Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001066
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54374/2024
LP/01808/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

RIK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Badar, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Bangladesh who sought asylum in the UK in 2022 on the basis of risks which he stated arose out of his membership of Islam Chatra Shibir. He seeks protection on the basis that his political activism led to threats by supporters of other political parties (in particular the Awami League and its affiliated groups) and that falsified claims were lodged against him. He appeals to this Tribunal against the determination of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cohen (‘the Judge’) dated 15 December 2025. On 6 March 2026 FTTJ Curtis granted the Appellant permission to appeal on a single ground, namely that the Judge’s decision was based on an error of fact amounting to an error of law. The Respondent’s position, as set out in her Rule 24 notice dated 21 March 2026 and at the hearing before me, was that the Judge did make an error but that it fell within the ‘slip rule’ and / or was not material. For the reasons given below, I accept that the Judge did err in law but find that the error was not material. I therefore dismiss the appeal.
The factual error
2. The Appellant arrived in the UK in 2022. Despite this, at paragraph 9 of the determination the Judge writes as follows:
“The appellant stated he was an active member of the ICS party in Bangladesh. The respondent considered the appellant’s immigration history. He applied for a student visa in 2010 and arrived in the UK on the same. This was issued in his own national passport and he failed to disclose his true circumstances or intentions when applying for the same or seeking entry. It was considered that as a result of his verbal deception, the appellant committed an offence under section 24 (A)1a of the 1971 Immigration Act and breached section 26 (1) (c) of the same act. The appellant stated that he left Bangladesh with his parents to attend a wedding and had no intentions of returning to Bangladesh as his life was in danger (AIR q’s23 and 40-42). This brings into question the appellant’s credibility as it was deemed that he had ample opportunity to fully explain his true reasons and circumstances when entering the UK but declined to do so”
3. The Appellant also points to paragraph 57 of the determination, in which the Judge notes that the Appellant “has been out of Bangladesh since 2010”.
4. It is not in dispute that:
a. The Appellant did not apply for a student visa in 2010.
b. Nor did he enter the UK in 2010 (or any time before 2022).
c. He has no criminal convictions in the UK and there is no suggestion that he has ever been charged with any immigration offences.
d. There is no suggestion that the Appellant left Bangladesh with his parents, nor came to the UK to attend a wedding; and
e. His answers at AIR 23 and 40-42 do not to relate to his departure from Bangladesh or the other matters set out by the Judge in this paragraph.
5. It is accordingly uncontentious that the determination contains a number of clear factual errors. The following questions arise:
a. First, does this factual error amount to an error of law?
b. Second, can this issue be dealt with by way of the slip rule?
c. Finally, was any such error material?
Error of law?
6. An error of fact does not automatically amount to an error of law. A legal error may arise (in cases not concerning precedent or objective fact) where (i) a decision-maker reaches an unreasonable conclusion as to a material factual matter before them or (ii) there is a mistake in fact giving rise to unfairness, as identified in E v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 49. In E at §66 Lord Phillips identified what has since been described as a “useful checklist” (Kanhirakandan v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1298, §58) for identifying such errors. The questions are: (i) was there a mistake as to an existing fact, (ii) was the fact uncontentious and objectively verifiable, (iii) was the mistake caused by someone other than the Appellant and his advisors, and (iv) did the mistake play a material (but not necessarily decisive) part in the Tribunal’s reasoning?
7. Subject to the question of materiality, which I deal with below, I accept that the Judge’s inclusion within his determination matters which simply do not relate to the Appellant was an error of law. The Judge’s understanding of the facts as expressed in paragraphs 9 and 57 was either unreasonable (by way of a failure to give anxious scrutiny to the matters before him and / or reaching perverse conclusions on the evidence) or within the terms identified in E, in that the Judge erred in relation to uncontentious existing facts for reasons other than fault on the part of the Appellant or his representatives.
Slip rule
8. The Respondent submits that these errors were an “unfortunate ‘slip of the pen’”. It appears from the Rule 24 that the Respondent invites the Tribunal to set aside the impugned parts of the decision.
9. I do not agree that this is an appropriate use of the slip rules. Firstly, this is not the correct mechanism by which slips and accidental errors in determinations should be rectified. It is clear from MH (review; slip rule; church witnesses) Iran [2020] UKUT 125 (IAC) (on which the Respondent relies) at §80 that, where a party considers that a slip has occurred, the correct approach is to write to the Resident Judge of the hearing centre in question, asking for the error to be corrected under r. 31 of the FTT’s Procedure Rules. It is not appropriate to invite the Upper Tribunal, after permission to appeal has been granted, to use the slip rule to correct a decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
10. Had it been procedurally appropriate for me to apply the slip rule, I would nevertheless have declined to do so. This is because the intention of the slip rule is to “give effect to the plain intention of the Court” (MR, §76). It is not clear to me that this is a simple slip of the pen; it is a lengthy and reasoned (if incorrect) paragraph, which is repeated later in the judgment. It would be taking the slip rule too far to allow substantial amendments such as this.
Materiality
11. The central issue in this appeal is whether the error which I have identified is material. This question requires considerable care given the heavy burden of anxious scrutiny which lies upon all judges considering cases such as this present. I have at the forefront of my mind the fact that, at paragraph 9, the Judge expressly states that the erroneous matters “bring into question the appellant’s credibility”, which played a significant role in the Tribunal’s later reasoning.
12. The test for materiality is set out in the Court of Appeal’s judgment in ASO (Iraq) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1282 at §57, in which the Court explained that: “The question is whether, on the evidence which was before the F-tT, any rational tribunal would be bound to reject A’s claim”. This is a high and exacting threshold.
13. Had the Judge’s determination turned solely on credibility, I would have found that these errors were material. Credibility has to be considered holistically, looking at the case in the round and taking all factors into account before reaching a determination. Having erroneously stated that the Appellant’s credibility was damaged by erroneous factual assumptions, it could not be said that any rational judge would be bound to reach the same conclusion, even though the Judge otherwise engaged in a lengthy, detailed, and robust analysis of the Appellant’s credibility.
14. However, the Judge did not base his decision solely on credibility. He expressly considered the Appellant’s claim at its highest and made the following findings:
a. “I firstly note that there has been a sea change in the political landscape in Bangladesh. The former prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, fled the country and the Awami League were removed from power. There is an interim government comprising a coalition of political parties but not including the Awami League. I find that even taking the appellant’s asylum claim at its high point, that based on the significantly changed country situation including the fact that the Awami League no longer hold any power in Bangladesh, I do not find that former ICSS members or supporters currently face a well-founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh due to their political allegiances or activities.”(§46)
b. “I note from the objective evidence, that following a review undertaken by interim government in Bangladesh, that over 17,000 cases involving false claims had been identified of which 11,448 had already been recommended for cessation. In these circumstances, I find that the appellant would not face a well-founded fear of persecution upon return to Bangladesh in any event.” (§47);
c. “In the alternative, taking the appellant’s case at its highest, the appellant fears prosecution and not persecution in Bangladesh. The appellant is accused of undertaking activities in Bangladesh at the time that he can prove he was present in the UK and did not undertake the same. The objective evidence indicates that Bangladesh has a fully working system of courts and judiciary. I do not find that the appellant faces a risk of persecution as a result of fabricated allegations having been lodged against him in Bangladesh. Having regard to the CPIN quoted above, I find that Bangladesh has a fully working police force and court system and that they would be willing and able to offer sufficient protection to the appellant if required upon return.” (§56)
15. The Appellant was refused permission to appeal those findings and that part of the application for permission was not renewed. Mr Badar did not suggest that these parts of the judgment were undermined by the error of law or that another judge could have reached a different conclusion on the material before the First-tier Tribunal. I note the expert report of Mr Tushar but I consider that his conclusions cannot lead to a different conclusion than that which the Judge reached on the material before him. I am strengthened in this conclusion by the Court of Appeal’s decision in MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812, in which the Court of Appeal accepted (in the context of a Bangladesh National Party supporter who feared the Awami League that “the truth is that the change of government has wholly changed the picture in such a way that there is no reason whatever to suppose that the respondent will be at risk of serious harm if returned” (§17). While I accept that each case must be determined on its own facts, it is clear that the “sea change” in the political landscape of Bangladesh which the Judge described has fundamentally changed the risks which the Appellant raises. In those circumstances, I conclude that any reasonable judge would have reached the decision the First-tier Tribunal did in this case and would have dismissed the appeal.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 May 2026