of the determination demonstrates that she did address the Appellant’s account given in interview (which mirrors that given in his statement) about why he turned away from Islam and why he turned to Christianity. The FTTJ concluded that the Appellant had given a reasonable potential explanation of his motivations for conversation. She was potentially willing to accept as credible the Appellant’s account of how he came to convert to Christianity. Ultimately, however, she did not find him to be a credible witness. She gave detailed reasons for that decision which were open to her on the evidence. There is no error in her approach.

13. Accordingly, I find that there was no material error of law in respect of ground 1.

Ground 2

14. This ground of appeal was framed as a challenge to the weight given to the FTTJ on what the Appellant says are immaterial matters. In truth, it is a perversity challenge. The Appellant argues that the FTTJ’s reasons for taking into account what he says are immaterial matters, were perverse.

15. Perversity amounting to an error of law is established where the decision is one to which no reasonable decision maker, properly instructing himself on the law, could have come on the evidence before him.

16. Mr Pugh argued that there was no error. He submitted that the weight to be attached to evidence is a matter for the judge and that the FTTJ was entitled, on the evidence, to reach the conclusions that she did.

17. At the hearing before me, this ground was pursued on the basis of three sets of evidence: letters of support, an email from the Appellant’s wife and screenshots of the Appellant’s Facebook account.

18. Firstly, Mr De Ruano argues that the FTTJ was wrong to reject the evidence of fellow congregants and friends, who had written letters of support, on the basis that they had not attended court. The Appellant provided letters of support from Mr Azer, a ‘cross-culture leader’ at his church, Mr Moayeri, a leader of the Iranian group at his church, and three friends, who claim to have been introduced to the church by the Appellant. As to why those individuals did not attend, the Appellant’s evidence was that:

(a) he had told Mr Azer about the hearing. He did not say whether he had asked Mr Azer to attend.
(b) he had not asked Mr Moayeri to attend because he works in a hospital and he did not want to take him away from his important work.
(c) his friends had attended when the hearing was last listed and had taken time off work to do so but he could not ask them to attend again in case the hearing was adjourned on a second occasion.

19. The FTTJ attached only limited weight to the evidence of Mr Azer and Mr Moayeri, given their non-attendance at the hearing (and given Mr Azer’s failure to express an opinion as to the genuineness of the Appellant’s faith). That was an entirely lawful approach. It reflects the guidance given in Darodian v SSHD [2001] UKIAT 01/TH/01537 (unreported) (referenced in FTTJ Parke’s grant of permission but not referred to by either party before me) that, unless the Respondent has accepted the Appellant as a committed church member in writing in advance of the hearing, the ‘minister’ should invariably be called to give oral evidence.

20. The FTTJ placed no weight on the letters of support from the Appellant’s friends and went further to find that the explanation given for their non-attendance was incredible and significantly damaged the Appellant’s credibility. Although it would have been open to a different judge to accept that explanation for their non-attendance, I do not accept that that was a perverse finding. It was a conclusion that was open to the FTTJ on the evidence.

21. Secondly, Mr De Ruano argued that the FTTJ was wrong to reject the evidence of the Appellant’s wife, in the form of an email, on the basis that it had not been accompanied by a form of identity confirming that the email was sent by her. That was not, however, the only basis for rejecting the email. The FTTJ noted ‘some difficulties’ with the email. She noted that the email referenced a visit from the authorities in 2025, which had not been mentioned by the Appellant and that the information in the email did not match with the Appellant’s evidence, that there had been visits between September and December 2023 and again in December 2024. She also noted that the email was lacking in detail. Finally, she noted that it was not accompanied by a statement of truth and that there was no way of verifying who it had been sent by given the absence, for example, of an accompanying identity document. The Appellant has been represented throughout and the FTTJ found that the failure to provide such evidence was, in the circumstances, damaging to the Appellant’s credibility.

22. Had the lack of an identity document been the only ground for rejecting the email, it may have been liable to criticism. That was not, however, how the FTTJ approached the evidence. She adopted an appropriate, holistic approach when considering what weight to attach to the evidence. Again, I accept that the findings were open to the FTTJ and were not perverse.

23. Finally, Mr De Ruano argued that the FTTJ was wrong to find that no weight could be placed on the two screenshots of the Appellant’s Facebook account and that they amounted to manufactured evidence which undermined the Appellant’s credibility. He submitted that that went ‘too far’.

24. I do not agree. The FTTJ gave clear reasons for her decision. She noted that the posts had been made very shortly before the screenshots and that no further screenshots had been posted since the refusal decision. On that basis, she reached the conclusion that they had been prepared cynically to provide evidence for the appeal. That was a finding that was open to the FTTJ on the evidence. It was not perverse.

25. Accordingly, I find that there was no error of law in respect of ground 2.

Notice of Decision

26. The decision of the FTT (Judge Revill) dated 17 December 2025 did not contain material errors of law. The appeal is dismissed.

J. Smeaton

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 May 2026